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If socialists are to develop a form of truly democratic 
policing which is appropriate for a transformed 
society, then they must develop, work and experiment 
with and extend democratic forms within the framework 
of capitalism. To do anything else, to assume that it 
will all come right in the end, that the wand will be 
waved and the state and its agents 'abracadabraed· into 
being good is ridiculous utopianism (Cain, 1976:165) 
When Maureen Cain wrote the above she did so within the 
context of a review of developments in policing for the 
year 1976. That review documented the de-democratization 
trends that had continued apace during the year in terms 
of the increased autonomy of Chief Constables, the 
increased control of the Home Office and the amalgamation 
of forces, all which had taken place under the guise of 
professionalization. The result of such developments was 
that any claims that the British police were 
democratically accountable were rapidly fading. Cain's 
demands that socialists should give the issue of the 
democratization of the police, and democracy generally, 
serious consideration took on a sense of urgency after the 
election of a radical Conservative government in 1979 on a 
strong law and order manifesto. 
a. The Policing Issues 
Within two years of this election serious disturbances in 
the inner cities forced the issue of the constitutional 
position of the police in British society onto the formal 
political agenda. For the first time in the post-war 
period there was a debate on policing which fully 
reflected the antagonisms and contradictions that had 
built up over the decades (see New Community, No 9:3, 
1981/82; Race and Class, No 2/3, 1981/82; Cowell, et al., 
1982; Benyon et al., 1984) • There was a break in the two 
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party consensus on policing matters with the Conservative 
government giving full support to the police whilst 
sections of the Labour Party pressed for reforms. The 
Police Authorities of the metropolitan county councils 
attempted to assert their role in relation to the policing 
of their areas whilst Chief Constables vociferously 
defended their autonomy from what they saw as political 
interference (see Simey, 1982; 1988; Loveday, 1985; 
Spencer, 1985; McCabe, 1988). 
There was even a public split in the ranks of senior 
police officers with one Chief Constable, John Alderson, 
seemingly betraying his colleagues by his highly 
publicized statements on the need for community policing 
(see Alderson, 1982; 1984). The basis of the debate was 
the nature of the relationship between the police and the 
community and more specifically the means whereby the 
police are accountable to the community for their actions. 
The proposals and demands for change shared a common aim 
to secure greater powers for the community, or its 
elected representatives, to influence or direct the 
process of selection through which a policy of law 
enforcement is constructed. Hence, such proposals are 
all attempts to secure a form of ·democratic 
accountability' (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1982:96). 
The Conservative government responded quickly to the riots 
and the demands being made through the utilization of the 
Scarman recommendations and the setting up of a statutory 
model of community representation and participation based 
upon the notion of local consultation. Critics were 
scathing in their response to these proposals arguing that 
such .. a . model .. was no substitute for real democratic 
accountability'Csee Bridges, 1982; Bunyan, 1982; Gordon, 
1983; 1987). In response to Scarman certain Labour 
controlled councils attempted to implement an alternative 
model. 
3 
b. The Theoretical Issues 
This thesis locates itself within two inter-related 
theoretical debates that emerged within the British Left 
in the 1980s after the election (and subsequent re-
elections) of a radical Conservative administration 
dedicated to the eradication of socialism. First, it is 
located within the wide ranging debate about how to make 
sense of how such an extreme Conservativism had achieved 
power and how the Left could construct a set of policies 
to preclude such a right wing shi~t in the future. This 
debate resulted in a rift between those who attempted to 
hold on to the old truths of Marxist th~orizing and those 
of the New Left who saw such an analysis as being 
incapable of challenging Thatcherism (see Hodgson, 1981. 
Miliband, 1983. 1987. Fine et al., 1985; Hall, 1988, 
Panitch, 1985; Jessop 1988 et al., 1988). For the New Left 
what was necessary, if Thatcherism was to be defeated, was 
the urgent reformulation of Left theorizing c6ncerning 
advanced capitalism, social formations, the state and 
civil society. Central to this renewal project was an 
analysis of democracy and the devising of policies geared 
towards the democratization of society through popular 
democratic participation. The New Left took hope ~rom the 
brief emergence of radical municipal socialist 
administrations in London and certain large provinCial 
cities which attempted to implement such ideas. 
The second, inter-related, theoretical set of debates this 
thesis is located within relate to those of Left wing 
criminology. The centrality of law and order within 
Thatcherism·spolitical project gave an urgency to debates 
about the basis for a socialist criminological project. In 
the 19805 tw~ competing paradigms, new Le~t realism (see, 
Taylor, 1980, Lea and Young, 1984. Kinsey, Lea and Young, 
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1986; Matthews and Young et al., 1986) and critical 
criminology 
within left 
(see, Scraton et al., 
criminology differing 
1987) materialized 
in their analysis of 
crime, criminalization, law and order and the state. 
Central to both paradigms was the issue of the police. The 
disturbances of the early 1980s generated an intense and 
at times vitriolic debate concerning racist policing, 
over-policing/under-policing in the inner cities, 
ineffective policing, political policing, the prospects 
ior police accountability and how it should be achieved. 
The fundamental issue that emerged from the debates and 
proposals about policing was what socialist democratic 
policing look like. Both paradigms utilized notions of 
community, participation and representation to give 
meaning to their demands for democratic police 
accountability. The new Left realists viewed the issue of 
crime as one with which to electorally challenge the 
Conservative government. This again led to engagement with 
those critical criminologists who were highly critical of 
the Labour Party·s record on the issue and who were 
arguing for extra-parliamentary community based 
strategies. Thus, the debates within Left criminology to a 
degree mirrored the above mentioned debates that were 
taking place within the wider socialist movement. It is 
these overlapping debates about socialist democratic 
theory and practice that provide the theoretical basis for 
this thesis in its analysis of attempts in Manchester to 
. 
realize the democratic accountability of the police. 
c. The Empirical Issues 
This thesis is empirically concerned with what happened in 
-Manchester'··between' 1981 and 1988,where·'a '·"situation 
similar to what Cain demanded took place. The Greater 
Manchester Police Authority was radicalized after the 
local elections of 1981 had returned a Labour 
s 
administration with the stated intention of furthering the 
accountability of the police to the local community. Such 
intentions were strengthened by 
in Moss Side during July 1981. 
the serious disturbances 
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In 1984 Manchester City 
Council came under the control of the Left of the Labour 
Party with the declared aim of implementing poliCies to 
~urther police accountability to the local community 
whilst rejecting the proposals implemented by the Police 
Authority. Thus, there were two Labour councils which were 
both committed to furthering the accountability of the 
Greater Manchester police force through greater community 
representation and participation. 
In order to attempt to achieve this they set up 
alternative structures. The Greater Manchester Police 
Authority utilized the 1964 Police Act and the Scarman 
consultation model whilst the Manchester City Council 
utilized a police monitoring model. At the basis of the 
two models were alternative conceptions of community 
participation and representation. This thesis specifically 
addresses the nature of the structures that the two Labour 
administrations set up in order to achieve their aims and 
analyzes them in terms of the difficulties and dilemmas in 
attempting to bring about community representation and 
participation. 
d. Thesis Outline 
.Part I of this thesis identifies the theoretical and 
structural issues which must be addressed by those the 
democratization of the police. The key concepts that have 
been evoked in the debate within the Left about police 
accountability in England, namely community, . 
representation and participation are addressed first. I 
attempt to demonstrate that whilst the concepts are easily 
and unquestioningly evoked in political discourse there 
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are key problematical issues relating to each concept that 
have to be acknowledged and con~ronted. These theoretical 
difficulties, I would argue, have to be faced by any 
socialist project having as its aim the democratization of 
social formations, institutions and arrangements. The 
conceptual issues identified provide an ideal type 
checklist of what proposals would ideally need to include 
to bring about perfect 
participation. 
community representation and 
In addition to the theoretical problems chapter two 
analyzes how previous demands for representation and 
partiCipation have been structurally settled by the 
British state. Three overarching processes are identified 
as being characteristic of the state forms that have 
emerged in Britain. First, through continuous struggle and 
negotiation formal rights o~ representation and 
participation were attained by the mass of the population 
throughout the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth 
centuries. However, such rights took a particular form, a 
form that emphasized controllable Parliamentary 
representation as opposed to potentially uncontrollable 
participation. In addition only certain interests achieved 
representation within the expanding edifice of 
citizenship. Second, a process of de-democratization and 
non-democratization can also be identified. As rights of 
representation were conceded key domains of governance 
were removed from the potential influence of the 
enfranchised masses. Other non-democratic institutions and 
arrangements were also defended vociferously against the 
demands for democratization. Hence, demands relating to 
democratization have not necessarily led to a democratic' 
state form. Third, if the interests of the state were 
sufficiently threatened coercion was used to suppress the 
demands of the masses. This routinized coercion was 
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carried out primarily by the new police forces that were 
formed during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Therefore, those demanding the democratization of the 
police through community representation and participation 
are faced with particular problems arising out of the role 
of the police. The new forces set up in the early 
nineteenth century were part of the overall compromise 
reached between the bourgeoisie and the state and were 
therefore part of the restructured system of local 
governance. However, as the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries progressed the institution of the police moved 
from representing the interests of local elites to 
representing the interests of the state in the maintenance 
of social order. It is within this context that it is 
possible to identify a process whereby the institution of 
the police has been removed ~rom the sphere of local 
democratic influence. 
I attempt to specifically chronicle the nature of 
community representation and partiCipation that has 
evolved in the development of the British police to 
illustrate the nature of the above mentioned problems. 
This centers on what community was represented and 
participated in making decisions about policing matters. 
This necessarily 
of the police 
participation in 
means analyzing the structural position 
and how community representation and 
the body politic is reflected or 
otherwise in the governance of the police. This analysis 
of how the British state has responded to demands for 
representation and participation provide an indication of 
"how"the--demands in the 19805, -'and'~1990si-concerning 
policing would be dealt with. 
The next section documents the precise social, political 
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and economic context within which such demands were made 
and responded to. This dissertation covers one of the most 
turbulent periods of civil unrest in England in the 
twentieth century. At the basis of that unrest, as 
indicated previously, was the final shift, from 1979, from 
a crisis ridden social democratic state form to what 
Stuart Hall has defined as a fully fledged authoritarian-
populist form. The emergence and consolidation of that 
state form has had considerable consequences in relation 
to the overarching process identified above. First, there 
has been the dramatic restructuring of the edifice of 
citizenship and redefinition of interests that would be 
represented. Second, there has been an extensive de-
democratization process implemented to facilitate the 
strong authoritarian state form. Third, as indicated 
hither to, the strengthening and utilization of the 
coercive agencies of the state to deal with the 
consequences of the restructuring of British society has 
occurred. This has resulted in the police taking on a key 
role within the restructuring project - that of containing 
the consequences. Politically the government has offered 
unswerving support for the police. It was within this 
specific context that demands for the democratic 
accountability of the police emerged and were dealt with. 
The above mentioned debates, processes and context 
constitute the macro-contours shaping this thesis. 
Part 11 of the thesis addresses the struggle over police 
accountability that took place in Manchester between 1981-
85. During the 1980s both the Greater Manchester Police 
Authority and the Manchester Police Monitoring Committee 
were at -the -forefront of the debates aboutpollce 
accountability in Britain. The Chief Constable and police 
force that they were demanding accountability from, the 
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) , were at the centre of 
9 
both local and national scandals and controversies 
relating to the handling o~ the 1981 disturbances in Moss 
Side, their role in the 1984-85 coal dispute and the 
Stalker Af~air. Additionally and intertwined was the 
outspokenness of the Chief Constable, James Anderton, on 
social, political and moral issues. This meant that the 
community became the site of struggle in the battle for 
police accountability in Manchester. 
After describing the overall context within which demands 
for accountability emerged in Manchester the next sections 
document and analyze the nature of that struggle to 
implement community representation and participation. 
Throughout I attempt to document how the two models, 
community liaison and community monitoring, ~irst, had to 
confront the conceptual and structural issues identified 
in Part I and second, how they attempted to resolve the 
difficulties arising from such issues. 
Part III of the thesis documents the macro changes that 
took place in the mid 1980s that were of direct relevance 
to the success or otherwise of the two models in 
Manchester. First, as part of the final struggle between 
local democracy and the central state, the Police 
Authorities were abolished. Second, there was the rise of 
a powerful discourse concerning the issue of crime 
prevention which had a considerable impact upon policing 
and the government·s law and order policies. Third, there 
was the impact of this discourse upon the Labour Party and 
the ramifications for those " sections of the Party 
campaigning for police accountability. Such changes had a 
considerabl~ impact upon the two" models of police 
accountability. Hence, part IV of the thesis concentrates 
upon those changes and analyzes the implications for 
community representation and participation. This part of 
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the thesis documents first, the move, within the model 
one, from community liaison to community relations and 
second, the dramatic shift, within model two, from 
community monitoring to community safety. Part V of the 
thesis chronicles the role that the local newspaper, as 
the disseminator of information and protector of community 
interests, played in making sense of the struggles for 
police accountability in Manchester. In particular the 
role it played in defining what community interests should 
be represented in policing matters is analyzed. The final 
part of the thesis attempts to extract the lessons that 
can be learned from this study of the attempt to create 
structures of community representatlon and participation 
on policing matters in Manchester. 
'II 
PART I: THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Section I: Theoretical Considerations: Community. 
Representation and Participation 
Philosophers have discussed the notion o~ ~amilies of 
'potentially ambiguous concepts' and 'essentially 
contestable' concepts which need care~ul theoretical 
clarification before they can be fully analyzed in 
practice (Held, 1984a:47; Berki, 1989:12). There could be 
no more problematical a family of theoretically ambiguous 
and contestable concepts than community, representation 
and participation. Therefore, it is necessary to highlight 
the theoretical difficulties of employing such concepts as 
the basiS for demands for the furtherance of the 
democratic accountability of the police. 
a. Community 
Many difficulties have been identified with utilizing this 
concept as the basis for demands. The.first relates to 
providing a specific definition of community. If one 
scrutinizes the literature on community, it is possible to 
identify four main categories of usage: locality, social 
structure, sentiment and social activity respectively (see 
Warren, 1957; Nisbet, 1970; Plant, 1974; Thorns, 1976; 
Midgley 19861 Wilmott, 1988). However, these categories 
are not capable of neat delineation and have plagued the 
social theorists who have attempted to define the concept 
more precisely. Hillering (1955), ~or example, has 
identified 94 different definitions. Stacey (1969) argues 
", ."" :'·that;:: community.- should be treated 'as" 'a·' non-concept 
precisely because it is incapable of exact definition. 
Jeremy Bentham seems to have been one of the first to deny 
the existence of the concept 'arguing that it was a 
'~ictitious body' (see Arblaster 1987165). Pahl (1970) 
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maintains because of its vagueness that it has served more 
to confuse than to illuminate whilst Pinker (1981), in a 
similar vein, refers to the 'fig leaf' of community, a 
device to conceal all kinds of contradictions and 
confusions. It is such a problem providing an exact 
definition of the word that these theorists have argued 
that it is worse than useless. 
Second, it is important to note that concern about 
community constantly expresses itself in relation to urban 
social processes. A fundamental sociological debate has 
developed over whether it is possible to discuss the 
concept of community, whatever its definition, in the 
context of urban industrial societies. Is community 
compatible with the city? The 'whither community?' and 
'loss of community' debates have continued to dominate 
urban sociology at both a theoretical and empirical level. 
A third problem, as Williams (1976:66) has pOinted out, is 
that although difficult to define theoretically and 
examine empirically community (unlike other terms of 
social organization) is never used in a negative manner. 
Titmus has also pointed to the implications of such a 
positive concept 
All kinds of wild and unlovely weeds are changed by 
statutory magic and comforting appellation into the 
most attractive flowers that bloom not just in Spring 
but all year round (19681104) 
In the course of researching this thesis, a fourth process 
has been· tentatively identified. where concerns about 
community and recourse to the utilization of the concept 
of community emerge during periods of social crisis. 
Another~related difficulty in.uti1izing .the concept as the 
basis for demands emanating 
control and accountability 
from the Left for community 
is the possibility that the 
community is not progressive in nature. As Plant has 
documented, community has a long tradition of 
respectability within 
compatibility gives it 
wing notion 
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right-wing thought and such 
a dangerous pedigree. The right-
sees the main emphasis of the descriptive meaning of 
community to be in terms of locality and cultural and 
kinship ties, and will be unable to make sense of a 
multi- racial form of community when 'multi-racial' 
implies that not all values are shared and not all ends 
are recognised, and this is why, with perfect if manic 
consistency, the new conservatives formulated the 
Volkgemeinschaft idea (1974:46). 
This should provide a warning to all those on the Left who 
naively promote the construction of alternative community 
control mechanisms. If attention is not paid to issues of 
representation and participation, the community in control 
could be extremely reactionary in nature, clearly defining 
who is and who is not of the community and which interests 
will be included and which excluded (see, Cousins 197~1 
Jackson 1968; Stacey 1960; Hoggart 19571 Willis 1977' 
Corrigan 1979a). 
However, despite the lack of agreement about the 
definition of community and whether its existence can be 
verified or not, community remains a powerful ideological 
organizing principle. As a result all political positions 
have attempted to claim it as their own. It is precisely 
because of its ideological power and attendant 
difficulties that it is such a problematical concept upon 
which to premise socialist demands. Given that policing 
debates and initiatives concerning accountability, 
representation and participation are based upon the 
concept, it is necessary to recognize the problematical 
status of the concept 
,. '".' A ' br. i ef . note of caut i on " is needed, here·" on the word 
~~ommunity' since it conjures up all too many 
illusions. In everyday usage it means a group of people 
sharing common interests and living in the same area-
even if it does not clearly denote a set of .xisting 
social realities, the word nevertheless conveys vague 
notions of harmonious social relations amongst 'the 
people'. It is therefore necessary to be entirely clear 
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on the class positions in all their subtlety and 
ramifications, that in fact occur in the neighbourhood 
or locality. To speak of a community when working 
politically on issues such as housing, health, play or 
welfare can cause great confusion, since, however one 
looks at it, no community exists. on the contrary one 
is confronted with a cluster of class pOSitions, 
conflicts and interests, some of which are 
irreconcilable (Cowley et al., 1979:5). 
If this critique is extended to include race, gender and 
age divisions then the 
even more problematical 
concept of 
in terms 
the community becomes 
of realizing policies 
premised upon it. Is it possible to have a conception of 
community that allows for pluralism, heterogeneity and 
diversity? 
b. Representation 
Representation as a concept is virtually synonymous with 
liberal democratic theory and practice 
There are, in very general terms, two broad types of 
democracy. direct or participatory Ca system of 
decision-making about public affairs in which citizens 
are directly involved) and liberal or representative 
democracy (a system of political rule embracing elected 
'officers' who undertake to 'represent' the interests 
and/or views of citizens) (Held and Pollitt, 198617). 
The latter has come to characterize the institutions of 
governance of Western forms of democracy. However, in 
complex social formations there are considerable 
difficulties in an individual, institution, political 
party, government or state claiming to represent the 
wishes of the community. Theoreticians of all political 
positions have had to tak~ into account what has been 
defined as the 'crisis of political representation' which 
has led to the . virtual paralysiS of many Western (and 
.. _.~._ ..... ~ ..• effectively. all. Eastern). ..... politicaL,.~ structures and 
institutions (see Pierson, 198711). The question that must 





representatives and. the 
this cannot be assumed, 
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especially given an increasingly fragmented British social 
structure, where sections of 
are not, and possibly cannot 
society have interests that 
be, directly represented by 
representative institutions 
the point of correspondence 
the vital question about 
the existing traditional 
(Dahrendorf 1985~l09). On 
Foucault (1981) has raised 
whether discourses and practices can ever be assumed to 
correspond and coincide. 'Building upon this point and 
utilizing the insights of post-modernist theorizing, Hall 
(1988) has argued that marxism in the 1990s must confront 
the problematical issue of the very production of 
representational sUbjects. As a consequence, key problems 
with representative democracy relate to the 
misrepresentation and non/under/over representation of 
particular interests and issues. 
It is within this context that the fundamental issue of 
the accountability of the 
institution takes on paramount 
representative individual or 
importance. Accountability 
because representation assumes central importance 
necessitates accountability 
Political accountability begins when individuals are 
given responsibility for carrying out tasks on behalf 
of their fellow citizens. The division of civic labour, 
the delegation of particular roles to individual 
citizens, creates the demand for political as distinct 
from personal accountability (Day and Klein, 1987~b). 
In a situation of partial participation, where the 
community must depend upon representatives, there must'be 
mechanisms for ensuring 'their continuing obligation to 
explain and justify their· conduct in public· (Day and 
Klein, 198717). This is particularly important if their 
representative status is open to question. Crucially as 
far' as this thesis is concerned, wh~~e there is a crisis 
of political representation, there must also be a crisis 
of accountability. It is precisely this crisis in 
accountability that can be identified in a· variety of 
social formations in the late twentieth century. 
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c. Particication 
Participation is a key concept within Western political 
theory and, like representation, is universally seen to be 
an essential component of democracy on two grounds. This 
is first, because it facilitates the rights of citizens to 
be involved in the decision making processes which affect 
their lives, thereby facilitating direct accountability 
That is what democracy was originally understood to 
mean: the people governing themselves, without 
mediation through chosen representatives, directly or, 
if necessary, by the rotation of governing offices 
among the citizens (Arblaster, 1987=62). 
And second because the developmental and educative effects 
of participation can enable people to discover more about 
their real needs and interests. 
As with the other 
been identified 




series of key issues has 
to participation. First, 
the relationship between 
participation and representative democracy. During the 
last twenty years disillusionment with the structures of 
representation, because of the issues cited previously, 
has led to renewed demands for direct participation (see 
Pateman, 1970; Richardson, 1983; Barber, 1984). Rustin 
(1984 1 14), for example, has argued for 'face to face 
deliberative decision, after due discussion' as being 'the 
proper socialist definition of democracy-. Following Mill 
(19761217) the supporters of .a fully partiCipatory 
democracy argue that it is the only fully democratic form 
representation destroys participation and 
citizenship ••• representative democracy is as 
paradoxical an oxymoron as our language has produced' 
its confused and failing practice make this ever more 
obvious (Barber, 1984). 
PartiCipatory theorists argue 
direct partiCipation that the 
and non-accountability can 
that it is only through 
problems of accountability 
be effectively resolved. 
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Arblaster (1987:63) has argued that despite claims to the 
contrary, in the twentieth century concerted eTTorts have 
been made to restructure democracy so that ·popular 
participation is treated with suspicion, iT not regarded 
as positively undesirable'. It is within this context that 
representative democracy, mentioned above, has become 
dominant. 
Second, there is the issue of active versus passive Torms 
oT participation as Tor many theorists participation 
necessitates activity 
Active members should gain inTluence by their tactiveJ 
ability to persuade others, not merely by their 
[passiveJ tenacity in turning up at meetings oT all 
kinds (Rustin, 1984114). 
Third, there is the inter-related issue oT mobilized 
versus voluntary participation. Should activity sponsored 
by the government or its institutions and agencies be 
deTined as active participation or should its definition 
be conTined to behaviour initiated by citizens in pursuit 
oT their own interests? The Tourth problem relates to the 
structural dimension oT power. Pateman (1970) has 
distinguished between two Torms of participation l Tull, 
where individuals have equal power and partial where one 
party/group retains final power. As Richardson (1983125) 
has argued eTfective power, "the combination of resources 
which groups mobilize in their cause (is) the critical 
variable determining who gets what in the end". Therefore, 
the notion of equality of opportunity and ability to 
participate and equality of power to affect the outcome of 
that participation must be given serious consideration, 
because if people do not have any power to affect the 
." outcome of' " decision making .... or· have their interests 
represented, then why would they voluntarily and actively 
participate in a given structure? The fullest possible 
form of participation therefore necessitates structures 








mediating between competing 
and Grimshaw, 19841154-59). 
Following on from the need to address power imbalances is 
the need to recognize 
structures can enable 
the possibility that participatory 
the powerful to manipulate and 
channel the needs, interests and demands of the powerless 
(Nelson 1975: 395-6). 
There must also be a means of influencing decision making, 
and there must be competence and the capability of 
articulating views. Furthermore, those participating must 
be in full and equal possession of the relevant 
information upon which to base a decision. This also links 
directly back to the educative effects of participation 
Groupings vary in cohesiveness, territorial 
dispersement, skills and experience, reSOurces 
(especially money), size, the intensity of feelings of 
support they engender, and even in their sheer ability 
to use techniques for their own advantage ••• Compounding 
inequalities in the opportunity or ability to 
partiCipate in the early part of the policy making 
process is the unequal distribution of information 
(Spitz, 1984:138). 
Arblaster argues that access to information is central to 
any participatory project 
it also requires a distribution of the resources for 
propaganda and persuasion which ensures that the power 
to influence our minds is distributed roughly in accord 
with the degree of diversity of opinion within society 
(Arblaster, 1987196). 
Foucault (1979127) has demonstrated theoretically the 
crucial connection between knowledge and power and in 
these deliberations the work of Habermas (19701 19761 
1974) on 'rational' and 'undistorted' communication is of 
direct significance. Habermas recognizes that in any given 
situation' there are inequalities between parties and 
substantive restraints affecting the capability to 
participate effectively. The decisive question he asks is 
How would the members of a 
stage in the development 
social system, at a given 
of productive forces, have 
~ , " .... 1.,' I~ • 
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collectively and bindingly interpreted their needs (and 
which norms would they have accepted as justified) if 
they could and would have decided on the organization 
of social intercourse through discursive will 
formation, with adequate knowledge of the limiting 
conditions and fundamental imperatives of society 
(Habermas 1976:113). 
The critical point of participation is allowing a 
meaningful and abiding decision to be made through 
ensuring that all sections of the community are 
represented in structures that allow equal participation 
and not the domination or exclusion of particular 
interests (Habermas, 1976=1ii). Any possibility of people 
deciding what they want and need can only be reached 
through participation and rational procedures of 
argumentation. The possibility of genuine consensus on any 
given issue can only be brought about through an ·ideal 
speech situation' which Habermas saw as evolving out of 
relatively egalitarian social relations between free 
individuals. 
Since many of the points and issues arising out of the 
discussion about participation are overlapping and 
difficult to separate, it is necessary to keep in mind 
always the dangers of evoking the concept in an uncritical 
manner. Participation does not merely refer to taking part 
in an activity. The manner in which participation is 
facilitated and structured must be considered and whether 
the participatory framework allows for direct or indirect, 
full or partial, purposeful 
It must also be stressed 
or purposeless participation. 
that for the participatory 
theorists effective participation can only be achieved in 








critique is against macro non-democratic structures such 
as the state. 
Thus, the concepts of community, representation and 
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participation each have a series of problems inherent 
within them which have bedeviled Western political and 
social philosophy. When combined in the iorm oi demands 
for community representation and participation, those 
making the seemingly unproblematical demands are running 
together a series of problems which demand close attention 
as they are not necessarily resolvable. Indeed, as 
indicated, according to certain theorists, they are 
running together concepts, most notably representation and 
participation, that are not necessarily compatible. 
Nevertheless, this has not stopped the incessant demand 
for what Held and Pollitt (1986) have rei erred to as the 
quest ior ~new iorms oi democracy'. Central to the new 
forms is the call for community representation and 
participation in political, social and economic life, 
whether it be in Western liberal democracies or the 
socialist democracies. Thus, in addition to the 
considerable problems identified, the ideological power of 
these concepts cannot be underestimated. 
Discussion 
A series of key issues and problems have to be addressed 
by those on the Left making demands for community 
representation and participation in policing affairs. If 
these issues and problems are not addressed satisfactorily 
the project will be flawed and people will not participate 
or be adequately represented. 
In relation 'to community, it has to be recognized that 
there is no homogeneous community but stratification and 
differentiation systems based upon class, gender, race and 
age,making ~conflicting demands' with no 'necessary overlap 
or correspondence of interests. It has also to be 
acknowledged that groups are further differentiated in 
terms of access to power and knowledge, and to possible 
resource mobilization in a given situation, or what could 
2I 
be defined as hierarchies of power. Given the existence 
such hierarchies the key question is whether it is 
possible to ~acilitate community representation and 
participation that does justice to all the interests and 
claims. Central to this must be a means o~ redressing 
structural power imbalances and recognizing that power 
imbalances also exist between more or less powerless 
groups. The basis o~ the 
structures o~ representation 
equalize such power imbalances. 
project becomes creating 
and participation that can 
In relation to representation the 
addressed, what is the most 
question has to be 
suitable form of 
representation, direct or 
facilitate the direct 
indirect? Is it possible to 
representation of the whole 
community, and if it is not how does one chose community 
representation that does justi"ce to all sections of the 
community and will be recognized by the community as 
legitimate. If one does not address this issue, 
participation will be seriously jeopardized. 
\ ) 
\---
Finally there is the problem of whether it is possible to 
create structures that bring about the active and 
meaningful-participation of the whole community. It is 
only through active and meaningful partiCipation in micro 
structures and situations that there is any possibility of 
people becoming aware of their true interests and needs. 
In order to do this power -inequalities, dominant 
ideologies and the possibility of manipulation of the 
powerless must be neutralized. These are the necessary 
conditions for any possibility of a lasting consensus on a 
particular issue. 
It must be stressed that some of the 
inherent in the above-mentioned 
insuperable and it is not expected 
theoretical problems 
concepts may be 
that any democratic 
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project can satisfactorily resolve them. Howeve~ any such 
project needs to be aware of the problems and will have to 
attempt to overcome them. Before discussing how these 
issues were dealt with in relation to the debates about 
police accountability, it is necessary to recognize the 
structural context within which demands for community 
representation and participation were made. This 
necessarily involves a summary of how the British state 
has dealt with demands for rights of representation and 
participation generally and the implications for those 





Section 11: The State·s Response To Demands For Rights 
Qf Representation And PArticipation 
It is possible to identify three overarching processes in 
the attempt by the British state to manage demands for 
democratic representation and participation. First, the 
British state has shown itself capable of compromising and 
negotiating with such demands, gradually extending formal 
rights of representation to the mass of British society. 
In doing so the British state form has, itself, been 
subject to change in terms of its representative status. 
Second, it is possible to identify a process whereby key 
institutions have been removed or defended from the 
possible consequences of the extension of such rights of 
citizenship. The most threatening consequence of the 
extension of democratic rights concerns the possibility of 
institutions of the state being held accountable for their 
actions and decisions. The third strand relates to the 
utilization of coercive agencies and measures to contain 
and, in repeated instances, to discipline such demands if 
deemed to threaten directly the interests of the state. 
Since the third strand relates directly to the development 
of the British police it will be discussed in a separate 
section. As a consequence of the configuration of the 
three overarching processes, a very tightly structured 
form of democracy -
representation rather 
in Britain. 
one that has consistently stressed 
than participation - has developed 
a. The construction of democratic rights o~ citizenship 
The British state has' responded continually and' 
comprehensively -to demands for political representation 
and partlclpatlon(see Parker, 1983). As such the 




the vector of two sets of political forces: 'pressure 
from below· and 'reform from above-. The first refers 
to the myriad ways in which class movements together 
with social and community movements demand social 
reforms to protect or extend their interests. This may 
result from pressure group politics within the state at 
one extreme to direct action and street conflict at the 
other. 'Reform from above· refers to the various ways 
in which the state seeks to implement social reform 
which will serve the long term economic, social and 
political interests of capital, or certain sections of 
capital (Gough, 1983:157-8). 
The upsurge of demands 
came at the beginning of 
for political and social reform 
the nineteenth century as a 
consequence of political and economic conflict unleashed 
by the industrial revolution. The agitation of the middle 
classes and the working classes for political 
representation resulted in radicalization, riots, the 
development of a formal reform movement and a near 
constitutional crisis (Miliband, 1982:21-22). Through the 
passing of the 1832 Reform Act and 1835 Municipal 
Corporations Act the edifice of citizenship was extended 
to the previously unrepresented areas and interests of the 
upper middle classes. This legislation created a political 
alliance between the bourgeoisie and the Whig gentry 
through which the urban elites were able to establish 
hegemony over their own communities (Fraser, 1979114). 
The effect of this alliance ,was to de-couple bourgeois 
demands from working cl4ss demands for political 
representation and participation. As a consequence, :the 
working classes did not make any political gains. This 
response was to be characteristic of one of the ways the 
developirig British state would deal with future demands 
for democratic repres~ntation and participation.-If pushed"--
to a point where concessions had to be made, the state was 
capable of ab:orbing and de-coupling moderate demands from 
radical ones (Feuchtwanger, 198312-3). 
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Miliband (1982:23) has argued that the key notion of 
parliamentary representation as the mechanism through 
which change could be achieved was established in the 
struggles OT the working classes during this period. 
Consequently, the idea of indirect representation, as 
opposed to direct partiCipation, was reafTirmed as the 
demands for mass democracy were effectively crafted onto 
an elite system of political representation (see Ramussen, 
1984). Thus the Chartist movements of 1838-39, 1842 and 
1848 had a six point charter demanding universal suffrage, 
annual parliaments, secret ballots, equal representation, 
the payment of Members OT Parliament and the abolition of 
property qualifications for Members of Parliament. 
Although the state did not immediately give way to such 
demands they were met, in one form or another, during the 
course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As 
a consequence of the struggles and concessions, by the 
1860s 
the British working class exhibited certain 
"contradictory" characteristics. If it.was increasingly 
-respectable" it was also increasingly well organized. 
If it had abandoned its revolutionary ambitions, it had 
not wholly lost its revolutionary potential. It left no 
doubt that those potentialities might be speedily 
developed if it was too long thwarted in its desire to 
secure political equality. In short, it had attained 
precisely that level oT development at which it was 
safe to concede its enfranchisement and dangerous to 
~ithhold it (Harrison, 196~1133). 
, ',I 
The 1867 Reform Act brought about the political 
representation 
property rights 
of the aristocracy of labour, who had 
within the existing system (see Gray, 
. ~ .. ," , .' '" 
19771 Kirk, 1985). During this period the rights of trade 
union representation were also furthered 
establishm~nt of the Trades Union Council 
and the election of the first Lib-Lab 
r ". 
through the 
(TUC) in 1868 
of 
Parliament. Moreo~er,~i a ~esult 6f the enfranchisement 
26 
o-f rural workers in 1884, the 1885 Redistribution Act and 
the 1888 Local Government Act, the democratic 
representative 
consolidated. 
basis o-f the British state was 
Nevertheless, such reforms could not contain the rising 
social, political and economic conflict of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The period 
between the 1880s and the 1920s witnessed a profound 
crisis which resulted in a dramatic change in the nature 
of the British state from liberal to representative-
interventionist one. Fuelling the change were the demands 
by the mass of British society for both formal and 
substantive rights of political, industrial and social 
representation (see Langan and Schwartz, 1985). 





the organized sections 
establishing their own 
of the working 
political Party 
were made upon the state in relation to 
and participation. After the Women's 
Bill had been rejected by Parliament in 
1904, the Suffragette movement became more militan~ in 
their demands for female political representation. Also 
during this period the question of Ireland was challenging 
the whole edifice of the British Imperial state form and 
in doing so precipitated a rebellion by British army 
officers and the rejection of the democratic process by 
the Conservative Party (Hobsbawm, 19691193). As a 
consequence 
The emergence of mass democracy could not be contained 
_within the limited forms of representation of the 
" 11 beral .. state. What the democratic challenge c'arried 
was nothing more or less than a new set of claims on 
the state by the unenfranchised masses, a new 
conception of citizenship and, indeed, an expansion of 
the rights' of citizenship from the sphere of legal and 
political to economic and social rights (Hall and 
_ 4" ••• 
. ,. " . ",.'.-,. '" ,.~ "'10._ 
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Schwartz, 1985:21). 
Universal, lormal, political representation was linally 
achieved, lor all male and female adults, through the 1918 
and 1928 Representation of the People Acts. As a result of 
the historic-compromise between the forces of change and 
the state, there was the emergence of the 'universalist 
state, formally representatative of the totality of 
interests which composed the nation· (Hall and Schwartz, 
1985= 28). It was also within this context that the notion 
of un i versal 
working class 
social provision emerged 
demands. Accordingly, the 
in response to 
struggles lor 
representation and participation during this period were 
resolved in a manner which reemphaslzed representation as 
opposed to participation 
With universalism too came the triumph of the 
electoralist version of democracy: the individual 
voting subject became the linchpin with all olficial 
state discourses. In turn the act shaped the conditions 
which made possible the strategic reassertion of the 
absolute centrality of parliament and constitutional 
politics (Hall and Schwartz, 1985:28). 
As a consequence 
any hopes for a more assertive, radical and popular 
conception of democracy either representative or 
direct disappeared. Democracy was contained within 
the confines of electoral ism and a very specific 
variant of national constitutionalism. The political 
settlement represented an unequivocal victory for the 
forces of constitutionalism but a much more ambivalent 
outcome for democracy (ibid:28-29). 
The Labour Party received the mantle . of official 
representative of the forces of change and in doing so 
once more reaffirmed the legitimacy of the two party 
structure pf"political representation~-Thusi the party of 
social change had a vested interest in the maintenance of 
the eXisting structures of representation (MacPherson, 
, ".< 
1977:65-66). There are _three,~other~aspects of~the advent 
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of formal mass representative democracy that should be 
noted. First, there was the possibility of the actions of 
the state taking on a fully legitimate foundation through 
being electorally mandated. Second, any active citizen 
participation increasingly came to be limited to first, 
channeled through two national parties and second, 
mobilized once evey four years for electoralist purposes. 
Finally, interests had to gain recognition through the 
formal two party system to have any hope of reaching the 
national political agenda. However, with regard to the 
issue of representation there are two fundamental problems 
with such a two party system. The first problem is that 
national parties, particularly when there are only two of 
them, are incapable of representing all the interests the 
claim they can represent. Therefore, prioritization has to 
take place and powerful interests inevitably dominate in 
such prioritization. The second problem overlaps with the 
first in that there may well be conflict between the 
interests that the political parties are supposed to be 
representing and the state interests they are supposed to 
represent when in government. These factors have important 
implications for what interests can be represented within 
the political system. 
However, it was not until the end of the second world war 
that full economic and social representation was 
consolidated with the implementation of the social 
democratic welfare state form and the post-war consensus 
(Marshall, 19~OI47). The foundations of that consensus 
were constructed upon the welfare state, the adaptation of 
capital and labour to the notion of a mixed economy and a 
·'·political- consensus about the continued" e~t$tence of 
capitalism (Hall et al, 1978:228). 
The whole idea of the post-war consensus was premised upon 
. ",,,- ", 
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fully representative rights, constructed through notions 
of universal ism and equality of opportunity. In theory an 
historic settlement had been reached ·under which all 
citizens enjoyed certain civil, political and social 
rights' (Gamble, 1988:11). Hence, full 





democratic state form. However, the rights of democratic 
participation were severely limited to engaging in 
pressure group politics, jOining hierarchically structured 
national political parties and voting once every four 
years. Within this context of limited participation there 
were considerable limitations to the type of 
accountability that could be exercised. 
b. The evisceration of democracy 
i. The national context 
The second process that can be identified in the response 
of the British state to demands for representation and 
partiCipation results from the fact that the state form 
which has developed in Britain has been 
fundamentally suspicious of democratic principles, and 
particularly hostile to the notion of participation by 
non-experts in the planning, policy making or service 
delivery of state agencies (Jordan, 19851341). 
As a consequence there has been first, the defence of non-
democratic institutions such as the House of Lords, the 
monarchy, the mi 1i tary and the ~ judiciary," fro'~ any 
possibility of democratic accountability being exerCised, 
and second, the. removal of other sensitive institutions 
and agencies from any such process (see Bentley, 1984; 
Leys •.. 1984). It -. must also. be - borne '. in .. mind· that key • 
sectors of decision making, most significantly economic 
ones, have never been subject to democratic processes of 
accountability (see Hindess, 19831 Hirst, 1988).Th~s the 
" ., , • c ,.' 
challenge for democratic representation and participation 
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did not result in the democratization of the social 
formation. At the same time as the state negotiated and 
compromised over formal institutionalized rights of 
representation it is possible to identify a concurrent 
process whereby democracy was eviscerated. As sections of 
the working classes and other social forces gradually had 
their demands recognized within highly formalized forms of 
representation whole areas of social and economic life 
were removed from the possibility of political influence 
being exercised (Bunyan, 1977: Hillyard and Percy-Smith, 
1988). As such they were made immune to the processes of 
political accountability (Arblaster, 1987:55). 
Central to this process was the emergence of 
interventionist central state. Even the nineteenth century 
liberal nightwatchman state form had little hesitation in 
interceding to regulate and contain aspects of social, 
economic and political life that were problematical. 
Complete state centralization was never introduced because 
of vested interests and because it was not necessary. 
However, central government did expand administratively 
throughout the century with the appointment of regulatory 
commissions and an inspectorate particularly to regulate 
social matters, most notably in the case of the Poor Law 
CRoberts, 1969:92-94). That interventionism became 
pronounced as the century came to an end with the rise of 
the interventionist collectivist state. As indicated 
previously both were in response to the political rise of 
the working classes and necessitated the state intervening 
directly in all aspects of social and economic life (see 
-Syford, 198313). As Hall has pointed out ~ it is no 
coincidence that the interventionist state emerged at the 
same time as the representative one 
A state that can claim to represent everybody can. with 
legitimacy compel everyone to conform._This was one 
consequence of the enfranchisement of labour and the 
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popular classes in the wider sense that occurred in 
this period. It enabled the state to intervene more 
extensively because now it could claim to be doing so 
in the name of the general interest. Representation and 
intervention were therefore linked: the extension of 
the state's democratic base provided the necessary 
legitimation for its expanded powers of intervention 
(Hall,1984:74). 
Such interventionist tendencies were strengthened by the 
development of the strong state during world war one which 
necessitated for the first time the mass co-ordination of 
the British people. During the war two more developments 
had a direct affect upon the possibility of parliament 
exercising some form of accountability. First,- the 
apparatus of national governance was significantly 
reshaped through the creation of powerful ministries. As a 
consequence, there was a shift from parliament to cabinet 
decision making. And se6ond, t~ere was the rapid expansion 
of the apparatus of the secret state in the form of its 
surveillance agencies and secret 
Thompson, 1980; Porter, 1987). 
sub-committees (see 
Centralist state intervention continued in the 1930s in 
response to the near collapse of international capitalism. 
The National government responded by developing a new 
protectionist economic strategy which represented a 
fundamental break with liberal Victorian ideologies., 
. "'-
Industrial cartels and central .agricultural marketing 
'\ . 
schemes were created and regional planning policies w~~e 
implemented. In addition there was crucial state 
intervention through the utilization of emergency powers, 
• l."' 
' .. , .. ,. ,., .. , •. ,to, control. the industrial conflict which, culminated in the 
1926 General Strike. Towards the end of the 1930s there 
was further intervention to control urbanization, relocate 
industry and construct new towns, as.well as in the area' 
, .. :",":. 
of social security. As a consequence, Britain changed from 
being one of the' least controlled economies to one of the 
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most <Hobsbawm 1969:242). 
Between 1936-45 two events consolidated the direction and 
control that was to be characteristic of the post-war 
period. First, there was the rise of Keynesianism which 
was premised upon the notion of the co-ordinating and 
regulatory central state form. And second the management 
of a total war resulted in all aspects of social and 
economic life being controlled in an unprecedented manner 
(see Harris, 1984). There was the implementation of 
comprehensive authoritarian state control in the areas of 
security measures, conscription, labour schemes, 
evacuation measures, the rationing system and the further 
extension of social welfare statism. As a consequence, by 
the end of the war, • British society was subjugated to 
tighter and more efficient government than that of any 
other combatant nation except Russia' CRoebuck, 19821149). 
This increase in the extent of the state's activities 
resulted in dramatic changes to the institutions of 
governance. The unaccountable power of ministerial 
officials was enhanced further; civil service departments 
were expanded and there was the continued consolidation of 
power in the hands of the prime ~inister and the cabinet 
with the resultant weakening of Parliament. Additionally 
as MacPherson has pOinted out (1977165-66), the main 
political parties concentrated power in their leadership 
, 
at the expense of MPs, party members and the electorate. 
As a consequence of such changes by the time the working 
classes finally achieved full political, economic and 
social representation within the state, a structure had 
. t _-" -- ~_'"'' -. been. created that precluded their' dramatically influencing' 
decision making, even if they had wanted to. 
During the post-war period formal democratic rights became 
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making corporatism and the 
powers in the hands of powerful elites. Such corporatist 
arrangements were the logical consequences of the trends 
1n the development of the central state identified 
hitherto. The social democratic state, in order to attempt 
to ~epresent both the interests of the working classes and 
capitalism, entered into negotiations with those groups 
whose acquiescence and consent was seen to be decisive. As 
a consequence, the representatives of these groups, 
principally trade union and industrial leaders, were given 
access to state deCision-making processes in a manner 
which effectively by-passed the democratic structures of 
representation. Whilst such an historic class compromise 
benefited those powerful groups in society who gained 
additional and substantive representation the powerless 
were excluded. Whilst having formal rights of 
representation their interests were not included in the 
corporatist arrangements (see Lindblom, 1977; Panitch, 
1977; Schmitter, 1977: Jessop, 1980; Offe, 1980; Thompson, 
1984) • 
ii. The local context 
The impact of the emergence of the strong central state, 
and eventual corporatist state, can be illustrated by the 
effects it had upon the structures of local governance. In 
the first decades of the ninet.eenth century in many. 
respects local government was more important than 
Parliament because the day-to-day governing of the country 
was carried out by the local ruling elites (see Finlayson, 
1969; Foster, 1974; Fraser, 1976;1979;1982) In addition 
there was no expansive national political party structure 
channelling politics solely towards parliament (see Gyford 
and James, 1983). However, as the nineteenth century 
progressed local government, particularly in the cities 
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and towns, began to come under tighter central state 
control. 
By the time the respectable sections of the working class 
finally achieved independent formal representation, it was 
within the tightly controlled council structures set up by 
the bourgeoisie after the 1835 Municipal Corporations Act. 
As late as the 1880s local government remained under the 
control of the middle classes even in cities where there 
was a working class majority (Blunkett and Jackson 
1987:4~). It is interesting to note that after 1919, in 
response to the emergence of the local Labour Party, it 
began to be asserted that local government was not a 
suitable place for politics. Central to this ideological 
de-politization process was the argument. that local 
government was above politics, as it was concerned with 
the delivery of services for the good of the community 
(Bulpitt 196719; Miliband, 19821136). 
Nevertheless, during the inter-war years certain Labour 
controlled councils did utilize local government to cope 
with the consequences of 
the struggle in London, 
economic recession. As part of 
there were demands in the 1920s 
for 'Home Rule For London P and a ~Parliament for Greater 
London P (see Saint et al, 1989). The development of such 
policies culminated in the struggles of the 'Little 





central government responses to mass 
(see Branson, 1979; MacIntyre, 1980). The 
the central state to such a direct 
was to pass coercive legislation to jail 
councillors who refused to obey central government edicts, 
and to appoint commissioners and co-optees to bypass local 
democracy. This unsuccessful challenge to the central 
state resulted,from 1926, in sections of the Labour Party 
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advocating more moderate policies for councils controlled 
by the party. For other sections of the party it confirmed 
the importance of gaining control of national power. The 
eventual hegemony of such centralist ideologies had 
important consequences. When the Party finally formed a 
majority government in 1945 structures of local 
governance, and therefore structures of democratic 
accountability, were viewed as being anachronistic and 
potentially troublesome (Blunkett and Jackson, 1987156-
59). 
The determination of the Labour government to manage and 
socialize the economy resulted in the construction of the 
social democratic corporatist state in the post war 
period~ This resulted in the considerable restructuring of 
local government to act as an apolit~cal mechanism for the 
realization of central government policies (see Corrigan, 
1979=207). Dunleavy (1984) argues that this was achieved 
by three principle means. First, there was the 
introduction of corporate management in local authorities. 
This reduced the influence of elected members, removed key 
areas of policy making from controversial arenas of public 
debate and facilitated the development of close links 
between public authorities and private sector interests at 
the local level. Second, there was the expansion of 
central administration with the establishment of regional 
offices to administer policies and supervise programmes. 
This also resulted in the transfer of fundamental aspects 
of policy making and implementation from the local 
electoral arena and effectively closed them off to popular 
pressure, whilst at the same time opening them to 
professional experts and private sector interests. The 
scope for democratic accountability to be exercised was 
strictly limited as none of the bodies were directly 
elected and many did 'not even include local authority 
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representation. The third dimension was the already 
mentioned introduction of non-elected forms of local 
administration which co-existed with local authorities and 
assumed responsibility for functions that had previously 
been discharged by the latter. Thus, by the late 1960s, 
Dunleavy argues that British politics had become 
bifurcated between a formal sphere of electoral democratic 
politics and a SUbstantive sphere of corporatist interest 
representation, in which powerful functional economic 
interests were directly represented in the decision making 
process (see Bassett, 1984; Boddy and Fudge, 1984; 
Blunkett and Jackson, 19875 Budge and McKay, 1988; 
Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1988) 
Additional developments inter-connected with the above in 
the attempt to neutralize further the potentially 
unpredictable political nature of local government. State 
policy developed a bias towards the professionalization of 
local government services reflecting the belief that local 
government·s role was the implementation as opposed to the 
formulation of policy. Laffing (1986130) documents how the 
central state encouraged 'outside sources of professional 
accredition over locally based training and experience'. 
As a consequence professionalization set limitations on 
the control local councils could exercise over their 
staff. 
Concurrent with the rise of local government professionals 
was the rise of the local social service professions. 
Taylor (1980139) argues that from the very moment the 
Labour Party took power, professional experts were given a 
key role'in ,the 'construction of the' social'democratic"--
welfare state. This role was strengthened throughout the 
1960s and 1970s and the ethos of , professional autonomy not 
onl y undermined local <',' 'structures of 'poli tlcal 
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accountability, but also drastically reshaped and 
restructured the local communities within which they 
worked in an unaccountable manner. Professionals took on 
the role of articulating and defining needs and as a 
consequence clients were offered • few opportunities for 
participation, criticism or choice· (Jordan, 1985:255). 
Therefore, to document the key changes in the nature of 
local government is to document the growth of the central 
state and centralizing tendencies which defined local 
democracy, and by definition accountability, as an 
anachronism and more importantly, politically dangerous. 
c. The corporatist state and the crisis of democracy 
At the same time as these changes were taking place 
various committees and commissions were examining 
virtually every aspect of local government in Britain with 
a view to further structural reform (Byrne, 1986:32-44). 
They were unanimous in the conclusion that because of the 
changes in the post-war period there were crises of 
accountability, representation and· participation 
respectively (see Day and Klein, 1987,41-50). However, 
recommendations to remedy the situation compounded the 
problems. The Conservative government's 1972 Local 
Government Act created even larger units of local 
government. The county council became the basic unit of 
local government incorporating district councils and 
Boroughs. This Act also created six massive metropolitan 
counties encompassing populations ranging from 1 to 2.7 
million (see Keith-Lucas and Richards, 1978). Such changes 
fundamentally challenged the whole idea of local 
government and local accountability. As Bassett has 
pointed out 
The end results of these developments by the 1970s was 
a centralized local government system heavily 
bureaucratized and professionalized, remote from a 
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local public who often showed 
electoral participation that 
breakdown in the system 
(Bassett,1994:94). 
so little interest in 
were warnings of a 
of representation 
In addition the unintended consequences of the rise of 
corporatist modes of representation, both locally and 
nationally, were three fold. First, seeming favouratism 
resulted in the erosion of the electoral support of those 
social groups not represented by the special negotiations. 
Second, by the prioritization of certain powerful 
interests, the powerless were systematically marginalized 
and effectively excluded from the edifice of citizenship 
(see Held and Krieger, 1992). The third consequence was 
the erosion of confidence in and acceptability of the 
political parties and institutions that had implemented 
such corporatist policies (see Held, 1994). The British 
state was facing a legitimation crisis in the inner 
cities. 
i. Renewed demands for rights of representation and 
participation 
The response was the revolt of the late 1960s, a wide 
ranging revolt by those excluded from key decision-making 
processes against the unaccountable and unresponsive 
central and local bureaucracies (see Offe, 1982). Although 
the revolt expressed itsel~ in different forms at the 
basis of demands was one thing the demand for power, 
most straightforwardly expressed. in the all embracing 
slogan, 'power to the people~. The participation of the 
trade union leadership in corporatist decision making 
strategies resulted in an upsurge of unofficial localized 
disputes as .. the .. gap between the representatives and .their 
members grew (see Pimlott and Cook, 1982). Scepticism 
about Party politics resulted in increasing volatility 
amongst the electorate in terms of voting behaviour. 
Consequently, the two major political parties attracted an 
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ever smaller percentage oi the total vote cast whilst 
there was the emergence of other parties. Indeed irom the 
latter hali oi the 1950s the two parties began to win 
elections with approximately one third of the electorate's 
support (see Butler and Stokes, 1974). 
Underpinning this crisis of political representation and 
participation was the dramatic international economic 
crisis that engulfed Britain in this period (see, Gamble, 
1979; Friend and Metcalie, 1981>.· Not only were 
corporatist modes of representation prioritizing certain 
interests but they were not capable oi resolving this 
economic crisis to the satisfaction of those groups that 
they were supposed to be representing. It is in this 
period that both Left and Right of the political spectrum 
began to develop cri~iques oi social democracy, premised 
upon the idea that social democracy could not deliver what 
it had promised. 
It was in the inner cities that the crisis began to 
manifest itself most fully. The re-deployment of 
transnational capital and the rationalization oi the 
labour process resulted in the emergence of substantial 
structural unemployment (see Braverman, 1974). The first 
phase of job losses overwhelmingly affected the large 
cities who lost over half a million jobs between 1966-71 
(McDowell, 1989:162). In addition to the impact of the new 
international division of labour the inner cities were 
also subject to constant professionalized redevelopment 
through slum clearance and the building of high rise mass 
housing schemes. As a consequence there .... was an .·e)(odus of 
those who could from the deteriorating inner cities. As 
Friend and Metcalfe (1981191) document, it was the 
unSkilled, the semi-skilled, the migrants, the old and one 
parent families who bore the brunt of the changes in the 
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inner cities because they could not leave. The result was 
the an increase in social tensions with the first 
recognition of the potential phenomenon of an urban 
underclass emerging consisting of those who were gradually 
being dispossessed of their social, economic and political 
rights. As a consequence, they were being defined out of 
the edifice of formal citizenship, supposedly constructed 
by the social democratic state. 
However, this potential underclass did not readily accept 
the position it was being allocated in the new economic 
structure. One of 
settlement being 
universality and 
the consequences of the post-war 
based on the formal principles of 
equality of opportunity was that 
departures from the principles would meet with resistance 
(Gamble, 1988:13). As a consequence the legitimacy of the 
state was not only being questioned but also being 
challenged in these areas 
Fresh demands for participation were put forward, and 
these generated fresh discussion about this supposedly 
obsolete concept. Trends towards the centralization and 
bureaucratization of power, far from being accepted 
with resignation, generated an opposition which 
stressed the virtues of smallness, accessibility, 
openness and decentralization (Arblaster, 1987157). 
It is within this context that the concept of community 
was first linked to demands for participation. The return 
to concepts such as community and participation was 
indicative of the alienation ,people felt towards the 
massive and unresponsive bureaucracies that had developed 
apace in the. post war period. There was the proliferation 
of localized community struggles and campaigns challenging 
M •• - •• ".~the,existing centralist forms of.politicalrepresentation. 
In addition to the progressive groupings, there was also 
the re-emergence of electorally potent reaction~ry ones, 
particularly the reassertion of racis~ political groupings 
most notably the National Front. Just over two decades 
41 
after the creation of the social democratic consensus the 
whole structure was straining under first, the class 
contradictions it had supposedly resolved and second, the 
new social and political contradictions it had 
unintentionally generated. 
i1. The response to the demands 
It is in this period that the problematical nature of 
demands for representation and participation premised upon 
the notion of community become clear. The state had the 
problem of attempting to respond to the demands of inner 
cities differentiated by age, area, class gender and race, 
where all conventional forms of representation and 
participation had virtually collapsed, where consent and 
legitimacy were absent and potential inter-communal and 
racial conflict present. Precisely because there was no 
readily identifiable community, as far as the state was 
concerned, state agencies set about creating one. Only 
when there was an identifiable community could these 
agencies construct mechanisms oT conSUltation with 
representatives of that community and attempt to forge 
links with that community~ In doing so it was also 
possible to attempt to neutralize and incorporate moderate 
interests and to define out those radicals interests who 
did not co-operate with the state-sponsored initiatives, 
structures and funding. Additionally, through the 
officially recognized communitx representatives and 
initiatives it was possible to educate people concerning 
the rights to which they were entitled as opposed to the 
rights they were demanding. Independent initiatives and 
demands were drawn into such structures for a share of the 
resources. Therefore, to some degree actual 
conflict was contained and controlled 
recognition, and legitimacy was given to 









As Friend and Metcalfe (1981) have noted 
A major strand behind all the projects set up at this 
time was a bid for the consent of the governed in areas 
with the highest concentration of the urban poor. Thus 
councils of community relations were set up in areas 
with large immigrant populations in an attempt to 
vocalize the discontent of minorities and channel it 
into governable forms. Similarly, community groups and 
pressure organizations were often funded and parallel 
emphasis on public participation crept into many areas 
of local government activity (1981114). 
Thus the vacuousness of formal rights and structures of 




of citizenship and 
had resulted in a 
process, the withdrawal 
intensification of social 
crisis of representation and participation, and therefore 
accountability, in Britain's inner Cities. The response of 
the state was to create additional forms of representation 
and participation in an attempt to contain and channel 
conflicting demands into an acceptable format. It is 
within this context that the concept of community was 
first used in a manner that became the norm in the 1970s 
and 1980s, as the basis for the creation of identifiable 
structures of controlled representation and participation. 
Such structures were characterized by non-accountable, 
undemocratically based liaison and consultation and by an 
emphasis on representation as opposed to participation 
(see Loney 1983; Cochrane, 1986). 
The social group to be subject·, initially, to such 
supplemental non-democratic community structures of 
representation was that of black migrants. The colour of 
their skin and the role allocated to them within the post-
-":":':'~'.'" ... " "war· Bri ti sh 
that these 
settlement 
economy, as a reserve'" army:' of 1 abour, meant 
migrants were excluded from the post-war 
(see Hall et al., 1978; Sivanandan, 19831 
Ramdin, 1987). As a consequence the~'.were located outside 
the edifice of citizenship (see Deakin, 19701 Humphrey and 
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John, 1971; Hill and Issacharoff, 1971). This outsider 
status was confirmed by their subsequent handling by the 
agencies of the state through the enforcement of measures 
which curbed immigration and encouraged integration. 
The British state initially left voluntary agencies and 
local authorities to deal with the welfare of the new 
migrants and to make contact with them. Liaison officers 
and conSUltative committees were appointed in Liverpool 
and Birmingham in the early 1950s. Little effort was made 
to bring about the participation of migrants in the 
liaison and conSUltative arrangements. Furthermore, many 
of the independent migrant organizations that quickly 
developed were not given representation because they were 
defined as being too political. At the first meeting of 
the Nottingham Consultative Committee for the Welfare of 
Coloured People in 1954, for example, no black people were 
invited whilst at the second meeting three members of the 
non-political Colonial Social and Cricket Club were 
invited to represent the West Indian community. It was 
only after the 19~8 disturbances that immigrant groups 
were invited onto the consultative committee. Therefore, 
black migrants were subject to liaison and conSUltative 
structures and institutions of mediation to represent 
their interests and to define and articulate their needs 
without their direct representation or active 
participation (see Hill and Issacharoff, 1971). 
Such liaison and consultative structures were formalized 
at the highest levels of state policy' in the anti-
immigration legislation passed in the 1960s. The 1965 
~White- Paper recommended," through- the 'setting up of a 
National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, joint 
central and local government ,support and financial 
encouragement for local authorities to establish such 
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structures. Additionally the White Paper laid down formal 
guidelines on the structures. They were to have the 
involvement of both the immigrant and host communities and 
concern themselves with matters concerning integration. 
Furthermore a new component was introduced as such 
committees were eligible for grants to cover staffing 
costs. To qualify for grants the structures and aims for 
the committees, laid down by the White Paper, had to be 
tightly adhered to. Thus the committees were subject to 
central supervision and control. 
As a consequence, the White Paper formalized and 
institutionalized professional liaison and conSUltative 
structures that were supposed to facilitate the direct 
representation of black migrants. As a consequence, 
channels were created through which immigrant interests 
were to be represented and their participation 
facilitated. Through this process, the state was able to 
create a mediating class of appointed community 
representatives and a set of organizations with which its 
institutions and agenCies could consult and liaise. In 
addition, the community representatives and leaders were 
allocated the role of educating their communities about 
the need to integrate into British society and their 
rights as British citizens. Such a process was fully 
institutionalized when the 1968 Race Relations Act 
replaced the non-statutory NeeI wi~h a statutory Community 
~ "." 
Relations Committee. Thus it could be argued that-the 
. " ,,' 
state was giving recognition to the need to have eKtra 
mechanisms of representation to compensate for the 
under/non-representation of black interests in the formal 
political structures. 
However. critics of these structures (Sivananden. 19831 
Dummett, 1968; Hill and Isacaharoff,19711 Humphries and 
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John 1971) have argued that there were a 
consequences of the institutionalization 
series of 
of such 
structures. First, non-democratic liaison and consultation 
structures were substituted for equal rights of 
participation and representation. Second, state 
sponsorship of such structures resulted in the 
disintegration of independent organizations and groupings, 
effectively defining out an important strand of black 
representation. Third, such sponsorship cultivated and 
encouraged a professional and unaccountable black 
bourgeois buffer zone of appointed community 
representatives who accepted state definitions of issues 
and policies and who had the role of "selling" such 






structures and community 
not be representative of the 
a community relations committee will almost entirely 
have to restrict its activities and its public 
statements to such an extent that it will be unable to 
retain the confidence of immigrants (Hill and 
Issacharoff, 19711204). 
Furthermore, the structures of representatives excluded 
the active participation and direct representation of the 
black communities on issues of governance affecting their 
lives. 
Thus, it is argued 
consultation structures 
channel the 
that the ·community liaison and 
were a means by which the state 
actions of black people in a non-.-- sought to 
political direction to -prevent the development of an 
. effective-protest movement. Funding and state recogn~tion 
went to the least militant and most multi-racial 
organizations and community representatives whilst the 
campaign committees and more radical organizations were 
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defined out of the structures of representation. Whilst 
this might have resolved the problem in the short term, 
two irresolvable long term problems were built into the 
structures created by the state to deal with its black 
population. First, the representativeness of the 
structures and individuals who were involved in them was 
open to constant questioning and challenges. And second, 
the representative structures and respectable community 
leaders could not deliver to the state the consent of the 
community for the proposals and policies to which they 
agreed. Within an overall context of institutionalized 
racism these problems have constantly beset state policies 
in its relations with its black population, particularly 
in its relationship with black youth. 
Discussion 
In addition to the theoretical difficulties posed by the 




of how the 
and 
accountability 
participation must be 
British state has dealt with such 
claims previously. The latter has proved itself capable of 
absorbing such demands by extending to the majority of 
society formally structured rights of representation. The 
consequence was the emergence of a highly formalized 
structure of representative democracy which met moderate 
demands. However, radical participatory ones were defined 
out by the development of this structure 
Ironically the growth of [representative] democracy 
help~d to curtail public participation in policy making 
by undermining the foundations of representational 
theory (Rasmussen, 1984:30). 
Additionally, it is possible to identify a concurrent 
process whereby key institutions of governance have been 
insulated from the potential consequences of theeKpansion 
. of representative democracy and the prinCiple of 
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democratic accountability. This was accomplished through 
three means. First, there has been the safeguarding of 
traditional non-democratic institutions. Second, there has 
been the development and encouragement of unaccountable 
corporatist structures and processes to counter-balance 
and neutralize the possible effects of democratic 
representation. And finally, where it has been deemed 
necessary, the central state has intervened directly to 
remove those institutions and agencies subject to the 
process of democratic accountability. This has been most 
notable in the domain of local governance. Thus structures 
of democratic representation have developed which have 
attempted to minimize the participation of the citizenry 
and curb tightly the potential influence of their 
representatives. In this context mechanisms of 
accountability became virtually paralysed, particularly in 
relation to the inner cities. 
In the late 1960s when those groups whose interests did 
not achieve formal representation within the social 
democratic corporatist structures and/or were excluded 
from the decision-making processes of unaccountable 
institutions and agencies remonstrated, the state 
responded in a manner which reflected an unwillingness and 
structural incapacity to meet such demands. By acting upon 
the multiplicity of diverse and fragmented claims, 
supplemental professional and non-democratic structures of 
community representation were created. These structures 
incorpor~ted moderate demands through the recognition of 
certain community representatives whilst defining out 
radical participatory ones. The state through these 
with those demanding 
was within strictly 
structures liaised and consulted 
community participation. However, it 
defined parameters and did not involve 
the transformation of the existing 
any possibility of 
\ <"1 "', 
social ·order. The 
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supplemental powerless consultation structures were 
e~~ectively tagged on to the existing corporatist 
arrangements and as such they contained and channelled 
participatory demands. In doing so such structures could 
not and did not resolve the increasing crisis of democracy 
in Britain, a crisis that was at its most acute in the 
inner city areas. It is within this context that it is 
necessary to consider the other means by which the British 
state has responded to demands which contest the 
hierarchies of power and powerlessness. 
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Section Ill: The Containment of Democracy and the i$sue 
of Police Accountability 
The third process that can be identified in the response 
of the British state to demands for representation and 
participation has been alluded to in the previous 
disc:ussion. That response has involved the 
'monopolization of the means of violence' (Giddens, 
1985:180) by the state in order to check and, in repeated 
instances, to discipline suc:h demands. It is this third 
response that leads direc:tly to an analysis of the role of 
the police in the development of democracy in Britain. The 
police, in the final instance, have been allocated the 
role of representing the state in containing demands for 
changes which threaten the existing order. As part of that 
function it has, on a daily basis, been given the role of 
disciplining and controlling those groups who at any given 
moment are not part of the citizen body. Furthermore, it 
is important to ac:knowledge that whilst the formation of 
the police was also a part of the embryonic struggle for 
democracy its ultimate representative role has 
necessitated its gradual removal from the democratic 
sphere of governance. By recognizing how the three strands 
have historically interconnected one can make sense of 
first, what interests are represented by the police and 
second, how the state has responded (and is likely to 
respond) to demands for police accountability in the form 
of community representation and participation. 
a. The accountability of the police to the community 
Cain (197611~8)' has argued that the notion that the 
o·.~o."····'· ·-..···.:British police .. are of the community'''isoadeeply embedded 
part of their occupational common sense and of state 
hegemony'. It has been constantly reiterated within the 
work of orthodox police historians CAscoli,' 19791 
Critchley 1978; Reith, 1948) that the uniqueness of the 
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British police lies in the symbiotic relationship between 
the community and its police (Critchley, 1978:52). Whilst 
acknowledging that the policing arrangements introduced 
~rom 1829 onwards were different organizationally from 
pre-1829 policing arrangements, it is argued that the new 
~orces also embodied the fundamental principles of the 
communal self-policing arrangements which had existed in 
England since Saxon times. 
This asserted relationship forms the basis for a series o~ 
other assumptions. The first assumption is that the police 
are implicitly accountable to the community and 
automatically have the consent of the community (Reiner, 
1985:15). The second is that the direct representation and 
participation of the community in policing matters is 
automatically ensured by this symbiotic relationship and 
because, through recruitment, 'the police are drawn from 
the community (Critchley, 1978:52). The third is that the 
British police are democratic since they exist within a 
democratic state form and indeed both facilitated the 
birth of that democracy and continue to protect it 
(Critchley, 1978Ixiv). 
Thus a coherent discourse has been constructed upon the 
notion of the existence of this sy~biotic relationship and 
it has been forcefully used by those rejecting demands for 
the political accountability of the police to the elected 
representatives of the community (see Mark, 19791 157; 
McNee, 1980:10). Within this discourse any initial 
conflict that took place between the polica and the 
~';,:'" ','" '" community.disappeared 'quickly when'; it' was realized, that 
the police were impartial, were not government agents, and 
had as their aim the protection of all the community from 
crime (Reiner, 1985: 16-17) Thus a very straight-forward 
connection is made between the police and the community. 
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The police directly represent the community and the 
community support the police through joining the 
institution. Central to orthodox histories is, therefore, 
a very important non-political notion of community, one 
that is given homogeneity through its support for its 
police force. This also has an important consequence in 
that it defines those who are critical o~ the police or 
who are opposed to the police as being outsiders and not 
of the community. As Reiner (1985:13) has pointed out, 
orthodox analysis 'denies the opposition any meaning or 
rationality that is not venaP. This is a,n important 
theme, one which has been reiterated in different forms 
both by police officers and their political supporters. 
There is, however, another analysis that can be drawn upon 
to give a different analysiS of the community who 
supported the new police and whose interests were 
represented by the introduction of the new forces. 
b. The structural relations of democratic accountability 
i. The police and the structures of local governance 
The first two forces introduced into the United Kingdom, 
the Irish Constabulary and the Metropolitan Police, shared 
the common characteristic of being directly controlled by 
central government. Despite powerful protests there was no 
input from the organs of local governance that existed at 
the time, except from the economically powerful City of 
London (Young and Garside, 1982:21). When it came to 
reforming the policing system in the rest of the country 
" .. ' --central government had ,to' . tread . careful 1 y :t!'~ there' was' ,-
little possibility of passing a Bill introducing a 
national police force CPalmer 1987:521). 
An understanding of the democratic political context oi 
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provincial policing can be attained by specifically 
iocusing on urban (borough) policing arrangments in the 
period before 1856. The precise structure of provincial 
police forces was the outcome of the intense struggle, 
already referred to, over the nature of political 
representation and participation in the early nineteenth 
century. It is within this context that the new urban 
police forces were created and they were firmly located 
within the new structures 
governance (Cohen, 1979:116; 
1984117-19). 
of bourgeois dominated local 
Brogden, 1982:371 Steedman, 
It was because of the policing clause included in the~1835 
Municipal Corporations Act that working class radicals 
were devided on whether to support the demands for the 
reform of local governance. As a consequence the reform 
struggles took different forms, had different effects in 
different parts of the country and resulted in a variety 
of class alliances (see Bailey et aI, 1981; Davey, 1983). 
The radicals were willing to ally with the Whigs in many 
areas whilst in others they were just as willing to ally 
themselves with the Tories against municipal reform 
precisely because they feared that wealthy manufacturers 
would attempt to discipline and control the working 
classes with a more efficient police force. In Birmingham, 
Manchester and Oldham prolonged struggles took place 
between Tories, Liberals and' Radicals over. the 
introduction of new policing arrangements, with Manchester 
and Birmingham having centrally imposed police forces 
because of the intensity of the political struggle 
,;'.:."'" >:::;~;, .• (Fr.aser, 1979:89;," Tobias,,·1979:95; : Hew:ltt,'t1979 1 47-8)· and·· 
the situation in Oldham demanding constant central 
government intervention (see Foster 1974). 
The newly dominant urban elite had little difficulty in 
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dealing with the questions: to whom would the new police 
iorces be accountable and whose interests did they 
represent. They 
Watch Committee, 
were accountable, through the council 
to the 
ratepaying property owning 
political representatives oi the 
classes. Whatever independent 
legal powers police officers, including Head Constables, 
had, they were distinct from and subordinate to this 
political relationship with the Watch Committee. Tthe 
latter that was responsible for policing and had the 
powers of apPOintment and dismissal. As a consequence the 
individual Head Constable was 
tied to elective local politics; he served his middle 
class employers, the borough Watch Committee which 
hired, fired and directed his men. From the time of 
their origin in 1835, the borough police were a part of 
the local government system. The Head Constable, a 
career policeman promoted through the ranks, was the 
mirror image of the self-made town councillors to whom 
he answered on a daily basis (Palmer,1987:532). 
The Watch Committee was the most prestigious of the 
Council's subcommittees not least because control over 
policing arrangements was one of the few powers that the 
new Councils had. The mayor was the Committee chairman and 
the members were chosen on the basis of long service and 
dedication (Steedman, 1984:43). The Watch Committee had 
considerable financial and operational autonomy. It was 
the only committee that met in private and whose 
discussions were not reported in the local press. Tight 
daily control of policing matters was exercised 'initially. 
Only towards the middle of the century when the 
bourgeoi si e had consol i dated its hegemoni c . posi ti on was 
there a shift in attitudes of the municipal councils 
::,.·:-:::,:,:' .. ;'~<",:.:'_towards their forces CBrogden '.1982:65';' However,·_· if Head '" 
Constables asserted their autonomy in a manner which 
conflicted with the wishes of the Watch Committee the 
former, ran the risk of being dismissed (L~stgarten, 
1986:37-38). 
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11. The policing of the community 
During this period the lack of dispute over who controlled 
the police was parallelled by the relative lack oi dispute 
over who would be policed. The objective of the middle 
classes was to establish a stable and orderly environment 
~or the developing market economy and to deal with the 
problems posed by the dangerous classes. In this context 
the concern about crime that justified the reform of 
policing arrangements was a metaphor for a more 
~undamental fear - the fear of the swelling urban masses 
The process of capitalist industrialization led to 
increasing economic inequality and exploitation and 
class stratiiication. Rioting became an essential 
political strategy oi an underclass (a surplus 
population) and a working class sufiering this 
increased economic deprivation. The modern system of 
policing evolved to control this riotous situation. And 
through the control system oi the modern public police, 
the ruling economic and political elites were able to 
separate 'constitutional authority' from their own 
social and economic dominance. It began to appear as 
though laws, not men and women, ruled. Finally, the 
police, not the military, emerged as the Visible 
everday presence representing the central political 
authority in society (Eitzen and Timmer, 19851373). 
The outright opposition of the working classes to the 
imposition of the new police forces has been documented 
extensively elsewhere 
attempts to remove 
as has the ultimately unsuccessful 
them physically from working cl~ss 
localities and the concurrent political demands for their 





1979; Tobi as, 
1982). 
to the daily 
.... " 
Fraser, 1979; 1982, Foster, 
) "" I ~~ 
1979; Bailey, 1981. cJones, 
policing of working class 
been identified whereby a 
with the police being 
neighbourhoods, a process has 
tentative truce was reached 
, .,'. '-'L', .~.,/. 
effectively incorporated into informal forms of social 
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control (Cohen, 1979: 132). As 
not encroach excessively upon 
long as collective disorder 
long as property crime did 
the middle classes and as 
remained within tolerable 
levels the police used their discretion to not interfere 
unduly in working class neighbourhoods (see Clarke, 1987). 
Furthermore, there were certain crimes that could be 
countenanced if they did not threaten social order. If 
anything the illegal gin establishments, for example, 
helped to maintain the social order. On the police side 
there was the utilization of informal intervention in 
order to assert their authority whilst the working classes 
continued to depend upon self-reliance for sorting out 
their problems. In addition the police did come to have a 
useful role for the working classes 
by patrolling working class communities the police also 
came to act on behalf of individual working people. For 
the first time working class people gained some 
protection from attack, robbery on the streets and 
burglary at home (Bunyan, 1977168). 
The multiplicity of other social roles played by the 
police did not necessarily infringe upon the interests of 
the working classes. The gradual stabilization of working 
class neighbourhoods in the course of the nineteenth 
century resulted in the development of their own SOCial, 
political and economic institutions, practices and 
hierarchies of 
negotiated truce 
respectability. Consequently, the 
with the police was consolidated and the 
nature of the conflict changed. ·Grumbling dissent' 
replaced wholesale opposition (Brogden, 1982:180) with 
being lessened to particular incidents and isolated to 
particular sections of the working classes (Storch, 
197~:89). 
Gradually regular conflict with the police became isolated 
, 
to young males, the disreputable, criminals and immigrants 
- those outside of 'the primary economy' (Brogden, 
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1982:181; see also Storch, 1975; Cohen, 1979: Brogden. 
1982; White, 1983; Scraton, 1986). Indeed in the policing 
of these groups the police could rest on the agreement of 
the more respectable sections of the indigeneous working 
classes (Hobbs, 1988:94-98). This differential policing of 
marginal outsider groups was a strategy that the police 
became adept at using to bolster their authority and 
legitimacy as well as meeting organizational needs 
(Brogden,1982:192-195). These outsider groups effectively 
became 'police property' (see Lee, 1981). Consequently, 
there was a distinct blurring of the interests that the 
police were representing on a daily basis (see Scraton, 
1987). It is in this context that informal structures of 
accountability were created. 
However, whilst some form of localized negotiation, and 
acccountability, could be begrudgingly reached and a form 
of order satisfactory to both sides precariously 
reproduced, conflict continued to characterize the 
relationship between the working classes and the police 
concerning the formers' demands for political and 
industrial rights of representation. There was less room 
for negotiation in the maintenance of public order by the 
police and their containment of the working classes and 
other groups who were demanding access to the body 
politic. It was in such situations that the.>more 
respectable sections of the working classes were sharply 
reminded of the straightforwardly coercive role. of the 
police in protecting the economic, social and political 
status quo (Bowden, 1978:221; Bailey, 1981194-125ISeary, 
... --198S:ch ·-2-4; ; Brogden, 1982: -184-189; Scratonj-.19871149). 
Furthermore, whether it was in relation to the policing of 
working class 'localities or in public order situatlon~.any 
complaints about policing that the working classes had did 
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not reach the formal political agenda. The exclusion of 
the latter from political life ensured that on fundamental 
issues, such as the nature of 
no formal means of having 
(Lustgarten, 1986:40). It 
law enforcement, there was 
their interests represented 
was only with the 
municipalization of working class culture and the rise of 
the Labour Party that respectable sections of the working 
class achieved the formal means of having a say in the 
policing of their neighbourhoods. As Reiner (1985) has 
pointed out 
The working class clearly had no possibility of 
influencing borough Watch Committees until the slow 
extension of the franchise to them (Reiner, 1985:46). 
Additionally there remained disreputable/troublesome and 
politically marginalized segments of the working classes 
who were subject to the routine attention of the police 
and periodic crackdowns (Cohen 1979:120-21, Brogden, 
1982:180-81). Such groups had liitle chance of having 
their interests included in any formal political 
sett;ement between the police and the respectable sections 
of the working classes 
Anyone who was transient - the common condition of the 
intermittingly unemployed, casual workers and seasonal 
workers - was also voteless. The political nation was 
thus comprised of the propertied and the respectable 
working class and their consensus about public order 
and public decorum could not be disturbed by dissonant 
notes from the politically voiceless (Lustgarten, 1986. 
39-40). 
In many situations the more respectable sections of the 
working class, including their political~epresentatives, 
virtually condoned the disciplinary actions of the police 
.. , " 
in relation to such disreputable groups (Cohen, 19791121). 
Thus, whilst the latter through their accommodation to 
respectable values and incorporation into the state did 
find the police to be useful there were other sections who 







to it. This situation has continued to exist 
to such outsider groups with the more 
sections of the working classes only 
the police periodically in public order 
as victims of crime. In this sense not only 
are the police involved in policing social divisions but 
also acting upon and contributing to those social 
divisions (Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate, 1988:101-105). 
Thus a much more complex and ambivalent picture of the 
nature of the relationship between the police and the 
community emerges from an analysiS of the class that was 
subject to the new policing. A negotiated and situational 
agreement over certain aspects and types of policing was 
reached informally between sections of the working class 
and the police. However, the possibility of the working 
class ever formally having any say over the police was 
precluded by the fact that by the time this class was in a 
political position to exercise control formally over the 
policing it was subject to, events had contrived to remove 
the urban police from the democratic process. By the 
beginning of the twentieth century the police had moved 
from representing the interests of local elites to 
representing the interests of the emergent state. 
c. The removal of the police from democratic control 
This removal was realized through a series of processes 
most notably, routinized state interventionl threats 
against the state; the existence of a non-democratic model 
of policing and the emergence of organizationally and 
" .• ~:~c·~:.legally empowered chief police officers. 
i. Routini%ed state intervention 
Throughout the nineteenth century, as a .result of the 
social problems brought about by industrialization and 
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urbanization, the boroughs and their form of governance 
became defined as problematical and subject to the 
attentions of an increasingly interventionist centralizing 
state. Between 1854 and 1870 the iorces of direct 
centralization were held in check but what was developing 
was the notion that local government should be the means 
whereby central government legislation could be 
implemented (see Redlich and Hirst, 1970; Byrne, 1986). 
This brought with it demands ior rationalization and' 
centralization of services within larger units of local 
government. Any state intervention with forms of local 
governance had automatic implications for local policing 
arrangements. 
In addition an increasingly powerful administrative 
central state began to attempt to intervene, through the 
Home Office, in the local policing arrangements that had 
developed in a relatively haphazard way since 1835 (Hart, 
1956:406; Steedman, 1984:42). This intervention became 
routinized as the century progressed in an attempt to 
ensure standardization, rationalization and efficiency. 
Successive pieces of legislation infringed upon the powers 
of the Watch Committee whether through attempting to 
allocate more powers to the Home Secretary or to the Head 
Constable. Accountability of the council for adequate 
policing was moving from the local ratepayer to the 
central state (Brogden, 1982197-103). 
The central state was also prepared to intervene in order 
to curb the excesses of local Watch Committees, such as, 
their refusal.or ...... inability ..... to . maintain.adequate police 
forces or attempts to expand upon their powers. As 
indicated previously, central government had no hesitation 
in intervening in Birmingham, Manchester and' Oldham 
respectively when the struggle over policing was deemed to 
••....• I '. 
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have been out of control. Central government also 
monitored attempts by Watch Committees to expand upon 
their powers. Thus in some towns the Watch Committee began 
to take on the role of a judicial body, 'a public semi-
legal trlbunal~ which investigated complaints against the 
police and compensated, particularly if it involved police 
damage to personal property (Steedman, 1984:44). 
ii. Threats against the state 
As the police was gradually allocated the role of being 
the first line of defence of the state the latter 
intervened in local policing arrangements in order to co-
ordinate threats against it. During the 1880s a highly 
autonomous and non-accountable Special Branch was 
developed to deal with the threat initially of Irish 






defined as politically threatening (see 
Porter, 1987). In addition from the last 
of 
in 
the nineteenth century industrial unrest 
direct state intervention in local policing 
matters. During the 1910 South Wales Colliery strike, for 
example, direct control of the police rested with the 
central state for the first time (Geary, 1985137; Morgan, 
1987:44). 
The state~s co-ordination of the 1914-18 war effort also 
directly intruded upon local policing arrangements.~The 
Home Office supervised the war time responsibilities of 
the Chief Constables and facilitated conferences and 
meetings, for the 
-Police-.-Authorlties 
first time, of Chief Constables and 
in.·· different formats-(Crltchley, 
19781183). Brogden (1982:103) argues that as a consequence 
chief police officers learned that it was possible to 
consolidate their own power bases through playing the Home 
Office against local police authorities. 
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As a consequence of the further expansion of its role 
during world war one and its role in the industrial 
conflict of the inter-war years, including that involving 
the police the Home Office gained 
unprecedented legal power and administrative capability 
to influence the evolution of policing throughout 
England and Wales (Lustgarten,1987:43). 
After world war one there was also the centralization of 
the state's contingency planning. In 1919 an Industrial 
Unrest Committee met to make plans for countering a major 
industrial dispute. In addition to giving the police 
draconian powers under the 1920 Emergency Powers Act, a 
structure of eleven regions was created. Commissioners 
were to be responsible for the co-ordination of military, 
police and emergency services, thus by-passing the local 
democratic structures. It was also in this period that 
mutual aid arrangements, originating in the late 19th 
century, were widely utilized for the first time. Again 
this enabled the Home Office and Chief Constables to by-
pass the political process if neccessary. 
World war two amplified central involvement in provincial 
policing arrangements and for the first time the "Borough 
Chief Constables came under the formal authority, of the 
Home Secretary through Defence Regulation 39 •. ,The Home 
Secretar~: als6 acquired the power to retire Chief 
Constables. The regionalization arrangements of the 
General Strike were reactivated and in the case of a 
national emergency the commissioners would assume 
executive.powers •.. The, General-Strike also provided the. 
mutual aid ideas that were implemented in the form of 
regional 
Secretary 
reinforcement schemes which gave the Home 
and the regional commissioners considerable 
powers of direction. Amalgamation plans were also a part 
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of central coordination during the war. In 1942 Parliament 
agreed to legislation enabling the Home Secretary to 
amalgamate any two or more areas if he was satisfied it 
was necessary for military purposes. As a consequence, 
seven amalgamations took place, reducing the number of 
county Borough forces by twenty one. As early as December 
1944 the Watch Committees involved passed a resolution 
calling for the revocation of all the amalgamation 
schemes. Immediately after the war they made a similar 
demand but it was not forthcoming (see Critchley, ch 6) 
External and internal threats against the British state 
had resulted in the central state acquiring powers over 
poliCing that were not returned to local government. 
ili. A non-democratic model of policing 
Of constant concern for the Borough Watch Committees was 
the existence of an non-democratic model of policing in 
the Counties, reflective of the continued importance of 
the gentry (see MacDonough, 1977). The existence of this 
model had serious implications for any proposed reforms in 
relation to policing arrangements or local government. 
First, this model, although adhering to the principle of 
local control, had no democratic form. Second, the Home 
Office had more input into policing affairs through the 
power of approval over the appOintment of Chief Constables 
and the power to enforce uniform standards. Finally, the 
Chief Constables had more autonomy and powers than their 
borough counterparts. The Chief Constables held statutory 
office, and although they were appointed by the 
magistrates they were empowered to appoint and dismiss the 
.-~-i ;other:ranks-:and:to direct the ·force. Thus the democratic' 
element was completely missing from the County policing 
model as it was from rural local government generally. In 
this context the practice was soon established of the Home 
Secretary and the Chief Constables by-passing the 
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magistrates and communicating with each other directly 
(see Steedman, 1984). 
It is hardly surprising then that when the 1888 Local 
Government bill to attempt to democratize the county 
structure of governance was being debated one of the most 
controversial aspects concerned the future role of the 
magistrates. Whilst all their administrative powers were 
transferred to an elected County Council they were allowed 
to retain their judicial ones. It should be noted that 
demands that the office of magistrate be democratized to 
deprive it of its class character were rejected. In the 
debates about whether the new councils or the magistrates 
should be responsible for the police the original 
proposals were balanced in favour of the latter. The new 
councils were to have little control over policing 
matters, there was to be no equivalent of the Watch 
Committee. Instead there was to be a financially 
autonomous Standing Joint Committee comprised equally of 
Council representatives and the magistrates. The 
magistrates were to be the sole body responsible for the 
appointment of Chief Constables whilst it was recommended 
that the Home Secretary should have the power to give 
directions to ensure the maintenance of proper standards 
of efficiency, discipline and the number of police 
employed. 
It was argued that responsibility for policing could not 
be handed over to the new councils because they had no 
experience of such affairs. However, given the fears 
>_ .expressed .i".the.rest of the bill, it could be argued that 
the provision was to make sure that representatives of the 
working classes never gained control of the police even if 
they happened to gain control of the Council. As a 
consequence of opposition to the bill the power of 
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appointment of the Chief Constable was given to the 
Standing Joint Committees and the proposal to give new 
powers of direction to the Home Secretary was dropped 
(Critchley, 1978:133-138; Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984134-
35) • 
The 1888 Local Government Act is important because the 
democratization of the county police did not occur. A 
~inancially autonomous Standing Joint Committee composed 
equally of magisterial and elected representatives meant 
that the magistrates, because of their judicial powers, 
would continue to have a substantial input into the 
policing of the Counties. Therefore, the act made sure 
that there was significant undemocratic representation on 
a committee which was ~inancially autonomous from the 
council. All the arguments to have them excluded from the 
process failed; indeed if the government had had its way 
only the magistrates, the Home Secretary and Chief 
Constables would have been responsible for policing 
arrangements. Additionally in the situation of a divided 
committee with no tight Home Office control the county 
Chief Constables could consolidate their power bases. Thus 
the act firmly established the autonomy of county Chief 
Constables (Critchley 1967:130). 
This act consolidated the powers of the non-democratic 
elements in order to make sure what happened to the Watch 
Committees could not happen in the Counties. The extent to 
which the Watch Committees could still control their Head 
Constables was illustrated by the 1880 disagreement 
between the 'Birminghu.m . Watch Committee and its "'Head 
Constable. This dispute was resolved by the Home Secretary 
reminding the Head Constable that under the 1835 Act the 
Watch Committee had the power to make regulations for all 
members of the force as well as the power to dismiss 
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officers (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:39). 
iv. The emergence of professional autonomy 
All of the above mentioned developments had important long 
term consequences for the relationship between the Borough 
Watch Committees and the Head Constables. The latter were 
the beneficiaries of first, closer state intervention 
which produced structured police organizations second, the 
allocation of more independent powers to chief police 
officers third, the role of the police, as the key 
'gatekeepers' in the expanding criminal justice system and 
the concurrent claiming of a professional mantle (Brogden, 
1982:70-71). Of key importance was the fact that the pre-
Tudor principle of constabulary independence began to 
legally challenge the extent to which Watch Committees 
could control their chief police o~ficers. In the course 
o~ the twentieth century a series of civil liability cases 
and cases relating to the discretion of chief police 
o~~icers legally af~irmed the principle of constabulary 
independence (Fisher v The Mayor and Corporation of Oldham 
[1930]; Attorney General for NSW v Perpetual Trustee Co 
Ltd [1935]). This principle, eventually taking on the 
guise 
firmly 
of 'enshrined orthodoxy' 
asserted that no-one 
(Lustgarten, 1986 1 48), 
could inter~ere with 
operational matters. As a consequence 
The Watch Committee 1n the boro~gh and county areas had 
by the 1930s lost out to the Chie~ Constables who were 
increasingly looking to London for guidance. Moreover, 
this process occurred during the same period that the 
majority of the working class were given the vote and 
labour Party councillors were beginning to form the 
majority party on the councils CBunyan, 1977172). 
Reiner (1985:46) and Lustgarten (1986) also make the 
connection between the rise of constabulary autonomy, the 
decline o~ the Watch Committee and the establishment of 
Labour controlled local councils. As a consequence of the 
establishment o~ the primacy o~ constabulary independence 
-. 
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Intervention by meddlesome Socialist local bodies could 
be precluded, yet the centre would not incur any 
opprobrium for politically controversial policing, 
since responsibility would rest with the independent 
chief constable (Lustgarten, 1986:46) 
Therefore, the period up until the end of world war two 
saw growing encroachment upon the principle of local 
democratic control of policing. As a consequence there was 
little possibility of the political representatives of the 
working class, never mind those sections of the population 
outside of the edifice of citi%enship, having a formal say 
in policing matters (see Brogden, 1982=81) 
d. Policing and the corporatist state 
Standardization and centralization trends developed apace 
in the post war period as did the autonomy of Chief 
Constables and the expansion of state expenditure upon the 
police, despite the fact that the Labour party had become 
a party of governance (Taylor, 1981 1 68;Gilroy and Sim, 
1987:74). Pay negotiations were nationalized and 
centralized pay negotiation. Regional training schools, 
crime records offices and crime squads were also 
introduced. In its deliberations on these matters the 
Oaksey Committee also addressed the issue of 
accountability 
The Police Authority has no right to give the Chief 
Constable orders about the disposition of the police or 
the way in which police duties should be carried out 
(Cmnd 783,para 183). 
This was to set the tone for debates about police 
accountability in the post-war period, as the Watch 
Committeesc~were'-to find out to their cost. The 
specialization and redefinition of • the policing function 
took place at the expense of the local authorities. Watch 
Committees were drawn into central committees to discuss 
national conditions of service. National organizations 
representing the different ranks within the police gained 
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more influence in a formal manner. Furthermore, there was 
more sustained Home Office interest particula~ly in 
financial matters. As a result by the end of the first 
half of the twentieth century precedents had been set in 
most areas of policing for the developments that were to 
take place in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Symptomatic of the changes that were taking place was the 
1950 dispute between the Nottingham Watch Committee and 
its Chief Constable. The latter, in consultation with the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), instigated an 
inquiry into corruption in the city council. Although the 
DPP decided that no further action should be taken the 
Watch Committee asked the Chief Constable for a report on 
his investigation. He refused on the basis that he was 
solely responsible for enforcing the law. As a result the 
Watch Committee suspended him. The Home Office supported 
the Chief Constable against what it defined as Watch 
Committee interference in law enforcement and he was 
subsequently reinstated despite the protests of the 
committee that they were within their right under the 
provisions of the 1835 Act. During a House of Lords' 
debate Lord Chesham, the government spokesman, made the 
governments position clear 
What I wish to emphasize (it has been said before and I 
say it again) is that no Police Authority or 
else has any authority to interfere in relation 
anyone 
to the 
police enforcement of the law by the 
(213.HL.Deb.5s.c47). 
Critchley (19781272) argues that although there was no 
difference in principle between this incident and the 1880 
Birmingham one -the Home Secretary had taken different 
sides because 'times had changed- and the Home Office was 
more prepared to intervene in local policing matters. 
However, it was not just that times had changed. as 
Jefferson and Grimshaw (1984:44) argue, it was the 
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political relations that had changed. The political 
relations were those brought about by the establishment of 
the social democratic corporatist state form. 
The 1964 Police Act 
The Royal Commission that led to the passing of the 1964 
act had been set up in response to a series of incidents 
in the 19505 which had focused attention on policing. 
Disciplinary action and legal proceedings had been taken 
against the Chief Constables of Cardiganshire, Worcester 
and Brighton. There had been parliamentary debate and a 
tribunal set up to look into the behaviour of two members 
of the Thurso police and a censure motion in the House 
after an alleged assault by a Metropolitan police officer 
led to a Home Office settlement (Oliver, 198718-9). There 
had also been the prolonged highly publicized argument 
between the Watch Committee and Chief Constable of 
Nottingham mentioned above (Critchley, 1978:271-272; 
Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:40-41). 
This Commission gives an indication of how the issue of 
the governance of the police would be dealt with in the 
social democratic corporatist state. It could be argued 
that the very setting up of a Royal Commission was proof 
that things had changed as the result of the working 
classes, through the post-war. settlement, finally 
achieving full representatory rights within the state. 
However, the recommendations of the commission could also 
be taken as proof of how concerns could be neutralized 
throug~.the setting up of inquiries which did not address 
the basis of such concerns. Lustgarten (1986148) argues 
that by the time the commission was set up the 'conceptual 
boundaries of that inquiry were narrowly defined'. It 
could be argued that the recommendations were virtually 
pre-determined by three features of the political context 
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referred to previously. First, there was the general loss 
of functions of local authorities in the post war period. 
Second, various other commissions and committees were 
recommending further regionalization, centralization and 
rationalization of local government services. And third, 
there was the rise of an administrative ideology which was 
reinforced by corporate managerial ism and professionalism. 
In such circumstances the policing powers of the Watch 
Committees were in a very precarious position from the 
onset. There was also the allegation, made most forcefully 
by Marshall (1960:225-226) and Chester (1960:15) 
respectively, that after the Nottingham incident a 
deliberate attempt was being made to depoliticize 
policing. 
The Commission recommended that Watch Committees and 
Standing Joint Committees should be replaced by Police 
Authorities which would continue to be responsible for the 
appointment of Chief Constables. However, they were to 
lose responsibility for the efficient policing of their 
areas to the Home Secretary, as well as the power to 
suspend and dismiss the Chief Constable and his deputy, 
and powers of appOintment, promotion and diSCipline 
amongst subordinate ranks. The latter power was to be 
transferred to the Chief Constable. In addition' there was 
the assertion of the princ~ple of constabulary 
independence from democratic control 
We entirely accept that it is in the public interest 
that a Chief Constable ••• should be free from the 
conventional processes of democratic .control and 
influence. (report 1962~para 87) 
Additionally it was recommended that the distinction 
between the County and the Borough forces should end and 
that one third of the new Police Authorities should be 
composed of magistrates 
the Royal Commission accepted the argument of the 
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Magistrates' Association that, since local authority 
decisions were increasingly swayed by political views, 
it was especially important that a police body contain 
non-elected persons, and that JPs were suitable because 
of their close knowledge of police work and problems 
(Levenson, 1981:46). 
The government rejected the Commission's centralization 
proposals and gave the Police Authorities the duty of 
securing an adequate and efficient police force in their 
area. However, the other proposals affecting the Police 
Authorities were accepted, strengthening the position of 
the Home Office and Chief Constables at the expense of the 
Police Authorities. The act formalized the tripartite 
structure of police governance. The accountability of the 
police to the local democratic political process was to be 
virtually non-existent. Any formal powers that the the 
Police Authority was allocated under the 1964 Police Act 
were subject to the ultimate approval of the Home 
Secretary. For example, the new Police Authorities were 
given the power to call for reports relating to the 
policing of their areas. However, the qualification was 
added that the Chief Constable could refer such requests 
to the Home Secretary if he considered it to be against 
the public interest or outside the responsibility of the 
Police Authority (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:19). Hence 
the 1964 Act laid clear restrictions on access to 
information about policing matters. 
Furthermore, although the Police Authority was to be a 
committee of the council the statutory duties placed upon 
the Authority were statutory not delegated. Therefore, in 
···"·",,., .. effect the-Authority was not accountable to the overall 
council structure-in the way other committees were despite 
the fact that the council had to pay its share of the 
pol ice budget. .The new arrangements bore a marked 
resemblance to those which had prevailed in the Counties 
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since 1888 with democracy being further diluted by the 
inclusion of the non-elected magistrates. The consequence 
of having an undemocratic policing system available by 
which to judge and condemn the Borough arrangements 
iinally made itself apparent. After all the municipal 
struggles of the nineteenth century to assert independence 
irom the Counties the Boroughs finally lost out, as did 
the possibility of local democratic control of policing. 
In addition the Metropolitan police remained exterior to 
any semblance of democratic control. 
The response to the recommendations and the subsequent act 
was by no means muted. It was claimed that the 
recommendations would result in the Home Secretary 
continuing to evade Parliamentary control in policing 
matters as well as the Chief Constables continuing to 
evade local control (The Tribune, June 1964). The 
commission·s dismissal of an independent complaints 
structure was criticized as was the 'recommendations 
designed to deprive local authorities of nearly all their 
few remaining powers over the local police forces· (Labour 
Research, Vol Ll, No 7; see also Okojie and Noble 198017). 
The pointed criticism was that those serving. on the 
commission would not 'spring to mind instantly when 
thinking of those who have resolutely upheld the liberties 
of the public when encroached upo~ by the forces of law 
and order· (The Spectator, 8.6.62). 
The 1964 Act gave the Home Secretary increased powers to 
amalgamate forces and the population bar contained 1n the 
. 1946 Act 'was remove'd~' Thus, 'the principle of l'ocai'i ty' was' ,. 
further threatened. The Home Secretary used these powers 
to create the Northamptonshire force in the mid 1960s. 
Considerably more amalgamations took place 1n May 1966 
which further complicated matters and reduced local 
;'.~: r --
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authority involvement. By 1969 the number of forces had 
been reduced from 117 to 47. Instead of separate Police 
Authorities joint ones were established with 
representation on the Authorities being premised upon the 
size of the populations of the respective counties 
involved. Marshall (1973) had no doubt as to the 
consequences of such arrangements arguing that they were 
likely to be less rigorous than the Authority of a single 
council in asserting either their own rights as against 
the police, or those of the constituent units against the 
Home Office and central government 
It has no civic spirit to stiffen it, no common 
interest to unite it and no effective local opinion to 
support it. The West Midlands or the Thames Valley are 
geographical expressions not communities. This may not 
matter for the purpose of administering services but 
for the purpose of securing participation and 
accountabi I i ty it matters a great deal (Marshall, 
1973= 60). 
This reorganization of police forces continued with the 
1972 Local Government Act, which resulted in further 
readjustment of police boundaries to facilitate new county 
structures. Councillors were virtually excluded even from 
this seemingly political exercise. Prior to the changeover 
in April 1974 the majority of the planning was conducted 
by senior police officers. Many authorities found 
themselves faced with 
already been agreed upon 
and in which they had 
reorganization schemes that had 
by the police forces concerned 
played no active part. This was 
the Home Office had placed ~ompounded by the fact that 
severe restrictions upon the Authorities' choice of Chief 
Constable fOr the.: new forces. Where reorganization had 
occurred Police Authorities could only select from Chief 
Constables of previously existing forces. In addition 
prior agreement had often been reached among the Chief 
Constables involved thus leaving no real choice for the 
Police Authorities involved (see Oliver 1987151-55). The 
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1974 reorganization plans affected virtually every force 
outside London in relation to the number of ~orces, the 
composition of the Police Authorities and/or the ~orce 
itsel~ and its police area. Northern ~orces in particular 
were a~~ected with the creation o~ virtually new forces in 
certain areas. The Greater Manchester Police force was 
created, for example, through the amalgamation of the 
whole of the Manchester and Sal~ord forces with parts of 
the Cheshire, Lancashire and West Yorkshire forces. 
e. The crisis of police accountability 
The crucial point of the changes was that the Chief 
Constables ~inally achieved formal representation within 
the state. As a consequence the central state did not gain 
the policing powers taken from the local authorities. As 
local government lost its powers the Chief Constables 
asserted theirs. No longer constrained by the Watch 
Committees, their legal position consolidated by the 
political and judicial endorsement of the Oldham decision, 
their professional power augmented by the emergence of 
large police bureaucracies and their political influence 
augmented by the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO), it was the Chief Constables who expropriated the 
Police Authorities claim that policing was a local matter. 
It was they who claimed prOfessional autonomy in relation 
to the determination of local poli~ing needs and policies. 
As a consequence, Brogden (19821 74-95) and Lustgarten 
(1986152) argue that the Chief Constables were able to 
assert their independence not only from the Police 
Authorities but also from the Home Office in the post.wa~ __ 
period. 
The above mentioned changes in poliCing, as with other 
state agencies, took place through the crucial ideological 




by the aforementioned corporatist 
Constables were able to claim 
su~cesfully a special esoteric knowledge over crime 
control which was constantly reinforced by a political re-
interpretation of the legal position of Chief Constables. 
The resultant strategic position of the Chief Constables 
meant that they were in a position not only to play the 
centre and local off against each other but to accrue, 
through their participation in national policy making, 
further powers and definition of their powers vis-a-vis 
the other participants in the tripartite arrangements 
Chief Constables could debate with the Home Office as 
equals, with each 'side· supported by its own army of 
professional advisers. Thus professionalization not 
only penetrated deeply into the reshaped structure but 
augmented the powers granted to both the Home Office 
and the Chief Constables under the 1964 Act (Jefferson, 
1987=18). 
As Cain (19721231) makes clear professionalization of the 
senior ranks also disguised ideologic~lly the increasing 
and unidentifiable growth in central powers. As a 
consequence accountability was being mystified by the 
'language of professionalism·. 
i. The crisis in the governance of the police 
The few studies that were conducted on the new Police 
Authorities in this period bear testimony to the worst 
fears of those who argued that policing had been divested 
of any pretence of democratic accountability. Concern was 
expressed about the role of the Police Authorities in the 
post-reorganization period, particularly as the Chief 
Constables::buil~, their autonomy upon the notion of 
'operational independence' in both their actions and 
public pronouncements. These new Authorities were part of 
a restructured system of local governance that meant they 
were far removed from the people they were supposedly 
representing. 
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As a consequence of the passing of the 1964 Police Act and 
the 1972 Local Government Act not only was there a lack of 
activity within most Police Authorities but a concerted 
effort was made to ensure the subordination of the 
Authorities to the Chief Constables. Certain Police 
Authorities not only fully accepted their subordinate 
role, but had become virtually moribund in terms of their 
role of ensuring police accountability and instead 
concentrated on facilitating the administrative 
reqUirements of the Chief Constables. It was repeatedly 
emphasized that local councillors had no expertise with 
which to discuss policing matters and this became further 
justification for Chief Constables to take the lead in 
discussions. (Marshall, 1973; Santon, 1974; Simey 1976; 
Judge 1976; Cain 1976; New Society, 25.8.1977; Brogden 
1977; Kettle 1980). It is symptomatic of the changes that 
the only real instances of conflict involving Chief 
Constables in this period were a result of the 
implementation 'of corporate management proposals. Within 
the new structures the now dominant professionals, that 
is, the Chief Constables and chief executives of the new 
councils, clashed over who was in control of the police 
(see Oliver, 1987151-53). The elected representatives had, 
seemingly, no role to play within the new structures. Two 
other points must be ~mphasi~ed. First, given the 
composition of the Police Authorities white, male, 
middle class and respectable working class - it is not 
surprising that they were only capable of representing the 
interests of those groups .. who were not in conflict with .. 
. . . . ~ 
the police. Second, the participation of the community in 
police authority matters, as in other areas of local 
government, was Virtually non-existent in terms of closing 
off meetings to the public whether through not advertising 
authority meetings or through the development of 
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subcommittees where the real discussion and decisions took 
place (see Cox and Morgan, 1973:131 Brogden 1977). 
Effectively the Police Authorities were closed off to any 
possibility of public accountability through the public's 
participation. 
Nevertheless, there is an important qualification that 
should be made in relation to the position of the Police 
Authorities. Although the 1964 Act divested the Watch 
Committees of certain of their powers and they were 
subject to "the ultimate authority of the Home Office and 
the immediate professional authority of the Chief 
Constable" (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984 1 38), the 
provisions of the Act had been worded in such a manner so 
as to be suitably vague about what the powers of the 
Authorities were and what were the exact limits to the 
powers were 
There is nothing in the Act to preclude Police 
Authorities discussing and offering advice on matters 
ef policing deemed relevant to the overriding duty of 
maintaining an 'adequate and efficient' force; nor, for 
that matter, since a Chief Constables responsibilities 
of 'direction and control' are not deemed to be 
exclusive, is there anything to specifically preclude 
their issuing instructions. On the other hand, there is 
no specific power to do so, nor any specific duty 
imposed on Chief Constables in this connection beyond 
those pertaining to reports (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 
1984116). 
Thus there was a grey area if any Police Authority were 
motivated enough to test the powers allocated to it under 
the 1964 Act. 
-; _0.- --ii. The crisis in the policing of the community 
1i (a) Dimensions of the crisis 
The overall absence of conflict over policing matters in 
Police Authorities did not mean that there was a consensus 
77 
about the policing. In fact there can be no clearer 
indication of how the structures of police accountability 
were malfunctioning and how remote and weak the Police 
Authorities were than to compare what was happening in the 
Authorities and what was happening on the streets and in 
the police stations. Just how unrepresentative the Police 
Authorities were of those sections of the community 
subject to policing is indicated by the fact that there 
was no discussion of the complaints of those on the end of 
the practical professionalized policing practices in this 
period. 
As the 1960s and 1970s progressed policing was placed back 
on the political agenda as it became more and more 
controversial. This was virtually inevitable given the 
changes that had been effected by the 1964 Police Act and 
the other organizational changes that had taken place in 
the post-war period. It was specifically because the 1964 
Act failed to resolve the problems of lack of police 
accountability that ensured the issue would resurface. In 
fact this was virtually inevitable because first, the 
powers of the police had been expanded second, the 
structures of accountability had been formally weakened 
and finally the political and economic climate had changed 
and the public order role of the police was once more 
prioritized. Certain sections of the community were 
particularly vulnerable to such developments. 
The growing concern about the nature of policing in the 
late 1960s and 1970s covered a wide spectrum of issues 
that can· be distinguish~d at ·f6~~·l~vels all of which are 
interrelated (see Jefferson and Grimshaw, 198411-8, see 
also Reiner,. 1985161-80 Morris, 19891144-151); First, 
apprehension was voiced about the increasing gap between 
the police and the community. Larger, impersonal and 
, ....... , 
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professionalized forces and changes in operational 
philosophy were the corollary of the 
that had taken place in the post 
structural changes 
war period. These 
technocratic forces did not feel the need to, negotiate 
their presence in neighbourhoods, to cultivate the consent 
of the community or to take into account the needs of the 
community. 
implemented 
Policing strategies were decided upon, 
and changed without any outside lay 
consultation. Thus a unit beat system was introduced and 
then replaced by fire brigade policing at the professional 
discretion of the Chief Constables and under the 
sponsorship of the Home Office. Such changes had a 
considerable impact upon the subculture of the lower ranks 
and the abrasive manner in which they dealt with the 
public, particularly in the inner cities 
In this way a variety of valuable and non-crime related 
contacts with the public were lost to be replaced by 
those involving a greater possibility of inquisitorial 
and potentially coercive relationships (Stephens, 
1988: 9) • 
This apprehension was fuelled by alarm about the 
apparently ever increasing crime rate and social disorder 
which gripped Britain from the late 1960s onwards. Second, 
there was concern about the growing catalogue of police 
malpractice in relation to the planting of evidence, 
instances of extensive police corruption, the policing of 
public order, the use of specialist troubleshooting units 
such as the SpeCial Patrol Groups, saturation policing 
methods, fire-brigade policing methods, anti- subversion 
and intelligence gathering activities, the application of 
"" .... ; ·new control-technologies from computers to surveillance 
equipment and, despite the 1976 Police Act, the continuing 
inadequacy of the complaints system (see Jefferson and 
Grimshaw, 198414-8). 
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Third, the words and actions of senior police officers in 
the 1970s became more pronounced and controversial (see 
Reiner, 1980;1983). Freed from the strictures of political 
accountability the professional corporate managers of the 
police service, both as individuals and through ACPO, 
began to assert their professional autonomy. This 
expressed itself politically during the decade in their 
challenging of any encroachment upon their powers and, 
through the utilization of moral paniCS about the riSing 
crime rates and social deviance, their exaction of more 
powers and resources (see Hall et aI, 1978; Hough and 
Heal, 1982). Sir Robert Mark's well documented 
intervention in 1973 in the form of the Dimbleby Memorial 
Lecture (as he himself) admitted was the first time that a 
senior officer had 'publicly voiced at length' his views 







1976 Police Act when he reSigned as 
Metropolitan Police rather than 
which he was opposed. Mark's overtly 
political interventions set the precedent not just for 
future Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police but also 
for prOVincial counterparts, most notably James Anderton. 
When finally challenged to account for the behaviour of 
the forces under their command, they responded in a manner 
which attempted to define any questioning of the police as 
an attempt to subvert the democratic process (see 
Levenson, 1981143). 
However, it was not only chief officers 
intervening in the political process. 
who were 
The Police 
. Federation'; "as' .. thE{··powerful' .... ·representative of "the'"}u'n1"or 
ranks, became more and more strident in its interventions 
in a manner which even embarrassed the chief officers. 
1965 was the first time that the Federation had attempted 
to intervene to mobilize the public behind the police by 
'''.r ',.;_ 
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organizing a fight crime campaign. However, it was in the 
1970s that the interventions became more systematic. In 
1975, supported by the Superintendents' Association, the 
Federation launched a law and order campaign. Between 
1977-78 it engaged in a wage dispute with the Labour 
government which resulted in the recommendation of a 407-
pay rise. In 1979 the Federation attempted to intervene in 
the national electoral process through a national press 
campaign by asking voters to consider where the candidates 
stood on law and order. It was in this year also that the 
Police Federation broke with tradition and appointed as 
its Parliamentary advisor a government rather than an 
opposition MP (see Reiner, 1980;1983). 
The fourth level of concern centred upon the manner in 
which the main political parties began to focus upon the 
issue of law and order as a basis upon which to mobilize 
electoral support. When in opposition in 1977 the 
Conservatives made an unprecedented intervention by giving 
full support to the pay claims of the Police Federation. 
In 1978 the Labour conference saw the party try to wrest 
·the issue of law and order from the Conservatives. As a 
consequence in the run up to the 1979 election both 
parties tried to outdo each other in their commitment to 
law and order 
committed itself 
law and order. 
e:<penditure. 
electorally to 
The Conservative Party 
~rioritizing spending on 
As Jefferson and Grimshaw have made clear 
Crystallizing practically all these controversial 
' .. ' ,_, .... , .. , causes for concern and providing t.hroughout t.he most 
acute and persisting examples for campaigners, has been 
the issue of police-black relations. Whether in 
connection with the abuse of police powers, 'reactive' 
policing, the failure of the complaints system or the 
use of the Special Patrol Group in both public-order 
and crime situations, the black community, and 
especially in the latter half of the period has never 
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been far from the centre of things (1984:7). 
There could 
police-black 
be no clearer manifestation of the crisis in 
relations than the lack of black 
representation or participation in the various police 
forces. 
When those concerned about the practices and policies of 
the police demanded accountability from that institution 
they were faced with chief officers who had been legally, 
organizationally and politically empowered during the 
previous twenty years. They also had to face the 
consequences of the constant redefining of the role and 
the position of the Police Authorities in that period, 
formally, substantively and ideologically. The 1964 and 
1972 Acts had reshaped them in terms of their composition, 
powers and the size of the forces for which they were 
supposed to be responsible. As a consequence they faced 
empowered Chief Constables who, spurred on by the 
ideologies of professionalism and corporate management, 
lost no opportunity both to consolidate and to assert 
their autonomy from the Authorities. The Police 
Authorities, like other institutions of local governance, 
had been restructured and redesigned, as apolitical and 
powerless committees and many Authorities saw nothing 
wrong with this state of affairs. 
ii (b) The response to the crisis 
It should also be noted that one of the ways the police 
attempted to rebut criticisms during this period was by 
. ".'- :' " ~":- pointing " to,.".the,- ,.work ._ of .. , their .. prqfessi onal , community .... '-,,' 
relations departments. Premised upon the same principles 
as the other community liaison and consultative 
initiatives referred to previously, police forces also 
appointed liaison and consultation officers (see Merricks, 
1970; Dear, 1972; Roach, 1978). The community in question 
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referred to those groups who were a problem for the 
police. primarily black migrants and young males of inner 
city neighbourhoods. Thus. the key target of both the 
routinized hard policing strategies mentioned above and 
the community relations policies was young black males 
(see Institute of Race Relations. 1987: Howe. 1988) 
There was a dovetailing between the state's overall 
attempts to contain the discontent of the inner cities and 
the attempts by the police to neutralize their critics. 
Haphazard approaches first developed by forces in the 
1960s came under Home Office direction by the first half 
of the 1970swith the resultant professionalization of 
community relations. However. the efforts of the police 
suffered from the same flaws as the other initiatives. As 
the HMI of Constabulary astutely noted in 1973 
This approach does, however, presuppose that coloured 
people are to some extent organized and have 
'representatives· with whom the police may forge links. 
With the rise of the British "second generation" there 
is less likelihood of this and the, police are now 
frequently faced with real difficulties in establishing 
contact with younger coloured people who very often are 
outside such "representative" organiZations (HMI, 
1973: 57) • 
However, the Home Office and the police persisted with 
professional community 
mounting evidence that 
relations strategies despite 
liaison and conSUltation, with 
community representatives was not "easing the tension from 
the policing of the frontlines of England·s inner cities. 
Discussion 
-~~. ' ... r,~ ·t~,.A·~ser.ies of important themes can be identified "from,,·this··'·' 
discussion of the relationship between the police, 
democratic accountability and communitY,representation and 
partiCipation. First, the new police.forces developed as a 
consequence of the settlement of bourgeois demands for 
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political representation during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. They had the key role of representing 
the interests of the newly dominant urban elites through 
regulating the working classes on a daily basis and 
containing the latter·s demands for rights of 
representation and participation. In the carrying out of 
this role the police were directly politically accountable 
to these local elites. 
As the century progressed the respectable sections of the 
working classes gradually negotiated the informal 
representation of their interests in the policing of their 
neighbourhoods. With the recognition of their political 
demands in the shape of rights of electoral representation 
came the possibility of formally influencing policing. 
However, despite the fact that it was the those sections 
of the working class who accepted the police who had 
attained representation, this did not happen. This was 
because concurrent changes were taking place in the 
interests that the police were being expected to 
represent. Instead of representing the interests of local 
elites the police were instead coming to represent the 
interests of the national state. In order to undertake 
such a role the attempt was made to insulate this 
institution from local democratiC processes. As a 
consequence the substantive pow~rs of the old Watch 
Committees were curbed, significant non-democratic 
representation was included in the Police Authorities, and 
the reinterpretation of the legal position and empowerment 
of chief constables took place (see Brogden. 198211-331 
Lustgarten, . 1986152). . ii·,us ~ '" the' polT'ce' mciv~'d f rc)m':b'el ~g:'i- ' 
subordinate ,to a particular form of political 
accountability to being professionally autonomous, and 
senior police of~icers have vociferously defended that 
autonomy from those who would reassert localized political 
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accountability. 
Whilst this situation may not have been a pressing problem 
for those sections of society not in conflict with the 
police or subject to policing, it was for those who were. 
As a consequence of the above mentioned developments, the 
Police Authorities proved to be incapable and, in many 
instances, unwilling to call the police to account for the 
type o~ policing certain groups complained they were being 
subjected to. In addition to not having their interests 
represented by the Police Authorities these groups were 
subject to the setting up o~ supplemental liaison and 
consultation structures which, because o~ their 
composition, were also incapable of representing their 
interests. Thus the structure o~ representation precluded 
the partiCipation of those sections of society for whom 
the police were a daily problem in a variety o~ contexts. 
In this situation a crisis in police accountability was 
virtually inevitable. 
Therefore, in the latter half o~ the 1970s the 
accountability of the police once more became a political 
issue. This was because the inherent tensions and 
contradictions of the settlement reached under the social 
democratic corporatist state form could no longer be 
contained. In the attempt to resolve the economic crisis 
an overtly authoritarian-populist state form ~inally 
emerged in the 1980s providing the context within which 
the renewed demands ~or police accountability emerged-
and were resolved. 
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Section IV: The Authoritarian State and the Crisis o~ 
Democracy 
a. The reconstruction of democratic rights of citizenship 
Any sembl~nce oT the post-war consensus collapsed by the 
mid-1970s and between then and the election of 1979 the 
new right of the Conservative Party was able to construct 
a series of concerns into first, a coherent anti-statist 
critique oT that social democratic consensus and second, a 
political manifesto of what needed to be done to reverse 
that state oT aTTairs. Feelings of powerlessness and 
resentment as well as the fears and anxieties of sections 
OT the British electorate were finally mobilized and 
harnessed into a new right electoral bloc. Powerlessness 
resulted Trom the creation oT the large professionalized, 
unresponsive, unaccountable and malfunctioning state 
bureaucracies oT the welTare state, the nationalized 
industries and other public sector bodies. Feelings of 
resentment stirred against the seeming prioritization of 
certain interests most ~otably the trade unions and those 
dependent on welfare benefits both of which were seemingly 
holding the country to ransom. Fears and insecurities were 
expressed about matters ranging from moral decline to the 
Irish Republican Army, rising crime rates, industrial 
militancy, immigration and the state of the inner cities 
(see Hall et al., 1978; Gamble, 19811 Hall and Jacques, 
19831 Beynon and McMylor,19831 Gamble, 19881 Miliband et 
al., 19871 Hall, 1988; Jessop et ai, 1988). 
The subsequent election of a radical right Conservative 
administration on an overtly .law and order manifesto, 
pledging to tackle the ills afflicting British society, 
had serious consequences for those institutions and 
sections of society who were identified as being to blame 
.. 
for this state of affairs. The construction of a 
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~onetarist-based new economic order heralded the breakup 
of the last vestiges of the post-war political consensus. 
This involved the elimination of the six "poisons" of 
exorbitant government spending, high direct taxation, 
egalitarianism, excessive nationalization, a political 
trade union movement and an anti-enterprise culture. The 
centrality of mass unemployment 
policy, the construction of 
as an aspect of economic 
a new industrial relations 
framework, and rolling back the state through de-
nationalization, privatization, cutbacks in public 
expenditure, re-structuring of social security and the 
shift in government policy to subSidize mortgage relief 
and tax cuts characterized the resultant restructuring. 
The stated objective of this hegemonic project was to 
redefine the role of the state in facilitating the 
interests of the free market and 
to create new channels 
intervention; to consolidate a 
a fundamental recomposition 
1988120). 
of representation and 
new social base through 
of class forces (Jessop, 
Ideologically two key themes can be identified as being 
the hall-mark of what Hall (1983) has defined as the 
resultant authoritarian-populist state form. First, there 
was the stated commitment to expanding meaningful 
participation and representation through individual 
economic freedom and choice with the state having no role 
other than as facilitator. Second, the emphasiS on law, 
order, discipline and conviction. necessitated a strong 
state form. If required the state would force people to be 
free of the nanny state and to participate in the 
unfettered economy. Whilst economic and consumer rights of 
participation were to be expanded and existing corporatist 
arrangements dismantled the authoritarian dimension 
ensured that there would be no corresponding 
democratization of the state or civil society. The new 
right had no hesitation in making it clear that it was 
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deeply suspicious of democracy 
to the dangers of unlimited 
1977; Levitas, 1985) 
making constant reference 
democracy (see Skidelsky, 
Consent has now been charged with a new ideological 
content: authoritarian, dismissive of democratic 
institutions, anti-union and anti-left; directed not so 
much to win over the organized Labour movement but its 
enemies within and without. Consent has increasingly 
been turned into a formality, as the old forms of 
public accountability, always minimal at best, have 
been rejected in the name of opposition to political 
interference. In their place the public are asked to 
identify with bureaucratic decisions taken 
independently of representative institutions (Fine and 
Miller, 19851229). 
What this project was heralding was the dramatic 
restructuring of British capitalism and class formations 
affected by that restructuring. Few sections of the 
working classes escaped the consequences of the new right 
project (see Loney, 1986; Pahl, 1984). Those affected by 
mass unemployment and the restructuring of the welfare 
state were effectively being excluded from the redefined 
rights of economic representation and participation. They 
were joining those marginalized groups who had never 
achieved full rights of citizenship within the post-war 
state. As a consequence a two-thirds society was being 
created in which 
There are those who are in and those who are out and 
not needed ••• there is no need for them in the scheme of 
citizenship (Dahrendorf 19851102-3). 
At the most the marginalized would play the historic role 
of being a reserve army of labour, servicing the new 
economic order but having no automatic rights within it 
(see Sivanandan, 1983). In order to bring about this re-
....... 0rdering"o,LBritish society and to contain the response of 
the dispossessed the coercive and authoritarian dimensions 
of the processes and institutions of the state were 
strengthened. • The notion of 'the enemy within' was 
constantly expanded, as Hall (1980) had predicted, to 
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include any group who opposed the restructuring. Thus the 
three overarching processes identified in the previous 
discussion about how the state has responded to demands 
~or representation and partiCipation continued to be 
important for the renewed struggles of the 1980s. 
11. The New Urban Left (NUL) 
The Labour Party in opposition attempted to come to terms 
with the seriousness of its situation. Initially, after 
the 1979 election, the left of the party gained the upper 
hand with the election of Michael Foot as leader and the 
eventual formulation of what has been respectively 
described as ·perhaps its 
or 'the longest suicide 
1988). More immediately 
most left wing programme ever' 
dramatic swing to 
taking control of 
Labour 
the 
note in history' (see Kavanagh, 
in the local elections of 1981 a 
resulted in the Labour Party 
Greater 
metropolitan county councils and 
London Council, the six 
district councils. These 
electoral victories were premised on manifestos in many 
areas, most notably in London, promising the 
implementation of policies fundamentally opposed to the 
philosophy of the Conservative government. 
The rise of the NUL in local politics was the culmination 
of an intense struggle to overthrow the old Labour Party 
machine which the former blamed for presiding over the 
decline of Britain's inner cities. This NUL viewed local 
. 
politics as being more important than national and began. 
to develop what became known as the municipal or ·local 
road to socialism'. (see In and Against the State, 1980). 
This ·local road' was critical of the national Labour 
Party's ··central.ist. anti-democratic and m~~'~t.arist 
policies and believed that, particularly with the election 
of a radical right central government, local government 
offered the only alternative and viable arena wherein to 
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challenge that Conservative government and to develop 
radical democratic socialist alternatives. 
By 1981 the NUL had gained control of the Greater London 
Council and the boroughs o~ Camden, Hackney, Islington, 
Lambeth and Southwark whilst nationally it subsequently 
took control, in Sheffield, Edinburgh and Manchester. In 
each area it is possible to identify different priorities, 
commitments and power bases which reflecting the local 
political context and traditions. However, as with the 
right of the Conservative Party, at the basis of its 
proposals was a critique of the representatory structures 
that had developed, primarily under Labour governments, in 
the post-war period. 
Boddy and Fudge (1984) have identified three strands to 
the resultant proposals. First, there was an attempt to 
deal with the formal defects and limitations o~ social 
democracy and the ways interests are represented. Second, 
there was the attempt to recognize previously 
unrepresented/non represented interests within the formal 
political arena. And ~inally there was the attempt to 
shift local governance towards operating in a more open, 
partiCipatory and democratic manner. The objective was to 
bring about the representation and participation of the 
dispossessed, through the creation o~ the 'rainbow 
coalition'. In addition it should also be noted that the 
NUL wanted to mobilize and channel this alliance by 
creating an alternative Labour electoral bloc. 
To achieve this a series of measures were implem~nted. In 
an attemp~' to'rmake 'the' leadership of the Labour Party 
accountable to the party members, an emphasis was placed 
on implementing manifesto commitments and the setting up 
of working parties to allow the participation of party 
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members. The NUL also attempted to use what powers local 
government had left to protect their constituents from the 
effects of radical new right policies by ·creative 
accounting' strategies to maintain and expand social 
services to those in need and to stimulate the local urban 
economy. It was recognised that in order to implement such 
strategies local government would have to be restructured. 
New council committees were set up and old ones recomposed 
to allow for the representation and participation of the 
dispossessed. To strengthen this co-optees and advisors 
from previously excluded groups were appointed to 
articulate the needs of those groups as well as to 
challenge the power of the professional council officers. 
Politically sympathetic and committed council officers 
were also appointed and promoted. Councillors were 
expected to work on a full time basis to represent their 
constituents and to confront the problem of the 
profeSSional autonomy of council officers. 
An attempt was also made to break down the corporati~t 
managerialist arrangements and 
bureaucracies that had excluded 
centralized professional 
certain sections of the 
community and stifled its participation. Policies were 
implemented to open up government, to decentralize 
services and to consult and meet with local communities to 
involve them in decision making (see Hoggett and 
Hambelton, 1987). Thus the NUL was plaCing the interests 
of the .dispossessed sections of the community on the 
formal polltl~al agenda (Campbell, 1987110). 
Hence·although both the new right and the NUL were 
implementing--proposals 
popular representation 
sets of interests were 
defined the difference 
premised upon an emphasis· on 
and participation, very different 
being prioritized. Hall (1980) 
as being between the popular-
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democratic and authoritarian-popular. The key differences 
identified by Livingstone (1988) were first, populism 
based on the celebration of cultural and racial difference 
versus populism based on racism 
intervention in the economy in an 
economically vulnerable versus 
iacilitate the survival of the 
and jingoism; second, 
attempt to protect the 
non-intervention to 
fittest; third, the 
assertion of the rights of women and homosexuals versus 
the assertion of the patriarchal Victorian family form, 
and finally the general recognition of the interests of 
the dispossessed versus prioriti2ation of the privileged. 
The fact that the radical wings of both political parties 
attained political power with fundamentally opposing 
ideologies meant that they were on a collision course. For 
the demands concerning the democratic accountability of 
the police that collision was fatal. Three identifiable 
themes overlapped to stifle such demands by the middle of 
the 1980s. First, there was the inevitable conflict 
between central government and radical local Labour 
administrations and the consequences for struggles within 
the Labour Party as it lost two more national elections. 
Second, there was the role given to the police within the 
Conservative government·s political project and the manner 
in which the police utilized such a role to further their 
own interests. Finally there was the issue of law and 
order upon which the Conservatives had been elected and 
which retained a prominent role within government policies 
through the virtual criminallzation of opposition, 
including the Labour Party. These themes formed the 
context within which NUL administrations attempted to 
implement "their ···policies, ·including demanding"democratie: 
accountability of the police. 
b. The further evisceration of democracy 
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i. The national context 
As indicated previously, given the deep seated suspicion 
of democracy in new right thinking it is hardly surprising 
that the Conservative government, from 1979 onwards paid 
scant regard to its infringements upon democratic rights. 
The strong state necessarily infringed upon the democratic 
rights of individuals but it did so in a just cause - to 
enable the expansion of economic rights, and therefore 
individual freedom. The Conservative government throughout 
the 1980s passed a plethora of legislation which, under 
the guise of facilitating economic freedom, weakened and, 
in certain instances, dismantled formal democratic rights 
of representation and participation (see Leys, 1984; 
Neuberger, et al., 1987. Hillyard and Percy-Smith, 1988; 
Pilger, 19.90). 
1i. The local context 
Given the considerable discrepancy in power between the 
two tiers of government documented previously, the NUL 
administrations came under intense pressure from central 
government. As the 1980s progressed it became clear that 
the final showdown between what was left of local 
democratic institutions of governance and the central 
state was taking place. The Conservative 




in terms of 'setting people free· from local 
bureaucracies and protecting ratepayers from the high 
spending fantasies of socialist controlled town halls. 
It is part of a process where, through populist 
rhetoric, central government appeals to the. local 
.populace, .... ·.bypassing the traditional mediatory 
structures-~of local elites and local bureaucracies 
(Bassett, 1984:96-7). 
Legislative coercion was utilized to bring ·creative· 
, '.' 
local authority expenditure under control by centralizing 
financial control and establishing increased control over 
specific policies. The new system of allocating central 
government financial support under the 1980 Local 
Government Planning and Land Act strengthened control over 
revenue and capital expenditure. It also introduced a new 
system of targets and penalties to punish overspending. 
The 1982 Local Government Finance Act banned supplementary 
rates and set up the Audit Commission. In 1983 a White 
Paper, Streamlining the Cities, was 
the Conservative government's plans 
metropolitan county councils including 
published outlining 
to abolish the 
the Greater London 
Council, which were under the control of the Labour Party. 
Legislation was introduced to limit autonomous local 
government initiatives in the areas of housing (eg, 
Housing Action Trusts), 
Bill) and local economic 
Corporations; Enterprise 
education (eg,Education Reform 
policy (eg, Urban Development 
Zones; Task Forces). This 
involved the introduction of quasi-markets and the 
transfer of powers to non-elected bodies (Hambelton,1989). 
The 1984 Rates Act gave central government the power to 
rate-cap those local authorities whose high spending or 
high rates were designated as irresponsible (see Blunkett 
and Jackson 1987:158-165). 
There was also the attack on local government through the 
encouragement to radical Conservative controlled local 
counCils, most notably Wandsworth, to privatize local 
services. The 1985 Transport Act destroyed the Left's 
attempts to regulate market forces, most notably in 
Sheffield and the GLC. The government also announced its 
intentions to abolish one of the institutions that the 
Conservatives--hated, the Labour controlled Inner London 
Education Authority (see Gordon and Klug, 1985). The 1985 
Local Government Act finally abolished, as from 1st April 
1986, the Greater London Council and the six metropolitan 
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county councils, all of which had continued to be Labour 
controlled. The Conservative government made no attempt to 
disguise why it intended to abolish 'the mets~. One 
government minister made the historical connection when he 
claimed, in 1984, that 
serious problem that the 
(Blunkett and Jackson, 
link even more explicit 
"modern Poplarism" was the most 
Conservative government faced 
1987:56). Norman Tebbit made the 
The Labour Party is a party of division, in its present 
form it represents a threat to the democratic values 
and institutions on which our parliamentary system is 
based. The GLC is typical of this new, modern divisive 
version of socialism. It must be defeated. So we shall 
abolish the GLC (The Guardian. 15.3.83; see also 
18.3.83; 27.11.84) 
Duncan and Goodwin (1988) have argued that the ratecapping 
legislation was making it clear to the people of Britain 
that there were limits to democratic choice. If they voted 
for Left-wing councils that spent heavily or pursued 
policies that opposed central government, their vote would 
be invalidated. If they continued to vote for such 
councils then the councils would be abolished. In addition 
local elected representatives who implemented mandated 
manifesto commitments, in defiance of government Wishes, 
ran the risk of being criminalized and debarred from 
office, as happened in Lambeth and Liverpool (see 
Livingstone, 1988; Parkinson 1985J Hatton, 1988). 
In addition to legislating to deffne out the policies and 
interests represented by the NUL, the new right benefited 
from and contributed to a systematic media mis-
information campaign which defined suchpollcies as the 
~ .. :" :.actions>,·, .:·of 




left· administrations (see 
attempt by the NUL to 
reconstruct the agenda of not only the Labour Party but 
also the national political agenda to ,include the 
interests of the previously under/non-represented brought 
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a fierce media backlash. This 
interests, groups and ideas 
Britain in the 1980s. Those of 
campaign made clear what 
should be represented in 
the 'loony left' were not 
acceptable. A series of folk devils, Greenham Common peace 
protestors, gays, 
blacks, Miltant 
and the miners 
lesbians, social security scroungers, 
Tendency, Trotskyites, the GLC, the Irish 
were linked together to constitute a 
conspiracy involving the enemy within and the enemy 
without. The media's campaign and the government's against 
the 'loony left' were virtually identical. As Hall 
(1988:263) notes 'once the 
deep symbiosis between 
one liner was launched, the 
Thatcherism and the press 
guaranteed it an uninterrupted flight'. Both emphasized 
the same conspiracy 
At the one end of the spectrum are the terrorist gangs 
within our borders and the terrorist states which 
finance and arm them. At the other are the hard left, 
operating inside our system conspiring to use union 
power and the apparatus of local government to break, 
defy and subvert the laws <Prime Minister, The Guardian 
27.11.84). 
As far as the media were concerned the prioritization of 
the interests of th~ dispossessed was not acceptable 
The 'Rainbow Coalition' has not even been attacked as a 
genuine set of proposals. Instead their challenge to 
the establishment has been portrayed as a sinister, 
subversive conspiracy of the consensus. For the press, 
they have ventured outside the traditional structures 
of society, left the 'normal' area of politics and 
entered an almost criminal world of disruption and 
anarchy (Hollingsworth, 198614) 
It was emphasized that there 
infiltrate the Labour Party 
had been a conspiracy to 
by extreme groups and 
individuals whose aim was to use the respectable guise of 
- ____ the.Party.in,-order to destroy British democracy_"Thus 
there was the constant association of the Labour Party 
with lawlessness and disorder_ This campaign had serious 
consequences for the Left of the Party and for the 
electoral chances of the Labour Party both nationally and 
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locally. The loss of two safe Labour seats in London by-
elections in 1981 was blamed on the policies of the GLC 
'loony left~ and in the Bermondsey Peter Tatchell lost a 
saTe Labour seat as the result OT an extremely vitriolic 
anti-left media campaign. It was vindication as far as the 
media was concerned that the Labour Party was not fit to 
govern 
by the time of the 1983 election campaign, Fleet Street 
had not changed its mind. Labour, in their eyes, had 
been taken over by small groups of extremists who had 
hi-jacked the Party for their own revolutionary 
ends ••• In other words Her Majesty's Opposition was not 
a legitimate political party (Hollingsworth, 19861209). 
The real consequences of the media campaign were felt in 
the 1983 election. The right wing press seemed vindicated 
~hen the results showed that the Party had its worst 
showing since 1918 capturing only 281. of the poll. In 
effect it had lost a quarter OT the votes it had in 1979 
and a significant percentage of those votes were those of 
its traditional supporters. With the rise of the Social 
Democratic Party there was no guarantee that the Party 
~ould even continue to be the automatic parliamentary 
opposition. The point was not lost on the press, nor on 
the Right wing of the Labour Party - the interests covered 
by the label 'loony left' were an electoral liability. 
c. The containment of the crisis and the issue of police 
accountability 
As documented previously, in the' late 1970s the party 
consensus broke down with the Conservatives making both 
law and order and the Labour Party's stance on the matter 
key electoral issues. The Conservative Party and right-
:;:"wing"media;···'~n··the run'up to the 1979 election,'''' sought to 
establish in the eyes of the electorate that the Labour 
Party was weak on law and order (see Phipps, 1988). The 
traditional weakness of the Labour. Party on law and order 
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(see Taylor, 1981; Kettle, 1982; Gilroy and Sim, 1987) was 
exaggerated by the near fanatical support the Conservative 
Party gave to strong law and order measures during this 
campaign. 
i. Renewed demands for democratic accountability of the 
police 
Simultaneously the Left of the Labour Party attempted to 
place on the political agenda the interests of those 
subject to the intensified discriminatory policing 
practices that had been unleashed by the new Conservative 
government. The resultant campaign for democratic 
accountability of the police was most intense in London 
since, as documented previously, there was no semblance of 
substantive accountability. Concern about racist 
. practices, corruption, deaths in police custody, 
utilization of weapons and general policing strategies on 
the streets led to 
the development of campaigns around cases directed 
towards the objective of creating effective 
participation of communities in the police policies, 
priorities and practices adopted on the streets 
(Scraton, Sim and Gilroy, 1987121). 
The outcome of some of the campaigns was the development 
of community based monitoring groups. Such groups involved 
themselves in the monitoring of policing practices, 
providing support and advice for those in difficulties 
with the police, campaigning for changes in the structure 
of police acountability and disseminating counter 
information. Despite the variety of objectives of the 
different groups they all shared ~ne characteristic 
to defend the community against police attack, 
.~.~lDalpr:actice· and' inefficiency, and, the incursion' of,r" . 
racists. These two objectives overlap and are 
prioritized by virtue of the geographic area which the 
group is in and the nature of their workers. Nearly all 
the work of monitoring groups can be characterized by 
the expressions 'community defence' and 'para-legal 
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defence' (Walker, 1986:45). 
This monitoring work linked into a wider political 
campaign for a Police Authority for London. In November 
1979 and March 1980 Jack Straw MP introduced 
(unsuccessfully) Bills into Parliament proposing 
amendments to the 1964 Police Act to strengthen the powers 
of Police Authorities and to set up a Police Authority for 
London (see Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984:150-156; Oliver, 
1987:68-70). Between March 1980 and the local government 
elections of 1981 the issue of police accountability and 
demands for a Police Authority for London achieved 
recognition within the electoral manifesto of the London 
Labour Party (see Bundred 1982). After the victory of the 
Labour Party the Greater London Council set up a non-
statutory Police Committee and support unit as part of its 
election manifesto promise to campaign for a 
democratically accountable police force. Within this 
initiative administrative and financial support WaS made 
available to the monitoring groups to enable them to 
first, act as the eyes and ears of the Police Committee 
second, articulate the concerns of the community and 
third, link the Committee to the community (see Walker, 
1986). Through the monitoring groups the community would 
be able to participate in attempts to hold the police 
accountable. 
The disturbances of 1980 and 1981 added impetus to the 
demands that ·the police should be accountable to the 
local communities· elected representatives· (Reiner, 
1982:470). All the simmering issues and concerns of the 
. 1970s were to take on~: new.~rgency as th~ inner cities 
burned.' This coincided ~i'th·'·th·;;'·~eturn, after the county 
council elections of 1981, of radicalized Labour 
administrations who were determined, like the Labour Party 
in London, to have an input into the manner in which 
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policing was carried out in their areas. Most of the 
Labour Parties in the Metropolitan areas had manifestos 
which called for changes in the 1964 Police Act to give 
Police Authorities the right to take decisions on matters 
of police policy as well as in relation to deployment and 
senior promotions. Later in the year at the national 
Labour Party annual conference a motion was supported to 
give more substantive powers' to the Police Authorities 
(see The Guardian 3.10.81). As Reiner says 
1981 was a climacteric not only in the debate on 
criminal procedure. The riots of the spring and summer 
of that year, and the Scarman Report on the Brixton 
disorders, were a turning point in the increasingly 
politicized debate about police organization and 
strategy, and the accountability and constitutional 
position of the police (Reiner, 1985:170). 
democratic accountability of the police 
ii. The authoritarian state's response to demands for 
ii (a). Community representation through consultation 
The response of the government to the disturbances of 1981 
and the intense debate about police accountability was 
formally extensive but geared towards a substantive defence 
of the status quo. Support was given to .the enhancement of 
the paramilitary response capabilities of the police whilst 
the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act and 1986 Public 
Order Act were eventually passed, legislatively empowering 
the police (see Zander, 1985; LSPU, 1987; Hillyard and Percy-
Smith, 1988). In addition, Lord Scarman was appointed 'to 
inquire urgently into the serious disorder in Brixton on 10 
to 12 April 1981 and to report, with the power to make 
recommendations' '(Warrant of Appointment, April 1981). There 
was ,- no democratically constituted inquiry into the 
disturbances or the constitutional position of the police. 
However, even Lord Scarman could not present a report on the 
disturban~es and the breakdown· of co'mmunity-police relations 
without conironting 








constitutional position of the Metropolitan Police. Scarman 
saw accountability as being important and he linked it to the 
notion of the mythical symbiotic relationship between the 
police and the community 
they [the policeJ are the servants of the community. 
They enforce the law on behalf of the community; indeed 
they cannot effectively enforce it without the support 
of the community. The community pays them and provides 
them with resources. So there has to be some way in 
which to secure that the independent judgement of the 
police can not only operate within the law but with the 
support of the community (para 4.60). 
Thereiore, he made specific proposals to try and bring about 
community representation on policing matters (see para 5.56). 
However, he rejected the evidence demanding a Police 
Authority for London and more powers for the existing 
Authorities. Instead he argued that what was necessary was 
community representation through statutory consultation with 
the police. 
Scarman in his analysis of the mechanisms through which the 
police and representatives of the black community consulted 
with each other before 1981 noted that such mechanisms were 
voluntary in nature and as a consequence both the police and 
community representatives could chose to participate, or not 
participate. The possibility of withdrawal from the 
consultation process had resulted in ·the collapse of 
structural and regUlar liaison between police and leaders of 
the local community' between 1978 and 1981 (para. 4.72) In 
particular, 5carman saw the withdrawal of the Council for 
Community Relations in Lambeth (CCRL) from· the liaison 
process in'1979 as· being of particular importance in the 
deteriorating relationship between the police and sections of 
the black community. It meant that as tensions bu~lt up there 
"as no means to resolve them. This led him to recommend the 
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development o~ a statutory ~ramework which would require 
local consultation between the Metropolitan Police and the 
community at Borough or Police District level (see para. 
S.69) 
Drawing heavily upon the ideas o~ the proponents o~ community 
policing (see Alderson, 1979; 1982; 1984; Schaffer, 1980; 
Moore and Brown, 1981) Scarman made a series of 
recommendations to re-establish the supposed symbiotic 
relationship between the police and the community. He 
recommended that consultative committees be set up consisting 
o~ representatives of the police, the council and the 
community which would have a specific role in relation to 
policing in their area. First, in relation to the complaints 
procedure, he recommended the development of a conciliation 
process to deal with minor complaints against the police. 
Each police station was to have a senior officer responsible 
for dealing with such a process and the consultative 
committees would provide a 
involved in this community 
recommended that members of 
list of people who could be 
mediation process. Second, he 




to make random checks 
of suspects in police 
consultative committees 
on the interrogation and 
stations. Finally, the 
would be able to make 
representations to a recommended Metropolitan Police Advisory 
Board made up of representatives of the Home Office, the 
Metropolitan Police and the London boroughs. 
However, in return for this input into policing matters by 
community representatives Scarman cautioned that 
Community representatives must seek to appreciate the 
.- !:-." i .. '", ... difficult~es (and dilemmas) of the pollce,and, .. tILavoid 
eKtravagant language or ill informed criticism (para. 
S.57) 
Scarman also assessed provincial policing arrangements for 
community consultation and liaison where, as far as he was 
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concerned~ the police ~are accountable to a committee [the 
Police Authority] drawn 
police' (5.60). He refused to 
concerning the nature of 
provinces and once more 
from the community they 
consider the criticisms made 
police accountability in the 
recommended that community 
conSUltation arrangements be implemented. 
Thus~ Scarman's recommendations were firmly located within 
the response, since the late 1960s, of the British state to 
demands for representation and participation. The essence of 
that response, as indicated earlier, was the implementation 
of non-democratic supplemental community structures which did 
not alter fundamentally the status quo. The ramifications of 
Scarman's recommending such structures were serious. First, 
any further democratization of the police was precluded. 
Second, in recommending that such structures be statutory he 
was in effect institutionalizing the problems of 
representation and participation associated with such 
structures. There was no democratic basis to the consultative 
structures. Third, the specific object of conSUltation was to 
discuss the development of policing policies and operations 
against crime (see para 5.56). Thus, there was the shift 
within Scarman's report from addressing the issue of the 
racist policing of black neighbourhoods to addressing the 
difficulties for the police in carrying out their anti-crime 
operations. Fourth, the object of consultation was to 
mobilize the active consent of the community to support anti-
crime operations (see para 5.46). Fifth, the final decision 
making power was left with the district police commander. If 
the conSUltation committee failed to agree to the proposed 
police operations/policies the police could ignore their 
wishes (see' 'para 5~54).-Si~th, no obligation was pI~ced 'upon 
the police to disclose information to the consultation 
committees. The police commander retained the discretion to 
decided what information would be placed before the 
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committees. Finally, Scarman moved from addressing the 
concerns of those groups in conflict with the police to those 
of the whole community (see para. 5.56). It was the whole 
community that was to be represented in the structures, even 
though the whole community was not in conflict with the 
police. As a consequence there was the very real possibility 
that those in conflict with the police would not have their 
interests represented in such forums and would not 
participate in such forums. If the experience of the other 
community consultation structures was any thing to go by once 
again only the more moderate and respectable sections of the 
community would be likely· to agree to the structures of 
representation and be prepared to participate in them. 
By the time ScarmanPs limited recommendations had been 
processed by Parliament and an intense anti-Scarman campaign 
orchestrated by the police any radical import, in terms of 
community representation and participation, was effectively 
neutralized (see Peirce, 1982. Sim, 1982; Benyon et al., 
1984). In December 1981 Parliament debated the report with 
the Home Secretary welcoming the recommendations for 
community consultation. After Home Office consultation during 
the first half of 1982 Home Office Circular 54/1982 on the 
guidelines for consultation was circulated to Chief 
Constables and the Police Authorities. The guidelines 
controlled tightly the proposed role of the consultative 
groups and reiterated the Chief Constables independence in 
operational matters. Ideally there would be large, formally 
constituted, consultative committees which would be based on 
diviSion/subdivision boundaries. It was made clear that the 
Home Secretary would look to the Inspectorate of Constabulary 
~~o ·satisfy himself that· appropriate·-(consultatation) 
arrangements have been made P with subsequent confirmation by 
the Chief Inspec~or. 
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In addition the four stated aims of consultation were centred 
upon the education of the community and the mobilization of 
the community towards concern about crime. The first aim was 
to identify local concerns about crime in the community and 
the police response. The second was to educate the public to 
understand that there were legal, financial and practical 
limitations to the capability of the police to respond to 
community demands. Following on from this the third aim was 
to stress the community's role in preventing crime. And 
finally, through identifying community priorities consensual 
poliCing would be reestablished. 
Central government continued to assert its ideas concerning 
what shape the arrangements should take. In February 1983 
the Home Secretary during a debate about the policing of 
London stated that consultative committees would have to 
have a balanced representation of community groups and 
recognize the operational autonomy of the police. During 
the following months new paragraphs were included in the 
Police and Criminal Evidence bill concerning the proposed 
consultation arrangements. The most important addition was 
a clause to say that if the Home Secretary considered a 
particular set of arrangements to be inadequate, he could 
require the Police Authority to submit a report and if he 
was still unsatisfied he could require a review of 
arrangements and the submission of a further report. 
The Home Office guidelines of 15 March 1984 on local 
conSUltation reiterated that the objective of consultation 
was to improve the relationship between the police and the 
community through contributing to crime control (Guidelines, 
198412). The" limitations to consultation were spelt out in' 
detail. Consultation committees could not have a say In first 
how the criminal law was enforced in their communities. 
Second they cO~I~ not have a say In how poiiceofflcers were 
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deployed in their communities. Thirdly they could not have a 
say in 
Finally, 





operations were implemented. 
a say in other operational 
investigations and security matter such as as 
matters. In addition they consultation committees could not 
discuss individual cases which might be under investigation, 
allegations oi police 
against police officers 
operational autonomy 
malpractice or individual complaints 
(see Guidelines, 1984:4-5). Thus, the 
of the police was enshrined in the 
consultative guidelines. 
The pattern of local consultative arrangements was also laid 
out in a detailed manner with the general principle being 
that membership had to be as representative of the community 
as Possible. The committees also had to be large enough to 
preclude a particular interest from dominating, with a 
regular turnover to prevent exclusivity. The police were to 
be members of right as were as local politicians but 
limitations were placed on the representation oi local 
councils. The community was to achieve representation through 
'traditional umbrella organizations· and community notables 
such as local teachers and the clergy. Additionally, there 
had to be the involvement oi local statutory agencies and 
local crime prevention panels. 
The guidelines specifically addressed, what it viewed as, the 
problematical issue of ethnic representation 
Where there are many small and disparate groups - for 
example in areas with many ethnic minority 
organizations but where regular representation on a 
conSUltative group will need to be limited - it may be 
worthwhile to invite such groups to meet together to 
settle __ the ... representation of their interests 
(Guidelines, 1984:7) •. _- .~ 
Representative groups from the ethnic minority communities 
were to be left to agree amongst themselves who would 
represent their community, if in fact anyone wanted to. This 
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statement is incredible when it is remembered that the 
origins of the consultative initiatives lay in the conflict 
between the police and black people. 
The revised Scarman proposals on community consultation were 
incorporated into the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill and 
finally became statutory under section 106 of the 1984 Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act. Thus the consultative structures 
were supposed to part of the government's balancing of the 
rights of citizens and the powers of the police. 
li (b). Lay visiting 
In addition the Home Office drew up provisional ouidelines 
for pilot lay visiting schemes which were to be implemented 
in Cheshire, Greater Manchester, Humberside, Lambeth, 
Leicestershire South Yorkshire and the West Midlands in mid 
1983. The schemes were assessed positively and the Home 
Office issued Circular 12/1986 
of lay visiting schemes 
commended the implementation 
'wherever local wishes and 
circumstances might make them appropriate' in February 1986. 
By the middle of 1988 thirty five out of the forty one 
provincial Police Authorities had introduced lay visiting 
schemes and in London thirty out of the thirty eioht proposed 
lay visiting panels were operational (see Kemp and .Morgan, 
1989). 
Thus, the Scarman recommendations .by the time they had 
undergone the parliamentary process had been considerably 
tightened to focus on issues that were of considerable use to 
the police and the Home Office. First, the Scarman Report, 
for all its limitations, had ~roued that the consultative 
.5tructures should have real powers and not be just a tal kino 
shop. However, no formal powers were oiven ·to the 
consultative structures. Second, the Scarman report stated 
that community involvement in both the policy and operational 
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sides of policing was, to a degree, feasible. There was the 
denial of this feasibility in the final formulation of the 
consultative proposals by the government. Third, Scarman 
recommended that the community, through the consultative 
structures, could also have a role in the complaints 
procedure. This was not acknowledged in the final 
formulations. Fourth, Scarman argued that the consultative 
structures in London should link into a proposed Metropolitan 
Police Advisory Board made up of the Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan Police with Home Office and London Borough 
representation. This proposed new tier of cons~ltation did 
not materialize in the final formulations. Fifth, the Scarman 
Report argued that there had to be consultation with the 
community before any representative arrangements were 
formalized. What emerged, after selective consultation, was 
government guidelines tightly controlling all facets of the 
proposed consultative committees particularly in relation to 
the representative and participatory structure and 
membership. Sixth, the overall emphasis within the Scarman 
recommendations on consultation was the rebuilding of a 
relationship of ·mutual trust and respect' between the 
community and the police. However, within the final 
formulation the emphasis was shifted to focus upon his ideas 
in relation to the control and prevention of crime •. Finally 
and allied to the sixth point Scarman recommended the need 
for a Co-ordinated approach with the active participation of 
the community to tackle the problems of 'inner city decline 
and minority disadvantage'. However, this was. later harnessed 
to government policies to encourage both a professional 
multi-agency approach and active communltypartlclpation 
geared solely towards the prevention of crime. 
This overall tightening 
proposals had undergone 
of emphasis that the Scarman 
during the Parliamentary, and Home 
Office, process meant that any wider recommendations were 
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neutralized. Given how moderate and limited those 
recommendations had been in the first place it is indicative 
of how concerned the government was to protect the police 
that it felt it had to neutralize them. 
DISCUSSION 
It is only possible to make sense of the Scarman proposals 
within the context of how the British state has responded 
previously to demands for democratic representation and 
participation. Characteristic of that response has been the 
formal recognition of particular rights of representation 
without such recognition necessarily resulting in 
democratization or challenging the hierarchies of 
power/powerlessness. Also characteri~tic of that respon~e has 
been, through the police, the coercive containment and 
disciplining of such demands. In this context, it was 
decidedly unlikely that the British state, particularly in it 
authoritarian form, would acceed to demands for the 
democratization of the police. 
Hence, although the government did respond formally to 
community premised demands concerning policing it was in a 
particular manner. Despite the fact that 
specifically addressed the relationship 
the Scar man report 
between the black 
community, and in particular black youth, and the police in 
Brixton his recommendations eventually addressed the whole 
community encompassed within the geographically divisional 
boundaries of the Metropolitan Police and the other police 
forces in Britain. This geographically ba~ed conception of 
the whole community was reaffirmed by subsequent government 
proposals which stressed that all sections of the community 
had to be represented. ,. -' '.-
In relation to the issues of representation, the whole 
community was to be indirectly represented within the 
109 
consultation arrangements and lay visiting by its readily 
identifiable leaders and organizations. There was to be no 
democratic basis to the representation. Since there was to be 
the equal representation of the whole community, all the 
local professional statutory agencies were also to be 
involved. The government recognised that ethnic minority 
representation would be problematical in terms of finding 
individuals and groups which could take on the mantle of 
being representative of their community. In order to resolve 
this problem the representative groups would be expected to 
pick a representative from amongst themselves. Overall, 
therefore, there was to be a clear structure of formal 
indirect representation of the community in the consultation 
and lay visiting process with the representatives relaying 
back information and discussions to the community. The 
crucial point within the proposed structure was that all 
viewpoints within the community would be represented, with no 
one interest dominating or being prioritized. The 
qualification to this was that the overarching interests of 
the government and Home Office in relation to crime control 
were being prioritized. Strict limits were therefore being 
set in relation to the object of consultation. 
With regard to participation, the participatory rights of the 
community were neither automatic nor extensive, being based 
upon an indirect representatory mode and the acceptance of 
the rights of others to particip~te within the process. 
Participation was to be within a highly formalized structure 
J 
and the terms of participation were predetermined by 
partiCipants having to acknowledge what was valid and invalid 
for legitimate discussion. There was a limited space for 
direct~ if limited~ com~~~it~-participation through the 
public gallery of the proposed consultative arrangements. 
Thus structures had been created which embodied all the 
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problems identified previously in the analysis of the 
supplemental non-democratic community structures that were 
utilized by the British state from the late 1960s onwards. 
Instead o~ attempting to create structures that specifically 
addreSSing the interests, needs and the demands of those 
sections of the community who had fought with the police the 
government's recommendations were aimed at the whole 
community. Furthermore in addition to promoting better 
relations between the police and the community the structures 
"ere given a specific remit in relation to facilitating 
consensual crime control and prevention. How could the 
interests o~ those ~or whom 
possibly achieve satisfactory 
structures? 
the police were the problem 
representation within such 
It is a tribute to the power of the concept of community and 
the vagueness of its meaning that in the aftermath of the 
1980/81 disturbances and the Scarman report community 
policing proposals reached the national political agenda in 
Britain. Nationwide senior police officers who had been 
previously hostile to such proposals responded by attempting 
to show that they were implementing community policing 
poliCies <Baldwin and Kinsey, 19821112). The attempts to 
relegitimate policing practices in the inner cities in this 
period were premised upon the ideological power of community 
in relation to participation and representation in policing 
matters. As Weatheritt has astutely noted 
It illustrates the power of an idea whose time has 
come ••• Community policing is a protean conceptlits 
strengths lie in its capacity to seem many things to 
many people and it is an ideal as much as a method 
(Weatheritt, 198313) • 
. The ideal was-something that the British"- state"once more 
tUrned to in order to neutralize substantive demands for 
democratic representation and partiCipation. The key question 
. . - .'
is which community would achieve representation? 
Summary of Part I 
The first section of 
the theoretical and 
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this thesis has attempted to identify 
structural problems that have to be 
confronted by the Left in its demands for the police to be 
made democratically accountable to the community. It has been 
argued the British state has dealt with demands for rights of 
democratic representation and participation in a three fold 
manner. First, there has been the construction of democratic 
rights of citizenship, premised upon the notion of 
representation. The mass of British society was eventually 
endowed with individual political and legal rights which 
could be exercised within a highly structured and 
hierarchical constitutional structure. As Hall and Schwartz 
(1985:28-29) argued demands for a radical participatory 
democracy were defeated, as were demands for fundamental 
changes in the hierarchies of power/powerlessness. At the 
same time as formal representative rights were conceded to 
the majority of people, a complimentary process of what Leys 
(1984162) has described as de-democratization took place. "Key 
areas of decision-making were removed from the possibility of 
being democratically accountable to the enfranchised masses. 
Under post-war corporatist arrangements formal rights of 
social democratic representation became virtually meaningless 
as powerful interests ensured that their' interests were 
prlorltlzed In the non-democratic corporatist structures. As 
a consequence by the end of the 1960s commentators began to 
identify a crisis in democracy and more specifically a crisis 
of representation and particiaption. This key moment provides 
another example of how the British state dealt with renewed 
demands for community 'participation and representation. 
Supplemental non-democratic community structures were created 
to give representation to the interests of the powerless. 
Through acting upon social divisions such structures 
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contained and channelled moderate community demands whilst 
radical participatory ones, which would were demanding 
changes in the distribution of power, were defined out. 
The third process identified in the state's response to 
demands for the extension of democratic rights, involved 
coercively policing such demands. Hence it is the interests 
that the police represent that provide particular problems 
for those demanding the democratization of this institution. 
Indeed it is a central argument of this thesis that as the 
police assumed this representative role steps were taken to 
remove the institution from the possibility of democratic 
accountability being exercised. It was this weakening in the 
democratic accountability of the police that resulted in the 
crisis of policing that developed from the 1960s onwards. 
This crisis in democracy and crisis in policing were 
heightened by the emergence of an increasingly authoritarian 
state form, from 1974 onwards. The election of a radical 
right administration in 1979 committed to the prioritization 
of economic interests over any others resulted in the 
dramatic restructuring of the edifice of Citizenship, further 
de-democratization of British society and the police being 
allocated the key role of containing the consequences of the 
Changes. As a consequence the demands for democratic 
representation and participation in policing matters were not 
high on the government' agenda. Instead, as in the 1960s and 
1970s, supplemental non-democratic structures of community 
representation were introduced. Given the pivotal interests 
that the police were representing there was no change in the 
democratic governance of the police. The next section will 
examine how "the issues of democratic accountability and 
community representation were dealt with in Manchester. 
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PART I I: POLICING. COMMUNITY AND DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN MANCHESTER: 1981-85 
Section I: The Police and the Community 
On 2 April 1976 James Anderton became the Chief Constable 
of Greater Manchester Police (GMP) , the largest provincial 





·a new generation 
intervene in public 
an ·ideology in its 
new generation 
of policemen' who were 
debate and who regarded 
own right' (see Kettle, 
officers were the direct 
of autonomous chief police 
beneficiaries of the legal, 
organizational and political changes documented previously 
(see pp 65-74). James Anderton's public pronouncements and 
his policing philosophy have generated more than a decade 
of controversy about the policing of Greater Manchester 
and in doing so provided the context within which debates 
about police accountability and community representation 
and participation in policing matters emerged in the 
county, and particularly in relation to the policing of 
Manchester. 
In order to understand why debates about the democratic 
accountability of the GMP emerged it is necessary to 
discuss the policing philosophy of the Chief Constable. At 
the basis of this philosophy was: an unequivocal view of 
police accountability premised upon the nature of the 
relationship of the police to the community • 
. , __ .·c .. ,,_.,=a.:. ........... ,-.:,Ti..l.h.:.:e=-_~C:.wh!.:!io..!:e::.:lf!;..;..._.!::C:!:io!.!.:n!..:sut::.!a!!b:L1:Le=-'.Es~~c::Jo:!!n..!.:c!::.Se~p~t~u1.::a::Jl~i~z~a~t~i~o!.!..n!.-..!o~f1-., -l:t.wh!.S,e 
community 
The Chief Constable's 
public order and the 
controversial views on policing, 
state are well known nationally. He 
has conSistently expressed concern about politicians, 
defended the autonomy of ,Chief Constables from political 
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interference, of any kind, and labelled those who demand a 
strengthening of democratic accountability as subversives. 
Although national prominence is given to his statements 
and actions it must be emphasized that ir, many instances 
the basis for such comments and actions is the local 
situation and usually this is where they have most impact. 
At the core of the Chief Constable's statements is a 
theory of police and community that provides the structure 
for the day to day policing of Manchester. There are 
~undamental themes about the community that underpin this 
poliCing philospohy. 
First, the Chief Constable has stressed the, 'traditional 
and unique partnership between the community and its 
police force' (1982 Annual Report:bS-bb) and has compared 
the nature of the relationship 'to that which operates in 
a well conducted family where there is complete trust and 
confidence and an absence of any kind of deception 
whatsoever' (1979 Annual Report:xiv). 
Consequently it is a definition of community which is 
premised on a Victorian notion of the family which is 
structured hierarchically with one party, the father, 
unquestioningly in control. Allied to that Victorian 
notion is one of respectability. Throughout his speeches 
and statements it is possible to d~tect a clear idea that, 
for the Chief Constable, the community is made up of those 
respectable people, irrespective of class, race, gender 
and age who both support and respect the police and the 
law of the land. Thus, the classic Victorian 
respectable/disreputable distinction has played an 
important part in the Chief Constable's views of who is 
and who is not of the community. 
Second, as far as he is concerned, the Chief Constable and 
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the police -force are, ~fully accountable to the community 
both directly and through the business of the police 
committee' (1977 Annual Report:viii). However, Anderton 
has always prioritized the direct relationship between the 
community and its police -force and has expressed constant 
oPposition to individuals and structures, particularly 
politically based ones, that would play the role o-f 
mediating in that direct relationship. In order to be 
fully accountable the Chief Constable, through one of the 
largest police Public Relations departments in England and 
Wales, has utilized and cultivated the media in order to 
explain his policies to the community. 
Third, it has been emphasized that the community is in 
constant moral danger and that there is an organized 
external conspiracy to subvert stable internal community 
structures (see Anderton, 1977; 1979a; 1979b; 1981b; 
1981c; 1982; 1985a). Fourth, there is a 'loss of 
community~ thesis that has informed his statements about 
the inner city areas o-f Greater Manchester. At a general 
level the Chief Constable has constantly harked back to a 
time -from a senior police officer·s, and perhaps a 
Victorian patriarch~s, point of view 'when life was rather 
less complicated than it is today,· (1985b). 
In addition to having to deal with·a more complex society 
the police also had to deal with the 'difficult' inner 
city urban areas where there is 'a dispirited and 
trammelled populace·, diverse standards of living, large 
.. scale.:.unemployment, poor housing and multi cultural values 
and where 'crime is endemic with whole communities 
actively involved'(ibid) Of such pathological communities 
the Chief Constable asked, 'how on earth do we reach these 
people?' 
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Finally, given this analysis of the nature of the 
relationship between the police and the community and the 
fact that in certain inner city areas community has all 
but disappeared and is endangered elsewhere the Chief 
Constable believes that it is the function of the police 
to intervene actively to halt the 'drifting morality' and 
improve 'the quality of community life'. This is 
particularly the case when those both socially and 
politically responsible have, as far as he is concerned, 
reneged on their responsibilities. The belief that the 
community in many of the inner city areas is falling 
apart, that people do not trust politicians and the other 
social agencies means that the police have an obligation 
to intervene in an attempt to reverse this situation. Thus 
Anderton, as the concerned patriarch, has argued that it 
is his duty to intervene if there is the possibility of 
community discipline slipping (see The Times. 27.1.78). He 
has stated unequivocally that 
It is furthermore my honest belief that our police will 
be the one body left to erect an umbrella of public 
confidence and safety under which all social agencies 
can shelter; the one truly trusted profession 
attracting the unwavering support of the public (MEN, 
12.3.82). 
Therefore, the Chief ConstablePs view of the 
hierarchically structured respectable community and the 
police is one where both he' and "bil force are of the 
community, instinctively act on the best interests of the 
community (even if the community is not aware of it) and 
are inherently responsive to the needs of the community. 
';'. , , : Wi thin' this scenario those who are c'ritical" oT the pol ice 
are not representative of the community and/or 
through naivety or malice are not acting in 
interests of the community. As far as the Chief 





Such views have provided the ~ramework ~or the community 
relations work o~ the GMP. The Community Contact branch of 
the force has focused upon those inner city neighbourhoods 
where there has been a loss of community and those 
disreputable groups that have been troublesome for the 
police. This working definition of community recognizes 
the heterogeneous nature of such inner city areas and that 
the police do not enjoy the confidence of the people who 
live there. There is also a belief that GMP had a right to 
intervene actively in an attempt to rectify the situation 
and to play a full part in this heterogeneous setting by 
liaising with various respectable community 
representatives and being represented on every non-
political social/administrative institution. 
The Chief Constable's overarching notion of community and 
the nature of the relationship between that community and 
the police effectively depolitici2ed and delegitimized the 
demands and complaints of the troublesome groups and those 
outside subversives who would undermine the police. As a 
consequence, it was the duty of the force to demand 
partiCipation and representation in any situation deemed 
to be relevant to its objectives bringing with it clearly 
articulated ideologies about the nature of community life. 
In doing so the force could counter the efforts of those 
troublemakers who would politicize the relationship 
between the police and the community. 
b. The Chief Constable·s conceptualization of community 
~'crepresentation and oarticioation in Dolic,ng 
Given the Chief Co~~~able's views on mediating structures, 
prior to the disturbances of 1981, there were no formal 
forums for community representation and participation on 
policing matters in Greater Manchester. Representation of 
the community was achieved through the efforts of the 
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Community Contact Branch of the force. Thus, with ethnic 
minorities there was, from 1976, extensive police liaison 
with the various non-political, respectable committees and 
organizations that were seen as representing the ethnic 
minority communities as well as extensive contact with 
community representatives. In addition there was the 
representation of those groups on policing matters that 
concerned them through their co-option onto force training 
sessions. With regard to young people there was police 
liaison with schools, colleges and youth clubs. However, 
there was no direct youth participation or indeed 
representation on poliCing matters. They were being 
represented indirectly by the community elders who would 
partiCipate in the police proposals. Therefore, through 
the work of Community Contact there was mutual police and 
community representation on policing matters. 
There were also clear limitations to the nature of 
community representation. First, there had to be an 
acceptance of the police role and function in society. 
Second, there had to be a recognition that operational 
matters were not a matter for community discussion. Third, 
representation was confined to non~political organizations 
and leaders who were community elders. Fourth, in relation 
to the youth clubs there had to be an acceptance of a 
particular form of youth work. Consequently, such 
representation was based on a very strict adherence to 
police definitions of what was acceptable and what should 
be the common concern of both the police and the 
community., ,namely, .. crime prevention .and .mobilizing support ..... 
for the police. In this scenario the community was given a 
passive role and those sections of the community in 
conflict or critical of the police had no possibility of 
having their interesti represented. 
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c. Th~ Chief Constable and democratic accountability 
Between 1976-81, the Greater Manchester Police Authority, 
under the control of the Conservative Party, was 
practically moribund in terms o~ challenging the 
statements and policies of the Chief Constable (see 
Kettle, 1979). However, during this period it was Anderton 
who took on the mantle of defending the police ~rom those 
demanding accountability. The Chie~ Constable made a 
series of highly publicized statements linking such 
demands to part o~ an extensive Le~t-wing conspiracy to 
overthrow British democracy. He argued that in order ~or 
such a conspiracy to succeed the police had to be made 
subordinate to politicians. Thus, criticisms of the police 
and demands for community representation and participation 
were part o~ the strategy to bring about such 
subordination. Consequently, 
all demands ~or accountability 
called for the state and 
as far as he was concerned 
must be rejected and he 
the community to protect the 
police from such demands. If the state and community 
failed to do so the police would not be able to protect it 
from the conspirators. 
In his 1979 annual 
his policing of 
report, in response to criticisms o~ 
Greater Manchester, he argued that the 
police were being asked to 
defend what need not be defended; to answer what did 
not have to be questionedJ to explain what was already 
known and abundantly clear; and to account ~or matters 
to an exceptional and unreasonable degree (1979 Annual 
Report) 
He emphasi zed,.once. more ,.that J 'the paramount truth,·· has to 
be faced that it is the duty of the state to protect the 
police'. Between this period and the county council 
elections of May 1981 Anderton aired his conspiracy theory 
at every opportunity, most notably on BBC Questiontime 
(16.10.79). He also claimed that race relations 
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organizations had been infiltrated by anti-police elements 
who were determined to create conflict between the police 
and the ethnic minorities (see The Times, 27.9.80). His 
response to the police accountability Bills introduced by 
Jack Straw MP was to argue that seemingly innocuous 
demands for accountability were a front for those whose 
real objective was to gain control of the police (see The 
Guardian, 10.1.81; Police Review, 1981:289). Such 
accusations linked into further allegations about the 
corrupt nature of politics in Greater Manchester (seeThe 
Guardian, 10.1.81) and his belief that he was the subject 
of a smear campaign 
There has been a political campaign in the Greater 
Manchester area, certainly for the past three years 
••• purposefully engineered and clearly designed to 
discredit me in the eyes of the public on the one hand 
to try to persuade responsible people, well meaning 
people, on the other hand to turn against the police 
force in general and the Chief Constable in particular 
( MEN. 12. 1. 81> • 
The Chief Constable was undoubtedly aware that if the 
Labour Party won the 1981 county council elections in 
Greater Manchester there was the possibility that his 
critics would be in control of the Police Authority. 
d. Policing the community 1976-81 
The Chief Constable, has consist~ntly stressed that his 
policing strategies and philosophies are community based 
and readily acknowledges that both hard and soft policies 
and practices are interlinked (see 1979:x-xi). 
i. Hard policing 
After Anderton became Chief Constable sophisticated 
computer and surveillance technology was quickly acquired 
and by 1979 the GMP was reputed to have the most extensive 
police arsenal in Britain (see Kettle 1979). In July 1976 
.'~ \ .... ; .".~ ,i~ 
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an elite paramilitary unit, the Tactical Aid Group (TAG) 
~as formed which was to be the source of continual 
c:ontroversy. There were c:ontroversial crackdowns on 
prostitution, pornography, illegal drinking and gay clubs. 
'War' was declared on muggers, particularly in Moss Side, 
and, following the example of the New York Police 
Department, police decoys were deployed in an attempt to 
lure muggers into the open. In the autumn of 1977, without 
informing the Police Authority or reSidents, a 
paramilitary anti-terrorist exercise was held in the 
Collyhurst area of Manchester which effectively sealed the 
area off for the duration of the exercise. Despite the 
public concern that was expressed Anderton refused to 
discuss the operation (see The Guardian, 2.11.77; Morning 
~,3.11.77). To add to public concern it was disclosed 
by the Chief Constable in 1978 that 95% of TAG officers 
were trained and authorized to use hand weapons (see 
Annual Report 1978). 
During this period Anderton also dealt with proposed 
National Front CNF) marches in a controverSial manner. In 
October 1977 after initially banning the proposed NF march 
he met secretly with leaders of the NF and agreed to a 
march if the location was' kept secret. In order to control 
anti-fascist demonstrators the force was placed on 
emergency stand by and helicopter~ with air to ground 
cameras were deployed at an estimated cost of £250,000 
(The TimesJ·.11.10.77)~ On 26 January 1978 another massive 
police operation allowed a public NF meeting to take place 
in~Hyde. On 10_February 1978 the Chief Constable deployed 
mounted police to enable a NF meeting to take place in 
Bolton town hall. Concern was expressed about the Chief 
Constable's seeming connivance in allowing fascist marches 
to take place in parts of Manchester with considerable 
ethnic minority populations and the policing styles that 
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were being implemented to protect such marches. As a 
consequence Tameside Trades Council organized an 'Anderton 
Must Go' campaign. In 1979 the behaviour of vice squad 
officers in Moss Side came under scrutiny when Darcus Howe 
was arrested for supposedly obstructing police officers. 
As a consequence of this arrest a group of black 
organizations started a campaign both to support Howe and 
to highlight the policing of black people in Manchester. 
The trial itself brought into the public some unsavory 
aspects concerning the policing of Moss Side and Howe was 
found not guilty with costs being awarded against the GMP 
(see Race Today May 1980). 
This incident was indicative of the concern in Moss Side 
about the type of deeply corrupt and brutal policing that 
the area was being subjected to. From 1978 onwards that 
concern was heightened to a such a degree that there was 
the widespread belief that the police were out of control. 
In 1978 there was considerable anger at the type of 
justice black youth was being subjected to - arbitrary 
arrests, beatings and heavy sentences. This was not helped 
by the fact that in 1979 the Chief Constable seemingly 
gave the seal of approval to such policing by say~ng that 
he would clean up Moss Side. During this period black 
youth also built up clear profiles of the type of 
treatment they could expect to recieve from the different 
pOlice stations surrounding Mo.ss Side. The youth of Moss 
Side knew that Longsight station was the place where 
juveniles were beaten up and that Stretford station was 
.... notorious-.. for. _, .. 'nigger ,bashing·. . They also had a deep 
resentment of the type of treatment that Greenheys station 
meted out and it is no coincidence that during the 
disturbances 
The youth attacked the station with such ferocity that 
police officers abandoned ship. Revolts of this kind 
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always contain within them violence of equal intensity 
to that experienced by those in revolt. It was proof 
positive of the intolerable violence that had been 
heaped upon generations of Irish and black immigrants 
by officers who manned that station (Race Today, May 
1985:3) 
Complaints about the policing of the black community 
continued, particularly from the Manchester Black Parents 
organization and there was another march and rally on 16 
August 1980 in Moss Side complaining about police 
harassment of black people. Thus the implementation of 
pro-active hard policing methods brought forth complaints 
irom various groups in Manchester on the receiving end of 
such a policing policy particularly gays, blacks, the 
young and trade unionists. However, of fundamental 
importance is the fact that the Chief Constable rejected 
all such allegations and complaints and in doing so 
protected his officers from being called to account. 
ii. Preventive policing 
Because of the Chief Constable·s beliefs about the role of 
the police in the community, the loss of community in 
inner city areas and the threat to the community, the 
community relations aspects of the force we~e also 
strengthened ·to compensate for the previous fifteen years 
in which the police weren't members of the community' 
(Kettle, 1979). During 1976-77 a ~ully fledged Community 
Contact Branch became operational and subsumed within it 
the traditional focus of police-community relations, young 
people and members of ethnic minorities living in the 
inner city. This Community Contact Branch became one of 
the most innwvative in the country and the nature of its 
work gives an indication as to how the police dealt with 
groups who were a problem for them. 
i (a). Young People 
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The Chief Constable laid particular emphasis on making 
as he believed that in many 
failed in its duty to provide 
contact with young people 
situations society had 
proper guidance and discipline for its young, particularly 
those living in the inner cities 
The Police Service in the past has adopted a relatively 
passive policy in the matter of direct intervention in 
social affairs, but I am now practically convinced that 
we are as well equipped as any institution to help in 
guiding and influencing society in what is best for 
young people ••• the police must take such action as 
appears to them appropriate before it becomes too late 
(1976) • 
It became force policy to concentrate on young people 
because first, they were susceptible to being corrupted by 
sinister elements and easily led into crime and anti-
SOCial 
people 
activity and second, because 
the force was able to make 
through the young 
contact with the 
parents. Community Contact operated summer adventure play 
grounds, soccer competitions, holidays as well as joint 
work experience programmes with the Manpower Services 
Commission for inner city youth. On 6 June 1980 the force 
opened up a controversial full-time solely police staffed 
youth club, with a sub-station on the premises, in the 
north of inner city Manchester. The club was viewed as 
'the pinnacle' of 'the most intensive' youth policy of any 
force in the country. ·(Scene. 198118) 
Community Contact had a very clear conception about the 
function of the youth club. Police involvement was geared 
towards helping to create a normal environment for young 
_people and compensate for.~their home background. to give 
young officers an opportunity' to partiCipate in the 
community that they worked in but did not live inl to 
break down the barriers 
and in the long run 
important role was to 
between police .and young people 
reduce the crime rate. Another 
counter the type of anti-authority 
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youth work being practiced in other clubs. Community 
Contact officers in this youth club expressed, 'distaste 
for some of youth work's theories and practices, Cibid: 5) 
and, in classic Victorian manner, stressed discipline 
amongst youth club members. In addition to their youth 
work Community Contact had regular contact with schools 
and colleges presenting lectures on the history of the 
British police and 'Police Weeks' devoted to explaining 
the role of the police in society and the duties of the 
citizenry. 
ii Cb). Ethnic minorities 
Considerable attention was also paid by the Community 
Contact Branch to ethnic minorities because as the Chief 
Constable made clear 'occasionally, as a result of 
language barriers and lack of understanding, problems 
arise in which the police are involved' <1980:56). 
Building upon links which had first been established in 
the late 1960s contact was extended through a special 
Community Relations Unit. GMP was thus represented on the 
committees of ethnic minority organizations and community 
leaders were appointed onto the force training programmes. 
However, there was a strict qualification in relation to 
whom the police would liaise with in that special care was 
taken to avoid any involvement in activity which was 
politically motivated. Therefore,· there were clearly 
delineated limits to GMP's consultation. There was also 
considerable overlap between the efforts in relation to 
ethnic minorities and young people. 
In both cases GMP set limits to those who it was prepared 
to talk to and as a result those youth workers, community 
workers and communi ty organi zati.o.,':i., ,who di d not accept 
that problems between police and blacks and young people 
were the result of communication and cultural difficulties 
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were excluded. In addition to being ecluded they were 
publicly identified as central participants in the 
conspiracy to discredit the Chief Constable. 
11 (c). The whole commLlnity 
Although the key contact groups 
people and ethnic minorities 
for the GMP were young 
under Anderton, its work 
began to be extended to other members of the community 
Various other groups within the community are catered 
for and include senior citizens, the blind, the 
mentally and physically handicapped and youth 
organizations, by providing outings to places of 
interest, horse riding and swimming instruction for 
handicapped groups and 'every aspect of outdoor activity 
<1980:56) • 
In addition open days 
police stations and 
were held regularly in divisional 
contact was made with residents 
groups, pensioners groups and with parents through the 
schools. In the case of the latter GMP attempted to foster 
relations with single parents 
the inner city and reported 
children police officers take 
who were characteristic of 
that, 'to the very young 
the role of the father 
figure~' (Community Contact, 27.7.81). 
" 
Furthermore, police contact was maintained with the 
various district council departments, particularly those 
of Manchester City Council. In the case of the latter the 
chief superintendent's of each division were allocated 
liaison responsibility in relation to each of the key 
local social service departments. Thus a police initiated 
" 
professional multi-agency approach was informally 
'~·established as part of the communitY'work" of~the GMP. 
e. Demands for democratic accountability 
The foci of both the hard and 9~ft policing strategies 
were the same, the young people and black inner city 
neighbourhoods of Manchester (not the whole of Greater 
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Manchester). This was the community that the policing 
strategy had as the object of its attention. Whilst 
Community Contact officers were making contact with those 
organizations that they defined as being acceptable and 
meeting youth who would accept their definition of youth 
work, their colleagues 
including those in TAGs, 
on ordinary policing duty, 
on the streets were coming into 
contact with young people and black people in very 
different circumstances. A piece of research carried out 
by the Home Office in October 1980 (Tuck and 
Southgate,1980) provides evidence about the type of 
policing that young people and black people were being 
subjected to in this period. The report notes that first 
of all the range of anti-police sentiment was more 
extensive in relation to all West Indian age groups from 
16 to 55+ than their white counterparts in the sample 
(1980:40). Second, there was a statistically significant 
tendency for West Indians in the 35-54 age group to be 
stopped, searched and or arrested more often than their 
white counterparts. Third, among both black and white 16-
24 year o!ds one in three expressed considerable anti-
police sentiments (ditto:40). And finally during the 
previous year to the 
between 16-24 had been 
also Walker, 1987). 
study one in three of all males 
stopped searched or arrested (see 
As indicated previously, in Manchester during this period 
those who complained about such policing practices ran the 
risk of being publicly defined as anti-police, therefore 
,.:not:ofthe".c.ommunity and thus subject to po1ice,.attentio~. 
The group who came to face this risk were inner city youth 
and community workers who worked with the young pe~p1e and 
in the areas where such policing practices were focused. 
They were having to deal with the consequences of the 
proactive soft and hard policing strategies in inner city 
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Manchester. When they began to protest the community 
become a site of contestation between GMP and those 
opposed to such policing philosophy and practices. This 
friction was added to by first, the election of a Labour 
administration to the Greater Manchester Council in May 
1981 which was committed to pushing for more democratic 
accountability of the police and second, the serious 
disturbances in Moss Side of July 1981. As a consequence 
those excluded from the Chief Constable's definition of 
community and from having 
participation on the policing 
to, finally forced their 
agenda. 
e (i). The May 1981 elections 
active representation and 
they were being subjected 
interests onto the political 
On 7 May 1981 a Labour administration was returned to the 
Greater Manchester Council (GMC) with a commitment to 
pushing for more police accountability. As part of the 
Labour Party's election campaign in Manchester candidates 
in those areas where policing was an issue promised that 
if elected there would be 
Support for policies to make the police accountable to 
locally elected representatives - so that YOUR views on 
how the police should spend their limited time and 
resources can have real importance to ensure all 
members of the community are treated fairly (Moss Side 
Labour Party). 
Labour believes that the locally elected councils shall 
have strategic responsibility for the policing of their 
areas (Bradford and Moston Labour Party). 
On 9 May 1981 the new leader of the GMC stated that under 
.,..<.,~" .·,<the new administration the·PoliceAut.hori't}/~would cease to 
be a -mutual appreciation society' and that the Chief 
more rigorous approach to his 
of Greater Manchester. The 
Constable could expect a 
accounting 'for the policing 
Chief Constable was also advised to cease making 
controversial political statements or he would be subject 
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to the same disciplinary procedures as other senior 
officers of the Council would be <Manchester Evening News, 
9.5.81). At the first meeting of the newly constituted 
Police Authority the new chair argued for the removal of 
the magistrates, 
relation to its 
Authority into 
a widening of powers of the Authority in 
jurisdiction and the integration of the 
the County Council structure <Manchester 
Evening News, 3.6.81). One of the first acts of the new 
Authority was to cut 1% of the police budget for 
reallocation to other council services (24.6.81). Thus, 
from the outset the new Police Authority was determined to 
assert itself in relation to its 




the policing of 
had the newly 
the serious constituted Authority taken over 
disturbances of 1981 took place with 
between 7-11 July 1981. 
Moss Side erupting 
e Cii). Moss Side, 7-11 July 1981 
The policing of the disturbances personified the soft and 
hard approaches of the GMP documented above. After initial 
trouble there was discussion between senior officers in 
Moss Side with the recognized community leaders to control 
the situation. The purpose of such discussion 
was to bring together the community and the police so 
that older members of the various ethnic.groups could 
help the police to influence the younger people and 
avoid .an escalation of violence (Chief Constable, 
19811 1817). 
An instructive inSight into how the Chief Constable looked 
upon community representation and participation is 
' •. ;":"'<.:.:',:~, ~~',?': prov~ded in the._j. ChieT ., .... Constable·s report . on -:<,the 
. 
disturbancess in which he recounted that when a group of 
young blacks demanded access to the meetings as 
representatives of the black youth of Moss Side the senior 
police officers in charge could not accommodate the 
request because it was force procedure to 'have 
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di scussions onl y wi th the el ders of the communi tyJ (di tto: 
1817). Given this procedure it is hardly surprising that 
the Chief Constable had to report also that despite this 
community consultation further disturbancess took place 
and 
demonstrated in a very real way that representatives of 
the community in the area had little or no influence or 
control over the people concerned in this rioting 
(Chief Constable, 1981=3) 
The Chief Constable subsequently implied that the fact 
that the community leaders had no control over the 
situation was one of the reasons why he decided to use 
hard policing tactics to re-establish control of Moss 
Side. The Chief Constable made it clear that the youths of 
Moss Side had 'had their chance' (Manchester Evening News, 
10.7.81) and a 'Force Contingency Plan' was executed 
24 police wagons, each manned by 10 steel-helmeted riot 
police, roared around the shopping and housing area 
pinning black and white youths to the walls and 
arresting them. Several youths were knocked to the 
ground by the wagons ••• The rioters moved on to take up 
positions in high rise flats and flyovers to hurl down 
rocks on the wagons. Later snatch squads of police 
moved into the flats. Youths - black and white - were 
kicked to the ground before being taken away (Daily 
Mirror, 10.7.81> 
This strategy initially brought praise, including from the 
Home Secretary who described it as a ·conspicuous 
success', for the way in which the Chief Constable had 
brought the disturbances to an end (see The Times. 
11.7.81). There had been few police casualties and the GMP 
did not have to face the ignominy of having to.retreat as 
~ . , ' , 
the forceS_in ott:ler: ... cities had ... to. Crucia.l1y, for force. '>.~; 
• ".~ - '-j- • 
morale, the authority of the GMP on the streets had been 
maintained. Initially certain community leaders emphasized 
that the disturbances were not race related and nor were 
they anti-police. However, there were also bitter 
recriminations from other community leaders and 
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representatives about the way in which police officers had 
behaved during the disturbancess, the raids that took 
place afterwards and the summary justice 
subject to. As 
political space 
the policing of 
a consequence for the 
people had been 
first time a 
was created 
Manchester. 
e (lli). Further complaints 
for a critical discussion of 
Concern was initially expressed by local shopkeepers about 
the way in which the police, during the first night of the 
disturbances, had not intervened and seemingly let Moss 
Side, and their shops, burn. However, this concern was 
lost amongst widespread allegations about the manner in 
which police officers had behaved during the second night. 
A Defence Committee was formed in Moss Side (MSDC) to 
mobilize community opposition to police brutality and 
racism and to defend those who had been arrested. Youth 
and community leaders refused 
during his visit to Moss 
to meet the Home Secretary 
Side in the aftermath of the 
disturbancess and his statements about copy cat 
disturbances. A proposed 'police week' at a local school 
in Moss Side had to be cancelled because pupils opposed 
the presence of police in their school and parents 
threatened to keep their children at home if the event 
took place. Community Contact faced considerable obstacles 
in their concerted attempts to ~e-establishrelations. 
Considerable anxiety was expressed about their proposals 
to-take as many youngsters as possible from Moss Side on a 
hastily constructed police holiday to the Lake District. A 
series.of_ .policeinitiated 'clea~-the-air' meetings with 
local youth had to be cancelled because of allegations 
that the police were attempting to pressurize local youth 
to attend the meetings. In addition letters were sent to 
the Chief Constable from residents of one of the local 
housing estates where the policing had been heaviest 
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complaining about the racist and brutal behaviour of 
officers. 
The complaints took on even more force when respectable 
community leaders and representatives voiced their 
concern. The Bishop of Manchester, during a service on 19 
July 1981, said he believed the allegations that police 
officers had used 'abusive language and undue force' when 
dealing with black people. The chair of the Manchester 
Council of Community Relations (MCCR) also expressed 
concern about the policing of Moss Side. The vice-chair of 
the Police Authority, who was the elected representative 
for the area, made similar allegation and officially 
complained to the Chief Constable whilst a local doctor 









them he now had to recognize 
of police brutality in 
true. The Haldane Society also 
about the manner in which 
magistrates were dealing with cases arising out of the 
disturbances. Thus considerable pressure was exerted from 
various respectable quarters for an independent inquiry to 
be set up into the policing of Moss Side. 
The Chief Constable did little to allay the growing 
concern about the policing the disturbancess. Predictably 
he c:laimed that people from outside the community had been 
involved, that,,· there 
Side alight and that 
had been a conspiracy to set Moss 
his officers had to deal with 
::: :,:;~,,~:,~~,,~.~,-.organi zed , . .guerill a warfare on',:.: the':streets of Manchester. 
He repudiated the allegations that the GMP was in any way 
racist in its policing of Moss Side and rejected initial 
demands for an inquiry saying that if,he had to hold one 




It would be open to anyone with more malicious intent 
to create severe internal problems for the police. That 
surely is desperately unfair. There is an established 
procedure and it is open to members of the public to 
use it (The Times, 21.7.81). 
His only concession was to give his personal assurance 
that if people used the proper complaints procedure all 
grievances would be investigated 
I will take it on myself to in the absence of formal 
complaints to look into the general allegations that 
are now being made (The Times, 21.7.81). 
However, as the pressure mounted both locally and 
nationally the Chief Constable appointed Assistant Chief 
Constable Stalker to head an internal inquiry into 
allegations of police misconduct. He also gave the ominous 
warning that everyone who had made a complaint would be 
interviewed by the investigative team and those deemed 
guilty of making unfounded or malicious complaints would 
be subject to criminal proceedings. It is hardly 
surprising that this move did little to assuage the 
intensifying demands for an independent inquiry. Those 
demanding an independent inquiry turned to Manchester City 
Council and Greater Manchester CounCil, the two political 
councils which had responsibilities for the area of Moss 
Side. 
f. The political response 
of (i) • The Hytner Inquiry: community representation 
through consultation 
:.') .... ' •• '-",..::'~' 'I '\ ,'"';-",".'''-':. '~.... - -~ - - ... 
Within r-,anchester City Council left wing Labour 
counCillors, particularly those representing Moss Side, 
pressed for a discussion of the policing - of the 
disturbancess by the city council. Their demands were 
initially rebuffed by the right wing Labour leadership and 
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instead the Council released an all-party statement 
supporting the police in their efforts to maintain law and 
order. However, the demands continued with Moss Side 
Labour party calling for the setting up of an independent 
joint inquiry between Manchester City Council and the GMC 
into the causes of the disturbances and complaints of 
heavy handed policing. After bitter argument between the 
Left and the Right of the Labour Party, Manchester City 
Council finally agreed in July 1981 that Lord Scarman 
should head an inquiry into the causes of the Moss Side 
di stLlrbances. 
The Greater Manchester Council (GMC) hosted a conference 
(with Greater Manchester Youth Association) of community 
and political representatives on 15 July 1981 to discuss 
the disturbances and what could be done to prevent them 
happening again. On 22 July 1981 it was announced that 
there would be a GMC sponsered inquiry, made up of 
representatives of ethnic minorities and youth 
organizations. The Hytner Inquiry, as it became known, was 
scheduled to start hearing evidence on 17 August 1981 and 
its brief was to examine the causes of the disturbances •• 
Despite the fact that there was widespread agreement that 
there should be an independent inquiry there was 
considerable disquiet about the nature of the inquiry that 
was agreed to by the GMC and the Police Authority. A 
public meeting_of approximately 300 people in Moss Side on 
12 August 1981 discussed a boycott of the Hytner inquiry 
• ,. 'C' ,:" ,with"the MSDC subsequently issuing a statement saying that 
such a' boycott was necessary because the nature and the 
structure of the inquiry had been agreed on in total 
disregard of the wishes of the community in Moss Side. It 
was stressed that the inquiry membership was not 
representative of the community and that the racist 
135 
policing of Moss Side should be the focus of attention not 
the community 
For the longest while, the Moss Side community has been 
protesting about the indiscriminate beatings, raids, 
frameups and harassment laced with racist abuse which 
the police have been dishing out in this community 
(MSDC, 13.8.81>. 
The MSDC warned that any information given to the Hytner 
Inquiry could find its way to the police and urged that 
people, including councillors and council officers, give 
information concerning police attacks on the community to 
the MSDC. The youth section of Manchester Labour party and 
the Haldane Society joined the boycott of the inquiry. 
Thus, because of the manner in which it chose its 
community representatives the inquiry faced the 
possibility of the non-participation of those who had 
fought with the police on the streets of Moss Side. 
However, it was not just radical opinion in Manchester 
that was opposed to the Hytner Inquiry. The local 
Conservative party questioned the quality and reliability 
of the evidence that the inquiry was dependent upon. 
Manchester City Council continued to demand that an 
inquiry 'with teeth' , under Lord Scarman, be . set up 
statutory 
was not 
arguing that the HytnerInquiry had no formal 
powers. The Chief Constable stated that he 
prepared to allow any of his officers to give evidence in 
person or to be subjected to cross questioning. Thus both 
the Chief Constable and his critics were claiming that 
there had been insufficient consultation before the 





participation and representation were raised 
all sides of the political allegation from 
that the inquiry 
key individuals 
the proceedings. Although 
was unrepreseQtative and the 
and groups to participate in 
a considerable amount of 
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evidence was amassed the public gallery remained empty as 
the boycott took effect. 
Those who did choose to co-operate provided evidence of a 
considerable breakdown in police community relations in 
Moss Side. Allegations were made about the heavy handed 
policing of the area, about the ineffectiveness of the 
complaints system, about the work of community contact 
officers being undone by the type of poliCing being 
practiced on the streets and about the Chief Constable's 
unwillingness to accept criticism of his force or policing 
tactics from community representatives. 
When the Report was finally released on 12 October 1981 it 
confirmed what critics of the Chief Constable's poliCies 
had been claiming. It concluded that despite the 
considerable efforts of Community Contact officers, links 
had been forged only with the older respectable community 
representatives in Moss Side. It found widespread evidence 
that the black youth of Moss Side held deep resentment, 
and in certain cases feelings of outright hatred, of the 
police because of the policing they were subjected to 
What is alleged is that over the past few years the 
police have developed a new style of 'stop and search' 
operation. It is said that young and inexperienced 
qfficers in Panda cars or vans tour areas of Greater 
Manchester at night stopping youths whether walking 
singly or in groups; that they phYSically manhandle 
them; that in the case of blacks they racially abuse 
themr that they sometimes are actually physically 
violent to them; that they not infrequently push or 
otherwise manhandle them into a police vehicle and that 
they rudely question them. It is further alleged that 
:·in-m~ny·casesi·particularly if the-'yo~ngst~r rejponds~-'~'­
to this treatment by 'giving cheek', he is taken to the 
police station and kept overnight before being released 
without a charge but a threat that he will 'be got next 
time'. (para 25.9). 
The report pointed out that it was not just young people 
who had made these allegations but that they had also been 
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given in evidence by respectable members of the community, 
that is, solicitors, youth leaders, clergy and community 
leaders. In its conclusions it recommended that the Chief 
Constable would be well advised to take note of the level 
of hostility towards the police that had uncovered and to 
realize 'that in Moss Side among young blacks the feeling 
1s intense' (48.6) 
We appreciate that the Chief Constable may believe that 
such a scenario is a figment of the imagination but we 
believe that he and the Police Committee should be most 
concerned that it is a figment of very many people's 
imaginations and we believe that policing in Manchester 
will never be wholly effective until young people cease 
to believe it (49.31) 
. However, despite these criticisms the report, concluded to 
the incredulity of the critics, that 'the police force in 
Greater Manchester is probably better than most in the 
United Kingdom' and praised the Chief Constable for his 
leadership. 
f (il). The response to Hytnerl community participation 
through monitoring 
The Hytner Report identified the operation of the 
complaints system as one of the major sources of s~spicion 
and tension between the police and the black community in 
Moss Side. It was suggested that steps could be taken to 
improve the existing system without changing its basic 
structure. There should be the apPOintment of a 'community 
representative', whose role it would be to receive and 
pass on to the police complaints brought to him/her. 
However, before passing on the complaints to the police 
, ", .;.. ·"the':"'<'community representative' would asses~'- the available 
evidence and screen the complaints to make sure that only 
strong cases were submitted to the official complaints 
(Section 49) procedures. The hope was that, as a result, 
the proportion of successfully pursued complaints would 





as being too weak 
by the 'community 
for the Section 49 
process would be taken up informally in an attempt to 
alleviate community concern. 
It was emphasized that in order for these recommendations 
to work three things were essential. First, the 'community 
representative' would have to enjoy the full confidence of 
the community, especially young people. Second, this 
confidence could only be sustained through the 'community 
representative' being able to achieve a real measure of 
success with any complaints that s/he deflected away from 
Section 49 status. And third, the Chief Constable would 
have to agree to the appointment of a special officer with 
seniority and community awareness who would be located in 
an office independent of the force structure to receive 
complaints in Moss Side. This police officer and the 
'community representative' would have to work closely 
together to build up an atmosphere of trust, assist with 
the informal complaints, help sift out the Section 49s 
made directly to the police and monitor local conditions 
and local concerns. 
Such conclusion and recommendations confirmed the 
misgivings of those who had boycotted the Inquiry as they 
did not address the key issue o~ the racist policing of 
Moss Side. In addition the idea of the appointment of 
another professional community representative, as the 
community representative, proved to critics that Hytner, 
and ·the:,··Police Authority were incapable. of .learning the 
lessons of the past. The MSDC released a counter report, 
'Hytner Myths', which concluded that 
What we have seen from the Hytner Report doesn't give 
us the confidence to believe that any future official 
inquiry will unearth the reality of policing in Moss 
Side (14.10.81). 
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In the post-disturbances period little effectively changed 
in relation to the policing of Moss Side and the policing 
of young people. There continued to be allegations of 
heavy handed policing as well as rumours about street 
justice being meted out by police officers in retaliation 
~or the disturbancess. An indication of the state of 
policing in Moss Side in this period is provided in an 
open letter ~rom local youth and community workers to ~ 
Guardian in December 1981. It pointed out that police 
officers in Moss Side had embarked on a campaign of 
harassment and intimidation of the young people of the 
area. Additionally, they argued that this campaign had 
been extended to youth and community workers and that as a 
result tensions remained high. As a consequence of the 
behaviour of these police officers the youth and community 
workers stated that they were no longer prepared to work 
or cooperate with the police in any capacity 
We cannot, in all conscience, work with a police force 
which allowed vans to career through our streets with 
uniformed hooligans beating their truncheons against 
the vehicles, and chanting slogans such as 'Nigger, 
nigger, nigger - Oi, oi, oi' (The Guardian, 9.12.81). 
This concern expressed by the workers extended to the work 
of Community Contact. Not only were police officers 
harassing youth and community workers on the streets but 
Community 
effort to 
Contact was continuinq to make a concentrated 
move into youth and community work giving 
resources to those youth and community workers/clubs who 
accepted their philosophy whilst publicly condemning those 
youth and community clubs/workers who opposed its work. As 
,., .. ' " " - . '.," i'··.. , . ," . ' ,",;" , . : 
far as inner city youth and community workers were 
concerned the connections between the policing of the 
streets and the actions of Community Contact were clear. 
Because of their opposition to Community Contact they were 
being singled out for harassment and intimidation. 
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It is within this context that the first independent 
police monitoring group emerged in Manchester. A series of 
developments heightened anxieties of youth and community 
workers as well as those concerned about the policing of 
Manchester. In March 1982 the Chief Constable, in a speech 
calling for the abolition of Police Authorities, was 
highly critical of certain youth and community work which 
he saw as fermenting anti-police feelings in young people 
For several years now in this country young blacks 
especially have been brainwashed by an increasingly 
intense campaign to promote hostility between police 
and black people. Even well intentioned workers in race 
relations, whose honest motives were not open to 
question, unwittingly lent support to this menacing and 
misled propaganda. problems were fostered in peaceful 
places, and discontentment in innocent minds. Such 
difficulties as there were with ethnic minorities were 
gradually cultivated, and this insidious work still 
goes on (1982). 
However, the Community Contact work of GMP and the 
comments of the Chief Constable were coming under 
increaSing scrutiny and complaint. A meeting of 
approximately 80 youth and community workers took place on 
21 ~uly 1982 to discuss how to respond to police 
involvement in youth and community work. By August 1982 a 
report, 'Police and youth Work' had been drawn up by the 
group that emerged out of the meeting which presented a 
systematic critique of the work of Community Contact. 
Drawing upon the work of those critical of community 
poliCing strategies (see Bunyan, 1981J Bridges, 1981) this 
critique argued· that GMP's youth and community work was 
geared towards the more effective policing of the 
community through the penetration of the community for 
information gathering purposes by attempting to disguise 
the true nature of policing in the inner City. A series of 
demands emerged from this report. It was stressed that 
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every means possible should be pursued to put a halt to 
police involvement in youth and community work and to stop 
the harassment of youth and community workers. It was 
stated that such demands could only really be effected 
through campaigning to bring about real changes in the 
policing of Manchester 
Community policing cannot be appended to an otherwise 
changed police force. There must be real changes in the 
balance of power between the various communities and 
groups and the police force in a region as socially 
diverse as Greater Manchester (1982:7) 
Such a critique meant that the central demands of Youth 
and Allied Workers Police Monitoring Group (YAWPMG) were, 
a complete overhaul of the system of police accountability 
and the establishment of an independent complaints 
procedure (1982:11). In order to push for their demands 
the group decided on three courses of action. First, to 
withdraw from any form of co-operation with police 
community activities and those agencies/authorities who 
endorsed mUlti-agency activities. Second, to place on the 
agendas of as many relevant organizations/groups as 
Possible the issue of police community work and finally to 
support the establishment of local community based police 
monitoring groups. 
The concern of the youth and - community workers was 
intenSified by two further incidents In the latter half of 
1982. On 22 September 1982 a black community worker was 
stopped for questioning by drug squad officers outside 
Moss Side Shopping Precinct. During the ensuing arguments 
:~.'.:~-~' another· well "-known black youth worker was arrested and 
charged with assault and obstruction. When he was released 
from the local police station he had extensive eye 
injuries. This caused an outcry and confirmed the worst 
fears of those youth and community workers who believed 
that they were being targeted for some very special 
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treatment by GMP. 
In October 1982 a youth worker who went to his office on a 
Sunday afternoon stumbled across what turned out to be an 
undercover police surveillance team operating video 
equipment from the vantage of the office. The youth worker 
was bundled into another room and informed that permission 
had been obtained to use the offices for an anti-mugging 
operation. In follow up inquiries it was found that 
permission had not been obtained and that the real focus 
of the surveillance was a gay pub directly facing the 
youth office. Specific concern was generated by the fact 
that the particular offices that had been broken into 
belonged to an organization that the police would have 
defined as being non cooperative and whose confidential 
files could have been open to police inspection. Such 
inCidents confirmed the worst fears of youth and community 
workers about the nature of policing Moss Side and the 
harassment of youth and community workers and provided 
more evidence for their case that GNP was attempting to 
penetrate the community 
purposes. 
for surveillance collecting 
In October 1982 one of the unions approached by the youth 
and community workers issued a press release criticizing 
police involvement in youth and community work and asking 
local authorities to clarify the true extent of such 
involvement. The Chief Constable replied immediately 
arguing that criticisms were unf~unded and 'not worthy of 
comment· " ,(Manchester Evening News,- Oct -.- 8 .,·,1982) en". As 
organizations and groups began to express concern GMC 
iinally agreed to set up a working party to look at the 
extent and nature of GMP involvement in youth work. 
Further meetings of the youth and community workers took 
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place and in March 1983 a statement was released from 
YAPMG reiterating that as far as it was concerned police 
intrusions into youth and community work in Manchester 
were part of a community policing strategy whose objective 
was neighbourhood wide surveillance and information 
gathering. Consequently, community policing should be seen 
as part of the problem rather than as a solution to the 
breakdown in police community relations in the inner city. 
The group reiterated its policy of non- cooperation with 
community policing operations and mUlti-agency policies 
because as far as it was concerned there was no point in 
entering into dialogue with GMP because the force was not 
prepared to listen or more importantly take on board any 
criticisms. 
Thus concerns about various aspects of the Chief 
Constable~s policing philosophy coalesced in the space 
opened up first, by the change in political control of 
Greater Manchester Council and second, because of the 
disturbances of 1981. As a consequence police 
accountability was placed on the local political agenda 
and brought with it demands for real community 
partiCipation and representation on policing matters. 
However, in response to what was seen as the ineffectual 
I 
response to those demands by the Police Authority and the 
lack of change in the policing of Moss Side YAWPMG placed 
independent police monitoring on the agenda through its 
questioning of the whole nature of community poliCing in 
Manchester. The issue was also placed on'the agenda of 
;.:: ,. Manchester.:. ... Ci ty",Counci 1 when . enough .. pressure". was, brought "". 
to bear upon Manchester Education Committee by members of 
YAWPMG to set up a working party in September 1983 to 
produce a set of guidelines to govern contact between 
youth and community workers and the police. 
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Discussion 
The eventual result of the debates, 
proposals was the emergence of 
, 
Manchester, both with the stated 
proposals and counter 
two distinct models in 
aim of bringing about 
community representation and participation in order to 
facilitate accountability of the police. One model, 
implemented by the Police Authority, was based upon 
utilizing the provisions of the 1964 Police Act to make 
the Chief Constable accountable for the policing of 
Manchester and utilizing the recommendations of the Hytner 
and Scarman Reports to facilitate community representation 
and participation through liaison. The other, placed on 
the formal political agenda by members of YAWPMG and 
eventually implemented by Manchester City Council, was 
based upon a rejection of the Police Authority model. It 
opted instead, in the absence of the possibility of the 
constitutional reform of the governance of the police, for 
community based police monitoring groups. Thus, the 
community became the site of struggle in the attempts by 
the Police Authority and Manchester City Council to 
implement their proposals. 
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Section 11: Model I 
Greater Manchester Police Authority and the accountability 
of the Chief Constable 
The Labour Party, upon taking control in May 1981, set 
about restructuring the Police Authority in its quest for 
fuller accountability oT the ChieT Constable. As indicated 
earlier prior to 1981, under the Conservatives, the 
Authority made no attempt to make the ChieT Constable 




councillors and oTTicers, the Police 
the qUietest of the council committees. 
the lack of scrutiny that the Chief 
Constable was subject to was th~ fact that there had been 
just one 'rubber stamp- subcommittee concerning itself 
with finance. However, in the period prior to the 









neighbouring Merseyside (see Loveday, 1985), Labour 
councillors began to Tormulate ideas on how to counter the 
pre-May 1981 practice of the Chief Constable setting the 
agenda and how to get to grips with the organizational 
structure of the GMP (Cox, 1985). 
As a consequence, a structure was 
paralleled the organizational stru~ture 
implemented which 
of the GMP. This 
involved setting up standing sub-committees composed of 
eight members of the Authority (Tive places Tor the ruling 
group and three places 'Tor the opposition and magistrates) 
Tor each of the distinct organizational components oT the 
- -
force where the ChieT Constable was represented by his 
senior management responsible Tor those components. This 
allowed Tirst, the Police Authority members to have a more 
direct relationship with the Assistant Chief Constablesl 




the agenda by requesting reports on items "not 
volunteered' by the Chief Constable; third to get away 
~rom the dramatic setting of the full Authority meetings 
where rational discussion was not possible; fourth to 
~acilitate the systematic following up of particular 
issues and finally to allow members of the Police 
Authority to develop an expertise on a particular area of 
the work of the GMP. Through this restructuring the Labour 
leadership of the Authority was saying to the Chief 
Constable ·we want to be involved; we want to know what 
you're doing; we want reports' (Cox, 1985). 
In doing so Labour was recognizing that if accountability 
was to be exercised it was necessary to break the Chief 
Constable's stranglehold on information concerning the 
poliCing of Greater Manchester. The Chief Constable agreed 
to such structural changes but as the conflict with the 
Police Authority intensified he began to complain about 
the amount of time the senior management of the force was 
having to spend servicing the sub-committees. As to'the 
demands for information the Chief Constable made it clear 
that he was, when he deemed it necessary, willing to 
furnish reports to the Authority. However, he gave no 
undertaking that he was prepared to respond to Police 
Authority demands for reports. 
The ruling Labour group also implemented measures to deal 
with the issue of representation ~n the Police Authority. 
As documented previously, unlike 
the Authority did not reflect the 
the".Council~'because of, -'the 
other council committees 
electoral composition of 
numerically significant 
presence of the non-elected magistrates. As a consequence 
there was the distinct possibility of the policy proposals 
of the ruling group beingd~feated in an open vote. This 
was particularly problematical because after the 
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decimation oT the Conservatives and Liberals in the 
elections of May 1981 the magistrates took on the role of 
being the official opposition to Labour .. The-:--inagistrates'-
immediately began to vote, as a block, with the 
Conservatives giving unquestioning support to the Chief 
Constable. To overcome this problem a strict party whip 
had to be .introduced by the Labour group which demanded 
that their representatives turn up for all meetings and 
support the Party line. It was made clear to Labour 
councillors that the luxury to express individual opinions 
that was present within other committees was not 
acceptable within the Police Authority -~on the Police 
Authority councillors are there to represent the group and 
the peopl e' (Cox, 1985). 
The Chair was acutely aware of the psychological impact of 
the fact that the voting on any issue always looked closer 
than on other committees because of the presence and 
voting behaviour of the unelected magistrates. It always 
looked as if the decisions had only just been agreed to 
and were not democratically reached majority decisions. 
Furthermore, there was always the possibility that if 
Labour members did not attend the chair would, on 
occasions, be forced into the position of having to cast 
the deciding vote. This was also the reason why 
representation on the subcommittees was constructed to 
make sure that the magistrates could not force a crisis. 
through their 
difficulties of 
voting behaviour. Because of the 
the situation, the Party leadership at 
iull Council level, endorsed the use of the party whip and 
was fully supportive of the actions of the Labour group on 
the Authority (Cox, 1985). 
a. The struggle for accountability 
The conflict between the Chief Constable and the Labour 
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group of the Police Authority manifested itself over a 
variety of other issues between 1981 and the passing of 
the Local Government Act in July 1985 which finalized the 
abolition of the Police Authorities. It is worth 
documenting this conflict for a series of interrelated 
reasons. First, it illustrates how extensive and serious 
the conflict in Greater Manchester was. The monthly 
meetings of the Police Authority became a media spectacle 
and were characterized by scenes of disorder, motions of 
no confidence, crisis adjournments and decisions to 
abandon meetings. Second, it illustrates how determined 
the Chief Constable was to defend any perceived 
encroachment upon his autonomy. Third, it demonstrates how 
empowered the Chief Constables had become in the post-war 
period. Fourth, it shows how difficult it was for the 
Police Authority to achieve any semblance of 
accountability. Throughout the period, because of the 
intensity of the conflict, the Authority was effectively 
reduced to reacting to policies, actions or statements of 
the Chief Constable and GMP. In this sense the Chief 
Constable continued to, through his utilization of the 
media and control of information, set the agenda for the 
Authority, despite the best efforts of the 'Labour group to 
do otherwise. Fift~, it furnished the context within which 
the Labour group attempted to implement its proposals for 
community representation and participation. Sixth, the 
failure of the Police Authority to hold the Chief 
Constable to account provided the context within which the 
police monitoring initiative emerged. Finally, given the 
high local and national media coverage, it supplied the 
- .· .. ·:,:"'C::.-:~~.::context~·;for:·: ;,the_ community"s _ understanding of what the 




During the last months of 1981 the degree of conflict 
between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority over 
the policing of the disturbances reduced public meetings 
to scenes never witnessed before. It was to set the tone 
40r the duration of the Police Authority. An important 
theme in the struggle for accountability within the Police 
Authority emerged during this period. It involved the 
Chief Constable'S refusal to disclose information about 
the policing operations that had taken place. After a 
period of relative calm the Chief Constable made a 
blistering attack on the Hytner Inquiry at a meeting of 
the Police Authority on 4 September 1981 when he was asked 
why he had not co-operated with the proceedings. The Chief 
Constable replied that it was not acceptable to expect 





or to be 
hearsay 
subject to cross 
and unsubstantiated 
allegations (see The Times, 5.9.81). He argued that more 
thought should have been given to the Inquiry and that the 
Chief Constable should have been consulted 'to discuss the 
full implications for police and determine acceptable 
lines of inquiry' (The Times, 5.9.81) before drafting the 
terms of reference. 
At the beginning of this meeting, Labour councillors had 
refused to allow the Chief Constable to read from his 
paper on the disturbances as well as a report of his 
submission to the Scarman inquiry. After this decision had 
been taken the Chief Constable'S aides distributed a 
, .... document "The 'Truth about ;the Moss, Side Meeting'" 'iri'~whrch 
he claimed that, among others, the deputy Chair of the 
Authority had asked him, during the disturbances, to make 
an apology to the black community as well as relieving the 
Divisional Chief Superintendent for Moss Side of his duty 
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I was absolutely dismayed by the appalling proposition 
the like of which I have never previously received in 
my whole career ••• We hear alot nowadays about the much 
heralded concept of "democratic community policing". 
Well, if this was a practical example, then all I can 
say is - God help us (see Police Review, 18.9.81). 
The argument continued on the World This Weekend (BBC 
6/9/81) when the Chief Constable claimed that there had 
been a ~calculated attempt', during the monthly Authority 
meeting to force him to speak against his will to the 
Hytner inquiry. The Chief Constable claimed that he was 
being ~gagged' and feared he would be sacked if a Labour 
government were returned to office. The arguments 
continued at an Authority meeting convened on 11 September 
during a discussion of the Chief Constable's report into 
the policing of the disturbances. Labour councillors 
stated that Chief Constable'S report was deficient because 
of its lack of detail concerning key aspects of the 
policing operation. The Chief Constable refused to answer 
questions about what he defined as operational matters and 
stated that he had no intention of providing further 
information (The Times, 12.9.81). 
During November and December 1981 the Chief C6nstable 
continued to clash with the Labour members of the 
Authority over issues arising out of his handling of the 
disturbances. During thejNo~ember meeting Anderton denied 
that there was a breakdown in relations between the police 
and young blacks·in Moss Side. In the December edition of 
the force newspaper, Brief he argued that the critics were 
.~. :.,-:seeking,rto- .. blame .the,police for the· social. decay,of 
Britain's inner cities and that 'like birds of prey 
descending on a corpse the researchers, historians, and 
analysts are metaphorically tearing us apart' (Brief, Dec. 
1981) • 
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He described the Scarman Report as 'unremarkable' in its 
recommendations and, in response to the Hytner Report, 
claimed that the majority o-f the community in Manchester 
supported the actions of the GMP and that unlike their 
critics the force worked for 'the bene-fit o-f the 
community'. The Chie-f Constable caused -further controversy 
by issuing a force statement praising his officers for 
in quelling the riotous, disorderly and criminal 
behaviour widespread in Toxteth, Moss Side and 
elsewhere in July 1981 and in ef-fectively and speedily 
restoring the Queen's Peace throughout the County of 
Greater Manchester for the bene-fit and protection of 
all its citizens (see MEN 7.12.81). 
The Leader of GMC attacked the Chief Constable'S statement 
and questioned the motivation behind it. On 16 December 
1981 the Police Authority met to discuss the Chief 
Constable's response to the Scarman and Hytner reports. 
Another controversial meeting ensued with the Chief 
Constable rejecting both Hytner's concern about stop and 
search and Scarman's proposals concerning ethnic 
recruitment and racial prejudice. He also stated that the 
iorce would continue to use rapid dispersal tactics in 
future disturbances. The conflict over the policing o-f 
Moss Side continued in January 1982 with the Chief 
Constable claiming that his police of-ficers were not 
carrying out their duties because they were afraid of 
allegations of racial harassment being made against them. 
He also demanded that those making allegations provide 
.proof of discriminatory policing practices. 
i i. The Laurence Scot t Di spute,",~"., q.. ,,' .. 
.. .,.'~". ~ '-' . "" 
During April 1981 
Scott engineering 
a dispute broke out at the Laurence 
works 1n Openshaw, Manchester. This 
became a -'source of further disagreement between the Chief 
Constable and the Police Aut~ority because of the dramatiC 
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way in which it was policed. On 26 October 1981 the 
management attempted to 
clashes between the 
re-open the factory leading to 
police and pickets. Management was 
unsuccessful in the attempt and complaints were made about 
the policing tactics used (MEN, 26.10.81). The Chief 
Constable publicly intervened in the dispute, guaranteeing 
protection Tor anyone crossing the official picket line. 
On 6 November 1981 a large number of police arrived at the 
factory gates without explanation to the pickets. Later on 
the same day a joint helicopter operation between police 
and management, involving the use of masked men, was used 
to lift out goods and equipment to enable Scott's to meet 
their contractual obligations to their customers. This 
decisive police action, involving three hundred officers 
on Tull time duty at the factory, helped to undermine the 
workers occupation. The Labour group of the Police 
Authority was highly critical of the Chief Constable for 
using the force in this manner. As far as the Chair of 
Authority was concerned the Laurence Scott dispute was in 
many respects more straight forward than the disturbances, 
in terms of the accountability issue. Despite police 
provocation there had been no picket line violence and 
there was considerable local sympathy for the workers. 
There was also the feeling in the locality that the Chief 
Constable had connived in an asset stripping operation. As 
a consequence local residents had complained to the Police 
Authori ty "about the dangers pos'ed by the hel icopters 
flying low over homes and the fact that ordinarily it was 
Virtually impossible to locate a police officer. The Chair 
of the Authority told a hastily convened public meeting 
,. that;.there.was:.nothing thafthe-Authority could do because-·~·::·-·:. 
it was an operational matter. 
up the severe limitations 
respect of fulfilling its 
For her the dispute showed 
placed upon the Authority in 
role of making the. Chief 
Constable accountable for his actions under the 1964 Act 
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people assume that somewhere there is someone who can 
say 'you can~t do that~, they assume that somewhere 
there is accountability. Laurence Scott showed that 
there isn~t - the Chief Constable is in control (Cox, 
1985) 
iii. The Quiet Revolution 
On 15 March 1982 the Chief Constable released the text of 
a postponed speech to the press in which he advocated the 
outright abolition of Police Authorities. It was his most 
forthright statement and probably the most forthright from 
any Chief Constable on the subject to date. He stated that 
the police should be removed completely from the realm of 
politics. He made a clear distinction between law abiding 
citizens and the Police Authorities who 
-acrimonious and secretive" battle to 
control of poliCing 
were fighting an 
gain political 
I firmly believe there is a long tern political 
strategy to destroy the proven structure of the police 
and tUrn them into an executive agency of a one-party 
state. I am also convinced that the British police 
service is now a prime target for subversion and 
demoralization (see MEN. 15.3.82). 
Anderton advocated the setting up of eight/ten regional 
forces under commissioners who would coordinate national 
campaigns against terrorism, public disorder and 
international crime. Police Authorities would be replaced 
by non-political boards and the pollce would be answerable 
to a central board in London chaired by the Home 
Secretary. 
-l:- :r~,:. :-', .. The response. _ by the Labour __ Party, Jo_: Anderton' s statement:: 
was unequivocal. Roy Hattersley described it as 
'inflammatory nonsense' and called into question the Chief 
Constable's competence to hold office. In the House of 
Commons a motion was put forward by Labour MPs expressing 
.. . ,., 
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concern about Chief Constables who were constantly 
·denigrating democratically elected police committees and 
recommending non-elected bodies in their place'. In 
Manchester the Chair of the Police Authority described 
Anderton's comments as ·a load of tripe' and said that the 
Chief Constable would have to face the consequences of 
such comments (see The Guardian, 17.3.82). 
However~ Anderton was unrepentant and in an interview 
reiterated his position 
The current concern over policing being expressed by 
certain political factions has got precious little 
to do with better community participation in 
policing affairs or the improvement of democracy-
rather it is the first conscious step manifesting 
itself towards the political control of the police, 
without which the dream of a totalitarian, one party 
state in this country cannot be realized (The Times, 
18.3.82). 
The March 1982 Police Authority meeeting discussed both 
the policing of the Laurence Scott dispute and the 
statements of the Chief Constable. A resolution that the 
Chief Constable's deployment of 300 police officers during 
the dispute was an ·over reaction' was carried. The Chief 
Constable accused the deputy Chair of fermenting trouble 
and ·working very hard in the area to canvass opinion 
against the police'. In this context the Chair demanded 
that the Chief Constable to clarify the statements that he 
had made and to indicate whether hi~ allegations about, or 
derogatory references to, members of Police Authorities 
referred to members of the Greater Manchester Police 
Authority. The Chief Constable refused to expand upon his 
statements .(see~The Times,~20.3.82). 
. '" 
• ", ~ " .• I "~'.".,", I ", ...... 
This led to a vote of confidence in the Chief Constable, 
tabled by opposition councillors and magistrates, being 
defeated and Labour members threatening to go to the Home 
.' t,}r' ... :. 
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Secretary if he did not comply with their request for 
clarification. This was followed up by the Labour Party~s 
North West regional conference calling for an inquiry into 
Anderton~s conduct and the passing of an emergency motion 
condemning his irresponsible statements (see The Times, 
20.3.82). 
Iv. Arming The Force 
In September 1981 a row started about the Chief 
Constable's seeming determination to turning GMP into a 
fully paramilitary force. The origins of the row lay with 
the discovery of the secret acquisition of two modified 
Heckler and Kock H~~33, SAS style, submachine guns (see The 
Observer, 20.9.81). The Leader of Greater Manchester 
Council and the deputy Chair of the Police Authority 
subsequently publicly condemned the Chief Constable's 
attitude towards the Police Authority by behaving in such 
an unaccountable manner. GMP spokespersons had denied that 
they had purchased the guns and, given that the County 
Legal Officer, acting on behalf of the Police Authority, 
had backed them up the GMP had made him 'look a fool and a 
liar'. The Leader of the Council stated that if any other 
officer of the Council had behaved in such an 
unaccountable 
MEN, 1.10.81). 
manner s/he would have been sacked (see, 
The deputy Chair of the Police Authority 
made it clear that 
Nobody stands in isolation to the community. This 
worries us immensely. They (the police) stand in 
isolation and seem to be unwilling to be accountable to 
the community (MEN, 1.10.89) 
''''Despite this, .. argument in' April 1983 ·the-ChieT Constable 
once more made national headlines with the announcement 
that armed police were patrolling Greater Manchester 
because OT the supposed increase in. the number of armed 
robberies in the region. As far as the Police Authority 
• 
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was concerned the issuing of firearms without relating to 
a specific incident represented ca major change of 
policy'. However, the Chief Constable made it clear that, 
for operational reasons, he had no intention of disclosing 
the number of police vehicles or officers involved (see, 
Manchester Evening News, 6.4.83). 
v. The Police Band 
In January 1984 the Police Authority decided to abolish 
the full time police band and return its members to normal 
duties. It was one of the 
Authority attempted to 
few instances where the Police 
set the agenda utilizing its 
Police Act to provide an 
which involved cutting 
responsibilities under the 1964 
efficient force. This measure, 
£300,000 from its budget, was 
economies put through the 
members. The Chief Constable 
had abandoned the practice 
part of a £1.Sm package of 
Police Authority by Labour 
claimed that the Authority 
of consulting the Chief 
Constable on financial matters affecting his force 
There is simply no precedent in this force for a police 
committee virtually to order or require the chief 
constable uncompromisingly against his carefully 
considered opinion and advice and without proper 
conSUltation practically to close a long established 
unit. I view this shift of policy and posture with 
grave concern (Fieldnotes). 
The Chair of the Authority refuted the assertions, stating 
that - the Chief Constable had been informed of the cut 
backs. She said that the Chief Constable's alternative had 
been to delete from the budget three new section stations 
-and-reduce-operational 'staff~' by' forty. ';'-As'''~far:~>a:i:-ttie-'' 
Police Authority was concerned this was not acceptable as 
the Authority wanted to maintain operational strength and 
viewed the section'stations as an important part of 
community policing. After an adjournment the clerk to the 
.'J. _. 
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Authority gave a ruling supporting the Labour position. 
The Chief Constable subsequently informed the media that 
this issue raised the constitutional question of whether 
or not a Police Authority had the right to ignore a Chief 
Constable's views on important matters connected with his 
force. He also stated that he intended to refer the issue 
to the Inspector of Constabulary and the Home Office and 
until ·the question is resolved I must allow myself the 
di sc:retion to deploy my forces as I please.' (Fieldnotes). 
A further meeting took place between the Chief Constable 
and the Council on January 9 to discuss the issue and the 
Chair of the Police Authority subsequently going to the 
Home Office to discuss the cash crisis facing the force on 
11 January 1984. 
vi. Policing the Coal Dispute 
During April 1984 the policing of the coal dispute was 
first discussed by the Police Authority. The Chair stated 
that a working party should be set up to assess whether 
the scale of the GMP operation to handle problems arising 
from the dispute was justified. The Chief Constable asked 
whether it was being suggested that there should be 
emergency meetings of the Authority members before he 
could dispatch bis officers to trouble spots. The Chair 
stated that whilst she was not suggesting that the Chief 
Constable ask permission she wanted him to recognize that 
the operations were having a detrimental effect on the 
poliCing of Greater Manchester and financially bankrupting 
.. ·:·,·,,.the Polic:eb·.Authority. Anderton· refused· to· be drawn'into"·· 
this debate. 
By the July meeting the full financial implications of the 
coal dispute were becoming clear. The Chair of the 
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Authority announced that the overtime budget would be 
exhausted by August due to police resources being spent on 
the dispute and that in addition Derbyshire was refusing 
to pay other Police Authorities. The questions were posed 
by the Chair as to who was going to pay for the policing 
of the dispute and what were the implications for the 
accountability of the police. She stated that too much 
money was being spent on one particular law and order 
issue and that the di spute could have been policed in a 
completely di fferent manner. It was reemphasized that no 
other chief officer of the council would be able to carry 
out his/her duty irrespective of cost and demanded that 
some form of accountability was necessary 
Chief Constables do not have the right to spend, spend 
and spend when other areas of policy are cut. There is 
the constitutional anomaly of Chief Constables being 
able to spend and no body being capable, legally, to 
stop them (Fieldnotes). 
Concern was also expressed, during the course of this 
meeting, about the implications of the emergence of the 
National Reporting Centre. Labour councillors stressed 
that the pOliCing of Manchester had suffered as a 
consequence of the overriding of the Police Authority by 
the Chief Constables, the Home Secretary and the National 
Reporting Centre. 
The Chief Constable refused to respond to the statements 
of the Chair during the meeting. Instead he chose to state 
his position in the form of ca speech at the Institute of 
Housing conference on 18 June 1984 when he compared mass 
picketing_and .. violent demonstrations to 'acts of terrorism 
. -., <"',··r,~~'· •.•. ~"' .......... ,_ I .'\"~'~ ~_'\., .... ·,s· .. , •.. -1 .. _, ~.~,:,...:: 
without the bullet and the bomb~. He also addressed the 
state of the police by once more expounding his conspiracy 
theory arguing that,. 'certain poll tic:al ldeologues 
recognize that power over the people requires first that 




c:ontrolled' (The Guardian. 
The Chair of the Polic:e Authority responded to the speec:h 
by putting forward a last minute motion at the July 1984 
meeting condemning the Chief Constable's c:omments 
It is exc:eptionally unfortunate when we are in the 
middle of a diffic:ult industrial dispute that comments 
are made which aggravate the situation. It does not 
help this Police Authority or police officers. I 
propose that this Polic:e Authority deplores the 
provocative partisan nature of part of the speech. I do 
not e~pect offic:ers to intervene into political issues 
in this bipartisan way as it erodes the idea of police 
impartiality (Fieldnotes). 
As a c:onsequence this meeting ended in scenes of disarray. 
At a subsequent emergency meeting the motion was again 
tabled with the Chief Constable attempting to justify his 
actions. He denied that he was specifically referring to 
the coal dispute and argued that any comments he had made 
reflected a balanced and impartial view. However the Chair 
reiterated the view she had put at the original motion and 
tabled a motion deploring 
the provocative and partisan nature of parts of the 
speech. The Police Authority believes these comments 
erode the concept of police impartiality and aggravate 
the already strained relations between police and 
miners CFieldnotes) 
As magistrates, the opposition members and the Chief 
Constable attempted to iAtervene the Chief Constable was 
ordered, by the Chair, to remain silent. The Conservative 
. ··::;·~member.5 . f uell ed .. the conflict . by .- present i ng" thei r._ own 
motion fully supporting the Chief Constable. Whilst the 
latter motion was defeated the motion of censure was 
carried. 
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vii. Prisoners rights leaflet 
During the September 1984 meeting the Labour proposal to 
produce a prisoners rights leaflet became the source of 
conflict. The Chief Constable stated that such a leaflet 
was unacceptable because it was inaccurate, biased and 
possibly even legally dangerous. The Labour members were 
completely perplexed by his opposition as the leaflet had 
been prepared over the previous five months and 
incorporated the advice of his own Assistant Chief 
Constable and the Home Office. This developed into another 
bitter row. The Chief Constable was asked to develop 
proper channels of communication with his senior officers 
so that when they attended meetings as his representatives 
they would know his views on the issues under discussion. 
The Chief Constable replied that he could not do this as 
it would mean that his senior officers would have the 
authority to bind him to an operational position with 
~hich he might not agree. 
During this period the various sources of conflict between 
the Chief Constable and the Police Authority became 
intermeshed. All of them emerged in an inter-related 
manner since they were all manifestations of the struggle 
over how Greater Manchester should be policed and who 
should be responsible for deciding on policing policies. 
Hence, the coal dispute again dominated the October 
~eeting and particularly the meetihg that had taken place 
with the Home Secretary to discuss the financial 
implications of ·--the policing operation. Only the 
Conservative councillors disagreed with.the Chair's stance 
~-"-' i,;;.'-':.during'.that'~meeting, concerning the need. for' cl arifit'."ati on 
of the government,s position in relation to paying for the 
policing of the dispute. The Conservatives affirmed their 
support for the Home Secretary's 'stand and demanded that 
the council find the money to maintain the police budget 
,"' .... 'f 
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including the money to reinstate the police band. As the 
argument raged the Chief Constable's aides gave out a 
statement to all present, without the prior knowledge of 
the Authority, specifically concerning the band. It stated 
that the Chief Constable had met privately with the Chief 
Inspector of the Constabulary and the Deputy Under 
Secretary of State and that they had asked him to request 
the Authority to defer any decision about the band 
until I, as Chief Constable, have had a proper and 
fuller opportunity to appraise them of the implications 
of the Police Authority's proposals, and of the legal 
and constitutional points which are of issue 
(Fieldnotes). 
He had advised the Home Office that the Police Authority 
was intending to use its financial powers of control 
in order selectively to restrict or prevent, the 
deployment by the Chief Constable of a manpower 
resource within the force for which budget provision 
has already been made in respect of which a Home Office 
grant is paid. According to advice I have received this 
morning I must seriously inform the Police Authority 
that the action they now propose to take may well be 
ultravires and I would suggest they look again at this 
matter (Fieldnotes). 
He concluded by saying until the question had been finally 
resolved he would continue to allow himself the discretion 
to deploy his force as he pleased. The meeting was 
adjourned and the advice of the County Legal Clerk sought 
to establish the constitutional position. The Clerk 
reiterated that the band was not within the Chief 
Constable·s operational remit. The magistrate members 
tried to stop the attacks upon the Chief Constable calling 
.. for "the meeti ng·to be adjourned 'unti 1", things "'had calmed·,;" '>-. 
down. This motion was defeated with the Chair accusing the 
Chief Constable of deliberately producing a constitutional 
crisis. As a consequence the Labour members proposed a 
-resolution expressing dissatisfaction with the behaviour 
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of the Chief Constable in the matter of the police band. 
They also stated that they would 
with the Home Secretary and the 
this issue. 
be demanding discussions 
Inspectorate to resolve 
The Chair stated that the Chief Constable was solely 
responSible for this state of affairs and that he was in 
breach of the duties of a chief officer of the council. 
The Chief Constable, upon the invitation of one of the 
oppositon members, replied that it was pure coincidence 
that he had been in London for a meeting of Chief 
Constables and was able to visit the Home Office. He 
stated that the reason he did not discuss the matter 
earlier was because he did not 'consider it opportune or 
necessary to explain'. In addition he made it clear that 
he was decidedly unhappy about the resolution proposing to 
report him to the Home Secretary. 
The magistrates asked for a postponement whilst the 
Conservatives maintained that the Chief Constable probably 
had good reasons for acting as he had. However the Labour 
members viewed the Chief Constable'S actions as an act of 
deliberate provocation. One member lucidly summed up their 
feelings when he said that the Police Authority seemed to 
~ind itself in its dealings with the Chief Constable 
always in the small print of the law and that there was no 
spirit of co-operation. The Chief Constable disregarded 
the work of the sub-committees and was constantly 
provoking constitutional issues 
we havep gone very far from ... theband to the_lssu~ o~ 
tonstit~tional c6ntrol. ·No~ is the time to·see~ cent~al 
confirmation of our powers as advised by the Home 
Office (Fieldnotes). 




Constable for his 
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police band and to censure the 
behaviour. Both the Chief 
Constable and the Police Authority appealed to the Home 
office for a definitive clarification of the powers of the 
Chief Constable. On October 9 ACC Stalker went to the Home 
Office and was advised that the band could not be 
considered to be necessary to the efficiency of the force. 
The Chief Constable subsequently agreed, in what he 
described as the best interests of the relationship 
between the Police Authority and himself, and in the best 
interests of the community, to ~accede' to the request to 
disband the police band. Nevertheless, the Chief Constable 
reiterated that as far as he was concerned the legal 
opinion he had obtained confirmed his own view that 
the deployment of personnel is the sole prerogative of 
the Chief Constable and that any decision by the Police 
Authority to oust his jurisdiction in that matter 
should be resisted by an application for judicial 
review (Fieldnotes). 
The November 1984 meeting once more reflected the tensions 
between the Chief Constable and the ruling group on the 
Authority. No sooner had the public meeting started than 
it withdrew into private in an attempt to resolve what the 
Chair referred to as ·the discrepancy between the Chief 
Constable's understanding of the meeting and the 
Authority's '. When it resumed in public the first item to 
be discussed was the effects of the policing of the coal 
dispute upon the policing of Manchester. The Chief 
Constable argued that there was no means of establishing 
what the actual effect was. The deputy Chair of the 
Authority asked 
When is the point at which the Police Authorities can 
say stop, the policing of our own area is more 
important? At the moment it is out of our hands because 
of the operational discretion of the' Chief Constables.' 
What about law and order within our own communities? 
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(Fieldnotes). 
On the issue of the police band, the Chief Constable 
stated that although he had decide to accede to the Police 
Authority's wishes 
the Home Office will agree with me that in certain 
circumstances it is within the right of a chief 
constable to seek legal advice, as an individual, from 
whatever source (Fieldnotes). 
On the issue of the proposed prisoners leaflet he 
reiterated that 
whatever the Police Authority chose to do 1 feel under 
an obligation to put it back to the Home Office to see 
what the legal implications are for Chief Constables. 
It will also be put to Association of Chief Police 
Officers. There's a long way to go on this yet 
(Fieldnotes). 
viii. The Truce 
By the time that the December meeting took place an uneasy 
pact was reached as a result of a series of private 
meetings with the Home Office. The Monday prior to the 
full meeting representatives of the Authority and the 
Chief Constable met with the Home Office in London. 
Afterwards the Chief Constable told the media that both he 
and the Authority would attempt to fulfil their respective 
duties without acrimony. The meetings of early 1985 were 
less acrimonious in terms of the relationship between the 
Labour members and the Chief Constable although the 
relationship of Labour members with the opposition and the 
magistrates remained strained. 
The .. January.~meeting witnessed the Chief Constable 
supporting the Chair in her complaints about the 
detrimental effects that the coal dispute was having on 
the policing of Manchester. She argued that it was time 
that the people of Manchester were made fully aware of the 
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seriousness of the situation. Despite the opposition of 
the magistrates and the Conservatives a motion was passed 
to the effect that the Authority 
deplores the lack of control it has over its own force, 
the loss of service to the people of Greater Manchester 
and the failure of the government to solve this long 
and costly dispute (Fieldnotes). 
The proposed abolition of the metropolitan county councils 
also initially unified both the Chief Constable and the 
Authority in their opposition to the bill. The Chief 
Constable was particularly concerned with clause 40 which 
could facilitate the breaking up of the existing police 
iorces by ·the Home Secretary. During the February meeting 
the Chief Constable complained about not only the 
implications of the local government changes but also the 
legal changes which were being implemented in the form of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, the Data Protection 
Act and the Criminal Law Act. The Police Authority 
supported the Chief Constable and agreed that their 
concern should be voiced to the Home Secretary during his 
visit in March. The Chief Constable reiterated all these 
complaints in an article in The Guardian on 29 March 1985 
and he even praised his Police Authority for its 
supportive role in matters to do with improving the 
effectiveness of the Greater Manchester Police. However, 
he clearly distinguished this proper role from their 
demands to have more accountability 
The cry for accountability is incessant and the 
principle dilemma today is how best to reconcile 
• essentially local policing, requiring public co-
.. ~operationrand. support with policing of a very different. 
kind 'for ~hich only professional police officer~~re 
adequately fitted (The Guardian, 29.3.85) 
The full Police Authority meeting in March started off by 
the Chair complaining about the disappointing meeting that 
they had had with the Home Secretary and that with 
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reference to the financial costs of the policing of the 
coal dispute they would have to seek redress through the 
courts. However, the visit of 
bequeathed another problem for 
the Home Secretary had 
the Police Authority 
because it had provoked a demonstration against his 
speaking at the University and subsequent allegations of 
heavy handed policing. The media once more turned up to 
the meeting in force to witness the showdown. However, the 
incident was not included on the public agenda. 
Ix. The Battle of Brittan 
The April 1985 meeting did, however, confront the policing 
of the visit of the Home Secretary to the University. The 
Chair expressed concern that the Home Secretary was not 
prepared to hold a public inquiry into the incident, as 
had been requested by the Police Authority. The Chief 
Constable was asked whether he would submit a report to 
the Authority, not on the specifics, but on the general 
way that the incident was policed. He replied that 
I cannot give you a full report of all that transpired, 
not even concerning the deployment of police officers 
because that is germane to the proceedings. What I will 
do and it is all that I am prepared to do is let you 
have a brief report containing such information as I 
deem it proper for you to have (Fieldnotes). 
Members of the Authority did not confront the Chief 
Constable over the issue and this ~et the tone for dealing 
with the incident. 'The Battle of Brittan' never became a 
source of public conflict between the Police Authority and 
the Chief Constable. The latter did provide a skeleton 
report for t~e May.1985 meeting and it was left.~o.the 
new Police'Complaints Authority to deal with the incident." 
The uneasy truce even carried over into the discussion of 
the Chief 
of the 
Constable's retrospective report on the effects 
coal dispute on the policing of Manchester. 
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Skirmishes between the Labour members and the opposition 
were quickly curbed by the Chair as were ones with the 
Chief Constable when he made clear that he was not 
prepared to enter into any discussions about the nature of 
the poli ci ng of the dispute. The Chair of the Authority 
did, however, make the most systematic statement about the 
consequences of the policing of the dispute for the 
Authority and for police accountability stating that it 
has been frustrating, demonstrating the inability of 
the Police Authority to deal with its own budget and 
its own area. There is the whole question of 
accountability and the issues of policing public order 
Situations. A lot of the issues of policing are not 
about the practicalities and technicalities but how we 
want our communities to be policed; what liberties and 
rights do we want upheld and how do we prioritize. 
There are issues about the preservation of peace being 
the key concern for the police. These issues are for 
the community to decide not the police alone; its not 
just for the Association of Chief Police Officers. I am· 
concerned that the police force will be demand led and 
that everything will be secondary to public order in 
future (Fieldnotes) 
She emphasized that she was concerned to see the financial 
resources of the Authority being "drained" and riot 
eqUipment purchased in an unaccountable manner to maintain 
public order in other parts of the country. Although the 
Conservative members complained about the Chair's comments 
the Chief Constable made no reply. 
There was a brief confrontation when the deputy Chair 
asked the Chief_ Constable whether the newly printed 
leaflets for detainees would be made available in police 
..:,.:_-''''<.',. stations •.. The Chief Constable, responc:red by s~yir.'g that he. 
was disturbed by certain of the paragraphs and intended to 
refer them to the Home Office, the Inspectorate and 
ASSOCiation of ·Chief Police Officers. The Labour members 
expressed their disappointment with the Chief Constable's 
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reply arguing that the leaflets were an important part of 
the Authority's lay visiting scheme. 
x. The Magistrates 
The May 1985 meeting did, for the first time since 
immediately after the 1981 election of the Labour 
administration, address the issue of the position of 
magistrates on the Authority. This was the result of a row 
that had taken place during the previous monthly meeting 
over the matter of the GMP adopting an anti-
discrimination statement as force policy. The statement 
would have committed all officers to take an oath 
promising to treat all citizens equally irrespective of 
race, class or gender. The Conservatives and magistrates 
condemned the proposal as an insult to the force whilst 
the Chief Constable argued that the existing oath was 
satisfactory. Anderton stressed that such a proposal was 
unprecedented. In the ensuing vote deadlock occurred and 
the Chair referred the issue for further discussion rather 
than cast the deciding vote. During the May meeting the 
re-presented motion concerning the anti-discrimination 
statement was passed, despite continued Conservative and 
magistrate opposition. The Chair declared that she 'found 
it appalling that the magistrates had voted down the 
policies of the elected Council'. She stated that the 
anti-discrimination statement would be distributed to all 
relevant community groups with a· letter explaining who 
voted for it and who voted against it. She added that in 
future, because of the attitude of the magistrates, the 
names of those voting for and against would be recorded 
. ~_under.the _.headi ngs el ected and non-el ected. She sai d that 
the role of the magistrates on the police Authority should 
be explained to the community and that there was the 
distinct· possibility that after the abolition of the 
Police Authority the magistrates could hold the balance of 
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power· on the new structure. Other Labour members argued 
that although the magistrates were supposed to act as 
individuals they in fact organized themselves as a 
political faction which supported the Conservatives and 
politici2ed every meeting through their actions and voting 
patterns. This caused a direct confrontation with a 
magistrate arguing that 
Whilst you represent a proportion of the community we 
are appointed to represent the whole community and we 
are appointed by statute (Fieldnotes). 
Labour retorted that it should be made clear to the 
community that the magistrates were non-elected, non-
accountable and certain of them did not even live in the 
Greater Manchester area. Despite the accusations being 
made the Chief Constable did not enter this argument. 
The truce with the Chief Constable was short lived when it 
was discovered that he had instituted a major internal 
reorganization of the force without consulting the Police 
Authority. When pressed upon the matter DCe Stalker, 
deputizing for the Chief Constable, replied 
it is not practical or the Chief Constables intention 
to go back and discuss the matter, these are 
operational decisions part of the normal senior 
management where chief officers get on with decision 
matters. I agree with consultation but when it comes to 
deployment its operational not ,administration. When it 
comes to deployment and movement of men it cannot be 
done by bargaining and bartering (Fieldnotes). 
Consequently, an amendment to accept the Chief Constable'S 
actions and DCC Stalker·s reasoning by the magistrates was 
defeated~ .~.; .: 
Discussion 
Thus in the period between May 1981 and May 1985 the 
efforts by the ruling Labour group to make the Chief 
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Constable accountable under the provisions of the 1964 
Police Act resulted in continual conflict. The Chief 
Constable rejected all attempts by the Labour members to 
exercise, what has been defined elsewhere as, 
retrospective accountability and prospective control (see, 
Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate, 1988:151-153). All 
attempts to exercise any form of accountability were met 
with highly publicized statements by the Chief Constable 
that they were manifestations of the conspiracy to 
overthrow British democracy. In doing so the Chief 
Constable was effectively indicating the lengths he was 
prepared to go to in order to thwart their intentions to 
make him accountable. In its efforts the Labour group was 
hindered by two further factors. First, given the role 
that the police was given to play within its restructuring 
of British SOCiety, there was the Conservative 
government~s unswerving support for any Chief Constable in 
conflict with his Police Authority. In this context there 
was little chance of the Home Office being sympathetic to 
the claims of the Labour councillors. And second, there 
was the unswerving support of the Conservative councillors 
and magistrates for the Chief Constable during Police 
Authority meetings. The numerical strength of the non-
elected magistrates and their voting in an homogeneous 
manner meant that every issue was fought out in a crisis 
Situation, particularly if it came to voting. As a 
consequence the Labour group had little success in 
representing the interests of those for whom the police 
were a problem. It was within this context that the Police 
Authority attempted to implement the second component of 
its ·a~countab1l1ty package and it had serious 
ramifications for the success or otherwise of that 
component. 
ITI 
Section 11: Model I 
Community rSDrsssntation 
community liaison 
and participation through 
The Labour group of the Police Authority combined the 
recommendations of both the Hytner and Scarman reports to 
construct consultative arrangements for the facilitation 
of community representation and participation. It was 
agreed by the Authority in November 1981 to appoint, under 
the Hytner recommendations, a community liaison officer 
(CLO) to act as first, the community representative on the 
matter of complaints and second, under the Scarman 
recommendations, to set up community liaison arrangements, 
initially in Moss Side. Further community representation 
and participation was to be achieved by the implementation 
of lay visiting proposals. 
The Labour group saw the Scarman and Hytner proposals on 
community liaison as the basis for the extension of the 
accountability of the police directly to the community 
an essential part of any accountability structure ••• an 
attempt to involve the community in making the police 
more accountable. (Cox: 1985) 
For the Chair. of the Authority the liaison panels would be 
an extension of the accountability struc~fires of the 
Police Authority. The community liaison~an~ls were to act 
as the 'eyes and ears' of the Authority providing crucial 
information about the type of policing being carried out 
in Greater Manchester. They were also viewed as having the 
;_potential~ ~o .be develop into devolved 'mini Police 
Authorities'. Whilst the Chief Constable and senior ranks 
were to be made accountable to the Police Authority, local 
police officers were to be made accountable to the local 
community via the liaison panels. Additionally, any 
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demands that the liaison forums might make in relation to 
policing through the Police Authority would allow the 
latter to pressurize the Chief Constable for changes as 
the representatives of the community. The latter was an 
important role as far as the Labour group was concerned 
because as the structures were supposed to be 
representative of the community the Chief Constable could 
not dismiss their demands in the same way he dismissed the 
Police Authority's, ie. as unrepresentative. 
Whilst the Labour group saw the initiative as a way of 
making the BMP more accountable by facilitating community 
representation and participation on policing matters, the 
other sections of the Police Authority had different 
ideas. The Liberal councillors, whilst supporting 
community liaison, wanted it to be extended to the whole 
of the community and saw it as contributing to the control 
of crime and therefore fostering better police community 
relations. The Conservatives and the magistrates were 
completely hostile to the whole idea viewing it as a ploy 
to hinder the police in the fight against crime. The Chief 
Constable, whilst supporting the appointment of the 
Community Liaison Officer (CLO) , was suspicious of the 
whole idea precisely because of how the ruling Labour 
group viewed the initiative. The local Police Federation 
rejected totally the apPOintment of the CLO (see, MEN, 
7.11.81). In addition the ruling Labour administration in 
charge of Manchester City Council, which had e~pressed its 
dissatisfaction with the Hytner Inquiry eventually 
publicly rejected the whole idea of community liaison 
-"'-.; ... making -it an issue in its 1984' election manifesto. 
This OPposition within the formal structures of governance 
was mirrored by the outright rejection of the proposals in 
Moss Side. As was documented previously, the MSDC had 
' .. , .......... 
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successfully urged the boycott of the Hytner Inquiry 
precisely 
this and 
because of its unrepresentativeness. Despite 
the fact that the MSDC had also rejected the 
findings and the recommendations of the Hytner Report the 
ruling Labour group 
the recommendations. 
of the Police Authority implemented 
Furthermore, to compound its 
problems, after meeting with the boycott of the post of 
CLQ by key community representatives in Moss Side, the 
Police Authority appointed a black member of the Inquiry. 
Thus, someone who had been previously publicly defined as 
unrepresentative was appointed as the community 
representative! It could be argued that this perseverance 
with community liaison, in spite of the opposition, was an 
indication of the constraints placed upon the Labour group 
of the Police Authority. However, the outright rejection 
of the proposals by key sections of Moss Side meant that 
there was little chance of setting up a community liaison 
panel in this area. If the radical representatives of the 
community would not participate in the structure what 
chance was there of bringing a.bout ~he participation of 
the youth who had challenged the policing they were 
subject to during the summer of 1981? 
The work of the CLO was compounded by additional problems. 
First, his efforts were constantly undermined by the 
statements of the Chief Constable and the actions of the 
GMP in relation to the policing ef Greater Manchester In 
general but Moss Side In particular. A series of incidents 
took place which confirmed the opposition of those opposed 
to consultation with the police. This was compounded by 
-· .. ·the~ fact ;-·documented previ ousl y,. that.- the' Poli ce Aut.hori ty 
seemed to be incapable of calling the Ch~ef Constable to 
account. Second, the problems that manifested themselves 
in relation to the type of CLPs set up elsewhere in 
Greater Manchester confirmed the scepticism of those 
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opposed to such structures. Third, the general philosophy 
inTorming the work of the CLO caused consternation amongst 
those groups locked into struggle with the police. The 
overall result was to lend support to those who argued 
that the Police Authority was incapable of representing 
the interests of those for whom the police were a problem 
and that an alternative to community liaison must be set 
up in Manchester. 
The Police Authority sub-committee set up to implement the 
Scarman consultation proposals and the Chief Constable 
also agreed to the suggestion concerning lay visiting. 
However, from the outset the GMP took responsibility for 
the initative with the Community Liaison Officer having no 
role to play in the implementation of this proposal. The 
Community Contact section of the force produced guidelines 
for the first provincial experimental scheme which became 
operational from 1 May 1983. In addition the force took 
responsibility for the training of the lay visitors. Thus 
the police were able to exercise tight control over this 
part of the Scarman recommendations and significantly the 
CLO did not gain any rights of access to police stations 
in the force area. In October 1983 it was agreed to expand 
the pool of lay visitors by including the membership of 
the liaison panels. Although all members of the panels 
were to be eligible for lay visitor status, each panel 
would be restricted to having' three who would be 
shortlisted and agreed to by the Authority's community 
relations subcommittee and the Chief Constable. Panel 
members would cease to be lay visitors if they resigned or 
.. <.. " '-;';-,,~ were :,.removed from the I i ai son panel .. , : and the Chi ef 
Constable had the right to terminate an appointment if 
conduct fell below the required standard. All visitors had 
to sign a document promising co~fidentiality concerning 
any information collected during the course of the Visits, 
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except in legal proceedings, in any report submitted to 





complaint against another police officer. 
was recommended that visits should be 
and only to police stations in the local 
Hence the lay visiting scheme was tightly structured and 
under the virtual control of the GMP. Lay visiting was one 
of the few real powers of active involvement available to 
the community liaison panels but the Chief Constable made 
sure that the GMP retained control over this initiative. 
In this situation there was little chance of the Labour 
group's views on the role of lay visiting being realized 
or the worries of those concerned about what happened in 
police stations being assuaged. 
a. The Community Liaison Officer (CLO): Representing the 
Communitx 
The Community Liaison Officer, although based in the heart 
of Moss Side, had to face a boycott from significant 
sections of the community that he was supposed to be 
representing in Moss Side. Thus, when he attempted to 
attend the first two meetings of Youth and Allied Workers 
Police Monitoring Group (YAWPMG) he was excluded on the 
grounds that his role and function made it impossible for 
him to be 'a legitimate member of the group'. This 
rejection of the representativeness of the community 
representative was a serious problem because the Hytner 
Report had emphasized that the proposal could only work if 
there"wasactive'community support and that this'could 
only be achieved through a representative who was 
acceptable to the community. 
There is little doubt that the Community Liaison Officer 
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took his role of attempting to represent the interests of 
the black people seriously and that he recognised the 
necessity of making sure that those needs were prioritized 
in his work. He focussed specifically on the areas of 
racial attacks and police response to them, complaints 
about police malpractice, racism and ethnic minority 
recruitment to the force. However, the manner in which he 
dealt with these issues meant that he confirmed the worst 
fears of those who opposed his work and questioned his 
representative status. 
i. Racial attacks and the response of the police 
The CLO held meetings with departments of Manchester City 
Council and police representatives in order to work out a 
multi-agency approach to the problem of racist attacks. As 
a result the council departments involved monitored the 
problem and passed on all information they had to the 
police. However, the promotion and adherence to such 
multi-agency approaches meant that the CLO was acting in 
direct opposition to those in Moss Side who were critical 
of such an approach. 
As a result of his concern the Chief Constable presented a 
report to the Police Authority Crime Sub-committee in 
September 1983 regarding force monitoring of racial 
inCidents. The Police Authority and the Chief Constable 
agreed to the holding of a conference to 
approach to the problem. However the 
subsequently decided that the force would 
produce a joint 
Chief Constable 
hold their own 
conference with limited participation by community 
;., representatives.: .. The .CLO was parti cuI arl yconcerned about - --~ 
the nature of the Chief Constable's' proposal because it of 
its narrow base. He argued that any conference on the 
issue should be open in terms of representation and 
partiCipation so that the community could Cbe given more 
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opportunity o-f understanding the nature of police 
monitoring being done, and have an opportunity to 
partiCipate in structuring any changes' (2nd AR:l0). 
However, this did not happen. Thus the CLO was coming up 
against the problem that the Chie-f Constable constantly 
redefined problems in order to exclude those 
unrepresentative members of the community who would be 
critical of the police. In agreeing to such redefinitions 
the CLO confirmed his critics point about the futility of 
his role. 
ii. Ethnic minority recruitment to the police force 
The CLO argued that "all ••• institutions should reflect the 
communities they serve and if black people are part of the 
community they should be part of the institutions' (1st 
Annual Report:5). He emphasised that the GMP should 
realise that they had the key role to play in the 
recruitment of members of the black communities. As far as 
he was concerned the police had to recognise that the way 
their actions were viewed by the black community 
determined whether black people would join the force. If 
changes were not forthcoming 
it is hard to see that there 
reflection of the black community 
Greater Manchester Police before 
Annual Report 15) 
is going to be a 
population in the 
the year 2400 (1st 
To bring about that change the 
race relations training within 
CLO worked to improve the 
GMP. He attempted to move 
the force policy away from classroom lessons to 'on the 
job~ and 'on the division' training. Additionally he 
. demanded ···the:'· refocussing .. ~·of" ,thi? training' content:'·to'·, .. · 
specifically address racial prejudice and discrimination 
This is the central issue that concerns people on the 
street. I don't care whether the police officer is 
familiar with the place where my parents were born; I 
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want the officer to exercise his discretions towards me 
without being influenced by racially motivated 
prejudice (1st Annual Report:7) 
In relation to the recruitment of black officers and race 
relations training the CLO argued that the Greater 
Manchester Police had to think seriously about two courses 
of action. First, there had to be an unambiguous statement 
from the force that they were prepared to act to 
'eliminate the use of inappropriate assumptions in the 
organisation based on national origin or colour~ (1st 
AR:16). And second, that force orders, training and 
supervision concerning anti racism had to be followed up 
by actions against racist officers and expressions of 
racism 
unless the profile of the Greater Manchester Police in 
the eyes of ethnic minority groups, particularly Afro-
Carribean groups, is radically changed, then ethnic 
minority recrUitment, despite the efforts being made by 
the police will never increase beyond the trickle at 
which it stands now ••• The fact that the police may 
perceive themselves to be neutral or even anti-racist 
is almost irrelevant because the action of the minority 
groups and individuals is based on their own perception 
of the police and not on the police perception of 
themselves (Ist Annual Report:16). 
However, as indicated previously, the Chief Constable 
rejected all allegations concerning racism in the Greater 
Manchester Police and there was no attempt to address the 
critiCisms of the CLO. When the Labour group of the Police 
Authority formulated its anti-discrimination statement for 
the force the Chief Constable rejected it outright. 
iii. Youth workers and the police 
The CLO attempted to' resolve the conflict between youth 
and workers and police officers 1n Manchester despite the 
fact that the Youth and Allied Workers Police Monitoring 
Group had rejected the liaison initiative and his 
appointment. However, his attempts to circumvent this 
I~ 
opposition utilised the multi-agency approach that the 
group opposed. The CLO set up a series of meetings between 
senior youth officers of all districts of Greater 
Manchester and senior police officers. Only those youth 
officers who had good relations with the. police or who 
actively supported police involvement in youth work 
attended. The difficulty was that no representatives of 
the youth service at the forefront of the conflict with 
the police attended. The consequence was that this series 
of meetings achieved three things that confirmed the worst 
fears of youth and Allied Workers Police Monitoring Group. 
First, they promoted a multi-agency approach through the 
formalisation of contact between youth work 
representatives and the police. Second because of the type 
of youth work representatives who attended they agreed to 
arguments presented by the police officers present and did 
not pursue the key issue of police intimidation of youth 
and community workers. Third, the outcome of these 
deliberations was to suggest that those youth and 
community workers who continued to oppose police 
involvement in police work were unrepresentative of the 
majority views of youth and community workers in Greater 
Manchester. Thus, those who were in conflict with the 
police were having their complaints defined out by the 
policies of the CLO. 
iv.Complaints against the police 
The CLO took on the role that the Hytner Report had 
recommended in terms of the complaints procedure. However, 
the Chief Constable refused to appoint an officer in the 
'ma~n9r ·suggested~ by the Report to co-operate with the 
community representative. Hence, the CLO was left to deal 
with the Complaints Department of the GMP. The CLO only 
dealt with those complaints submitted directly to him and 
was not involved with any complaint made directly to the 
~o 
police under normal statutory arrangements. Thus there 
were severe limitations placed upon his role in the 
complaints procedure. 
The CLO saw this work as being important, particularly in 
relation to those complaints which were not strong enough 
to be dealt with under S49 and which Hytner had 
recommended be dealt with by informal dispute resolution 
methods 
The accent is on the achieving of 
a personalised focus and not 
obtaining of testable evidence 
punishment (1st Annual Report:13). 
understanding through 
necessarily on the 
so as to mete out 
This case work was viewed as having a crucial role to play 
within the overall liaison strategy of the Police' 
Authority in relation to Moss Side. If the community could 
be persuaded that complaints would be resolved in a 
satisfactory manner they would participate in the liaison 
panels (1st Annual Report:13). 
This informal conciliation process was supposed to allow 
members of the community with a grievance to come along to 
the community representative and resolve the matter 
quickly and satisfactorily without activating the formal 
complaints procedure. 'Complainant' and 'complained about' 
were brought together in an attempt to achieve mutually 
. 
satisfactory reconciliation. If clear complaint patterns 
emerged these would be taken up by the CLO with the local 
police commander. 
Whilst- the - CLO" expressed' satisfaction wlthhow this 
casework method had developed, he recognised that there 
were serious issues to be addressed if community concerns 
were to be assuaged. In ~lsfir~~ annual report h~ n~ted 
that half of the total of 549 complaints recorded by him 
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against one quarter of the non-849 
assumed that the 549 complaints 
his office would have had a higher rate 
completion than ones which had gone through the official 
police complaints department. In fact it turned out that 
the rate of withdrawal for both was the same. His feedback 
from complainants indicated that they felt themselves to 
be under pressure when they were interviewed 
of f i cers. In his second report he noted 
by police 
that the 
withdrawal rate was down to 25% and he explained this by 
reference to his being more closely involved in the cases 
I have tried to stay much more closely in contact with 
the complainants and in doing so have, hopefully, 
enabled them to feel more confident during the 
generally long, tedious and often fruitless wait which 
they endure after having given their statements (2nd 
Annual Report: 19). 
It was precisely because the formal 
so arduous and often pointless in 
complaints system was 
terms of outcome that 
the CLO put so much emphasis on the informal dispute 
resolution mechanism. However, even with regard to this 
mechanism he was worried that 33% of non-549 complaints 
were not followed up by the complainant. ' 
This part of the CLO's work took him to the heart of the 
matter as far as the policing of the black community in 
Moss Side was concerned. In his ~ast report he concluded 
that ·the high proportion of complaints from black or 
brown people may point to the need for an indepth look at 
policing on the ground' (2nd Annual Report I 19). He once 
more emphasised that if a CLP 
Moss Side complaints would, 
was going to be set up in 
first, have ,.~ to remai n a 
priority area of work, and second, (despite the Home 
Office guidelines to the contrary, [see pp 104-5]) have to 
be included within the remit of the CLPs. Furthermore, a 
mechanism would have to be found to address the problems 
;". '.J 
associated with attempting to use the ~ormal police 
complaints process. 
Thus, the CLO did attempt to represent the interests o~ 
the community in Moss Side by addressing the key issues o~ 
concern, namely, racist attacks and the inadequacy of the 
police response, the refusal to join the police ~orce 
because of the racism within it and the operation of the 
complaints procedure. However, he did so in such a manner 
as to confirm the criticism of those who opposed him. He 
had no powers to challenge the fundamental ways in which 
the police dealt with these issues and as a consequence 
the GMP could ignore criticisms that they disagreed with. 
Furthermore, his suggestion in relation to responding to 
racist attacks facilitated multi-agency policing. 
Therefore, not only could he not challenge police policies 
but he was facilitating multi-agency policing. 
In addition there was no identifiable change in the 
controversial policing of Moss Side. A series of incidents 
undermined the efforts of the CLO to bring about a 
dialogue between 
Compounding the 
the area were a 
the police and people in Moss Side. 
routine complaints about the policing of 
series of highly publicized incidents 
continued to fuel the tension. As indicated previously the 
treatment of youth and community workers in the area 
caused considerable concern, resulting in the setting up 
of the Youth and Allied Workers police Monitoring Group. 
The resultant court cases, during 1983, arising from the 
inCident outside Moss Side Shopping precinct in September 
-." 1982 resulted in the two·youth workers=tnvolved eventually 
winning their cases against the Chief Constable. 
Furthermore, in April 1984 a young black woman, Jackie 
Berkeley, complained officially that she had been racially 
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abused, stripped and raped by police officers during her 
detention in Moss Side police station. She, in turn, had 
been charged with assaulting police officers and criminal 
damage. The ramifications of her complaint, the resultant 
defence campaign and court case for the work of the CLO 
were staggering 
Here was an allegation, more serious than any so far, 
being made about Moss Side Police just at the time when 
the Chief Constable of Manchester, James Anderton, and 
the police establishment of the city are desperate to 
prove that since the mass revolts against the police in 
1981, all is rosy in the garden (Jackie Berkeley 
Defence Committee, 1985). 
Such incidents also had serious implications for the 
attempts of the CLO to convince people in Moss Side that 
community liaison panels should be set up in Moss Side. 
b. The Community Liaison Officer: The Facilitation of 
Community Representation and Participation 
In addition to the CLO attempting to represent the black 
community he also had to attempt to set up community 
liaison panels in Moss Side and elsewhere in Manchester to 
bring about the representation and participation of the 
whole community. The CLO looked to the Lambeth 
Consultative Committee as being the possible model for the 
Greater Manchester initiative. His concern about what he 
Viewed as LambethPs 




to construct structured 
terms of reference and precise agendas for the Manchester 
initiative (1st Annual ReportI2). The deliberations of the 
Home Office and the government on the issue of 
.-"."',~, ... consul tation"arrangements<'provided the' eventual structure 
and terms of reference for the CLPs. 
There were a series of communities that were to be 
represented by and partiCipate in the liaison panels, the 
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black community as well as the whole community. In 
addition communities were geographically premised on the 
sub-divisional boundaries of the Greater Manchester Police 
covering the whole County. Therefore, the 
consulted was that enclosed within 
community to be 
each police 
subdivision. Thus, the actual geographical boundaries of 
community being used were police defined ones. 
In order to achieve community representation the Police 
Authority attempted to get as wide as cross section of the 
community as possible. Although it was recognised that 
flexibility was important limits were fixed in order to 
reconcile the need to keep the Panel meetings manageable 
whilst at the same time ensuring that all relevant 
sections of the community were represented. In order to 
set up the liaison structures the Police Authority entered 
into negotiations with the constituent district Councils 
and the Council for Voluntary Organizations. As a 
consequence the Police Authority constructed lists of all 
community groups and representatives in each police 
subdivision. The respective groups were sent a letter 
informing them of the Police Authority's decision to set 
up liaison panels and inviting them to a meeting to 
discuss the constitution of the panels. There was the 
automatic representation of the Police Authority, the 
constituent councils and the GMP. Additionally local 
residents within the subdivision were invited to attend 
.. the meeting 'in order to decide who they wanted to have as 
members of the liaison panel'. Thus, the meetings were to 
be open for anyone to attend , as observers and after the 
:o~ ,;··:..·.:.::·"" •. ior.mal busi ness '. all present· were to. have ~the opportuni ty 
to air their views. 
Community participation was 
invitation within a formalized 
to take place through 
structure and setting and 
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would be primarily indirect in nature through the 
community representatives. Community representation was 
undoubtedly prioritized over community participation. The 
type of participation was also very clearly delineated by 
the definition of consultation 
consultation is the idea of the police consulting the 
community or meeting with the community to discuss all 
aspects of policing so that they will be better 
informed about public feelings and ideas and as a 
result be better able to make decisions about policing 
the community ••• consultation is not about the 
community making decisions affecting policing, but it 
should lead to the police taking better decisions 
affecting the community (CLO 1983). 
Thus, a formal structure of police community liaison was 
created that was supposed to facilitate community 
representation and participation not just in Moss Side but 
in all parts of Greater Manchester. However" it was a 
structure that prioritized structured representation over 
participation. 
i. Moss Side 
. 
The fundamental problem facing the Police Authority and 
the Community Liaison Officer was how to set up ,such a 
panel in Moss Side given the opposition/suspicion/apathy 
that had been shown to the whole idea' of community 
liaison. Every endeavor 
opposition by attempting to 
was made to overcome this 
establish immediately liaison 
structures in the area. Between 1 February and 30 March 
1983 fourteen meetings were held in ten different venues 
in the area. Two of the meetings had to be cancelled for 
lack of interest but the people who had shown enough 
interest to attEmd th'~ other meetings ~ere -·earmarked~--as '" 
being the potential core for a liaison panel. These 
individuals were invited to another meeting which was to 
discuss what kind of consultative machinery would be 
appropriate for that subdivision. This meeting was 
attended by eighteen people, five police officers and the 
CLO. A draft proposal suggested that there would not be a 
iormal CLP with a formal membership. Instead liaison was 
to be premised upon public meetings spawning sub-groups as 
neccessary. There would be a core of individuals who would 
organise meetings, set the agenda, 'proselytize' and 
manage the publicity. This core would consist of the 
elected representatives for the area, those individuals 
who had been involved through the area meetings and 
interested others. 
Thus, despite the views of the CLO concerning the need for 
tight structures the urgent political need to try and set 
up a CLP in Moss Side meant that he, and the ruling Labour 
group on the Police Authority, were willing to agree to 
very unstructured arrangements. However, after further 
discussions no enthusiasm was shown for the proposal and 
the proposed liaison forum did not materialise. Further 
meetings took place on 25 January 1984 which only seven 
people attended and 7 March 1984 with thirty six people 
turning up. Because some young people turned up it was 
agreed to have a further meeting between these young 
people and street officers and a general one between the 
Chief Constable and the adult community. However, this 
provided just as difficult to realize. 
A meeting of the 17 September 1984 was the third such 
meeting organised by the CLO where the Chief Constable was 
sUpposed to meet the community, as- suggested above. 
-However, to the embarrassment of the Police Authority 
~epresentatives-and theCLO, __ the Chief"" Constable did not 
turn up because of other commitments. Instead nce Stalker 
and the Chief Superintendent of the division were present 
to deal with "the audience of less than twenty 1n 'an open 
and frank way·. nce Stalker was asked about a wide variety 
., ;." " --;..; w... --~ .. 
of issues relating to 
Manchester in general. 
tapping and of police 
the policing of Moss Side and 
He denied allegations of phone 
infiltration of the area for 
political surveillance purposes. He refused to accept the 
general criticisms that were being made concerning the 
heavy handed and racist policing of the black community. 
He said that he was worried that there was 'a feeling of 
paranoia in Moss Side' and that nothing was to be gained 
by 'raking up the past'. He also refused to acknowledge 
that there was anything wrong with the complaints system 
as it stood and denied the allegations that certain police 
officers were 'fitting people up' on a regular basis. DCC 
Stalker argued that in addition to the complaints 
procedure there was now a community liaison Officer and a 
lay visiting scheme to deal with such matters. A complete 
stalemate was reached over a whole range of areas and 
issues with the Chair of the Police Authority and the CLO 
less than satisfied with the level of openness of the 
police. 
During this meeting the worst suspicions of those opposed 
to the initiative were confirmed. The Chief Superintendent 
when discussing the changes in policing that had resulted 
from the Scarman recommendations said that co-operation 
was needed to improve the quality of life in the community 
and that in other areas of Manchester this had been 
carried out by the setting up of ·liaison panels. He said 
however that because the Manchester City Council and 
certain community groups had refused to co-operate with 
such an initiative other ways had to be found. First, 
there"'~was -ongoLng' discussions ·with~·community· elders~ 
Second, the for~e had deployed "omnicompetent" community 
police officers after consultation with the five members 
. 
of the community who turned up to a meeting in the West 
Indian Sports and Social Club. Third, monthly meetings 
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were held between himself, the CLO and the Community 
Contact Inspector to discuss the general situation in Moss 
Side. Finally, a multi-agency environmental committee had 
been set up in Moss Side to co-ordinate a response to the 
problems of the areas. It became apparent that alternative 
mechanisms to represent the community and involve the 
participation of the community were being set up with the 
help of the CLO to bypass the opposition to the liaison 
panel. 
However, despite sustained efforts by the CLO no community 
liaison panel was set up in Moss Side. Despite meetings 
being held in a variety of forums and a variety of 
flexible ideas being tried the black community was not 
participating in the proposed structure. Furthermore, 
whilst respectable community .leaders were prepared to 
continue to meet with the police in other forums they were 
not prepared to become embroiled publicly on the issue of 
liaison panels. It could be argued that this was a damning 
indictment of the representativeness of the community 
representative and the gap that existed between the Police 
Authority and the black community. A clear indication of 
the gap that existed is provided by comparing the paltry 
turnout to the meetings set up by the CLO and those set up 
by other groupings in Moss Side. youth and Allied Workers 
Police Monitoring Group attracted over 80 people to its 
. 
first public training day on policing and youth work in 
November 1983. Throughout this period there were also 
large turnouts to meetings held by the Manchester Campaign 
Against the Police Bill. Public meetings concerned about 
",,,the Home ·,O-f-fice.'s illegal·"immigrant trawls 'In Moss Side 
were also well attended and approximately 150 people 
attended a public meeting to support Jackie Berkeley in 
December 1984. By comparison the CLO could not muster more 
than twenty people, including councillors and police 
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office~s, to any of his meetings during this pe~iod. 
ii. The Constituent Councils 
In o~der to establish the liaison panels th~oughout the 
fo~ce a~ea delicate negotiations had to take place with 
the local Councils that made up Greate~ Manchester County 
Council. Th~oughout late 1982 and 1983 meetings we~e held 
with the individual councils and through the Greate~ 
Manchester Association of Met~opolitan Autho~ities 
(GMAMA). As a matter of principle the recommendation to 
create CLPs on a police subdivisional basis was accepted 
by a GMAMA meeting on 29 July 1983. Furthe~ discussions 
then took place between ~ep~esentatives of the Police 
Authority's community relations subcommittee plus the 
app~op~iate GMC membe~s and the rep~esentatives of the 
constituent Dist~ict Councils to discuss the exact 
details. By Octobe~ 1983 the negotiations were complete. 
Howeve~, two District CounCils, Tameside and Mancheste~, 
we~e ideologically opposed to the p~oposed community 
liaison structures. The opposition of Manchester City 
Council was of pa~ticula~ significance because Moss Side 
lay within the City's boundaries and, as indicated, the 
Police Autho~ity's intention had been to set the fi~st one 
up in Moss Side. Spurred on by the rejection of liaison 
panels by the black community on 1 February 1984 
Mancheste~ City Council passed a resolution stating that 
CLPs would not enhance the democratiC accountability of 
the pol ice and that the Counci 1 "woul d be unwi 111 ng to 
participate~ in such structures. 
[' ,/ ,""1 l .. '. ' .... '.; .,." , ............ 
There were constant efforts to cajole and persuade the two 
maVerick councils into ag~eeing to the liaison structures. 
However, not only did Manchester City Council continue to 
oppose the p~oposed structures but eventually decided to 
~o 
set up an alternative in the form of police monitoring 
groups. The Police Authority, in an atttempt to resolve 
the conflict, stated that liaison panels could be set up 
in such a way as to complement the proposed police 
monitoring groups. However, this was rejected. In 
September 1984 the Police Authority's community relations 
subcommittee resolved to inform the Chief Executives of 
both councils that the Authority intended to establish the 
panels with or without the co-operation of the respective 
councils. In October 1984 it was resolved to set up 
meetings of the appropriate GMC members and the district 
CounCils as well as representatives from the CVS and CRC 
to agree to the principle of establishing the panels. By 
November 1984 it had been decided to set up a meeting in 
Tameside which would include representatives from the 
Tameside Volunteer Bureau and the Tameside Council for 
Racial Equality. Liaison panels were subsequently set up 
without council representation soon after this because it 
was seen to be ·a weaker political animal' than Manchester 
(CLO, 1985). It was also hoped that when the CLPs had been 
set up and were 
people in Moss 
working elsewhere in Greater Manchester, 
Side and Manchester City Council would 
change their minds. 
iii. The first CLPs (CLPs): Leigh and Salford 
The first panels 
areas of Leigh on 
1983, areas of 
set up in Greater Manchester were in the 
14 December 1982 ·and Salford on 2 August 
the county where there was no public 
• 
. -... controversy about policing. The two CLPs came into being 
utilizing the structure mentioned earlier, having a named 
membership_of :twenty sixand.thirty three respectively~ A 
review of the first year of the operation of the two 
panels by the CLO identified key problems in relation to 
the structure of representation· and participation that had 
been set up. In terms of membership it was stated by those 
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involved that there were too many councillors who 
exercised undue influence and too few young, unemployed 
and working cl ass. The CLO's report also showed 
disproportionate middle aged male participation. 
Members of the panels stated that they had no real 
understanding about what they were supposed to be doing 
other that representing the organisations and groups that 
had asked them to attend the meeting. In terms of 
participation members said that they ~elt constrained by 
the agenda, the lecturing manner of the police, the 
re~usal of the police to share information and the size 
and format of the meetings. The suitability of using the 
police sub-division as the basis for the CLP was queried 
as it was felt that the sub-division was too big. General 
scepticism was also expressed about the e~fectiveness of 
such a forum as a means of influencing policing. As one 
member put it 
Things might have changed on the street, but I don't 
think they can put that down to us. (quoted in CLO 
report 31.7.84:10-11) 
Panel members acknowledged that that they were 'not really 
in touch with those people who are in conflict with the 
police'. Members also recognised that their positive 
relationship with the police which had been built up 
during panel meetings was o~ little use because it did not 
affect relations between the police and those sections of 
the community in conflict with the police. 
Thus problems relating to the issues of representation and 
.. participation . of all .. ·sections· o~ the _.' comm~ni ty wase'a: 
practical dilemma that immediately surfaced in the 
establishment o~ the CLPs. The CLO pointed out that there 
was ·lack o~ clarity, sometimes confusion and even 
ignorance' about the responsibilities o~ panel members and 
.~~.~ . 
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their understanding of the role of the panels. His 
conclusion was that unless the Police Authority gave more 
structured support to the panels the confusions and 
contradictions mentioned above would result in the panels 
operating and ultimately degenerating ·in an isolated 
voi d' (CLO Report 31. 7.84: 11). 
The concerns that were being expressed about just who was 
participating and being represented within the liaison 
process were confirmed when the first meeting of 
representatives from all the CLPs in Greater Manchester 
took place on 29 September 1984. The majority of those 
attending were white, male and middle aged. The CLO 
recognised that, whilst in theory, the whole community was 
supposed to be represented and participating in the 
liaison structures certain important sections of the 
community were not in fact doing so, namely, ethnic 
minorities, young people and women. Thus, the problem that 
had to be faced was that key sections of the community 
were not participating in the area based structures 
whether it was in terms of Moss Side or elsewhere in the 
county. 
The lack of participation 
the types of issues that 
There were demands for 
of key groups was reflected in 
the panels were focusing on. 
more police, queries about victim 
support, questions concerning crt"me prevention, demands 
for neighbourhood watch, and complaints about truancy and 
juvenile'delinquency. Thus, as the Home Office wanted, 
discussions about the extent of crime, fear of crime and 
cri me: preventi on -domi nated the., agenda 'of, the'· CLPs. ";The 
issues that had resulted in the initiative being set up in 
the first place, ie, the breakdown in relations between 
the police and black people, rapidly disappeared off the 
liaison agenda. The CLO recognized the dilemmas posed by 
". ,"",,> -' .. 
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the change in focus 
Are the CLPs' local machinery where the police are part 
of a process which addresses and seeks to find ways of 
tackling policing issues; or are CLPs' local machinery 
where the police are party to a process which addresses 
and seeks ways of tackling the police. (CLO Report 
31. 7.84: 11) 
However, despite the problems identified, the CLO, with 
Home Office encouragemnt, continued to set the panels up 
elsewhere and by September 1984 there were sixteen panels 
in various parts of Greater Manchester. 
c. Attempts to Resolve Problems of Community 
Representation and Participation 
i. A panel for ethnic minorities 
The CLO recognized that the interests of the black 
community were not being represented within the CLPs. He 
refused, however, to recognise that non-participatlo~ of 
the black community in liaison structures could be because 
there was a conscious rejection of such structures. 
Instead he viewed it as a technical problem that could be 
remedied through setting up an ethnic minority 
conSUltative forum to look at the issues of policing that 
specifically related to ethnic minorities. Thus, the CLO 
was fully cognizant that special supplemental arrangements 
might have to be developed to deal with the policing of 
ethnic minorities as well as their representation and 
participation in the consultation structure 
.,-:,' '" '. 
~. ~-. I ••• ~ ..... 
It is possible that issue's relating to policing and its 
effects·· or·- implications·,; for .. ethnic. minorities ·will 
never be adequately aired or dealt with in a localised 
forum. The localised forum will have many other 
pressures on its time'and if they are to be adequately 
aired and dealt with, this might have the effect of 
making an imbalance in the· work of any local or 
division wide forum (CLO Discussion Paper 21Dec 1982). 
~4 
In order to overcome this problem he suggested that a 
seperate CLP be set up Tor ethnic minority 
representatives. To this end he had continual discussions 
with the various community relations councils in Greater 
Manchester proposing that any such panel should have 
representatives Trom all ethnic minority organisations in 
the County and should be attended by Senior Police 
OTTicers. A discussion document was distributed to all the 
relevant community organisations but there was no positive 
response to the proposal. Nevertheless he argued that this 
type OT proposal should be borne in mind when the Police 
Authority decided to establish a liaison panel in Moss 
Side. 
ii. A oroTessional CLP 
The CLO eTfectively attempted to by-pass opposition to 
community liaison in Moss Side by creating a professional 
liaison panel which did not require community or political 
partiCipation and representation. On 17 June 1983 the CLO 
convened a meeting OT area managers of recreation. 
housing, employment, education and social services 
departments and the senior police oTficer who were 
responsible for Moss Side. The aim of the meeting was to 
formulate a multi-agency approach to what they defined as 
the preSSing social problems in Mos~ Side. This group of 
. . - '., 
area managers continued to meet regularly, focussing on 
one particular housing estate in the area ·in order to 
test whether a co-ordinated approach can have an impact on 
", . ~ , '~,. 
some of the issues identified as leading to a fear of 
(CLO May 1984). Relevant data was collated and 
shared between the agencies involved in order to target 
their efforts. more effectively. Consequently an.~pen day 
took place on 19 September 1984 . ·in order to inform the 
community about the approach that the local services are 
~5 
taking in trying to coordinate the services better and 
also to test out the effect of focussing on a well defined 
area' (2nd Annual Report:16). Although the attendance of 
the community was ~disappointing' a second day was held on 
1/2 March 1985 in the Moss Side Shopping Precinct. 
However, there was also an apathetic response to this day. 
This professional liaison panel provoked considerable 
anger because of the way it was meeting in an 
unaccountable manner and because it was utilising a multi 
agency approach. Furthermore, in terms of mobilizing 
community interest it was conspicuously unsuccessful. 
iii. Young People 
In July 1984 the CLO once more expressed concern that 
young people were not being 'picked up' by the CLPs in any 
large numbers and that in some panels young people were 
not represented at all. He recognized that it was 
'extremely difficult' to involve young people in processes 
such as CLPs because of the nature of the area based 
panels (CLO ReportI31.7.84). In his second annual report 
the CLO repeated his concern about 'the almost total lack 
of young adult involvement in the work of the Panels' and 
he warned that 'if the panels are to be at all effective, 
then this section of the community must be enabled to have 
their say· (2nd AR:22). 
The concern of the CLO about "the representation and 
participation of young people was restated by panel 
representatives during the proceedings of the first two 
forums for representatives of all'the CLPs in Manchester 
Everyone is talking about young people yet look around 
here there, is a lack of youth. There's a lack of cross 
sectional representation. Where's the young people on 
the panels' - 18 to 25 year olds views should be heard. 
These meetings are mainly for councillors, there's not 
enough people from where the problems are (Fieldnotes). 
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At our first meeting there were 24 young people and we 
got 6 representatives from youth. However, they didn't 
did'nt come to the following meetings. There's a lack 
of youth. People of our age bracket are identifying the 
problem of youth yet the youth aren't here (ibid). 
How do you incorporate young people who don't want to 
come? How do you incorporate old people who only come 
to moan about young people? We must incorporate youth 
but it can't be done (ibid). 
One CLP representative said that his 
effective, if undemocratic, means 
representation and participation 
panel had found an 
of achieving youth 
The 
We go to the youth clubs 
to come to our meetings! 
CLO attempted to 
and physically 
Ubid) 
get the youth 
facilitate 'more consistent 
involvement of young adults in public consultation about 
poliCing' by proposing that. a weekend forum be set up with 
youth representatives from each district, with more places 
being allocated to Manchester to try and persuade the city 
council to co-operate. The participants would be young 
people aged between 16 and 21 who would be contacted 
through general advertising in the local media as well as 
through youth officers, community relations councils, 
councils for voluntary service and voluntary youth 
organisations. 
The Chief Constable immediately intervened to neutralise 
this proposal. He argued that such a forum should involve 
all the agencies involved in dealing with young people not 
just the police. Additionally he asked for first, a change 
. i"= the,focus ,_of i I.the forum from policing matters to one 
'allowing the young people to discuSS their views of 
current social issues· and second, a change in location 
from the CLO's proposed weekend rural retreat to a one day 
seminar at the force training school. The Police Authority 
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opposed the change in focus arguing that the point of the 
proposed Forum was to enable young people to discuss their 
relationships and attitudes to, and with, the police, 
rather than general social issues. 
The eventual ~compromise' that was reached reflected the 
demands of the Chief Constable as it was agreed to hold a 
one day conference at the force school with the ~emphasis 
to be put on allowing the young people to identify those 
issues most important to them.' This was a considerably 
different proposal from the CLO's original proposal to 
create a forum to facilitate the participation of young 
people in policing debates and the CLPs. Once more the 
power of the Chief Constable to have his demands acceded 
to was illustrated as well as the powerlessness of the 
CLO. As a consequence the GMP gained control of the agenda 
and the location making sure that the issue of young 
people and policing was not the focus of the discussions. 
in addition it created another multi-agency forum with the 
police in control of the discussions. 
iv. Women 
The Community Liaison Officer also identified the 
under/non-representation and participation of women as 
another of the issues that would have to be addressed 
If the membership of the Panel- offers us any clues as 
to who they might influence in terms of police/public 
relationships then relationships between women and the 
police will be unaffected (2nd Annual Reportl5) 
He noted with apprehension that within one of the panels 
·~the ~iew :had:been expressed that·the·f~~t-that there are 
very few women involved is irrelevant and makes no 
difference' and he was concerned that there had been no 
real attempt by the panels to ·address the balance and 
increase the number involved in this work' (2nd Annual 
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Report:5). Overall out of the initial thirteen CLPs set up 
there was a total of 445 members of which 102 were women 
(average of 7.8 out of memberships of 34). Furthermore, at 
some of the meetings there were no women present. 
The CLO also identified the issue of policing and women 
through his casework. He noted how there seemed to be an 
increasing tendency within GMP's policework to define 
cases as 'domestics' in order to not become involved 
and/or to suggest ci vil action. As far as the CLO was 
concerned this was not acceptable because 'the casualties 
are weak, usually female of sometimes frighteningly 
violent relationships' (2nd Annual Report:20).This was the 
first acknowledgement of an issue that was to become a 
national issue in the mid-1980s (Heidensohn, 19891 160-
170: Walklate, 1979). As a consequence of the CLO's 
concern, in May 1985, the Police Authority agreed to the 
idea of having a women only conference on women and 
policing. 
This conference, held on 22 June 1985, provided a further 
example of how the Authority sought to deal with the 
question of representation and partiCipation and the 
problems arising from such a format. A list of all women's 
groups and organisations was constructed and their 
partiCipation and representation was invited. The . 
conference was devided into seperate workshops on issues 
relating to black women, domestic violence and sexual 
offences. With regard to the latter two workshops, splits 
emerged between the' representati ves of the more 
""""'"<''''' trad ttionaland .. conservative .' women.! s c.; organisations, eg,' 
the National Council of Women and the more radical ones, 
most notably, Rape Crisis, Womens Aid and Taboo. However, 
it was during the discussions in the· black women's issues 
workshop that the problems with the Police Authority's 
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format became apparent. This workshop was abandoned a~ter 
two of the councillors dismissed the complaints of police 
racism as exaggeration and hearsay. As a consequence o~ 
the arguments a black women~s only workshop was 
reconvened. The point was made that the very fact that 
there had to be a separate workshop was indicative of the 
Police Authority's inability to address the black 
community's complaints about police racism. 
During the plenary session of this conference there were 
further problems when the black women's workshop attempted 
to report back. One of the key concerns they raised was 
how difficult it was for black women, who were victims of 
domestic violence, to complain to the police, because 
action would probably be taken because it gave racist 
police officers a legitimate opportunity to arrest black 
men. During the ensuing discussion a councillor from GMC's 
Equal Opportunities sub-committee stated that she failed 
to see what relevance race had in the police response to 
domestic violence. She argued that at one time all human 
beings had been black but that 'by the grace of God some 
of us had lost this pigment from our skin' (Report to 
PMC:12.7.85). As a consequence this meeting ended in 
uproar. At a subsequent women and policing working party 
meeting, the radical women's groups withdrew from 
discussions after a vote of censure agaainst the two 
councillors was overruled by the Chair of the Police 
Authority. Thus, although women's concerns about crime and 
policing were placed on the agenda of the Police Authority 
it was in such a manner so as to result in the withdrawal 
'" ",,·of the radical groupings from the proceedings.",,··.:.:,_.,~, .... ,~ '" 
In February 1985, although the CLO resigned, he reaffirmed 
his belief in CLPs because 'there is no other existing 
structure for police/public consultation Which has the 
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capability of delivering the level of involvement for 
local people' (CLO, Report, 8.3.85). However, he suggested 
that the whole notion of community liaison should be 
reviewed as should the future of the post of CLO. He 
argued that there should be a properly staffed full time 
community liaison unit to service the panels 
Specifically help is needed to increase the confidence 
of Panel members; help them understand their role, 
functions, powers and potential; enable them to carry 
out basic research on police/community issues within 
their own areas; assist them to understand local police 
strategies and their place in defining local police 
priorities; clarify the Panels aims and objectives 
<ibid) • 
If this was to be achieved the new unit would have 
undertake two types of work. First, the unit would have to 
work with 'community groups of all kinds to publicize and 
populariaze the work and potential of the panels' <ibid). 
And second, it would have to provide structured links with 
the Authority and the other panels. As far as he was 
concerned, if the Police Authority did not accept the idea 
of having a unit the panels would eventually become 
defunct. Thus, in response to the difficulties he had 
encountered the CLO was proposing a process of further 
professionalization. A professional community liaison unit 
was to be given the role of articulating what the needs of 
the panels, and therefore the community, were. 
Discussion 
The Police. Authority, in addition to being .in _. open 
conflict with the Chief Constable had to confront the 
.~'.':.~:!:J';::'."~"!~" -'I.problems-, generated by it.s .. :.. attempt.: to 5'r~:fac:ilitate'" the 
accountability of GNP to the community. This chapter has 
documented the nature of these problems both in relation 
to the CLO acting as the community representative and his 
attempts to set up CLPs. 
20I 
With regard to his roie as the community representative a 
series of problems have been identified. First, the CLO's 
ascribed representative status was rejected by significant 
sections of the community he was supposedly representing. 
Given that the Hytner Inquiry had specifically cautioned 
against appointing some one who did not enjoy the full 
confidence of those sections of the community in conflict 
with the police, this was a serious defect. As critics of 
the CLO emphasized, what the appOintment indicated was 
that GMC and the Police Authority had paid no heed to the 
wishes of the residents of Moss Side. Second, the 
philosophy underpinning the work of the CLO, and enshrined 
in the Home Office guidelines, confirmed his 
unrepresentative status. In particular his enthusiastic 
support for mUlti-agency policing strategies and 
acceptance of the status quo confirmed those who viewed 
his appointment as, at the very best, sheer tokenism. 
Third, and interconnected with the second pOint, was the 
fact that whilst the CLO was trying to assuage community 
concerns, the harsh policing of Moss Side had not changed 
and, as indicated, there were a series of very 
controversial incidents. In addition the Chief Constable 
had continued to make well publicized statements, 
rejecting all allegations of racism, denying that there 
had been a breakdown in police-community relations in Moss 
Side and attacking the ·anti-pol(ce' youth and community 
workers in the area. What this showed was first, that the 
CLQ was completely powerless in relation to effecting 
change in the policing of Moss Side and second the 
:~.~:-::.~-:;-:·r~.~::. '.incapability of· community ~ interests be'ing";':'lrepresented 
through the Home Office's community consultation 
structures • 
. Such problems had serious ramifications for the attempts 
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of the CLO to set up a liaison panel in Moss Side. First, 
the CLO and Police Authority faced the problem of the 
rejection of community liaison by Manchester City Council 
on the grounds that it would not enhance police 
accountability. Opposition of the council could have been 
overcome if there had been support in Moss Side for the 
idea. However, the second problem was that the whole idea 
of community liaison was rejected completely, not least 
because the terms of reference did not address the issue 
of the policing of Moss Side. The CLO was not helped by 
the fact, as indicated above, that all his attempts to 
implement community liaison were undermined by the 
arrogance of police officers attending public meetings and 
the ongOing controversial policing of Moss Side. 
Furthermore, the expressed hope of the CLO and the Police 
Authority that the setting up of CLPs in the rest of 
Greater Manchester would persuade people in Moss Side to 
change their minds was hopelessly misplaced. By utilizing 
the theoretical concepts that are central to this thesis, 
community, representation and participation and the 
analysis of the state's previous response to the 
management of problems of citizenship, it is possible to 
identify just how problematical the Home Office's 
conSUltation structures were. Community referred to 
first, the geographical entity of the police sub-
division. However, as members of the panels made clear, 
they had a more localized understanding of their 
community. And second, within the community liaison 
initiative, community referred to the whole communit~."The 
.. "- ....... ,.: problem with thi s . concepti on was that °al though" i t'was not 
the whole community who had problems with the police their 
interests were being included on the agendas of the CLPs. 
The ClP structure emphasized the representation of the 
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community as opposed to the 
community. As a consequence 
organizations and representatives 
CLPs. However, there were a series 
participation of the 
all formal community 
were invited to the 
of problems associated 
with such an approach. First, there was no recognition 
that there were power inequalities between the different 
groups that were supposed to have equal representation. 
Second, there was no recognition of the problematical 
nature of the representativeness of many of these 
community groups and individuals. Third, there was no 
recognition that certain sections of the community did not 
have formal community representatives. Fourth, invitations 
were given to community groups and representatives who had 
no necessary relevance to the discussions of the CLPs. 
Finally, GM?, the Police Authority and the local council 
were given a privileged status in that they enjoyed 
statutory rights of automatic representation, despite what 
the other community representatives might think. 
A representative 
controlled and 
structure was created that tightly 
limited participation. First, the direct 
representation of the community was limited to their being 
able to contribute at the end of the highly formal CL? 
meetings. In addition, there was a highly formalized 
structure and accompanying procedures governing the 
partiCipation of· the community representatives. First, 
their participation was mobilized by' the powerful as 
opposed to being a spontaneous or voluntary decision. 
Furthermore, through the Home Office guidelines their 
partiCipation was being mobilized for the purpose of 
-helping ,~the ,·police to control crime. Second, the 
partiCipation of the community representatives was limited 
by the tightly structured terms of reference. Third, the 
CLP meetings were, in Pateman's '(1970) terms, situations 
of partial participation with power residing firmly with 
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the police representatives who had their operational 
autonomy enshrined in the terms of reference and who kept 
control of the information and knowledge that would have 
been a pre-condition for an open discussion about 
policing, or indeed about crime. 
Thus, the initial community liaison model facilitated the 
representation and participation of white, middle aged, 
respectable males. As a consequence the manner in which 
issues of community, representation and participation had 
been dealt with, reproduced the existing power 
inequalities. The CLO did acknowledge that important 
sections of the community, eg, ethnic minorities, women 
and young people were non/under-represented in the CLPs 
and he did attempt to redress the situation to bring about 
their participation. However, in order to do so the CLO 
recommended that all-encompassing supplemental structures 
of representation, based on the notion of the whole 
community of ethnic minorities, the whole community of 
young people and the whole community of women, be set up. 
It is not surprising that even the respectable black 
community leaders rejected the proposed ethnic minority 
liaison panel. Effectively what the CLO was suggesting was 
that representatives of the supplemental community 
consultation committees set up in the 1960s participate in 
a supplemental forum to compensate for the fact that the 
CLPs had failed to represe~t the interests t~~y had been 
set up to represent! Even if this forum had been agreed 
to, the CLO would undoubtedly have had to encounter the 
problems of the non/under-representation of black youth 
.... ·and "black:. women.. The· recommendations" concerning . young 
people and policing suffered from similar flaws. The CLO 
recommended that ten young people be selected ·from the 
suggestions of those organizations that· were involved with 
respectable young people. These ten respectable youths 
. . 
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were then to be given the mantle OT being the 
representatives of young people in their districts. The 
problem with such a proposal was that it was not 
respectable youth who were in conflict with the police. 
Furthermore, by the time that the Chief Constable had 
finished restructuring the proposal, not only was the 
meeting OT the youth representatives convened within GMP 
premises but discussion of policing was not necessarily on 
the agenda! 
The non/under-representation of women was given the most 
attention by the CLO and the Police Authority. However, 
the all-encompassing Tormat of structured representation 




and class inequalities between women's groups 
certain women's groups articulate dominant 
and interpretations OT reality. As a 
consequence the interests of those powerless women~s 
groups who challenged dominant ideologies concerning women 
and policing were defined out. For example, when the 
motion OT censure of the racist comments made by two of 
the councillors was overruled by the Chair of the Police 
Authority the radical women's groups were forced to 
withdraw from further participation in the proceedings. 
Thus, not only did the original structure of community 
representation reproduce the existing power inequalities 
and social divisions but the supplemental structures, set 
up to counter-balance those inequalities and provide 
justice to all interests, reproduced further divisions 
. between respectable youth and disreputable youth and 
respectable women and disreputable women. As a consequence 
the interests of those in conflict with the police were 
being defined out by the representative structures. How 
the professional community liaison unit attempted to deal 
with these problems 
thesis. BeTore that 
Manchester City Council 
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will be addressed later in this 
it is necessary to analyze how 
attempted to create alternative 
structures of ccmmunity representation and participation 
through their police monitoring initiative. 
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Section Ill: Model 11 
Community Representation and participation through 
community monitoring 
a. The Police Monitoring Committee (PMC) 
On Thursday 3 May 1984 the 
~inally won control o~ 
Left-wing of the Labour Party 
Manchester City Council in the 
local government elections. This was a dramatic change 
because the "old guard" 
in charge of the Town Hall virtually uninterrupted for 
decades, regarded the City Party as a machine to be 
wheeled out at election time to rubber stamp the status 
quo <Labour Leader, MEN, 15.5.84). 
The experience of the Left in opposition and, as they 
viewed it, the constant betrayal of manifesto commitments 
by the Right of the Labour Party in Manchester, meant that 
they were determined to implement the radical manifesto 
that had been presented to the electorate for the May 
elections. This time there was to be no compromise 
The manifesto is firmly based on the belief that 
councils in Labour strongholds like Manchester should 
act, not only as a platform for resistance to the Tory 
government, but as a real socialist alternative that 
can show that socialism works in practice. For that 
reason Labour's manifesto sets its aims high - to begin 
to build a city of PEACE, EQUALITY and DEMOCRACY, a 
SOCIALIST CITY (Red Banner. June 1984) 
However, after the election resu~ts were announced the 
rest of May was spent in an intense struggle to get the 
old guard of the Party to finally give up power. In order 
to do· this officials from the regional and national Party 
- .~. 
had.to .. be called in because 28 of the Right Labour 
councillors. were not adhering to the Party whip and 
refusing to adhere to the previous agreements. As a 
consequence it was not until 23 May 1984 that the whole of 
the 1984 manifesto was adopted as official Council policy. 
This manifesto promised to: make the services provided by 
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the City Council more accountable to the community; turn 
the City into a nuclear Tree zone thereby guaranteeing a 
peaceful existence for its citizens; create and defend 
jobs and 'actively oppose all forms of racism and sexism 
and discrimination based on a person's sexuality or 
physical ability'. Thus, it reflected the key concerns of 
the new urban Left in other parts of Britain at that time. 
As Wainwright (1987: 114-26) 
from mainstream politics 
to the 
has pointed out, in exile 
in Manchester the Left 
community to build its power councillors looked 
base and reformulate its alternative policies. There were 
alliances with housing groups, public sector unions, 
community centres, womens and gay groups in formulating an 
anti-cuts campaign. This alliance of the excluded and 
dispossessed and the construction of an alternative 
manifesto meant that their interests finally reached the 
formal political agenda in Manchester when the Left came 
to power. It should be noted however that a significant 
percentage of Manchester Labour Party remained uncommitted 
to these policies and priorities and indeed represented 
traditional Labour areas of Manchester where there was 
little support for the policies of the NUL urban left. 
This was to have important implications for the continued 
commitment to such policies. 
,a. Honouring The Party Manifesto Commitment 
This commitment to implementing ell manifesto commitments 
meant that the vague proposal 
accountability had to be realized 
concerning police 
We-do·-not'believe that community liaison panelS' will 
assist local people in having a greater say in the 
operations of police activity. In order to campaign for 
real accountability of the police to the,communities 
they serve, we will set up a police monitoring group. 
We will also consider setting up' a'co~mittee to 
establish guidelines for council policy towards and 
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cooperation with the police (Party Manifesto. 1984). 
Had the Right of the Party retained power this electoral 
commitment, along with the other new ones, would probably 
not have been implemented. They would have been ignored, 
shelved or neutralised by tokenism. However, it was now on 
the agenda for implementation despite the fact that many 
on the Left of the party were not as committed to it as to 
other manifesto commitments. 
b. The Origins of The Police Monitoring Commitment 
The origins of this commitment are to be found in the 
previously documented struggle over police accountability 
that had taken place in Manchester since the 1981 
disturbances. The apparent inability of the Police 
Authority to exert any form of accountability over the 
Chief Constable, the unacceptability of the community 
liaison proposals and the discriminatory nature of both 
the 'hard' and community policing of Manchester's inner 
city areas provided the immediate context for the 
inclusion of the policing proposals in the 1984 manifesto. 
In effect the conclusion was reached that the Police 
Authority could not represent the interests of those in 
Manchester who were in conflict with the police. 
Consequently, those concerned with police accountability 
decided that there needed to be another type of structure 
to try and make the'GMP 'a'ccountable,for the policing ~f 
Manchester, through exerting press~re b~th on ~he Chief 
Constable and th~policeAuthority. ' 
,,' 
. !'., • .', 
'" . 
; , 
c. The Immediate Implications of The Commitmentl The 
Struggle For The Community 
The inclusion of the police monitoring proposal signalled 
potentially serious conflict over policing in Manchester. 
J ., "~. ,\" ", t,~ , ' .," 
The assertion that ,Manchester Cit~ 'Council would be 
pushing for· real accountability of the police in the form 
.--.. ~~ ---'"' -'" -"~ -- .. -.~- .... ~ ... -....... -.--.-.,.---.,.,-.--~ ... --.... , .... --
210 
of 'full democratic control over how the city is policed' 
and that it was rejecting the Police Authority's 
consultative arrangements meant that the community was 
going to become a site of struggle not just between the 
police and the City Council but also between the County 
Council and the City Council, both of which were Labour 
controlled. With the implementation of the manifesto 
Manchester would become the first city in the country with 
both a statutory Police Authority and a formal City 
Council P~lice Monitoring Committee (PMC), both supposedly 




attempt to neutralize any conflict a meeting took 
between 
immediately 
representatives of the two Councils, 
after the election. The City Council 
representatives reiterated that CLPs were not acceptable 
because given their origins (in the Scarman report) such 
panels could not strengthen police accountability. They 
Here merely public relations exercises and talking shops. 
Additionally it was stressed that they were 
unrepresentative and 'did not reflect any natural 
(geographical) communities' in Manchester because they 
Here premised on police sub-divisions. The representatives 
of the Police Authority, as indicated previously, argued 
that there was.no reason why there could not be both CLPs 
and police monitoring groups (PMGs) operating in the city. 
No agreement was reached on the issue other than not to 
criticize each . other in public. Both sets of 
representatives 'agreed ··to disagree 'whilst pursuing their 
--., ,c--different strategies. In the immediate debates between the 
two Councils, the questions of who constituted the 
community and how to facilitate its representation and 
partiCipation were central. 
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d. From Commitment to Committee 
The Town Clerk of the City Council made his report on the 
setting up of the new Police Monitoring Committee on 16 
July 1984 warning that detailed consideration would have 
to be given to the legal and constitutional factors 
governing both local government and policing outside of 
London. On 2S July 1984 the Police Monitoring Committee 
was approved by the policy committee and the council and 
it met for the first time on 31 July 1984. A standing sub-
committee was immediately set up consisting only of Labour 
members, co-opted members and advisors in order to 
neutralize any attempt by the opposition to disrupt 
progress. Throughout August a series of meetings of the 
standing sub-committee were held and visits were made to 
London to meet with the Police Committee of the GLC, and 
those of the Boroughs of Lambeth, Camden, Hackney and 
Southwark. Therefore, despite the protestations of the 
Town Clerk that Manchester was constitutionally different 
to Greater London, the GLC model of police monitoring was 
adopted. However, terms of reference still had to be found 
that would be legally and constitutionally acceptable. 
After seeking the advice of counsel the Town Clerk 
presented terms of reference <utilizing the Home Office 
circular on crime prevention) that were more concerned 
with crime control than police accountability. There was 
the feeling within the Labour group that the political 
. ' 
terms of reference drawn up had been considerably 
weakened, possibly deliberately, by the Town Clerk. As far 
as the Labour members were concerned the control of crime 
was not one of the major' roles envis~ged':fo~" th'~ police 
,-monitoring initiative. After the'gen~ral~ ·purging·- of ' the 
Town Clerk's department by the Labour 'Council, more 
sympathetic personnel were appointed ,who were more willing' 
and able to find terms of refer~nce that::'fa:ci'iitated the 
Police Monitoring Committee having a legitimate concern 
.. ~-. '-
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with police accountability as well as crime control. 
From the beginning the police monitoring initiative had to 
recognise that there was considerable opposition to the 
initiative. First, not all sections of the Left of the 
Labour group (never mind the right of the Party) supported 
the initiative. Second, the Town Clerk's office was 
seemingly attempting to place severe limitations upon the 
Committee's terms of reference. Third, the local 
Conservative and Liberal Parties expressed their outright 
opposition to the initiative making it clear that they 
would vote for its abolition at the first opportunity. 
These problems came to dominate initial discussions as 
they collectively were hindering the establishment the 
unit and starting the work of police monitoring. 
Discussions about what the Committee should be dOing and 
how it should proceed became secondary to these practical 
political problems. 
A bureaucratic set of structures was developed in order to 
implement the manifesto commitment. There was a full 
committee with a standing sub-committee, constituent sub-
committees and pre-meeting meetings, the working party and 
the police monitoring unit. There was also, in theory, 
supposed to be community participation through PMGs and 
the. local wards of the labour Party. Key advisors and co-
opte~~ ~ere appointed to provide t~eexpe~tiseon policing 
matters and the issues concerning the community that the 
councillors did not possess. In dOing so direct 
repre~entation was supposedly given to' t~6~e groups in 
,;'conflict with ,the police. 'Whilst in'theory,there was"an 
impressive level of inputs, access to certain parts of the 
structure was more important than others, particularly the 
,standing subcommittee,pre-meeting meeti~gs and 
subcommittees. Through tight control of the' latter 
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structures, the Conservative and Liberal opposition on the 
PMC, and ultimately the community, were denied access to 
all o~ these key areas and their role was effectively 
limited to participation in monthly full committee 
meetings. A hard line was taken by the Labour group 
because of the opposition parties pledge to campaigning 
for the abolition of the committee. 
determined that they would 
participatory and representational 
Therefore, Labour was 
be allowed limited 
rights within the 
structure. Whether such a position 
acceptable is questionable. For 
was democratically 
those demanding 
representation and participation in policing matters is it 
acceptable that they in turn see no problem in placing 
limitations on the effective participation and 
representation of those who oppose their views? However, 
given the context of the embittered ideological struggles 
of the 19805 and that the aim of the monitoring initiative 
was to represent previously unrepresented interests it is 
·difficult to see how Labour could have done otherwise. 
e. The articulation of the key issues within the Police 
Monitoring Committee 
i. Representation and participation 
A pattern of ritualistic exchanges during full meetings 
was established. Labour councillors would presentvarlous, 
items -on a pre-constructed agenda with the opposition 
being reduced to asking for clarification or complaining. , 
The opposition was immediately overruled and Labour 
members,would demand a vote if, the opposition persist~d~ 
-.~h~~Given,the~:overwhelming majority_that the LabOur-g;ou~ had" 
and the fact that a strict Party whip was exercised there 
was no - possibility of the Conservatives or the Liberal 
ever" winning" a vote. At the . initial meeting~thi~ 
. ,- , . 
situation produced constant arguments about the nature ef 
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representatory and participatory rights. At the first full 
meeting on 2 November 1984 the initial agenda item 
concerned the Committee representation on interview panels 
for recruiting the staff for the proposed research and 
development unit. Labour proposed an interview panel with 
no Conservative or Liberal representation or participation 
in the process. Although the latter opposed the objectives 
of the initiative they demanded the right of 
representation and participation in the process 
Con: What about us? 
Lab1: Since you did not want this committee we cannot 
include you. 
Con: At least we are accountable to the community the 
co-opted member isn't. If' we make suggestions you 
resent it. 
Lab21 Vote against it 
Con: I propose a member of the opposition. 
Lib: I don't have an interest in it because I support 
the democratically elected Police Authority. The 
establishment of this committee undermines the fight 
against the abolition of the GMC and the work of the 
Police Authority. 
Lab2: Why are you on this committee if you think we are 
undermining the Police Authority. We work 
alongside the GMC. 
Lab1: Its that sort of comment that has led us to not 
inviting the opposition onto committees. How do 
you expect to be invited onto them? 
Lab3: You should resign. 
Con: We don't get a chance to participate (Fieldnotes). 
Beause they were opposed to the. initiative the opposition 
were toldthat.they had no right' to demand representation 
and participation. Only if they accepted the position of 
the legitimacy of the PMC would they be allowed such 
partiCipation and representation.' This argument became a 
~·-~·'~·~~~~pnstant feature ,·of the meetings of"the,PMC, particularly 
in relation to the establishment of the overall structure, 
eg, the establishment of the sub-committees, committee 
vi si ts, pal icy ,formulation. However, . in its attempts ,.t.o 
'. ': "" 
achieve representation and partiCipation the opposition 
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was constantly hindered by first, being in a minority, 
second, being divided amongst themselves and third, by 
trying to maintain an oppositional 
acceptable to the ruling Labour 
quickly realized that not only did 
position that was not 
group. The opposition 
the Labour group not 
allow them any participation or representation in the sub-
committees but that the non-elected advisor and co-optees 
were playing a significant role within these sub-
committees and indeed the full committee. 
Con: Should you not have a member of the opposition on 
the standing sub-committee? 
Lab: No, you didn't even want a police monitoring 
committee. 
Con: What about the opposition being represented? 
Lab: Propose someone. 
ConI I propose Councillor Kershaw (Fieldnotes) 
This proposal was defeated because neither the Labour 
group nor the Liberal supported the Conservative 
councillor's appOintment. To the further consternation of 
the opposition, Labour then set up another working party 
with a subcommittee consisting of only Labour members with 
all the Labour members included and co-opted members 
Con:This is undemocratic. We should be represented 
Lab :00 you want to move someone? 
Con:Myself. 
NOT SECONDED 
Coni How dare you put co-opted members on this 
committee. They are not answerable to the general 
public. They are not democratically elected. 
Con: ·You represent one area. We represent a damned 
Sight more. 
Lab: The co-opted members help us. Mrs Hills hinders us 
(Fieldnotes) •. 
. The row over representation and participation continued in 
March 1985 over the appointments committee with the 
Liberal councillor demanding access to the standing sub-
committee in order to see the agenda and to know who was 
.", ,', 
on it. The Labour· chair responded by giVing the list of 
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all those on this sub-committee 
Con: No opposition? 
lab: No, that was the decision of the committee. The 
Tories don't want anything to do with the 
committee. 
Con: Why are you so afraid of having opposition 
members on? 
lab: We will if you are constructive (Fieldnotes) 
The opposition argued that the Police Monitoring Committee 
was deliberately trying to subvert the work of the County 
Council Police Authority and the Labour representatives 
continually argued that it was precisely these type of 
allegations that had led to the opposition's exclusion 
from the decision making process 
Lab: If you don't support the PMC you have no rights. 
Con: We have rights as representatives. 
Lab: You have no rights (Fieldnotes) 
There could be no clearer statement of the attitude of the 
Labour group towards those who 
monitoring initiative. There 
power. During the April 1985 
disagreed with their police 
was to be no sharing of 
meeting Labour recommended 
that an emergency sub-committee be set up in order to deal 
with any urgent business that might emerge between full 
meeetings of the committee. Access to this sub-committee 
would be crucial for anyone wanting to have their views 
represented because it effectively would be the means by 
which the day-to-day decision ma~ing of the PMC would be 
carried out.· Labour nominated the chair and deputy plus 
other Labour nominees that they saw fit to co-opt. The 
opposition again complained that such a decision and 
, proc~ss was . totally undemocratic., 
by arguing that the opposition 
Labour again responded 
had ruled out their 
participation and representation by their continued 
opposition to the existence of the committee and tts work. 
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These extremely acrid debates and clashes over 
representation and participation within the PMC meetings 
reTlected a belieT amongst councillors that they were the 
representatives of the community and that the community's 
participation in council matters was through them. Labour, 
in particular, had a substantial electoral mandate upon 
which to base such claims and in the PMC exercised that 
mandate to the full. The powerless minority opposition 
parties were reduced to complaining the Labour group was 
not allowing them to actively participate in the PMC and 
represent the interests oT their communities and were 
giving non-councillors more rights oT participation and 
representation than them. Whilst willing to have certain 
interests represented on the Committee the Labour group 
were not prepared to have opposing interests represented. 
ii. The community 
The issue oT the community was also addressed in exchanges 
during this period in PMC meetings. During the March 1985 
meeting the issue of CLPs emerged when the Liberal 
counCillor made the point that he was opposing the PMC's 
stafTing proposals and the idea oT PMGs because the 
Liberal Party supported the Police Authority and its CLPs. 
He also stated that whether the PMC liked it or not 
liaison panels would be set up within Manchester by 1 
April 1985.' Labour,' in response, argued- that their 
monitoring groups would be very different from the 11aison 
panels because the former would represent the needs'of 
·the community' defined as young people, ethnic minorities 
and the elderly. They argued that the groups would be abl~ 
-···:to···inform the community in general'·not·11ke'CLPs. We have 
to get down to the grass roots.' 
Labour also justified the placing of the research unit 
(PMU) in accomodation outside oT the Town Hall by arguing 
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that this was because the groups that had been consulted 
had preferred such a situation and found the Town Hall 
intimidating. The Liberal member pushed the Labour group 
on the issue of consultation asking who had been consulted 
before the making of the decision. The responses illicited 
by this question gave further confirmation of what 
community was being consulted 
We have working parties and that's how we consult the 
people of Manchester. Members of the public come to the 
working party. 
The venue of the working party, tenant associations and 
community groups. As Chair I was invited to the 
Campaign against the Police Bill and invited to the 
Labour Party ward meetings and got cross references 
back (Fieldnotes) 
The Head of the PMU tried to neutralise opposition 
questioning by saying that he would 'talk to every section 
of the community including the police'. However, in 
reality it was not every section of the community that the 
PMC was set up to represent. The Labour group consistently 
responded to such questioning in a manner that indicated a 
concern with those constituencies for whom various aspects 
of policing was a problem, ie, the over-policed and/or 
under-policed community. This was very different to the 
whole community being supposedly represented by the 
community liaison panels. This was the reason why the PMC 
argued that the panels did not represent the community but 
. ' 
that monitoring groups would. They were addressing two 
very different conceptions of community 
attempting to respond to 
the local community. 
,r.· ~,'" "monitoring-group and gay 
be contacted by the 
(Fieldnotes). 
indications of concern within 
The youth workers .police 
pal ice monitoring'" group"will 
unit in the near future 
4. The Articulation of Key Issues Within the Working Party 
Each committee of the council had a working party attached 
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to it. Within the police monitoring structure the working 
party was given a series of roles. First, it was to be the 
forum where interested members of the Labour party and 
interested others could have a practical input in the 
formulation of committee policy. Second, it was the means 
whereby councillors on the PMC were to be held accountable 
for their actions as they had to be present at the 
meetings to explain what was happening generally and 
specifically to the proposals put forward by the party. 
Third, it was supposed to be 'the source of legitimation, 
within the Labour Party, for the Committee's proposals, 
because of its representative and participatory status. 
Fourth, members 
en the work of 
the proposal 
were supposed to report back to the wards 
the committee and to harness support for 
within the wards. Fifth, through its role 
within the council and its relationship to the committees 
and wards, it was to be the the means whereby the 
community was kept constantly informed as to what was 
going on and had a means of participating in the police 
monitoring initiative. The final and allied role that the 
working party was to play was stated and agreed to at the 
first meeting. When the PMGs were set 
working party would be the forum 
members participation within the 
initiative. 
up and operating the 
for monitoring group 
formal part of the 
Although the meetings of the Working Party were taken up 
with the internal difficulties relating to the PMC and the 
PMU, this was the forum where the issue of the community 
and monitoring groups was initially discussed in most 
'detail "u.s· well as issues arisingconcer'ning'~community 
representation and participation. 
i •.. 'Community representation and participation in 
monitoring groups 
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The first well-attended meetings of the Working Party 
after the election saw a wide ranging and enthusiastic 
debate about how to bring about community representation 
and participation in policing. A sense of optimism 
concerning the setting up of PMGs informed the first 
meetings. On 21 June 1984 the first meeting of this 
Working Party took place in the Town Hall in order to 
start the process of implementing the manifesto commitment 
on police monitoring. The chair of the meeting believed, 
as a consequence of discussions with those involved in the 
campaign for police accountability in Manchester, that 
there should be a small PMC with a research facility 
wherein 'the key would be local groups and community 
groups-. The concept of community appeared in all its 
complexity during the ensuing discussions about to how to 
bring about community participation. The points that were 
made addressed the key issues arising from the evoking of 
the concept as the basis for the initiative 
We have a problem where the police are needed but not 
wanted. The police are not the answer. 'We as a council, 
must build up our communities then the incidence of 
vandalism will be reduced and the communities will be 
able to look after themselves. 
Communities in Manchester are non-communities they 
don-t have collective strength. 
The council must do something about it, for example how 
much money goes into these areas on what basis. We must 
help to create the conditions for developing strong 
communities because the problems of policing lie within 
the strength of those communities. 
I know from my 
all this is that 
"-··;'I::~'." 'Their: h' view of 
different to what 
constituency. that the difficulty with 
they' are not a liberal community. 
pol icing and· needs:, might .. be - :very 
you propose (Fieldnotes) 
The pOints addressed were the basiS of a discussion about 
the general concept of communityl. whether it existed, 
whether it could be created where it did not, and whether 
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it should be the basis for policy, given the possibility 
that the community may hold negative rather than positive 
views. The discussion was concluded with a resolution that 
there should be a PMC, with its own research unit and 'a 
real imput from the community'. 
The meeting also addressed the pragmatic problems of 
getting the new initiative off the ground and to a 
considerable degree such considerations curtailed the 
debates about the nature of the community. Thus the 
discussion focused upon issues such as conferring council 
"status" upon the initiative, making the terms of 
reference bland enough to make it acceptable to the right 
of the Labour Party and the Council and making sure that 
it was set up before the expected confrontation with the 
Conservative government 
place in the following 
the PMGs could provide 
mobilize the community 
council. 
over local government funding took 
Spring. There was agreement that 
additional means through which to 
in the campaign to save the 
The issues continued to emerge in subsequent meetings. At 
the next meeting, for example, questions were raised as to 
how the community would be consulted, were there concerned 
community groups already in existence, who could be seen 
as valid community representatives and the dangers of 
imposing unwanted structures upon 'the community. However, 
pragmatic considerations once more had to be considered 
with the chair of the meeting halting the discussion by 
making it clear· that the priority was to get the 
. ' ,;", '-i ni ti ati ve: implemented. ,> ".:.' •• :', 
In April and May 1985 the issue of setting upPMGs was 
-discussed in great detail and it was agreed that PMGs 
should not be funded or staffed by the committee because 
the groups retention of their autonomy was seen to be 
important. If it was deemed necessary the PMC should 
support monitoring group 
committees for funding 
the PMC would be limited 
phone bills and publicity 
applications to other council 
as required. Direct support from 
to helping with accomodation, 
needs. It was agreed that what 
should be given was support from the PMU's development 
workers rather than money. In discussions about the 
establishment of PMGs, it was recognised that flexibility 
was the key. Some would be already existing community 
groups, some would be geographically based whilst others 
would be issue based. It was agreed that there should be a 
city wide campaign with public meetings on the issue as 
well as utilizing the Labour Party wards and other Council 
Departments. It was also agreed that there would have to 
be positive vetting of the application of any group or 
locality wanting to set up a PMG. This latter point came 
up at the Working Party meeting in May 1985 when a request 
~rom a residents association in North Manchester was 
discussed. After investigation it was discovered that this 
association was a right wing vigilante group. 
It was recognized that the PMC would have to be sensitive 
in how it went about creating PMGs. It was stressed that 
if the initiative was to be successful there would have to 
'be real grass roots interest, community participation, the 
possibility of exerting influence; autonomy and council 
support. Although the dangers of imposing unwanted 
structures was recognized a sense of frustration came to 
characterize meetings when the PMGs failed to emerge. What 
".-:·~:-.,::also 'became:~apparent was that many members ·of:·:the Working' 
Party were operating with an over~arching geographically 
based notion of community. This was why there was so much 
concern that community based PMGs were not emerging •. There 
was recognition that a youth and Allied Workers Police 
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Monitoring Group and Gay Police Monitoring Group existed 
but these were perceived as being different, ie, issue 
based, to the ones that would be set up in the community, 
particularly in Labour wards. 
Discussion 
The deliberations about the setting up of alternatives to 
CLPs in Manchester utilized very different notions of 
community, representation and participation to those 
articulated by the Police Authority and the CLO. The PMC 
did not utilize the notion of the whole community as there 
was the recognition that there were certain groups within 
the community whose interests needed to be prioritized in 
terms of the policing they were subject to. Labour 
neutralized the political opposition who, as 
representatives of dominant ideologies and powerful 
community interests, would have blocked attempts to 
prioritize, and therefore do justice to, the interests and 
needsof the under/non-represented. During the initial 
discussions the key issues of representation were also 
addressed. The stress was on the setting up of structures 
that would facilitate the participation of the under/non-
represented sections of the community. It was emphasized 
that there should be voluntary, spontaneous and active 
partiCipation with the community groups setting their own 
agendas. There was also recognition of the issue of the 
power imbalance of different groups and interests. In 
theory, the PMC was to take on the role of empowering the 
powerless and neutralizing the power imbalances. This was 
to be achieved by silencing the'political opposition, 
making~sure·that.right:wing communitY':groups-did-~not .get 
access to resources, blocking all attempts to set up CLPs 
in Manchester and holding the Chief Constable to account 
for discriminatory policing practices. Furthermore, 
through the commitment to set up a research and 
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development unit (PMU) and publish a magazine there was 
also recognition of the need to challenge the Chief 
Constable's monopolization of knowledge and information 
about how Manchester was policed. 
Thus~ the fundamental issues concerning community, 
representation and participation were, in theory, 
addressed by the first deliberations of the PMC. However, 
that is not to say that there were not problems with the 
proposed PMC initiative. First, the PMC had no statutory 
powers to call the Chief Constable to account for the 
manner in which Manchester was policed. Therefore, 
although it was attempting to empower the community it was 
effectively powerless. Second, this initiative was still 
located within heavily bureaucratic and hierarchical 
Labour Party and Council structures and, as indicated in 
the discussion of the Working Party, this meant that very 
few members of the community participated. Third, the 
Labour Party was assuming the role of being the 
representative of those under/non represented groups and 
interests. Not surprisingly, given their previous 
experience of Labour councils, those groups and interests 
were deeply suspicious of the motives of the Party. They 
were also aware that such a representative role was always 
vulnerable to internal Labour politics and electoral 
factors, particularly since a considerable section of the 
Party was totally opposed to the whole idea. Fourth, there 
were different ideas within the PMC, and Party, as to the 
- role that the PMGs would play when they were set up. As 
indicated, it was hoped that the PMGs, like the other 
initiatives,:-would' harness support for ,the Party--and the· 
Council. It is within this context that the hope was 
expressed that the PMC was working towards the idea of a 
multiplicity of community based-PMGs, premised on the 
geographical notion of the Labour Party ward structure. 
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Finally, there was the assumption 
under/non-represented groups and 
that the different 
interests in the 
community conceptualized their problems in the same manner 
as the PMC and therefore viewed PMGs as a solution to 
their problems. The next sections examine how the PMC 
attempted to implement it alternative structures of 
community representation and participation. 
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Section Ill: Medel 11 
Community reoresentation and participation through 
community monitoring 
From the outset, as indicated, it was agreed that a full 
time research and development unit was needed if the 
campaign for police accountability was to have any chance 
of succeeding. As far back as the disturbances of 1981 
those concerned about the policing of Manchester had 
emphasized to the Labour group on the Police Authority 
that if the Chief Constable was to be made accountable 
such a unit had to be set up. It was argued that only 
through having a unit researching and analysing the 
poliCing of Manchester would councillors be able to to 
challenge the Chief Constable'S control of information and 
begin to set the agenda. The Labour group of the Police 
Authority rejected the proposal, relying instead on the 
CLO. The experience of both the Police Authority and the 
Community Liaison Officer confirmed the belief that a 
full-time unit was fundamental to the success or otherwise 
of the monitoring initiative. 
The PMU was fully operational by 15 April 1985 with a 
~ormal six month work programme commiting the unit to a 
two fold monitoring role. First, it was supposed to 
represent the community on policing matters through its 
research and monitoring and second, facilitate community 
partiCipation in policing matters through setting up PMGs 
(see PMC Report No 4:1985) 
a. The Police Monitoring Unit (PMU)I Reoresenting the 
Community 
The PMU-cwasOJaprofessiorial full-time 'police'monitoring 
, unit and a considerable amount of its time was devoted to 
monitoring the poliCies and practices of the GMP and 
national policing trends. This monitoring was devided into 
very specific tasks. First, it was supposed to monitor the 
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nature of the policing of Manchester. This involved work 
in the areas of complaints, policing strategies and crime 
statistics. Second, it was supposed to monitor contact 
between the Council and GMP to counter attempts to 
implement multi-agency policing strategies in Manchester 
The Council as a major service provider has to gather a 
considerable amount of information about individuals 
and organisations and, to minimise the possibilities of 
abuse in a multi-agency context, authorised the 
preparation of guidelines for the exchange of 
information between Council staff and the police. The 
aim of this exercise was to ensure that Council staff 
operate in the best interests of those Manchester 
residents with whom they have regular contact and do 
not unwittingly pass on information which might be used 
in unacceptable ways (PMU,F,inal Report, 1988; see also 
PMC Reports Nos 12; 38; 65; 81; 104; 128). 
Third, the PMU was supposed to campaign on civil liberties 
and public order issues. This involved the unit in the 
preparation of educational materials on the civil 
liberties implications of legislative changes (see PMC 
Reports no, 24; 26; 34; 35; 40; 47; 77; 93; 110; 112 118; 
135; 154; 170; 186; 187; 193);. Thus, it was given the 
role of monitoring the consequences of the lack of police 
accountability to the community in Manchester. 
The PMU was fully equipped to take on such a role. It had 
five full-time staff, administrative backup, and 
eventually a magazine which was delivered to every 
household in Manchester. As far as representing the 
community on policing matters it did not have to ask 
itself questions about its representative status because 
-that had been conferred on it by the Council and by the 
fact that, unlike the CLO and CLPs, it had been presented 
to ,the community as part of" the election manifesto"and 
agreed to by the community at the polls. 
The contours of. the ~ommunity it ~as representing in this 
monitoring role can be identified through the issues it 
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became involved in and through the issues and concerns 
that were articulated in PoliceWatch. That community, as 
indicated previously (see pp 217-218), was made up of 
those who were vulnerable to the practices and policies of 
an unaccountable police force in Manchester. This 
vulnerable community was made up of those subjec:t to 
racist attacks and lack of effective polic:e response; 
those subjec:t to polic:e racism, brutality and 
intimidation; those suffering from the consequenc:es of the 
apparent polic:e incapacity to prevent and solve c:rime; 
those subjec:t to the Conservative government~s law and 
order polic:ies and paramilitary developments in policing. 
The PMU was never able to rationally commit itself to its 
work programme. It was beset by a series of inc:idents and 





to the policing crisis in the 
sooner had the PMU become 
operational than 
visit to Manchester 
the polic:ing 
March 1985 demanded 
University's 
attention. 
of the Home Secretary's 
Students Union on 1st 
Given the nature of the 
polic:ing tactics and the 
the infamous Tac:tical Aid 
type of police units used, eg, 
Groups, and the allegations of 
police brutality demands came from a variety of sources 
for an inquiry to be set up. After the Police Authority 
had their request for a public inquiry turned down the PMC 
set up its own independent inquiry on 22 May 1985. This 
inquiry began its highly publicized deliberations on 8 
June 1985 and the report was· published on 31 October 1985 
(see Platts-Mills et al., 1985). During this period the 
PMU was stretched by having to respond to ensuing 
.developments~which arose out of the incident and inquiry. 
It had to provide considerable and prolonged support for 
two of the students, central to the inquiry, who were 
allegedly subsequently. subject. to serious police 
intimidation and This role continued 
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throughout the following year (see Platt-Mills, 1985; 
Wa I k er ~ 1986). 
b. The Police Monitoring Unit: The Facilitation of 
Community Representation and Participation 
The PMU was also given the role of facilitating the 
participation of the community in policing matters by 
setting up police monitoring groups. At the basis of their 
work was a systematic critique of community liaison and 
police monitoring which drew upon Left criminologists 
critique of multi-agency community policing strategies 
(see Bunyan, 1981; Bridges, 1981; Gordon, 1983). The Head 
of the Unit identified a series of key differences between 
the two structures. (Wright, 1985). As far as the PMU was 
concerned the CLPs were first, part of an attempt to 
create a much larger overarching policing system which had 
a nationally set agenda whereas PMGs were to be part of a 
decentralised police service which would correspond to the 
needs of the community. Second, CLPs were part of a para-
military information gathering exercise which was geared 
towards furthering political control whereas PMGs would, 
through their local knowledge and information, set the 
agenda for local policing needs. Third, CLPs were a 
component of multi-agency policing geared towards 
producing social control whereas PMGs would empower local 
people to challenge p~licing practices and hold officers 
accountable. Fourth, CLPs were geared towards calming down 
and educating community expectations whereas PMGs were 
attempting to empower communities to demand their rights 
and justice. Given the nature of the exisitng political 
and economic structures and the role of the :police within 
suchstructures~there was a hidden agenda-operating behind 
attempts to introduce community policing into the 
ghettoes. That hidden agenda was producing a more 
sophisticated form of social control. 
,,' . -, , .. ,,. . ".-.~ ,', ',' 
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As far as the PMU was concerned community policing would 
only be possible when decentralised policing arrangements 
were introduced where the community could decide what type 
of policing it wanted. There could be no community 
policing until the police were made accountable to the 
community. The fundamental difference between the CLPs and 
the police monitoring initiative was that 
the needs of the authoritarian state 
represented the needs of 
the monitoring initiative 















A series of pragmatic problems, alluded to previously (see 
pp 224-225), meant that the above mentioned ideas would be 
difficult to realise. First, there was the assumption that 
PMGs would quickly emerge if given the opportunity and 
encouragement by the Council and the PMC. Second, as it 
was a Labour Party initiative, PMGs were going to be 
linked into the Labour Party and Council structure. Third, 
not just issue based there was the pressure to produce 
monitoring groups but community 
since the CLP structure had been 
based ones. And finally, 
rejected this model could 
not be used by the PMU. However, the potential presence of 
CLPs in Manchester had to be countered by the development 
of alternative structures that could deal with the problem 
of crime and the problem of the police. ,The key issue was 
how to ensure that any structures that did develop 
facilitated the p~rticipation and representation of the 
community they were purportedly representing. Two 
development ~orker~ . had the specif~c duty . of setting up 
__ and __ servicing_ .. PMGs •. ,There· were alreadytwo.issue based 
monitoring groups, YAWPMG and the Gay PMG, already in 
existence before the PMU had become operational 50 there 
was little problem in, ,making contact with these groups. 
'However, fa~ili~a~~ng ~he 5ettingu~ of the new community 
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based ones was always going to be problematical. 
There were several petitions addressed to the PMC 
concerning policing matters and the latter viewed them as 
the possible basis for spawning PMGs. In the report 
outlining the proposed six month work programme for the 
unit it was argued that the unit would achieve the 
objective of setting up independent police PMGs by linking 
in to the concerns shown by people like the residents of 
Longsight and Benchill 'who are actively demanding better 
policing practices in their area- (29.3.95). It was argued 
that if PMGs emerged from these meetings they would form 
the prototypes for other areas. However the Unit had to 
also respond to a more immediate community petition in 
April 1985. The resultant meetings provide an insight into 
the problems facing the police monitoring strategy in 
Manchester 
i. Thornton Road 
An incident took place in April 1985 that the monitoring 
initiative responded to, in the hope that a monitoring 
group would emerge, but also to attempt to block the 
Police Authority setting up a liaison panel. On 17 April 
Liverpool F.C. played Manchester Utd F.C. at the 'neutral· 
ground of Manchester City F.C. in the semi-final of the FA 
Cup. Afterwards the police lost control of the crowd and a 
running battles resulted in which residents of one of the 
near by streets, Thornton Rd, suffered considerable damage 
to their cars and houses. There was little doubt that the 
Thornton Road incident· allowed for a real critique of 
policing in Manchester because the police had 
operationally mishandled the .·situation~ Thus, it:could 
possibly have provided a basis for the discussion of 
public order policing in Manchester. The Police Authority 
organised a public meeting to disCUSS the issues arising 
from the incident and there was a panel of three 
' ..... 
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representatives Trom the police, the deputy chair oT the 
Police Monitoring Committee, the chair of the Police 
Authority, a senior representative of Manchester City F.C. 
and the local Labour councillor. At this meeting there 
were approximately 150/200 
meeting did not focus on the 
many of those present used 
people present. However, the 
issue of policing. Instead 
the opportunity to complain 
about the general problems of living so close to a large 
football ground and the fact that Manchester City refused 
to take responsibility for the unruly behaviour of its 
supporters. They were also concerned about who was going 
to compensate them for the damage they had suffered (see 
PMC Report no 9) 
This was a very heated meeting where the majority of the 
criticism was addressed to Manchester City F.C. The police 
representatives calmly deflected attention from themselves 
with one officer summing up th~ police position by saying 
that the police could not be held responsible for 
SOCiety's ills. When one member of the audience made the 
comment that if there were enough officers for a police 
band then why was not there enough to put officers on 
Thornton Rd, he was jeered by the audience. After this 
people began to leave because of the ·mob' like atmosphere 
that was developing. The PMC representative argued that 
residents should be worried by the lack of policing policy 
and should push to make the police accountable and 
answerable for their actions in th~ future. The Chair of 
the Police Authority argued for the setting up of 
conSUltative arrangements to deal with, SUch, problems. 
However~ those present at the meeting were not int~:ested 
in taking the_police to task. ,Any attempt by the PMC, 
representative or the chair of the Police Authority to get 
the meeting to focus on the policing issues raised by the 
inCident were finally laid to rest when the Manchester 
City F.C. representative said 'that what ha~p~ned out~~de 
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the ground was of no concern to him. The meeting exploded. 
In this situation the police representatives were not 
challenged to to account for how and why they had lost 
control of the policing situation. 
Hence, this meeting did not provide the basis for the 
setting up of either a community monitoring group or a 
police-community liaison panel. On the contrary the 
meeting conferred legitimacy on the police to user harder 
measures in futUre when dealing with football supporters. 
This they duly did and the following Saturday home fans, 
for the first time, found themselves faced with riot clad 
officers, police dogs, riot 
cordoning and searches outside 
vans and intensive police 
of the. Ironically no-one 
from the PMU or the Police Authority was present to 
witness this. 
The PMU was not unduly concerned that a PMG did not 
emerge. It is certainly questionable whether such a 
structure would have been a progressive structure. It 
would have been composed of the middle aged, white and 
pro-police, and would have been monitoring Manchester City 
F.C. not policing. This meeting, given the multi-racial 
nature of Moss Side did not have any representation or 
participation from black residents who had suffered racial 
abuse from visiting supporters to the ground and little 
police protection. It also posed the question about the 






allowed .. to be articulated by 
Alternative, views were literally 
majority viewpoint was 
the people present. 
howled down to such a 
C ",,,,,;,,,.,,,"degree that people walked outafter'"being subject :·to a 
torrent of abuse because they disagreed with the majority 
viewpoint. In unstructured public meetings the nature of 
the discussion may not necessarily focus upon the reason 
why the meeting was called. 
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There were two other meetings that the PMC hoped would 
produce comunity based PMGs and in doing so prevent the 
Police Authority from establishing CLPs. 
ii. Longsight 
The Police Authority took the initiative in convening a 
public meeting in Longsight on 11 April 1985 in response 
to demands by residents to do something about burglaries 
in that area. Representatives of GMP, the Police 
Authority, the PMC were present along with Gerald 
Kaufmann, the then Shadow Home Secretary and MP for the 
area. The Chair of the Police Authority was hopeful that 
the meeting would generate the first CLP in Manchester, 
whilst the PMC hoped that a monitoring group would emerge. 
As it turned out there seemed to be more researchers, 
politicians and media present than members of the 
community! Nevertheless, those members that did bother 
turn up complained about the general hooliganism and 
burglary they had to put up with and were angry about the 
response of the police. One resident said that when he 
reported that his flat had been burgled the police 
officers laughed in his face. The GMP representatives said 
that they were doing everything that they could but stated 
that they could never respond to all calls and had ·to make 
a 'value decision as to when to respond with such 
resources that are available'. Another resident said that 
when he reported a break-in he was sworn at by the police 
officer and had the telephone put down on him. One of the 
GMP representatives replied that he could not understand 
why people did not use the official complaint system when 
such,incidents happened. 
When the discussion turned to how few people had turned up 
., . -
in comparison to the number of people'who had signed the 
petition, residents pointed out that'~~~ meeting had' b~;n 
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advertised fer the people of Longsight but that it was 
difficult for people ·to relate to a global area called 
Longsight~. It was argued that it needed to be broken down 
into more localised meetings and it was pointed out that 
the petition was not actually from the people of Longsight 
but from one particular estate where, in the past, up to 
70 people had attended meetings. 
The Chair of 
explained the 
She defended the 
the Police Authority, 
philosophy underpinning 
decision to have a 
in responding, 
community liaison. 
meeting based on 
Longsight as opposed to specific neighbourhoods arguing 
that 'there are occasions when a wider area is needed to 
balance the communities'. 
She went on to argue specifically for the setting up of 
CLPs claiming that such a structure would allow people to 
have local meetings where th~y could discuss the issues 
they saw to be important and then they could attend the 
wider geographically based based panels to discuss their 
concerns. The representatives from the PMC attempted to 
demonstrate the limitations of such an approach by asking 
questions about the operations of Special Branch in 
Manchester and the implications of the coal dispute on the 
policing of Longsight. The GMP representatives refused to 
answer such questions because they were operational 
concerns. The PMC took hope from the fact that no CLP had 
been forthcoming and from the fact that the police, in 
refusing to answer their ~uestions, had shown that they 
were not prepared to enter into meaningful discussions. As 
far as they were concerned 
th~ Longsight episode had a profound impact on 
determining Council Policy on contact between the 
police and the community and the futility of the 
Liaison Panel approach (PMC Report no 6) 
Although it is certainly true that the Police Authority 
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had failed in its efforts to 
little evidence to suggest 
promote a CLP there was 
that the meeting would have 
supported a community PMG. What residents present wanted 
was a positive response 
was no indication from 
forthcoming either. 
iii. Benchill 
irom the police. However, there 
the police that this would be 
The other petition awaiting the unit proved to be even 
more of a dilemma for the PMU and the PMC. In January 1985 
a petition was signed by 135 residents of the Benchill 
area of Manchester stating that they had been were being 
terrorized by gangs of youths and demanding that the 
Council and GMP do something. The petition was presented 
to the City Council and handed to the PMC who decided to 
hold a public meeting on 18 July 1985 where the residents 
could meet with the Committee and the PMU and discuss the 
setting up of a PMG. This was the first meeting that the 
PMC had sponsored and there was no GMP or Police Authority 
presence. The intention of the PMC was to devide people 
into separate groups in order to facilitate a more 
detailed discussion of their particular concerns, eg, 
women and poliCing, youth and policing, old people and 
poliCing (see PMC Report no 20). 
However, the reality was dramatically different and 
illustrated the difficulties facing the PMC in 
implementing their ideas -concerning community 
partiCipation. Very few young people turned up because 
they claimed. _that they thought that it was a police 
sponsored and controlled meeting and the old people did 
. not~attend.because of the lack of· ~dequate transport. 
Therefore, the idea of breaking the meeting up into 
specific workshops was never implemented and what resulted 
was a free for all discussion which addressed few areas 
concerned with policing and certainly not the issue of 
- . ---- r 
..... '" 
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police accountability. There were people who complained 
about the Council giving money to gays and some argued 
that the meeting was a Labour Party set up because there 
were so many Labour representatives present whilst others 
complained about the lack of GMP presence at the meeting. 
There was also a general air of cynicism about what 
exactly the PMC could do in relation to crime problems. As 
a consequence. the meeting did not provide the forum for 
the setting up of a PMG. 
Discussion 
Although the PMU encouraged people to think about setting 
up PMGs the above mentioned meetings indicated that people 
in the communities involved did not necessarily think on 
those terms. What had emerged from the meetings during the 
first half of 1985 was that there was no desire amongst 
those present to monitor the police in the way envisaged 
by the PMC. Instead they were demanding an adequate police 
response and that the council do something about crime and 
delinquency. It should also be noted that the first 
meetings had involved traditional Labour voting white 
neighbourhoods. No similar petitions were forthcoming from 
black neighbourhoods during this period, despite 
continuing concern about the policing of their 
neighbourhoods. The PMC/U found real difficulties in 
responding to the Jacki= Berkeley incident and no public 
statement or campaign was forthcoming. Thus, the outcome 
of these first forays into the community and the first 
attempts to set up PMGs resulted in a considerable rethink 
of the overall strategy. 
_.Summary of Part I I .'. , ... ~. ,_ 
rart- 11 of this thesis has attempted to document and 
analyze the struggle for police accountability that took 
place in Manchester between 1981-85. This struggle 
resulted in the setting up of two models that had as their 
stated intention bringing about community representation 
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and participation in decisions about policing. 
a. The Police Authority and Community Liaison 
The Police Authority's model had two components. First, 
the Police Authority attempted to call the Chief Constable 
to account through utilizing the vague powers of the 1964 
Police Act and through setting up a sub-committee 
structure that paralleled the force structure. As a 
consequence it was hoped that not only would the Authority 
have a greater input into policing matters but would also 
begin to set the agenda for how Greater Manchester should 
be policed. However, given the position of the Home Office 
and the overall context of the authoritarian state, the 
Chief Constable defeated all attempts to make him 
accountable. As well as utilizing his conspiracy theory to 
neutralize ideologically the efforts of the Authority he 
also 'policed' the vague provisions of the 1964 Police Act 
to make sure any loopholes that might favour the Authority 
were quickly dealt with. Anderton also pushed the notions 
of operational independence and 
the limit to deny the Police 
information needed to have a 
Greater Manchester. 
professional autonomy to 
Authority access to the 
say in the policing of 
The outcome of the struggles within the Police Authority 
provide a case study of the major problems in the 
tripartite structure of police governance documented by 
McCabe and Wallington (1988). They argue that the 
struggles between Police Authorities and their Chief 
Constables of 1981-85 illustrated the limitations of the 
powers of the Police Authorities. First the operational 
autonomy of the Chief ~0!:lstables was expanded so .muchthat,. 
they did not have to account to the Police Authorities, in 
any manner, for policy formulation and implementation. Any 
discussion that took place between Chief Constables and 
Police Authorities was at the discretion of the Chief 
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Constables. Second. the coal dispute showed that although 








accountability. Third, Police Authorities were excluded 
irom involvement in the development, by ACPO and the Home 
Office, of new policies in riot training and the 
development· of the completely unaccountable National 
Reporting Centre. Finally, 'the powers given to the Home 
Secretary under the 1964 Act were used to overrule the 
wishes of the Police Authorities and to provide definitive 
interpretations of the clauses of the 1964 Act. 
It was within this context that the Police Authority 
introduced the second part of its model to make the police 
accountable. The CLPs were supposed to provide the 
foundation for the efforts of the Authority to hold the 
Chief Constable to account. Through the operation of the 
CLPs the Authority would be, theoretically, able to build 
up an independent picture of how policing was carried out 
in Greater Manchester and determine what type of policing 
the community wanted. However, its attempts were seriously 
hampered by the Home Office guidelines which limited the 
purpose of consultation to crime control and enshrined the 
autonomy of the police (see Cox, 1986). In terms of the 
issues of community representation and participation there 
~ere also serious problems with the Police Authority's 
model. 
An analYSis of this model illustrates the difficulties of 
using a model which prioritizes community representation. 
A . series of problems have been identified. First, the 
Police Authority appointed Hytner's _ community 
representative despite the opposition of significant 
sections of the community this representative was 
, supposedly representing. Given that the Hytner, Inquiry had 
specifically cautioned against appointing som~'one who did 
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not enjoy the full confidence of those sections of the 
community in conflict with the police, this was a serious 
defect. Second, the mUlti-agency and reformist philosophy 
underpinning the work of the CLO~ and enshrined in the 
Home Office guidelines, confirmed his unrepresentative 
status. Third, whilst the CLO was trying to assuage 
community concerns, the controversial policing of Moss 
Side, and the statements of the Chief Constable, did not 
change. This demonstrated that the CLO was completely 
powerless in relation to effecting change in the policing 
of Moss Side and that the incapability of black interests 
being represented through the CLPs. 
The failure of the Police Authority to resolve the issues 
of community representation had serious ramifications for 
the attempts of the CLO to set up a liaison panel in Moss 
Side. The whole idea of community liaison was rejected 
comple~ely, not least because the terms of reference did 
not address the issue of the racially discriminatory 
policing of Moss Side. The belief of the CLO and the 
Police Authority that the setting up of CLPs in the rest 
of Greater Manchester would persuade people in Moss Side 
to participate also failed. 
By utilizing the theoretical concepts that are central to 
this theSis, community, representation and participation 
it is possible to identify just hoW problematical the 
representative structures were. Community referred to 
first, the geographical entity of the police sub-
diVision and second, to the whole community. The problem 
with this conception was that although it was not the 
whole community who had problems with the police thei~ 
interests were prioritized on the agendas of the CLPs. 
The CLP structure emphasized the representation of the 
community through representatives of all formal community 
241 
organizat ions and representatives. There was no 
recognition that there were power inequalities between the 
different groups that were supposed to have equal 
representation. A series of problems have been identified 
with this approach. First, there was no recognition of the 
problematical nature of the representativeness of many of 
these community groups and individuals. Second, there was 
no recognition that certain sections of the community did 
not have formal community representatives. Third, rights 
of representation were given to community groups and 
representatives who had no necessary relevance to the 
discussions of the CLPs. Finally, GMP, the Police 
Authority and the local council were given a privileged 
status in that they enjoyed statutory 
representation, despite what the 
representatives might think. 
rights of automatic 
other community 
A representative structure was created that tightly 
controlled and limited participation. First, the 
partiCipation of the community was limited to their being 
able to contribute at the end of the highly formal CLP 
meetings. The participation of community representatives 
was mobilized by the powerful as opposed to being a 
spontaneous or voluntary decision. Furthermore, through 
the Home Office guidelines their participation was being 
mobilized for the purpose of helping the police to control 
crime. Second, the participation of the community 
representatives was limited by the structured terms of 
reference. Third, the CLP meetings were, in Pateman's 
(1970) terms, situations of partial partiCipation with 
power residing firmly with the police representatives who 
had their operational autonomy enshrined in the terms' of 
reference and who kept control oi the information and 
knowledge that would have been a pre-condition for an open 
discussion about pol icing, or indeed ,about crim,e. Hence, 
'the initial community liaison model facilitated the 
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representation and participation of white. middle aged, 
respectable males who accepted such limitations. As a 
consequence the manner in which issues of community, 
representation and participation had been dealt with, 
reproduced the existing power inequalities. 
The CLO quickly recognized that important sections of the 
community, eg, ethnic minorities, women and young people 
were non/under-represented in the CLPs and did attempt to 
redress the situation to bring about their participation. 
However, to bring about their participation the CLO 
persisted with all-encompassing supplemental structures of 
representation, based on the notion of the whole community 
of ethnic minorities, the whole community of young people 
and the whole community of women. Practically the CLO 
recommended that additional supplemental liaison 
arrangements be tagged on to the CLPs. Even if such 
structures had been set up, the CLO would undoubtedly have 
had to encounter further problems of the non/under-
representation. 
What is notable within the initial efforts of the CLO is 
how one section of the community began to have their 
interests prioritized. The non/under-representation of 
women was given the most attention by the CLO.and the 
Police Authority. However, the all-encompassing format of 
structured representation failed to give recognition to 
the fact that first, there ~re racial and class 
inequalities between women's 
women's groups articulate 
groups and second, certain 
dominant ideologies and 
interpretations of reality. As a consequence the interests 
'. ~ 
of those powerless women's groups who challenged dominant 
ideologies concerning women and policing were defined out. 
Thus, not only did the original structure of community 
representation reproduce the existing power inequalities" 
243 




counter-balance those inequalities and provide 
to all interests, 
respectable youth 
reproduced further divisions 
and disreputable youth and 
respectable women and disreputable women. As a consequence 
the interests of those in conflict with the police were 
being defined out by the representative structures. 
Manchester City Council and Community Monitoring 
The deliberations about the setting up of alternatives to 
CLPs in Manchester utilized very different notions of 
community, representation and participation to those 
articulated by the Police Authority and the CLO. The PMC 
did ~ utilize the notion of the whole community as there 
was the recognition that there were certain groups within 
the community whose interests needed to be prioritized in 
terms of the policing they were subject to. During the 
initial discussions the key issues of representation were. 
also addressed. The stress was on the setting up of 
structures that would facilitate the participation of the 
under/non-represented sections of the community. It was 
emphasized that there should be voluntary, spontaneous and 
active participation with· the community groups setting 
their own agendas. There was also recognition of the issue 
of the power imbalance of different groups and interests. 
In theory, the PMC was to take on the role of empowering 
the powerless sections of the community and neutralizing 
the power imbalances. This was to be achieved by 
nullifying the political opposition, blocking all attempts 
to set up CLPs in Manchester and holding the Chief 
Constable to account for discriminatory policing 
practices. Furthermore, through the commitment to set up a 
research and development unit (PMU) and publish a magazine 
there was also recognition of the need to challenge the 
Chief Constable's monopolization of knowledge .and 
. . 
information about how Manchester was policed. 
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Thus. the fundamental issues concerning community, 
rep~esentation and participation were, in theory, 
addressed by the first deliberations of the PMC. However, 
that is not to say that there were not problems with the 
proposed PMC initiative. First, the PMC had no statutory 
powers to call the Chief Constable to account for the 
manner in which Manchester was policed. Therefore, 
although it was attempting to empower the community it was 
effectively powerless. Second, this initiative was still a 
'top-down' initiative, located within heavily bureauc~atic 
and hierarchical Labour Party and Council st~uctures. 
Third, the Labour Pa~ty assumed the role of being the 
representative of those under/non represented groups and 
interests. Fourth, there were different ideas within the 
PMC, and Party, as to the role that the PMGs would play 
when they were set up. As indicated, it was hoped that the 
PMGs, like the other initiatives, would harness support 
for the Party and the Council. It is within this context 
that the hope was expressed that the PMC was working 
towards the idea of a multiplicity of community based 
PMGs, premised on the geographical notion of the Labour 
Party wa~d structure. The danger with such a plan was that 
the model of police monitoring referred to previously (see 
p 97) was being used for a purpose it was not meant for. 
Finally, there was the assumption that the different 
I 
under/non-represented groups and interests in the 
community conceptualized their pro~lems in the same manner 
as the PMC and t~erefore viewed PMGs as a solution to 
their problems. 
Such problems manifested themselves in the first attempts 
by the PMU to set· up PMGs in Manchester. Traditional 
Labour voting white communities began to demand that their 
interests be represented by the PMC/U. Therefore, under 
political pressure the PMU was expected to encourage~'in 
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addition to issue based ones, community based PMGs. The 
PMU found communities who were angry about being neglected 
by the Council and who wanted something to be done about 
crime. This meant that they did not necessarily want PMGs, 
or indeed CLPs. Once more, the difficulties of allowing 
the whole community representation were illustrated. In 
addition the PMC was also hindered by the fact that it had 
no statutory power to effect the policing that these 
communities received it was GMP who had that vital 
power. 
Part IV of 
Authority and 
this thesis will examine how the Police 
the PMC models attempted to resolve these 
difficulties of community representation and 
participation. However, before this it is necessary to 
examine the macro developments that were important in 
determining what sections of the community would achieve 
representation and participation in Manchester. 
, 
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PART Ill: POLICING. COMMUNITY AND DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
a. From Police Authorities to Joint Boards: Changes 1n the 
Form of Political Representation 
In July 1985, 
government bill 
despite ardent opposition, the local 
became law, abolishing the Labour 
controlled metropolitan county councils as from 1 April 
1986. It was the iirst time that a layer of government, 
controlled solely by an opposition political party, had 
been abolished by a central government. As indicated 
previously, the reason ior abolition was purely political 
and there had been no Royal Commission, no public inquiry 
nor financial assessment of the consequences (see Flynn 
and Leach, 1984; Harris, 1986). The main duties and powers 
of -the mets', including the powers of the Police 
Authorities, were to be transferred to a system oi 
statutory joint boards. 
As a result the new Police Authorities were established to 
discharge the duties of the 1964 Police Act ensuring the 
maintenance of an adequate and eiiicient police iorce for 
the districts previously encompassed by the old 
Authorities. However, strict central government guidelines 
were laid down concerning the compOSition and powers oi 
the new boards. The act changed ~he iorm oi political 
representation that had previously· existed on the Police 
Authorities. The joint boards were to consist oi 
councillors nominated directly by the constituent councils 
reilecting, as iar as possible, the party balance of power 
- :--,.-=-.; . ':" ~ on:' .the .... r:especti ve counci I s. However, -,;. the __ magistrates 
continued to be represented, as beiore, on the boards. The 
boards were to raise their iinance through a precept on 
the constitue~t councils whilst also. being subject to the 
financial control laid down in the 1984 Rates Act ior 
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three years. The Home Secretary was given potential 
control over the day-to-day running o~ the joint boards 
through being given a say in decisions concerning staffing 
and the allocation o~ resources. In addition, the Home 
Secretary was alloted the power to restructure joint 
boards through ~irst, allowing district councils to become 
separate Police Authorities and second, amalgamating 
di~ferent police areas. Thus, this act gave central 
government unprecedented formal control over the 
previously troublesome Police Authorities (see Loveday, 
1987a; 1987b; 1988). 
In addition, there were a series o~ other macro 
developments, in relation to the politics o~ crime and 
policing, that were to have a signi~icant impact upon the 
campaign for police accountability - in Manchester. First, 
there was the emergence within the Conservative 
governments's law and order project of crime prevention. 
Second, there was the impact o~ left new realist 
criminology within the overall campaign by the Labour 
Party leadership to prove itsel~ acceptable to the British 
electorate. This also had as a central concern the control 
o~ crime. The result was the re-emergence o~.a party 
political consensual discourse on crime and ,-the community 
which covered crime prevention, ~ear o~ crime and victims 
.- , 
of crime (see Reiner, 1989). Thi~, discourse had serious 
policy implications ~or those within the Labour Party 
demanding police accountability because'cent~al to it were 
ideas concerning community, 
. - -
representation and 
• '; ., 1 
partiCipation. 
b. The Government and the Community. Active Citizenship 
As in the first years o~ the 19805 the:government 
continued to prioritize law and order.2-i~erewas·the 
substantial allocation of _resources to the police, the 
augmentation of the 
building programme and 
the criminal justice 
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court system; a substantial prison 
legislation covering all aspects of 
system (see Savage, 1989; Pilger 
1990). This continuing emphasis on law and order meant 
that there was no public inquiry into the controversial 
poliCing of the coal dispute. In addition when Handsworth 
and Broadwater Farm erupted there was no repeat of the 
Scarman inquiry. As far as the government, the police and 
considerable sections of the British media was concerned 
it was the work of murderous criminals. The demand for an 
inquiry suffered a heavy defeat in the Commons and at the 
subsequent Conservative" Party conference the Home 
Secretary announced the strengthening of public order 
legislation and the upgrading of the riot capabilities of 
the police (see Police Review, 18.10.85; 1.11.85). In 
addition, the Conservative government continued to give 
unqualified support, as it had during the coal dispute, to 
the controversial policing of industrial disputes and 
public order situations such as Wapping and the Peace 
Convoy (see Graef, 1989: 29-38; LSPU, 1987). 
However, the government did have to face the consequences 
of its prioritization of the issue of crime. Although 
spending had increased in real terms by 31Y.it had little 
effect on the increasing crime rate. The spending had not, 
. ".~ . 
prevented crime, "deterred crimi~als, protected people, 
eradicated fears, helped victims" or reformed offenders 
(see Savage, 1989). In this context the limitations of the 
role of the police in fighting crime were becoming 
apparent. Criticism~ of the~over~me~t·s law and or~er 
policies were fuelled by the publication of the first 
national crime survey (see Hough and Mayhew, 1983) which, 
for the first time, attempted to provide an"accurate 
picture of the extent of crime and the nature of crime in 
Britain. This survey demonstrated that although crime was 
249 
much" more prevalent than indicated by official statistics 
it was of a petty nature. The survey also emphasized that 
the fear of crime was out of proportion to the risk of 
being a victim of crime. The survey concluded that more 
police officers was not the answer to such fears 
For many sorts of crimes, people themselves, might take 
effective preventive action, either acting individually 
or together with others. The police could do more to 
promote preventive action of this kind while the trend 
towards putting more officers back on the beat may have 
the desirable effect of reducing fear of crime (Hough 
and M~yhew, 1983:34) 
Such conclusions stimulated a debate and further studies 
about the extent of crime, the nature of crime, the fear 
of crime, the victims of crime and the effectiveness of 
the police in controlling crime (see Hope and Shaw et al., 
1988; Maguire and Pointing et al., 19881 Walklate, 1989). 
The response of the 
through the notion of 
community in taking 
government was two fold. First, 
active citizenship the role of the 
responsibility for the control of 
crime was stressed. Ironically, a government that had 
constantly asserted its opposition to collectivist 
concepts found it necessary to turn to the concept of 
community in the attempt to deal with crime. The 
community, which was made up of active citizens, was to be 
, 
mobilized to participate actively. in the fight against 
crime. As" a consequence, there was the decoupling of the 
concepts of community and participation from demands for 
police "accountability and their re-articulation in 
,~. . . ".' 
relati6n to crime prevention, in partnership with the 
police. The proper role of the community in policing 
matters was actively participating in consultative 
arrang~~~nts, neighbourhood watch schemes, vi~ti~support 
schemes "and the Special Constabulary to help in "the fight 
against crim~ (see Wilmott et al., 19871 Hope and Shaw et 
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al., 1988; Maguire and Pointing et al., 1988; Mawbyet 
al., 1988; Heidensohn, 19891 Leon, 19891 Walklate, 1989). 
Indeed, the very basis oi the community was active 
citizens uniting to iight crime and those not 
participating were by deiinition not oi the community. 
Second, to compliment the 
proiessional multi-agency 
prevention was promoted. By 
eiiorts oi the community, a 
based approach to crime 
the middle oi the 1980s a 
poweriul mUlti-agency approach had emerged not only to 
harness all the criminal justice and related agencies but 
also voluntary eiforts, central government departments and 
the media. In April 1986 a ministerial group on crime 
prevention was set up to co-ordinate the crime prevention 
strategies oi twelve diiierent government departments (see 
Police Review, 18.4.86). The Education (No 2) Act 1986, in 
response to the 'loony leit' policies oi local authorities 
such as the Inner London Education Authority, proposed 
placing a obligation upon school governors to liaise with 
Chief Constables over the role oi the police in schools 
(see Police Review 6.6.86). All the proposals were 
emphasizing the role that statutory authorities should 
play, in co-operating with the police in the fight,against 
crime. Thus, a total community policing strategy was being 
proposed by the government in relation to crime control. 
Morgan (198917-8) has also pointe~ out that this strategy 
was useful within the go~ernment's overall ~am~aign to 
curb public expenditure. Despite public pronouncements to 
the contrary, community crime control was considerably 
cheaper than all ocat i ngunl i mi ted resources t6't'he: pol ice. 
c. !he Police and the Community' Towards a Common Purpose 
The potentially damaging critique oi poliCing that could 
." ., ' 
have developed out of the concern about constantly 
increasing crime rates and the manifest failure of the 
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police to control crime never happened. Kenneth Newman, 
the Commissioner 
force which was 
incorporated the 
of the Metropolitan Police Force, the 
most vulnerable to such a critique, 
criticisms and public debate to 
neutralize demands for the democratic accountability of 
his force. The result was the unveiling, from 1983, of a 
realist corporatist (multi-agency) community policing 
strategy aimed at re-establishing the authority and 
legitimacy of the force. Hence, Newman's strategy and 
philosophy neatly dovetailed with the government's 
approach to the problem of crime and provided additional 
direction for the largest of the provincial forces. 
Central to this strategy was mobilizing active community 
consent in the fight against crime and educating the 
community about the realistiC role of the police in that 
fight. Newman supported the consultative arrangements as 
forums where the consent of community representatives 
could be mobilized and where the education of the 
community could take place. Neighbourhood Watch, crime 
prevention schemes, victim support schemes and the Special 
Constabulary were designated as the means through which 
the community could participate with the police in the 
fight against crime. Community beat officers were given a 
key role in forging this new relationship between the 
force and the community. At the basis of Newman's ideas 
was the ·notional contract' 
The contract is ••• an extension of the concept of 
"" - ·pollclng by consent' but takes the argument forward 
from a passive endorsement of policing to an.active 
Involvement In a 'partlclpative venture (Newman, 
198319). 
Newman also pressed for corporatist policing strategies to 
be implemented, under .the aegis of the police, to deal 
with. the' problems of difficult inner city areas. To 
compliment such changes Newman embarked upon the attempted 
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internal reorganization of the force. In order to put more 
bobbies back on the beat civilianization of those tasks 
not requiring the skills and powers of police officers 
took place. There was the prioritization of particular 
crimes that were of community concern, through policing by 
objectives programmes. To compliment the role of the 
community in taking responsibility for looking after 
itself the public order capabilities of the force were 
enhanced through the acquisition of new equipment, the 
upgrading of training and the re-organization of 
mobilization procedures to deal with the front lines 
(symbolic locations) of London·s black neighbourhoods. 
Such a strategy underwent further revision and refinement 
after the policing disaster in Broadwater Farm in 1985 
(see LSPU, 1987) 
Thus, there was a redefinition of the role of the police 
in the fight against crime involving the creation of new 
channels of information and communication with the 
community and other statutory 
was concerned if the new 
agencies. As far as Newman 
strategy was successful 
effectiveness of the force would be improved in three key 
areas. First, in dealing with the problem of crime through 
giving the community and other social agencies the primary 
responsibility for looking after itself. Second, by 
building the consent of the c~mmunity through closer. 
police community contact through the conSUltative 
committees and neighbourhood watch. And third, in the 
maintenance of public tranquillity through the creation of 
. . 
a more efficient riot control force, which would have the 
consent of the community. Central to the latter would be 
the criminalization of any instance of civil disturbance 
and targeting this form of crime would be a priority of 
the Metropolitan .. Police. Through this strategy, as far as 
Newman was concerned, the historic social contract between 
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the police and the community would be re-established. Such 
a social contract also defined who were of the community 
and who were not (see, Kettle and Shirley, 19831 Wright, 
1985; Policing London, vols 3 & 4, 1986; Gordon, 1987). 
c. The Labour Party and the Community: Partners Against 
Crime 
Le~t local authorities did not just come under pressure 
from the Conservative government and the police, on the 
issue of crime prevention. The Labour Party began to take 
the issue of crime seriously because of first, its 
electoral vulnerability on the issue of being labelled 
anti-police and soft on crime and second, the possibility 
of scoring electoral points as the crime rates officially 
soared under a law and order government. 
It is rarely acknowledged that the 'loony left' campaign 
had a considerable impact upon the Labour Party's law and 
order stance. The result was a right wing backlash within 
the Party resulting in the rapid emergence of what became 
known as new realism in the attempt to regain lost 
electoral support, including that of its own traditional 
supporters. That new realism took on board the issue of 
the 'loony left', extremism and infiltration. The national 
leadership condemned the irresponsible actions of radical 
Labour councils. Militant Tendency and the black sections 
. '. 
received particular attention, being publicly condemned by 
Neil Kinnock during the 198~ Party conference. There was a 
considerable distancing of the national party from 
controversial issues that its political opponents and the 
. right wing press could use against it, most notably during 
the coal dispute of 1984-5 (see Howell, 1975) and minority 
issues which were redefined . as fringe issues (see 
Thatchell, 1983. Wainwright, 19871 Negrine 1989). 
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Throughout 1986 the electoral implications of the 'loony 
left', particularly in London, dominated debate within the 
party. The result was a further distancing of the Party 
leadership from any actions, policies or issues that could 
be defined as examples of lunacy/extremism. However, this 
did not stop the Party from losing the traditionally safe 
parliamentary seat of Greenwich in an 1987 by-election. 
Furthermore in the 1987 local elections Labour suffered 
notable set backs losing control of ten councils. This 
confirmed to the Right of the party and certain of its 





significant section of its 
Times 9.5.87) 
of minority interests was 
the electorate, including a 
traditional voters (see The 
In order to maximize from such an anti-Left atmosphere the 
Conservative Party and the media continued to expose the 
antics of the 'loony left' of the party during the 
election campaign of 1987 (see Harrop,19881163-191). In 
an attempt to counter such a campaign the Labour Party 
Virtually jettisoned the interests of the dispossessed and 
excluded 
the leadership cast its vote unflinchingly for the 
'traditional' image, in search of the 'traditional 
Labour voter'. Again, everybody, understood that thiS, 
too, was a code. It is a code for 'back to the 
respectable, moderate, . trade Unionist, male dominated 
working class ••• tt signalled the distance of Labour 
from all those 'fringe issues' and a commitment to 
rooting Labour political loyalties exclusively through 
an identification with the traditional culture of the 
left (Hall, 1988~263). . 
. During this period the Conservatives, the pro-Conservative 
media and the Police Federation pressed Labour on their 
new found realism, particularly in relation to law and 
order. After the 1985 disturbances conSiderable pressure 
was exerted upon the Party leadership to expel Bernie 
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Grant, Leader of Haringey Council, for his statements 
after Broadwater Farm erupted (see Police Review. 
18.10.85). At the Conservative Party conference the Prime 
Minister's key note speech denounced the Labour Party's 
anti-police stance. In November 1985 the Police Federation 
renewed its demands for the Labour Party to deal with 
those members of the party who were anti-police (see 
Police Review, 
Secretary made 
29.11.85). In January 1986 the Home 
another attack on those Police Authorities 
who were in conflict with their Chief Constables stating 
that 
They help to create an atmosphere in which crime can 
thrive and responsible citizenship is condemned (Police 
Review, 31.1.86). 
This was followed up in March 1986 by a statement accusing 
Labour politicians of spreading malicious anti-police 
propaganda (see ~, 1.3.86). 
It is in this period and this context that the leadership 
of the Party began to highlight publicly its support for 
the police, its concern about crime, and its apprehension 
about those members of the Party demanding police 
accountability. Statements by the Labour leadership 
promised that future Labour governments would give full 
support to the police and would promote policies to bring 
about community support for the police in the fight 
against crime (see Police Review. 29.11.85, 25.4.86). In 
May 1986 Netl Kinnock denounced those in his party 
involved in 'polfce bashing' (see The Guardian, 16.S.86) • 
. _In_June.1986 the Shadow Home Secretary.stated that a crime 
wave was engulfing Britain as a result of the government's 
policies. In the same month Sir Kenneth Newman was able to 
_ state that the 'policies of the Labour Party and the 
Conservative Party on law and order were virtually 
indistinguishable (see, Sim et al 1987154-56). 
256 
Just how sensitive the Labour Party leadership was to the 
charge of tieing anti-police can be gauged by its response 
to the leaking to The Times of its 1987 local election 
manifesto proposal to place the police under local 
democratic supervision and the comment by the Home 
Secretary that the proposal was 'lunacy·. Instead of 
attempting to defend their manifesto Labour Headquarters 
rewrote, in a more neutral form, the policing proposal 
(see The Times 4.2.87). However, this did not stop the 
Home Secretary asking the leadership to denounce publicly 
the Labour councils, such as Manchester, who were 
attempting to 'undermine and discourage the police· and to 
reject proposals to give Police Authorities more powers 
I can imagine no step more dangerous for policing in 
Britain than to entrust the main decisions on the 
policing of our cities to the enemies of the police 
(The Guardian. 21.3.87) 
The government also pointed to the refusal of 'loony left· 
councils to partiCipate in the community consultative 
arrangements as proof that the demands for police 
accountability were politically motivated (see The 
Independent, 27.5.87). In the electoral battle both 
parties contributed to the construction of a discourse on 
community representation and participation in relation to . 
the control of crime. Bolstered ~y the crime surveys and 
ideological shift of the new realist criminologists (see 
Lea and Young, 19841 Kinsey, 19851 Jones, Mc Lean and 
Y~ung, 19861 Kinsey, Lea and Young, 198b) in the run up to 
the 1987 election, the party leader~hip fleetingly 
confronted the Conservatives on the issue of law and 
order. Crime prevention was one of the key themes of the 
1987 manifesto (see 'Protecting Our People'). The 
manifesto stressed the importance of local authorities and 




part of a coordinated multi-faceted approach to 
crime. In its critique of the failure of the 
Conservative government to defeat crime the document 
harked back to the golden days, before Thatcherism, when 
the community and the police were at one. It was 
emphasized that unity against crime and criminals would be 
the basis for re-building communities that had been 
ravished by Thatcherism. Within this critique and 
proposals the position of the police was enhanced both in 
relation to the community and other government and 
voluntary agencies. 
As a consequence, the issue of police accountability was 
down played to a commitment 
(unspecified) powers to Police 
abolish magistrate representation 
Community Police Councils whose 
practically indistinguishable 
to first, give more 
Authorities, second, 
and third, create 
functions were to be 
from the existing 
consultation committees 
discernible difference 
(see Reiner, 198915). The only 
between the two parties concerned 
the respective claims to be the party of law and order. As 
a consequence, as Reiner (19891 5) has noted, during the 
1987 election on the issue of police accountability 
'inter-party conflict was muted by a 'new realism' which 
seemed to infect all parties'. It could be argued that if 
the conflict was muted it was an indication of how far the 
Labour Party had reconstructed its policies to accept the 
dominant ideologies concerning law and order in Britain 
In effect, the Labour Party is no longer addressed 
.. , .. - ... ' ''-, ..... primarily tochallenging.police.power-.per se but rather 
-to reordering police priorities away from public order 
and towards crime prevention and control. The 
difficulty with this approach, on a political level, 1s 
that it moves some way towards accepting the Tory 
agenda of ·lawand order' and' places Labour spokesmen 
in open competition with their opponents in bidding up 
public anxieties about. crime, with all the racist 
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overtones that entails (Bridges, 1986:80). 
Thus, there was the prioritization within Labour's 
criminal justice proposals of the representation and 
participation of a particular type of community. That 
community consisted up of those people who were, living in 
iear of crime, concerned about preventing crime and 
victims of crime. Within this prioritization there was 
little space for the representation and participation of 
those for whom the police were a problem. 
iv. The victims of crime 
For the government, the police and the Labour Party, the 
aim of active individual community and participation in 
crime prevention and corporatist policing was to make it 
more difficult to become a victim of crime. Concern with 
the victim had become 'a powerful motif' within the 
criminal justice system (Rock, 1983:172). Within this new 
community crime agenda and the prioritization of victims 
one section of the community came to the fore. The 
concerns of feminist groups and feminist criminologists 
suddenly became part of a formal political agenda On 
victims. As a consequence the concerns of women in 
relation to crime became a key concern for all agencies 
and institutions. The impact of the prioritization of this 
concern had considerable implications for the police 
accountability debates and indeed. for those independent 
radical womens' groups involved with the issue of violence 
of male violence against women. 
-", ' 
,------Those.conce~ned.wlth police accountabilitY,had toAace.the 
fact that the basic problem for women was not the police 
response (or lack of it) to their needs. As feminist 
. groups have always maintained the fundamental problem for 
women was/is men. In addition, it began"to be recognized 
that all government departments were guilty of 
_. -',.~. ,._-..... -
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implementing policies that were detrimental to the safety 
of women. Such criticisms provided a powerful impetus for 
corporatist approaches to crime prevention. For those 
independent radical womens groups the result of the issue 
of rape, for example, reaching the formal political agenda 
was a resultant professionalization and medicalization of 
the issue. 
The police were able to reclaim a group of victims and in 
doing so were defining out radical groups analyses of the 
issues, premised upon the idea of women being the 
survivors of male terrorism not the victims of violence. 
Premised upon Home office circulars 25/1983 and 69/1986, 
there was the rapid development of specialist training for 
police officers, the recruitment of women doctors for 
forensic examinations, specialist police units, publicity 
on women's safety and the development of rape examination 
suites. Within these professional medicalized structures 
there was no necessary place for groups such as Rape 
Crisis, Taboo and Womens Aid (see, Scott and Dickens, 
1989). In a situation very similar to the outcome of the 
anti-vice campaigns in the nineteenth century, the demands 
and critiques of radical women's groups were rearticulated 
in such a manner so as to define them out of the debate 
(see Walkowitz, 1982). 
Summary of Part III 
By the mid-1980s the confrontation between the 
authoritarian state and local institutions of government 
was finally resolved. As documented previo~sly (see pp 92-
._.' "-~~~94)~legislative coercion was .. used to ~bring problematical 
local authorities under control. The central state brought 
• 
in measures to regulate revenue and capital expenditure, 
created QUANGOs to by-pass local political processes and 
finally decided to abolish the metropolitan county 
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councils. The increasing subordination of local government 
to the central state was finally taken to its logical 
conclusion. As part of the restructuring the Police 
Authorities were finally abolished with new forms of 
political representation and tighter central control 
imposed. As the Home Secretary made clear there would be 
no repeat of the conflict of the 1980s (see Hurd, 1987). 
The implications of these changes for those struggling for 
democratic accountability were profound. 
In addition, the overall impact of the emergence of the 
discourse on community and crime was three fold for those 
campaigning for police accountability within the Labour 
Party. First, it made them vulnerable to the accusation of 
being anti-police by their political opponents outside of 
the Labour Party. The practical implications for local 
authorities who were at the forefront of campaigning for 
police accountability and fundamentally opposed to such 
corporatist community policing approaches to crime 
prevention were serious. Non-cooperation was ideologically 
and financially damaging, particularly in a climate when 
local authorities were under constant attack from central 
Qovernment. 
Second, it made them vulnerable to those sections of the 
Labour Party, both locally and nationally, who alleged 
that an anti-police stance was an electoral liability. 
Third, they had to confront the issues' of crime 
prevention, the fear of crime and the mobilization of the 
community to actively participate in a co~ordinated fight 
against crime. As a consequence, considerable pressure was 
-- _ .. ··,···brought,·,·to··bear," on ·loe'al- authorities'to--participate' 
directly in multi-agency crime prevention projects. This 
pressure also meant that policies and proposals concerned 
with police ~ccountability and prioritizing .. theconcerns 
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of those sections of the community for whom the police 
were a problem were being defined out. It is now necessary 
to examine the specific consequences of this discourse for 
the accountability debates in Manchester. 
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PART IY: POLICING. COMMUNITY ANP DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN MANCHESTER: 1985-88 
Section I: Model I 
A. The Demise of the Police Authority 
The implications of the changes for the Labour group in 
the run up to abolition of the Police Authority were 
profound. There were three main inter-connected areas of 
concern. First, how the group could maintain any semblance 
of its authority in the run up to abolition, since both 
the Chief Constable and the opposition could block any 
proposal they did not agree with by stalling. Second, 
because of the new form of political representation that 
was being proposed, there was the distinct possibility 
that the magistrates and the Chief Constable would be in 
control of the joint board. If this happened, given the 
considerable antagonism that existed, it was possible that 
the CLPs, in their present form, and the other initiatives 
that Labour group had set up would not survive the change 
over. Third, there was the issue of Manchester. As 
Manchester City Council had been allocated the largest 
representation within the new Police Authority its 
influence could be significant. This was particularly 
worrying because, through its PMC and PMU it had a 
coherent position on policing worked out. If this 
happened, given Manchester's opposition to CLPs, it was 
possible that its representatives would not necessarily 
oppose any move to abolish them. Thus, for the Labour 
group of the Authority a priority became ensuring that the 
community liaison initiative survived the abolition. It is 
.... not,5urp~1sing . that in this context·in·the period between 
the passing of the Local Government Act and the abolition 
of the metropolitan county councils the struggle between 
the Labour group of the Police Authority and the Chief 
Constable intensified. 
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i. Accountability revisited: The prostitution of the 
British police 
In June 1989 the Chief Constable went of the offensive 
against the Police Authority. Instead of being present at 
the monthly meeting Anderton addressed the ACPO 
conference. He argued that developments in the 1980s were 
threatening the basis of British policing. He attacked the 
Home Office for interfering with traditional police work 
through its support for the privatization of policing 
functions. He attacked the government for failing to 
provide adequate resources and, referring to the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act and the Crown Prosecution 
Service, for implementing changes that were hindering the 
police in the fight against crime. Finally, he moved on to 
attacking the politicization of policing that had occurred 
in the 1980s through the actions of certain Police 
Authorities. He stated that as a result the time had come 
to jettison ·sentimental attachments to local 
accountability and management· 
You cannot police a community by Police Authorities. 
Unless I am very much mistaken the majority of the 
public would prefer policing at the discretion of their 
chief constable rather than policing with the consent 
of the Police Authorities. 
He emphasized that the police must never become 
the willing instruments of unscrupulous politicians. 
There must be no prostitution of the British police. 
The Chair of the Authority responded by stating that she 
deplored the suggestion that a crisis was being 
preCipitated by the Police Authorities attempting to carry 
out their statutory duties and she said that the public 
.:,. C_;,: ,woul d :.,. have '"to . make up thei r mind 'whether: they wanted 
c democratic policing or policing on the dictate of one 
individual. She added that a threat to policing by consent 
and indeed a threat to democracy was posed by those who 
refused to accept the outcome of the democratic process. 
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As a consequence the Chief Constable was asked to explain 
his remarks and to acknowledge, in writing, the powers 
given to the Police Authority under the 1964 Act. The 
Chief Constable claimed that to sign such a document would 
be both 'inappropriate' and 'legally irregular~ under the 
1964 Act and that he had no intention of doing so. During 
the August meeting of the Authority the Chief Constable 
was asked whether he was prepared to expand upon his 
comments about the Police Authority but he refused saying 
that he had discussed the question in the context of an 
ACPO meeting. He was accused of being tyrannical in his 
dealings with the Authority and the Chair criticized the 
manner in he had publicly denigrated his Police Authority 
I would say to the people of Greater Manchester that 
the trend of his speech is that the police should not 
be accountable to democratic structures. Come abolition 
the semblance of accountability which currently exists 
will be gone. We are moving down the road to the 
tyranny of the Chief Constable. There is a substantial 
minority of people, especially those who have contact 
with the police, who are not happy with them. I~m not 
gOing to demand anything from the Chief Constable-
that~s like spitting in the, wind. We~ve seen what 
happens [reference to Merseyside] when' the relationship 
between the police and local representatives breaks 
down - they are investigated by Special Branch for 
inCiting public disorder. 
A motion was passed stating that the Chief Constable~s 
speech showed contempt for the structures of democracy, 
and the role of the Police Authority. 
TheChief Constable said that he would seek legal advice 
on the accusations made in the resolution. On his report 
on the policing of the Home Secretary·s visit ,to 
Manchester UnivE!rsi ty'" thE!'r"TChair. sai d . that she was· not ' .. :;"., 
satisfied with such a brief report because she knew of at 
least one MP who had received more information than the 
\olice Authority. As far as she was concerned the Chief 
.. 
Constable was making it clear that MPs had more rights 
than his own Police Authority did. This conflict was added 
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to by the Chief Constable' s decision, in the same month, 
to refuse the complaints subcommittee access to completed 
complaints files on the grounds that in the past Authority 
members had made critical comments about the way that 
investigating officers had carried out their duties. 
ii. Phone tapping 
Throughout 1985 there had been rumours circulating in 
Manchester about the monitoring of all phone calls to the 
GMP Headquarters. At the September meeting the Chief 
Constable admitted that between November 1984 and April 
1985 he had ordered such monitoring as part of an 
investigation into the unlawful disclosure of classified 
information. However, in the public interest he refused to 
divulge any further information in answer to further 
questions. As a consequence the Labour group stated that 
it was going to request that the HMI of Constabulary 
investigate the affair (see Police Review, 13.9.85). 
ili. Plastic bullets 
During the same meeting the Chief Constable reported that 
he had acquired five hundred plastic bullets and four guns 
for the force. The Chair criticized the Chief Constable 
for not consulting the Police Authority before the 
purchase and for his unquestioning support for the use of 
such technology. In the ensuing row the Labour members 
demanded that the bullets be returned to their 
manufacturer whilst the Chief Constable claimed that the 
Police Authority was ·trying to intrude into areas of 
police autonomy'.· A deadlock was reached with the 
Authority demanding that he produce a report justifying 
need for-such weapons as'weil'~as providing a demon·stratiC;;n.---·--
for Authority members and the Chief Constable refusing on 
the grounds that such demands were infringing upon his 
operational independence. 
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iv. Accountability revisited 
On 4 November 1985 the Chief Constable addressed a meeting 
of the Greater Manchester Police Federation saying that he 
had no intention of returning the plastic bullets. He went 
on to attack the Police Authority as a disruptive 
influence and that he would be grateful when the joint 
board took over 
Much of what has passed for police committee business 
has been a total sham and of limited value either to 
the police force or the public we try to serve (MEN, 
5.11.85) 
The Chief Constable also indicated that there was no 
possibility of his further co-operation with the Authority 
The 
When, as in Greater Manchester, a police force resents 
as deeply as I know we do, the stances sometimes taken 
and public statements made in the name of its police 
committee, there can be no sensible or lasting basis 
for trust and confidence between the force and its 
committee (The Guardian, 6.11.85). 
Chair accused the Chief Constable of trying to 
deliberately sabotage the work of the Authority and of 
provoking a constitutional crisis through his decision to 
keep the plastic bullets. As far as she was concerned the 
bullets were the property of the Police Authority and the 
Chief Constable, in ignoring the decision .of the 
Authority, was stating that he was above the law and not 
prepared to accept the legitimate decision of the Police 
Authority. 
Both the Authority and the Chief Constable sought legal 
advice on whether the Police Authority had the right to 
return the plastic bullets. This advice went against the 
Chief Constable. stating that the eqUipment was the 
property of the Authority and that it had the right to 
dispose of it as it thought fit. The' Chair went to the 
Home Office on 18 November to try and resolve the 
Situation. At the November meeting of the Authority the 
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Chie~ Constable in~ormed the members that since the 
argument was about ownership of the bullets he had 
cancelled the order and instead had obtained the equipment 
on permanent loan ~rom the Commissioner o~ the 
Metropolitan Police with the approval of the Constabulary 
(see Police Review, 13.12.85). The Chair responded that 
the whole tripartite structure o~ police accountability 
had been undermined by such a decision. It meant that the 
Home Secretary 
was prepared to impose plastic bullets on a community 
when its elected representatives have made it clear 
they do not want them 
The Chief Constable was asked whether he accepted the 
right of the Police Authority to make the final decision 
about matters such as'the purchase o~ plastic bullets. The 
latter refused to be drawn on the matter saying that where 
it could be shown that an Authority decision was 'firmly 
and lawfully based' he had a duty to comply. The Authority 
asked the Clerk to find out what further action could be 
taken in relation to the plastic bullets that the Chief 
Constable had acquired and also whether disciplinary 
action could be taken against the Chief Constable about 
the remarks he made at the Police Federation meeting. The 
matter of the plastic bullets was finally resolved when 
representatives of Greater Manchester and the three other 
Authorities reiusing to sanction the acquisition of such 
weaponry were told by the Home Secretary at a meeting on 5 
• ,1, 
December '1985 that if they persisted with their ~pposition 
their Chief Constables would be able to acquire them from 
a central Home Office store. 
On 20- March 1986 the Chair 'of the Police Authority 
reported on the last five years of the Police Authority's 
eXistence. Her statement was a damning indictment o~ the 
. . . '. 
1964 Police Act and the supposed tripartit~~system of 
governance (see also McCabe and Wallington. 19881 Simey, 
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1988). She identified a series of issues which illustrated 
the impossibility oi trying to call the Chiei Constable to 
account. First, there issue of levels of establishment 
We cannot believe that a matter oi this importance 
should simply be presented to the Police Authority as a 
fait accompli, and we iail to see how the public can 
have confidence in a process of reallocation of 
resources irom which elected members are excluded. We 
wish to see an end to the system where a Chief 
Constable is able to reduce an area's establishment 
without recourse to public consultation and debate 
(Cox, 1986). 
Second, there was the issue of 
objectives and priorities. This 
consultation or reference to the 
Authority 
the setting oi iorce 
again was done without 
wishes oi the Police 
'Policing by consent' needs to be transferred from a 
cliche into a positive concept of community involvement 
in the setting and assessment of priorities, the 
devising and monitoring of policies, and the judgement 
as to the acceptability of strategies. That is a 
creative and generative process which we acknowledge is 
not a simple one. It must start however with a 
willingness to work with the elected representatives of 
the people (ibid). '. 
Third, there was the issue of the complaints procedure. 
She said that the setting up of a specific sub-committee 
to scrutinise the complaints structures and proceedings 
had 'deepened rather than ameliorated' the Authorities 
concern about the system. And she also made clear that the 
Chiei Constable's attempts to obstruct them in this 
scrutiny was not acceptable 
We do not believe public confidence will be enhanced by 
a system which responds to criticism by shutting down 
the system to scrutiny by the Police Authority Cibid).' 
The fourth issue she identified was the lack of Authority 
invol vement in the selection of senior oificers for the 
force. As a consequence of the service selecting its own 
candidates and the Home Office's power of approval the 
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Police Authority found itself with little choice in such 
matters. The fifth issue was the unaccountable development 
of public order policing policies 
We are angry that the Chief Constable chose to buy 
plastic bullets without any consultation, that he would 
not accept our decision to dispose of them, and that 
the Home Secretary subsequently used a legal strategem 
to frustrate the wishes of the Police Authority - the 
only representatives of the people in policing matters 
in Greater Manchester (ibid). 
The Chair concluded by saying that a frequent criticism of 
the Police Authorities was that they did not use the 
powers given to them under the 19b4 Act and that was the 
reason why Chief Constables had been able to exert their 
autonomy. However, the Greater Manchester Police Authority 
had attempted to exercise their powers to the full but 
found the act to be vague, unworkable and the source of 
conflict rather than enlightenment. It is this 
fundamental legislative flaw at the heart of the police 
system which requires urgent attention if we are to 
maintain a consensual rather than a coercive system of 
policing Cibid). 
b. The New Police Authority. 
On 1 April 198b the Joint Board took over responsibilities 
of the Police Authority. If the Chief Constable thought 
that the abolition of the old Authority Would bring about 
the end of the conflict he was mistaken. The degree of 
turmoil and struggle for control.of the new Authority is 
indicated by the fact that in the first year there were 
~our -Chairpersons. This struggle between the Left and 
Right of the Labour Party for control of the new Authority 
took place in the context of a conti~~ing struggle with 
the Chief Constable. 
These struggles were fuelled by the fact that 
the Stalker affair broke catapulting, by 
accountability debate in Manchester onto 




headlines once more. As far as this thesis is concerned 
the importance of the Stalker Affair lies in the 
implications for the accountability debate. According to 
the official version of ' events, on 19 May 1986 Anderton 
lodged a formal complaint that John Stalker, the Deputy 
Chief Constable of GMP, had committed the disciplinary 
offence of associating with known criminals in a manner 
likely to bring discredit to the force. Given that the 
appointment of an investigating officer could only be made 
by the Police Authority considerable planning went into 
making sure that the matter did not reach a full meeting 
of the Authority for open discussion. As a consequence of 
discussions between the Chief Constable, the right wing 
Labour Chair and the Clerk, the Police Authority was 
informed on 30 May 1986 that the Chair had agreed to the 
suspension of John Stalker. 





the determination of certain 
Constable had to be made 
accountable for his decisions. The eventual result of the 
Stalker Affair was the rejection by the Labour group, the 
magistrates and the Conservatives of the official inquiry 
into the affair when it was submitted for the Authority's 
deliberations. Although the Chief Constable's decision was 
questioned during the course of the meeting he refused to 
give details about the events that had taken place prior 
to the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings 
against his Deputy. Thus the Police Authority still failed 
to break the Chief Constable's monopoly on information 
(see Taylor, 19871 Stalker. 1988) 
The aftermath of Stalker Affair meant that the Police 
Authority remained in the news. There was a considerable 
struggle within the Authority as 'the focus moved onto the 
Chief Constable's role in the affair. There were demands 
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to make the Chief Constable accountable over his 
association with known criminals, misuse of his official 
police car and his handling of the initial allegations 
against John Stalker. The latter point related to the well 
publicized claim that there had been a high level 
conspiracy to discredit the Stalker inquiries in the North 
of Ireland (see Doherty, 1986) However, the appointment 
of a new Chair and the consolidation of the position of 
the Right of the Labour Party meant that all attempts to 
get to the bottom of the Stalker Affair or to discipline 
the Chief Constable failed. This was publicly justified in 
terms of the majority of the Labour members wanting to 
build bridges with the Chief Constable. 
In December 1986 two controversial issues emerged to rock 
the seeming calm. First, John Stalker announced that he 
had decided to retire because he claimed that he had been 
frozen out by the Chief Constable since returning to duty, 
and second, on 11 December, the Chief Constable made his 
infamous statement on Aids. In relation to the latter the 
Manchester representatives on the Police Authority called 
for Anderton's resignation whilst 
since the old Authority had been 
the Chair stated that 
abolished every effort 
that had previously had been made to curb 
existed 
the conflict 
Yet in a matter of minutes, Mr. Anderton seems to have 
demolished all the bridges which have so painstakingly 
been built between the police and the authority during 
the past few months (MEN. 16.12.86). 
Another intense argument followed between the Labour group 
and the· magistrates and opposition during the full 
.~.~Authority_meeting of 19 December. A four point motion.was 
passed stating that the Chief Constable should retract his 
speech, that the Authority 
homophobic views of the 
instigated to discipline the 
disassociated itself from the 
Chief Constable, that moves be 
Chief Constable and that the 
272 
Authority backed the Aids awareness campaign (see The 
Times, 20.12.86). 
The Chief Constable stated that he would not be silenced 
and on the 18 January 1987 returned to the issue in a 
series of interviews on radio, television and in the 
press. In response to the renewed demands for the 
Manchester representatives for his resignation Anderton 
replied, 'am I to be persecuted for my Christian beliefs? 
Is that it? Is that what people want - if that is the case 
then God help this country' (ITN, 19.1.87). 
The Labour group of 
the Home Office for 
the Authority subsequently met with 
its reassurance that if the Chief 
~ 
Constable did not refrain from such statements he would be 
forced to resign. As the result of meetings of the Home 
Office, the Chief Constable and representatives of the 
Police Authority a compromise, known as the Tripartite 
Agreement, was reached on 27 January 1987, whereby the 
Chief Constable and the Chair of the Authority would meet 
regularly to discuss matter of common interest. However 
the Chief Constable made it clear that the agreement did 
not mean that he had been muzzled 
I think the Chairman would agree that I have not been 
gagged and that I am free to speak at my discretion. I 
shall consider in the future when I wish to speak upon 
any issue germane to the policing of Greater Manchester 
whether or not it would be in everyone's best interest 
and prudent to discuss my intentions with other persons 
(The Times. 28.1.87). 
Further conflict- was muted as a result of, the Chief 
Constable becoming the President of ACPO for the year and 
.- ',,-.'"::; ;-'.-, the -Right.:~~.bf -the Labour Party consolidated its- control"of 
the Authority. In September 1987 in his last major speech 
as ACPO President ~nderton called for the castration of 
rapists. The Police Authority defended the Chief 
Constable's right to make the statement whilst complaining 
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of media inaccuracy. However, in December the Chief 
Constable gave interviews supporting the flogging of 
criminals until they begged for mercy, arguing for the 
criminalization of homosexual practices and stating that 
he would not be gagged. As far as many Labour members were 
concerned this was Anderton's last chance and there were 
renewed demands for his resignation. In January a special 
disciplinary committee was set up by the Authority to look 
at the Chief Constable's speeches and there was a number 
of courses of action suggested. First, under s5 of the 
1964 Police Act he could be called upon to retire in the 
interests of the efficiency of the force. Second, 
proceedings could be initiated under the 1985 regulations, 
governing the discipline of senior officers. And finally 
the Authority could seek a High Court declaration and 
injunction relating to his breaking of the January 1988 
tripartite agreement. However, at the February meeting, 
after seeking legal advice, members decided to take no 
further action. Instead both the Authority and Chief 
Constable accepted the terms of a letter from the Home 
Office recording the Chief Constable's assurance that he 
continued to accept the Tripartite Agreement. It stated 
that 
There is a responsibility, in the interests' of the 
police service and of the force in question, for a 
chief constable not to jeopardize, knowingly and 
necessarily, the reputation and efficient functioning 
of a force by purposely making public. statements making 
public statements or comments calculated or reasonably 
likely to provoke or produce controversy <police 
Review, 26.2.88). 
Nonetheless, the letter .. also stated that the Chief 
~~~l~~~~.ConstabLe must be free to make publlc.statements·about his 
professional duties and responsibilities and that the 
prior consent of the Police Authority was not required on 
such matters. Thus despite the fact that he had breached 
' .. 
the prior agreements the autonomy of the Chief Constable 
wasreaffirmed by the Home Office. A sense of new realism 
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and consensus characterized the proceedings of the Police 
Authority as the Left members were marginalized. This new 
realism argued that the conflict of the previous year was 
the result of ·a carry over of attitudes from the old 
Police Authority· (First annual report l 4) • The degree of 
consensus between the Police Authority and the Chief 
Constable was indicated by the Chair of the Authority who 
noted that the only visit to the Home Office was in order 
to demand more officers for the fight against crime. 
Thus, the Chief Constable survived all attempts to make 
him accountable for his statements and actions. Through 
the constant assertion of his autonomy and the support of 
the Home Office the campaign to bring about the democratic 
accountability of the Chief Constable was finally 
neutralized. What has to be also analyzed is what effect 
the changes had upon the the community liaison initiative 
during this period of conflict • 
. .' .' 
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Section I: Model I 
a. From the Community LiaisoD Officer to The Community 
Relations Unit 
i. Response to the Community Liaison Initiative 
As it became apparent that the Police Authorities were 
going to be abolished the issue o~ the use~ulness and 
~unction o~ the community liaison initiative was once more 
placed on the political agenda. In March 1985 the position 
of Manchester City Council was discussed publicly ~or the 
~irst time during the full Police Authority meeting when 
opposition councillors demanded to know why a CLP had not 
been set up in Manchester, given that this was where they 
had been intended for and 
councillors argued that 
areas where they were 
given the crime problems. Labour 
panels would not be set up in 
not wanted, admitting that no 
support had been expressed ~or the idea. It was also 
pOinted out that there was a problem because sub-
divisional boundaries in Manchester did not correspond to 
communities. Therefore, it was more difficult to set up 
CLPs. This public questioning of the initiative by the 
opposition became more pronounced. 
Considerable reservations were expressed about the 
proposals for a unit to support the panels. In April 198~ 
the Conservative opposition 'argued against the setting up 
of the proposed Community Relations Unit eCRU) because of 
the question of finance and the imminent abolition of the 
Police Authority. The opposition also expressed concern 
about where the proposed unit would be located, and who 
-would-it=, would~b~ accountable to. It was pointed out--that 
although the supposed role of the unit was to work with 
the police to improve the ·relationship between the 
community and the police· in terms of responsibility it 
Was to be ·divorced from the Chief Const~ble' 'and instead 
.' ". ~ ~ 
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report to the Police Authority. Additionally the 
opposition was alarmed, as ·it had been over the 
appointment of the CLO, about what the real role of the 
CRU and the CLPs might be. The fear was expressed that the 
panels might not just hinder but actively oppose the 
police in the carrying out of their duties. 
The Conservatives and magistrates demanded that the 
Authority·s proposal be sent to the Home Office. It became 
apparent that the Chief Constable was also decidedly 
unhappy with the proposal. He argued the original Home 
Office idea was that any consultative system should be 
inexpensive and non-bureaucratic. He argued that what was 
being suggested was a massive costly bureaucratic 
expansion of community liaison which would result in an 
unacceptably heavy burden being placed upon his officers. 
Consequently, he asked for a deferment on any decision on 
grounds of cost and until a managerial study had been 
carried out to determine whether such a unit was 
justified. He also asked that the Inspectorate and the 
Home Office be consulted before any final decision was 
made. 
The ruling Labour group rejected such claims, reiterating 
its commitment to the strengthening of the CLPs. 
Consequently, on the 23rd April 1985 it was agreed to go 
ahead and advertise the posts. The.post of CLO was to be 
replaced by a community relations coordinator and three 
community relations workers • 
. -.In ..... June ... ,."..1985, ..... curing. an . argument ·~-about .. the .Chief 
Constable·s refusal to discuss force reorganization plans 
with the Authority, further discussion about the CL Ps took 
place. The Labour members argued.that if changes affecting 
local policing arrangements were being considered, proper 
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consultation with the CLPs and the Police Authority should 
take place. However, the opposition and magistrates 
disputed such a position 
Supposing the Community Liaison panels say ewe do not 
agree with the Chief Constable - we want the most for 
our patch~. Where does this leave the chief constable? 
(Fieldnotes). 
It was emphasized that if such a scenario developed the 
CLPs would be interfering with the operational autonomy of 
the Chief Constable. Labour members argued that if 
confidence in the police was to be restored it would have 
to be recognized that the community had the right to be 
involved in formulating decisions about how they were 
policed. As far as the magistrates were concerned this was 
totally unacceptable and unrealistic 
the community liaison panels should not have any say in 
the deployment of police officers. To give them the 
idea they have a such a right is frustrating because 
they do not (ibid). 
Although the Chief Constable did not participate in this 
debate, in the same month he questioned the usefulness of 
CL Ps in bringing about community involvement. He also 
argued that they were 'wide open to political abuse' 
I became very concerned when I learned that certain 
persons meeting privately in my.area had spoken of the 
panels as providing a structure to use 'political 
clout', and as 'power bases in the community' against 
the kinds of pro- police policies a Tory controlled 
Joint Board would produce (Police Review, 14.6.85) 
.... _ .. ' " .. ' -. ·i'· J)esp ~ te th i s opposi t i on the .... Labour '.~ group pushed through 
the CRU as quickly as possible because, despite 
pronouncements to the contrary, they were well aware that 
abolition was imminent and that there _ was the very real 
possibility the Chief Constable would attempt to obstruct 
the proposal until it became too late to set up the unit. 
In addition there was the feeling that the Authority was 
responding to the fact that Manchester City Council had a 
279 
the Authority was responding to the fact that Manchester 
City Council had a full time PMU and that this was how it 
was able to defend its position on proposed liaison 
arrangements. 





to ask questions about 
Chief Constable attacked 
situation in 
the Police 
Authority's refusal to set up CLPs in Manchester 
I find it strange that in areas where panels would 
conceivably perform a helpful function none, at 
present, exist, whereas Police Authorities are being 
pressed to formulate panels where nobody at all sees a 
need (Police ReView, 14.6.85). 
He said that 'for reasons that remain obscure' there were 
no 11aison panels in Manchester but a PMU. As a 
consequence community self-help in the area of crime 
prevention in the City was solely police activated. He 
finished off by arguing that if the Police Authority was 
serious about setting up the CLPs it should have bypassed 
the City Council and 'if the Home Office had invested 
Chief Constables with that duty then problems of this kind 
would not have arisen'. At the July 1985 meeting there was 
further discussion about the Manchester situation when the 
Chief Constable reported that he was reviewing the 
diviSional boundaries in the City. This gave a final spur 
to the Police Authority to do something about the 
situation. It was resolved at the meeting of the 16th July 
1985 to go ahead with setting up a panel in Wythenshaw and 
a second one in Longsight with a 'phased programme for the 
establishment of the remaining panels in the City of 
Manchester'. 
b. The Community Relations UnitS The Facilitation of 
Community Representation and Participation 
280 
Following on the recommendation of the CLO and the report 
of the County Legal Officer the Community Relations Policy 
Coordinator's appointment was confirmed as from 17 June 
1985. Subsequently three Community Relations Officers were 
appointed. However, the role of the Community Relations 
Unit differed significantly from the CLO. First, the 
purpose of the job was changed from finding means to 
·improve relationships between Police and Community, 
initially in the area of Moss Side' to working ·with 
community liaison panels and other community groups to 
promote the community relations policies of the Police 
Authority and develop structures which increase the 
accountability of the police to local communities'. Thus, 
any reference to Moss Side was deleted. Second, in terms 
of the duties and responsibilities associated with the 
Post,there was a considerable down playing of the concerns 
of black people and the complaints work. Thus, there was 
to be more concentration on facilitating general community 
representation and participation. This meant that there 
was the real possibility that the interests and concerns 
of Moss Side would no longer be on the agenda of the CRU 
because the role of the CLO as ·the community 
representative' effectively related to black concerns. 
Furthermore, the issue of crime prevention was constantly 
to the fore in a way that it was not within the work of 
the CLO. The latter had tried, however unsuccessfully,·to 
include the interests of those for whom the police were 
the problem through his own work whilst the CLPs had 
prioritized concerns about crime. Since the CRU concerned 
_itself ~with ~the work of-the panels concern. about crime 
dominated its work. The three most conSistently important 
issues for the liaison panels were burglary, vandalism and 
public order incidents (see, Community Liaison. No4 1987). 
Consequently, ·the CRUs work addressed these issues and all 
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aspects of crime prevention, including the continued 
promotion of corporatist multi-agency approaches. In this 
context criticisms of the police could only related to 
their ineffectiveness in relation to the control of crime 
and,of course,in this period the dominant police and Home 
Office discourse emphasized the responsibility of all 
sections of the community in the fight against crime. 
There was no formal mention within its work of the 
controversial issues arising out of the conflict between 
the Chief Constable and the Police Authority or the 
policing of Greater Manchester. 
However, whilst the crime focused work of the Community 
Relations Unit was expanded considerably it still had to 
address the problems of community representation and 
participation that had been recognised by the CLO during 
the initial period of community liaison and consultation 
in Manchester. 
i. Moss Side 
The efforts to 'sell' community liaison were once more 
hindered by events relating to the policing of Moss Side. 
The outcome of the Jacki Berkeley Affair confirmed the 
arguments of those opposed to having anything to ·do with 
the Greater Manchester Police. In March 198~she was found 
guilty of all the charges brought against her, including 
that of wasting police time by falsely claiming that she 
had been raped by police officers in Moss Side police 
station. As a result she was given suspended prison 
sentences of various 
'- .. allegations _of .. a cover 
to be set up into the 
lengths. ThiS, once more) brought 
up and demands for. .. a . pub 1 i c ,i nqui ry 
policing of Moss Side (see Race 
Today, May,198~; The Guardian, 15.3.85). 
In 1986 the case of Viraj Mendis took firm root in Moss 
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Side. After his final appeal against deportation for being 
an illegal immigrant was rejected in July 1986 he took 
sanctuary in a local church, with the full support of the 
local clergy, in December 1986. This case developed into a 
powerful campaign in 1987 involving an alliance of local 
groups determined to prevent any attempt by the Home 
Office to forcibly remove Mendis from the church. Any 
issue to do with the policing of immigration was always 
going to have a detrimental effect on police-community 
relations in Moss Side. Once more relations with the 
police were placed under considerable strain as everyone 
concerned was aware that it would be the GMP who would be 
used in any assault on the church. 
Whilst this case was still progressing towards an 
inevitable conclusion Moss Side was rocked by the rape and 
murder of a black woman, Eisa Hannaway, by a black man in 
October 1987. For possibly the first time co-operation was 
forthcoming with the police stating that the response to 
the call for information had been overwhelming. However, 
~ 
the co-operation was short lived with allegations being 
made that the GMP were using the investigation as the 
excuse to conduct raids in Moss Side in a manner not seen 
since 1981 and to question every black male with 
dreadlocks. The resentment and allegations resulted in 
public: meetings and the forming of eS;;j;ioD for Black 
.. 
Justice. The refusal of senior police offic:ers to take any 
of the allegations seriously onc:e more resulted in a 
complete breakdown of relations (see New Society, 13.~.88) 
It was .in_thls_context that the CRU was supposed to .set up . __ . 
CLPs in Moss Side. Eventually, a meeting was held on 5 
July 1988 to ·launc:h the E Division North Community 
liaison Panel·. Onc:e more a formal approach to the meeting 
was utilized. The Chair of the meeting was the Chair of 
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the Police Authority and the membership was to comprise of 
councillors, nominees of the Divisional GMP Commander and 
an initial membership nominated by the Police Authority 
consisting of representatives of the community 
organizations invited to attend. In addition 'anyone with 
residential qualifications who attends three consecutive 
meetings can be a member». At this meeting approximately 
eighty people turned up and during the discussions it was 
reiterated that just because the CLP structure had worked 
elsewhere in Greater Manchester did not mean that it was 
suitable for Moss Side. After heated debate it was agreed 
to delay the setting up of a CLP and instead set up a 
working party to discuss the issue. 
This working party met for the first time on 1 September 
1988 and those present were asked to address the question 
of what would be the 'best sort of arrangements for the 
Police Authority to obtain the views of the people in the 
-E" North Sub Division about policing the area and 
improving police/community relations'. It was stressed 
that whatever arrangements were established would have to 
enjoy the confidence of the community and could not be 
imposed upon the community. With regard to the issue of 
community representation some interesting pOints were 
made. One member felt that 
. . 
the sub division was large and contained within it a 
number of very different communities. Unlike other 
areas they had recognised community leaders. The most 
suitable forum for the area would be one which was 
limited to such community leaders (minutes of meeting). 
This was reiterated 
there should be a number of forums which would report 
to a panel coverin; the whole subdivision. Membership 
of the forums would be open to anyone but initial 
invitation would limited to the recognised community 
leaders in the area (ibid). 
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This was agreed to by those present as well as another 
meeting in December ·to discuss the proposed structure for 
consultation'. Prior to this meeting a great deal of 





groups and local councillors 
In addition members of the 
working party were invited to a prior meeting on 15 
November 1988 in order to discuss the organization of the 
full meeting. They were also asked to identify and talk to 
key individuals in their areas and to construct 'a list of 
people you feel represent your area and who could offer 
advice or would have criticisms about the proposed 
scheme'. 
However, all of this ground work and discussion was 
interrupted by the dramatic end to the Viraj Mendis case. 
In January 1989 approximately 50 police officers made a 
dramatic dawn raid on the church forcibly removing Hendis 
for deportation to Sri Lanka. This caused an uproar both 
locally and nationally. GMP had not only carried out the 
wishes of the Home Office but in doing so had violated the 
sanctity of a church. The anger of local people was 
iuelled by the rumour that it was a local community police 
officer who had led the raid on the church. It was agreed 
after discussions between the community relations worker 
and local representatives, particularly of the local 
churches, to postpone further. meetings concerning 
community liaison until the issue'calmed down. Thus once 
more the policing in Moss Side had undermined the efforts 
to set up CLPs. 
ii. Manchester 
After the setting up of its Community Relations Unit 
representatives from the City Council and the Police 
Authority met on 6 September 1985 to discuss the issue of 
I _ 
',,' • - .~ - \#' 
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CLPs once more. The differences over the panels remained. 
The Police Authority representatives pointed out that not 
only were they committed to liaison panels but that, under 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, there had a legal 
duty to set them up. They reiterated that liaison panels 
could extend the accountability of the police because if 
local support for them was forthcoming and there was 
adequate resources allocated to them the police would have 
to Cignore demands at their peril' 
There is a crying need to do something about policing 
in Manchester. The County group have held back in 
deference to Manchester City Council ••• The County Group 
want to get on with it urgently and if necessary will 
go ahead WITHOUT the partiCipation of the City Council 
(minutes of meeting). 
However, the City Council representatives 
claims once more emphasizing their views of 
views should be prioritized 
rejected such 
what community 
there is a commitment to articulating the concerns of 
sections of the Manchester Community, particularly 
black people. The City Council's view is that its role 
is to assist groups in the Community to make ·informed' 
demands, hence a team of research and development staff 
have been established (ibid). 
It was made clear that 
there is little convincing evidence to persuade the 
Manchester City Council Police Monitoring Committee to 
alter its scepticism about liaison panels ••• The City 
Council feels therefore that its energies should be 
channeled into articulating the needs of its· many 
communities and to campaigning for alternatives to the 
present system (ibid). 
A meeting in November discussed the liaison panels as well 
"":'-as the implications of the imminentde~ise of the Police 
Authority. It was agreed to set up a working party in 
order to attempt to resolve their differences and to 
provide a forum for communication between the 'two groups. 
The County group was particularly concerned about the non-
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co-operation stance of Manchester City Council on the 
proposed joint board. Concern was also expressed about the 
City Council's Labour group wanting no opposition 
representation on the new joint board, something which was 
theoretically possible under section 39 of the Local 
Government Act. Police Authority representatives made it 
clear that if the CRU was to survive the change over 
... 
Manchester would have to change its stance on opposition 
representation 
If Manchester City can agree to allow opposition 
representation ••• then the chance of Liberal support for 
joint servicing is assured. The Labour group needs to 
consider working with sympathetic opposition members on 
certain issues(lbi.1). 
As well as agreeing to consider thiS, it 
that the working party should draw up 
achievements of the Police Authority and 
was also agreed 
a report on the 
what elements 
needed to be preserved 
Constable. However, on 
agreement was reached 
to keep the pressure on the Chief 
the issue of CLPs no fUrther 
The Police Authority continued with its exertions to set 
up CLPs in the city. On 10 March 1986 at a public meeting 
of local voluntary and statutory agencies it was agreed to 
establish two panels in Wythenshawe to serve a population 
of 100,000. At the meeting the Chair of the Police 
Authority said that she hoped that the exercise would be 
repeated 'in the rest of Manchester. However, this exercise 
seems, with hindSight, to have been a publicity stunt to 
show that the Authority was not prepared to allow 
Manchest~~ to continue as 
'wa~F not, until late 1988 
a 'no-go area' any longer. It 
and early '1989 that the next 
attempts to introduce CLPs were made. It is no co-
incidence ,that this'process took place only after the PMC 
, , , 
and PMU had ·been abolished and Manchester City Council was 
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promoting community safety instead of the accountability 
of the GMP. 
else in Greater Manchester the Unlike everywhere 
structures that were introduced in Manchester were very 
~lexible. They were not based on the sub-divisional 
boundaries of the City and covered a wide variety of 
neighbourhoods. By any definition of community the areas 
included in each panel had very different demographic 
profiles. Even within this eclectic structuring of 
boundaries for CLPs there was still a problem with regard 
to "E" Division North, covering Moss Side. It was decided 
not to use the panel format but to use open 'forums' as a 
. 
way of facilitating 
participation. The aim 
community representation and 
was to have three forums for 
Rusholme, Fallowfield and Moss Side respectively. Thus to 
deal with the problems in Manchester very flexible 
arrangements, reminiscent of the initial efforts of the 
community liaison officer, were utilized. Indeed, it is 
questionable, whether under the Home Office guidelines, 
some of the forums, could be defined as consultative 
committees. 
c. Attempts to Resolve problems of Community 
Representation and Participation 
The highly structured and formalized CLPs already in 
existence throughout the rest .of Greater Manchester 
continued to face general issues of representation and 
partiCipation. The response to the general lack of 
community participation was based upon the principle that 
~. if the ..... community would not come to the .panelsthen the 
panels would have to go to the community. Thus 
representatives from the panels went to meet tenants' 
groups, held. public meetings on council estates, set up 
surgeries. The surgery was suggested for those who might 
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feel uncomfortable in a police station. In addition to the 
general community work of the 
initiated by the CRU to bring 
participation of three key 
young people and women. 
i. Ethnic Minorities 
panels specific efforts were 
about the representation and 
groups, ethnic minorities, 
Various liaison panel working parties were set up by the 
panels to address issue of the non-participation of young 
people and ethnic minorities. (Community Liaison. No 
3:1987). However, there were serious problems in trying to 
bring about ethnic minority representation in other parts 
of Greater Manchester just as there were in Moss Side. The 
basic problem concerned the incapability of the CLPs to 
represent the interests of black people. Thus, the Chair 
of the Joint Board Community Relations Committee, himself 
black, explained that CLPs were important because 
\ 
we have to start rebuilding the shattered trust and 
confidence the public had in our police force. The 
miners strike, racial riots in London and Liverpool did 
not help matters (Community Liaison. No3: 1987). 
The most obvious and serious omission was that of the 
disturbances in Moss Side. How could black people be 
expected to participate in a structure that did not even 
\ 
acknowledge the problematical history of the relationship 
between the black neighbourhoods and the police in 
Manchester? Another example of the.di~ficulties in making 
the panels aware of the problem of black non-participation 
was provided by the Bury North CLP. The Press Officer for 
that panel stated that it had a good relationship with its 
. . 
...... ,.: ... ~-.-.c~police.off~cers, 'reinforcing the .. general·feeling within 
the sub-division of trust in and support for the police·. 
However, this officer admitted that 
there are sections· of the 
black community who would 
community, especially the 
not totally share this view 
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(Community Liaison. No 8:1988). 
Hence, there was a considerable difference between the 
views represented by and on the panel and those of black 
people which would made their participation and 
representation difficult. Another disturbing issue was 
acknowledged when it was noted that two of the panels had 
agreed to adopt anti-discrimination statements 'as a first 
step to increasing the awareness of issues important to 
black and Asian members so that racist comments and 
attitudes can be examined and changes made' (Community 
Liaison, N03). 
In comparison with the work of the CLO in representing 
black interests, there was considerably less emphasis on 
such work within the CRU. The only issue to be to be taken 
up was racial harassment. 
Council for Community 
However, it was the Manchester 
Relations (MCCR) and the GMP who 
formulated a response not the Police Authority. There was 
no mention of police racism or monitoring of police 
training in the MCCR report and at Forum 88 it was the GMP 
who gave the presentation on racial harassment. When 
reference was made to racism within the GMP the police 
officer stated that there were moves to recruit more 
members of ethnic minorities, to educate officers in 
social skills and to enable them to respect other 
cultures. Thus the same answers were being given and 
accepted by those present that the CLO had been critical 
of three years previously. When someone brought up the 
issue of the policing of Moss Side after the murder of 
Eisa Hannaway the police responded that the claims about 
over-policing.~had~e~n· exaggerated •. Given this type of 
comment it is not surprising that the problems in 
faCilitating black representation and participation in the 
panels remained unresolved. 
-:.-., 
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ii. Young People 
The importance of securing the representation and 
participation of young people was re-emphasized during the 
1985 Panel forum. The CRU began to address the continuing 
problems in ensuring representation and participation of 
young people. It was realized that there was a distinction 
between ensuring representation and the 'varying degrees 
of commitment the young people will have to participation· 
and re-emphasized that 
there are many and 
people in the debate 
panels themselves. It 
input they want from 
No 2:1986). 
varied ways of involving young 
with regard to policing - if not 
is up to the panels to see what 
young people (Community Liaison. 
It was argued that if the CLPs were interested solely in 
youth representation this could be achieved by focussing 
upon panel proceedings. However, it was emphasized that if 
active participation was the aim of the panels it would be 
necessary to take a more active role in meeting young 
people in the community. 
Consequently, some CLPs decided to approach local youth 
workers in order to see if they could persuade young 
people to participate in the panels. Salford South, for 
eXample, set up a working party on this issue 'to liaise 
with the City of Salford to see what could be done to 
support police work with young people' (Community Liaison, 
No 211986). The panel subsequently carried out a survey of 
young people In two schools on attitudes to the police and 
youth provision In the area. However, they subsequently 
. , 
reported that they found the whole exercise frustrating 
because. of the negative reaction of the young people. 
Certain panels evolved a strategy based upon the idea that 
if young people would not ~ttend CLP ~eetings, -then the 
panels should go out to the young people. Consequently, 
panel representatives arranged meetings at local youth 
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clubs, neighbourhood centres and colleges to find out 
young people~s views on policing. The Swinton and Walkden 
panel, for example, went to a local youth centre to meet 
young people. As a consequence a youth committee was 
formed which was supposed to represent the young people 
affiliated to the centre and a representative was chosen 
from this committee to attend the meetings of the CLP 
It is to be hoped that this representative is accorded 
the same respect as other members of the panel - and 
that they in turn, ensure that they do speak on behalf 
of the young people they represent (Community Liaison, 
No 211986). 
During 1986/1987 eight of the panels set up 
working parties to address the issues arising from the 
lack of youth participation (along with ethnic minority 
participation), with the head of the Community Relations 
sub-committee urging the 'need to involve ever more people 
in 'the debate~ (Community Liaison. N03:1986). 
Thus the panels continued with their attempts to reach the 
young people in their areas, through questionnaires and 
the youth service with certain of them attempting to set 
up separate forums for young people. What is notable about 
these attempts is how little progress was made no matter 
whether the meetings were highly formalized or informal. 
Formal meetings were not attended whilst report backs from 
informal ones noted that 'the meeting was too large and 
rowdy to be productive. By the end of the meeting little 
had been achieved· (Community Liaison, No 8:1988). What 
some of the CLPs had to confront, in their meetings with 
., . 
young people, was the issue of police representation. When 
-the Ashton panel had a meeting in a' Ideal college there 
were no police representatives present 
It may well be that it was a good thingl several young 
people needed to be assured that there were no police 
. . ~. 
in the hall 
that they may 
thought that 
who said what 
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before entering, and members speculated 
not have been so forthcoming if they 
policemen were there and perhaps noting 
(Community Liaison, No2: 1986). 
The most systematic attempts to deal with the problem of 
youth participation were made by the Trafford and Salford 
North CLPs. In January 1988 thirty five young people and 
eleven youth workers went to a rural retreat 'to learn 
about decision making and participation' (see, Community 
Liaison, N08: 1988). The weekend consisted of young people 
dealing with a series of issues relating to de~ision 
making, relations with statutory agencies and the 
prioritization of community resources. The main issues 
under discussion related to community problems surrounding 
the establishment of a youth centre, ranging from dealing 
with a letter from the local police about the behaviour of 
youth club members to facilitating wider community 
participation in the youth centre. There was also 
discussion, with the councillors present, of the role of 
councillors in the local community. 
Sal ford North CLP also set up a similar weekend for young 
people from two local youth clubs. This was the most 
developed approach and premised upon the notion that 'it 
is essential that the views of young people are heard with 
regard to their community and its policing' (Community 
Liaison, ·No 1111989). In order for young people to 
partiCipate actively in such discussions particular skills 
were needed. These particular skills were in the areas of 
the law and the duties of the police, rights and 
responsibilities of citizens, the ways in which 
,. ~_~:communities~operatel decision· making . processes and 
communicative processes • 
. There were four.stages to this process of creating 'active 
participation'. First, meetings were organized at the two 
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youth centres which focused on the rights and 
responsibilities of young people in relation to the law 





them· understanding reasonable 
(Community Liaison No 
issued invitations to 
11:1989). Second, youth workers 
the 17 young people (16-19 year 
olds; 80% males) who were present at the first meeting to 
attend the weekend. The weekend focussed on issues such as 
how a community develops; the diversity of needs within 
it; the causes and consequences of crime; the role of the 
Council and local councillors in their lives. 
This was supposed to develop new skills and confidence 'to 
participate generally in their community and, in 
particular in the Salford North Police CLP' (Community 
Liaison, No 11:1989:9). The third stage was to facilitate 
a further meeting with police officers present where, with 
their new knowledge, skills and confidence, the young 
people would specifically discuss policing, crime and 
crime prevention. The fourth stage would be the young 
people finding a representative from amongst themselves to 
attend regularly meetings of the liaison panel. Thus 
despite constructing 
participation the 
an elaborate structure to encourage 
overall objective was to enable the 
choosing of a respectable youth representative. 
lil. Women 
Within the work of the CRU the concerns of women achieved 
high prioritization. The safety of women was a major area 
of work for the CRU. Through the prioritization of crime 
prevention nationally, women's fears and concerns were 
addressed in a manner which attempted to incorporate all 
women's interests. Thus attention was paid to domestic 
violence against womenJ child sexual abusel women and the 
criminal justice system and kerb crawling. The new Police 
.. ". / 
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Authority also demanded greater protection for women and a 
complete reorientation of the criminal justice system to 
reflect such needs and concerns 
In a very changing world women are taking full part in 
activities. At the same time the world is decreasing 
ior them because of the fear on the street, in public 
transport, even taxis (Community Liaison. No 10). 
CLP were encouraged to promote 'Women Alone' exhibitions 
to promote awareness of personal safety among women, show 
women how best to protect themselves and reduce the risk 
of attack and as reassuring the vulnerable by promoting a 
multi-agency policing approach. The exhibitions consisted 
of self-defence displays and self protection tips as well 
as displays of crime prevention equipment. The 1988 annual 
CLPs' Forum had a specific workshop on 'Women - their 
safety and concern' which focussed on crime prevention, 
victim support services and criminal injuries 
compensation. Although there were supposed to be 
representatives present from all womens' organizations and 
groups, Rape Crisis and Womens Aid were not present. 
Instead the Women's National Commission dominated the 
session which resulted in a very conservative analysis of 
women's concerns and needs which emphasized the importance 
of the famil y. 
Within the work of the CRU in this area considerable 
publicity was given to the setting.up;of St Mary's Sexual 
Assault Referral Centre. In December 1986 GMP decided to 
set up a sexual referral centre for women who had been 
raped or sexually assaulted because 
The 'police were concerned that the aftermath of the 
attack was left to them to resolve and that the 'back 
up' services from other agencies were inadequate 
(Interim report on Centre 198612). 
As a consequence the GMP proposed their coordination of a 
mul tt":.::.-" ""agency approach-invol vi ng~ "pol i cesurgeons, GPs, 
psychiatrists, gynecologists and venerologists because 
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public opinion, both as represented by voluntary 
organizations and by individuals was often highly 
critical of existing arrangements (ditto:2). 
Thus, radical women's groups working in this area, most 
obviously Rape Crisis, were in danger of effectively being 
defined out whilst respectable groupings were being 
mobilized to justify police intervention. The Centre was 
thus located within a local hospital with the consent of 
the Area Health Authority, 
Authority and the Department 
gave high profile publicity 
financed by the Police 
of the Environment. The CRU 
to the Centre in its 
publication as proof that it was taking the needs of women 
seriously. However, Rape Crisis expressed severe 
reservations about the whole orientation of the Centre as 
well as the underlying philosophy behind it. Thus, the 
prioritization of women's concerns took place within a 
context and took a form which accepted and reinforced 
dominant ideologies concerning the causes of violence 
against women. Alternative interpretations were 
marginalized and excluded. 
Discussion 
The Police Authority, despite considerable opposition, set 
up a professional CRU in an attempt to strengthen the work 
of the CLPs. There were considerable differences between 
the work of the CLO and the CRU. First, the CRU discarded 
the community representative work of the CLO and 
eventually closed the community liaison office in Moss 
Side. Thus, the, concerns of direct relevance to black 
- people.were not. part .of.- the-CRU's terms of reference. 
Second, reflecting the national developments documented in 
Part Ill, there was the prioritization of crime prevention 
within the work of the CRU. By contrast the work of the 
CLO had been geared towards addressing the issue of police 
accountability. There was little mention of the issue of 
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police accountability in the work of the CRU. Hence any 
worries that the Chief Constable. the magistrates and 
Conservative councillors had about the CRU were allayed. 
With regard to the problems oi community representation 
and participation within the CLPs, the CRU did address the 
issue of active participation. This again iitted in with 
its strategies to mobilize the community to prevent crime. 
Once the PMC and PMU were disestablished the CRU attempted 
to move in on the ·no-go' areas of Manchester. As has 
been documented strenuous efforts were made to set up a 
CLP in Moss Side. Every effort was made to incorporate 
community representatives into some form of liaison 
structure. To this end the CRU and the new Police 
Authority promised not attempt to impose a CLP and made it 
clear that if a panel was agreed to, it did not have to 
operate like those elsewhere in Greater Manchester. 
However, every time that such efforts seemed to be making 
some progress, a controversial incident involving the 
police, eg, the trial of Jackie Berkeley, the murder 
investigation concerning Eisa Hannaway, the deportation of 
Viraj Mendis, resulted in respectable community 
representatives having to withdraw from all negotiations. 
There could be no clearer indication that police-community 
liaison was incapable of representing the interests of the 
people of Moss Side. FleKible community liaison 
arrangements were used elsewhere 1n Manchester. An open 
~orum structure, not premised upon community 
representatives, was used in three areas 1n an attempt to 
establish the idea of police-community liaison. Thus, six 
y': ....... ,,~ !,years after the .first e~forts had been ·made-to set up CLPs' 
in Manchester there were still no structures comparable to 
those set up elsewhere In Greater Manchester. 
The CRU persevered with its representative model elsewhere 
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in Greater Manchester. The CRU encouraged the CLPs to take 
a more active approach to the problems o~ the under/non-
representation of certain sections of the community. 
However, there remained fundamental problems with this 
representative model. Despite the innovative methods used 
to try and mobilize young people to become involved in the 
CLPs, the objective remained finding youth representatives 
who would liaise with the police and who would be prepared 
to discuss the problems that young people caused the 
community. Those who were suspicious o~ the police or in 
con~lict with the police did not participate in such 
exercises. Thus, the exercises resulted in the 
partiCipation of those respectable young people for whom 
the police were not a problem. The obvious question is how 
representative were these youth representatives? 
There were similar problems with the CRU's e~~orts to 
4acilitate female representation and participation. In 
line with national developments (see pp 258-259), the CRU 
made the sa~ety interests of women a priority. However, as 
with the first efforts to address women's concerns (see pp 
197-199), the CRU did not address the power imbalances and 
ideological diVisions of interest that existed between 
~omen. As a consequence, giving equal representation 
resulted in the mobilization of respectable women's groups 
~ho articulated dominant ideas concerning the causes of 
domestic violence, rape, child abuse etc. This led to the 
non-participation of those groups who rejected such idea. 
Thus, during Forum 1989, it was a conservative women's 
organization that led the session on women's safety. Such 
. ~".". - •• h.· •• '-''0:,.... a process· also occurred when the Police Authority decided· 
to provide financial support for a professional, GMP 
controlled, rape examination centre. This resulted in Rape 
CriSis, and 'a discourse that· was critical of the 
ideologies which informed police attitudes towards rape, 
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being ideologically and financially defined out. 
Thus, 
model 
the Police Authority·s 
continued to facilitate 
community representative 
the interests of those 
sections of the community not in conflict with the police. 
A CLP was not forthcoming in Moss Side because it could 
not represent the interests of black people. In addition 
the CRU did nor represent black interests in the way that 
the CLO had attempted to. Hence, the interests of the 
section of the community that the community liaison 
initiative was set up to represent were not represented. 
Elsewhere the model succeeded in facilitating the 
interests of those sections of the community whose concern 
was crime prevention and fear of crime and who accepted 
the dominant ideas concerning the cause of crime and the 
role of the police and the community. This process of 
inclusion/exclusion and prioritization/marginalization 
seems to be the almost inevitable consequence of setting 
up representative structures which attempt to mobilize the 
whole community within tightly defined parameters. The 
problem with allowing all sections of the community rights 
of representation is that it can lead to the systematic 
non-representation and participation of other powerless 
and marginal sections. And of course the whole idea behind 
community liaison in Greater Manchester, originally, was 
to facilitate the representation and participation of the 
powerless and the marginal sections of the community who 
were in conflict with the police. 
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Section 11: Model 11 
From the Police Monitoring Unit Io the Community Safety 
With regard to the abolition of 
public position of the PMC was 
the Police Authority the 
that it would refuse to 
have anything to do with the proposed joint board because 
it represented the attempt by the Conservative government 
to nullify its democratically mandated political 
opponents. However, in private, careful thought was given 
to the implications of the new structures of 
representation as participation could enhance the work of 
the PMC. There were a series of possibilities that could 
be of benefit to the work of the PMC. First, one of the 
major difficulties that the PMC had encountered since 
being set up was that since it was non-statutory it had no 
rights of access to information and, under the old system 
of representation, no access to the Police Authority. As a 
consequence the PMC was never in a position to confront 
the Chief Constable. However, under the new system the PMC 
had the possibility of gaining access to information and 
the Chief Constable. Second, the Committee could have a 
significant influence within the joint board because 
Manchester had the most representatives and a coherent 
policy on ,policing, backed up by a fully operational 
research and development unit. Third, it could keep CLPs 
out of Manchester or indeed neutralize them altogether. 
Fourth, there was the possibility, under clause 40 of the 
Local Government Act, of challenging the structural form 
of the GMP. Thus, the government'~changes to the form of 
political representation could, in theory, strengthen the 
PMC's campaign for police accountability. 
In the run up t~ the abolition of the Police Authority and 
immediately after the Joint Board took over, the PMC began 
to move centre stage in the struggle for police 
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accountability in Manchester. The aftermath of the Battle 
of Brittan, in the form of the Justice for Steven Shaw 
Campaign and the report of the Platts-Mills inquiry, and 
the PMC's controversial statements on the policing of 
Manchester ensured that the Committee retained a high 
public profile. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, in 
January 1986 a survey into residents perceptions of 
council poliCies, 601. of those interviewed supported the 
police monitoring initiative. 
However, during the first half of 1986 the controversy 
surrounding the PMC, both locally and nationally, reached 
new heights. In February 1986 the first issue of 
Policewatch was published and delivered to every household 
in Manchester. It was immediately denounced by the 
political opposition in Manchester, by Conservative MPs in 
the House of Commons and by the Home Secretary. The 
magazine was condemned as a 'scurrilous and divisive 
document', as a 'blatant misuse of ratepayer's money for 
subversive campaigning' and as an example of the 'vicious 
anti-police propaganda spewed out by various hard left 
controlled authorities' (see Manchester Evening News, 
25.2.86; 1.3.86). Because of the PMC Manchester City 
Council was being nationally identified as being part of 
the extremist 'loony left'. The Labour leadership, in the 
House of Commons, made no attempt to defend the magazine 
and Gerald Kaufman, the Shadow Home Secretary and 
Manchester MP, condoned the crit~cisms. For considerable 
sections of the Labour Party in Manchester the response of 
both the Conservative government and the Labour opposition 
confirmed their misgivings about the police moni~~ring 
initiative. 
An indication of the local concern is provided by 
documenting how the Labour Party in Manchester dealt with 
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the issue during the 1986 
distribution of Policewatch was 
election with priority instead 
friendly 'A-Z' of the council's 
local elections. The 
delayed until after the 
being given to a user 
services! The manifesto 
made no mention of the work of the PMC, instead choosing 
to focus upon the issue of 'Inner Cities and Crime' 
Tory policies on law and order have failed. Their 
response to economic and social crises includes giving 
more powers to the police, yet the numbers of crimes 
being solved is on the decline. Inner city communities 
suffer increasing violence. Labour believes that high 
technology policing is not the solution and that we 
will only be able to tackle the problems when 
communities have democratic control over the police. 
Individual Labour candidates, in their election 
literature, either made no mention of law, order and 
policing or, in certain traditional wards, attempted to 
distance themselves from the PMC. In Levenshulme, the 
candidate emphasized that tackling crime, through 
preventive measures and more bobbies on the beat, would be 
one of his main concerns. In Moston, the Labour Party 
stressed that they were 'not extremists' and that they 
'supported the police in their attempts to establish 
better community relations'. In Beswick the candidate 
stated that he opposed those who were attempt~ng to 
undermine the police through constant criticism and that 
he would give his full support to the Chief Constable in 
the fight against crime. The Labour candidate in 
Lightbowne gave his full support to neighbourhood watch, 
CLPs, community policing and multi~agency efforts to fight 
crime. 
The wariness of sections of the Party was complimented by 
.::,::,,~,,:,;--.. ,~,", ~ ... ,.:~ ~the determination of the_Conservatives - "and Liberals to 
make the PMC an electoral issue. Conservative candidates 
referred to the setting up of the PMU and Policewatch as 
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'madness on the rates' whilst Liberals denounced the 
Labour Party for its refusal to support CLPs and for 
setting up a structure that engaged in the 'destructive 
criticism' of the police. All the opposition candidates 
promised to campaign for the abolition of the PMC. The 
fact that the Labour Party strengthened its hold in these 
elections was proof for some that the cautious policy had 
succeeded. It also meant that several Labour candidates 
who opposed the whole initiative had been elected. 
The high profile role that the Manchester councillors took 
on the Joint Board during 1986 and 1987 increased the 
controversiality of the PMC. This was particularly so in 
relation to the Stalker Affair and the AIDs speeches of 
the Chief Constable. During this period the PMC also had a 
high media profile because of the demands of Labour 
members for the sacking of the Chief Constable, the 
continued furor over the contents of Policewatch and its 
stance on the policing of Manchester, including its 
continued opposition to CLPs and support for the cases of 
Steven Shaw and Viraj Mendis. For many in the Party the 
continued controversial publicity was decidedly unwelcome. 
However, it was the response of the PMC to the issue of 
neighbourhood watch that finally brought the opprobrium of 
the Party leadership down on the initiative. Because of 
this, the issues of crime, the fear of crime and crime 
prevention were forced onto the agenda of the PMC. 
From its inception the PMC had conceptualized the issue of 
crime within the overall demand for police accountability. 
It was argued that the issue of crime could only be 
tackled successfully when the GMP had been c~lle~'~o 
account (seePMC Report no 58). Additionally an important 
dimension to the work of unit involved trying to counter 
multi-agency crime control strategies of the GMP and the 
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Home Office. This involved research to assess the exact 
extent of council departmentPs involvement with the GMP 
and producing guidelines to govern the type of contact 
council departments should have with the force (see 
Reports nos 52; 75). This conceptualization of the issue 
of crime, combined with the LeftPs traditional difficulties 
in dealing with the issue, meant that it was not the 
dominant priority of the PMC or the PMU. Rising crime 
rates were only one manifestation of the overall crisis in 
the policing of Manchester, and it was that overall crisis 
that the PMC was concerned about. 
a. The Community and Crime 
In December 1986 the PMC, reiterating its position of July 
1986, stated its opposition to neighbourhood watch in 
Manchester by refusing to pay for the erection of 
'Homewatch' signs (see PMC Report no 53). The decision was 
attacked both locally and in the House of Commons as a 
further example of the extremist anti-police stance of the 
'loony left' in control of Manchester City Council. The 
backlash was so intense that a damage limitation exercise 
was embarked upon. Discussions took place immediately 
concerning the need to' produce a constructive alternative 
to 'Homewatch'. As a consequence a series of proposals 
emerged premised upon the idea that the council would have 
to give serious consideration to the issues of crime, fear 
of crime and crime prevention (see PMC Reports nos 102. 
1031 1041 1051 106). Fi~~t, it was ,decided to ~pgrade the 
crime prevention work' of the council both at the political 
and officer levels. Second, all the major .service 
departments of the Council were asked to identify 
.. 
resources that could be used to promote crime prevention 
policies. Third, the Crime Prevention Working Party had 
its terms of reference expanded and was redesignated the 
Community Safety Working Party. Fourth, it was recommended 
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that a Community Safety Officer be appointed within the 
Town Clerk's Department, under the control of the Policy 
and Resources Committee. Fifth, the PMU was directed to 
organize a series of workshops on community safety for 
relevant officers of the council. Finally, the Unit was 
instructed to prepare a 
community safety booklet 
Manchester •. 
report on the production of a 
for dissemination throughout 
The speed with which the PMC moved to embrace community 
safety is indicated by its response to the Council's 
recommendation concerning the appointment of a community 
safety officer. In a paper of February 1987, justifying 
the locating of the post of Community Safety Officer 
within the PMU, reference was made to the real problem of 
crime and fear of crime 
The Committee has consistently expressed its view that 
the local authority is in a position to influence crime 
and fear of crime, particularly through a community 
based strategy which does not marginalize these issues 
from others, such as appropriate policing and service 
provision. Whilst recognizing that solutions lie 
primarily in major structural changes. the Committee 
has accepted that it is possible to create a safer 
community - noting also that the ultimate success of 
such an initiative is dependent on adequate resources 
for investment in services, facilities and the fabric 
of neighbourhoods (PMC Report no 123). 
In addition to the internal reassessment and restructuring 
of the work of the PMU the Chair of the PMC and the Leader 
of the Council also publicly attempted to explain their 
. position on 'Homewatch'. The Chair of the PMC felt it 
necessary to explain in great 
. watch schemes were not the 
. -Policewatch, .. No._59 .1986) •. - This 
length why neighbourhood 
answer to crime .. (see. 
was followed .up- by the . 
Leader of the Council intervening to assure the community 
of the Council's concern with crime. He also announced the 
setting up of the 'Council Initiative On Safety' as an 
~. III • * ," ~ . 
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alternative to neighbourhood watch (see Policewatch No 6, 
1987). 
It was stated that the Council opposed the 'Homewatc:h' 
scheme because it was no substitute for 'effective 
community policing' and it resulted in the diverting of 
police resources from 'the less articulate and less 
organized sections of the community'. Although it was made 
clear that the Council would not oppose residents who 
insisted on setting up 'Homewatch' schemes it was also 
pOinted out that there was a Council alternative 
Manchester City Council is committed to supporting 
groups of residents who want to protect themselves, 
their communities and their homes from crime. 
A City Council Community Safety Working Party is to 
ensure that all Council activities are sensitive to the 
need to prevent crime and create safer communities 
The Council announced that it would give gran~s to help 
groups of residents set up their own community safety 
schemes; there would be improved locks, doors and windows 
installed in Council housing; more effective caretaking 
and park warden schemes; landscape designs that made 
public play safer for children and security lighting 
installed in streets and Council property. The dilemma of 
the Council was made clear 
The City Council has no intention of becoming crime 
busters. That's the job of the police and our 
involvement in that area is mainly a matter.- of 
persuading the police to give Manchester's communities 
the effective and sensitive protection they need. 
- On the other hand we face demands from local community 
groups to help them make their areas free from such. 
crimes as burglary and assaults and from the fear which 
such crimes create '(Polfc:ewatch No 6 1987) _"'_'~'H"""" 
At the same time as this was taking place consideration 
was being given to two reports that related to the 
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relationship between the PMC/PMU and the community. The 
Policy and Resources Committee of the Council, since 
November 1985, had been monitoring the attempts by the 
various committees and departments to bring about public 
involvement in their work. In July 1986 the Committee 
passed a resolution requesting that all the committees and 
departments consider its report 'Consultation and 
Participation~. In addition it recommended that every 
department and committee should take measures to actively 
involve the community 
affected the PMC as the 
PMGs groups meant that 
demands. 
in its work. This particularly 
failure to set up community based 
it could not meet the committeePs 
The second report that addressed the relationship between 
the PMU and the community took the form of an internal 
review into the work of the unit (see Walker, 1986). This 
report found serious levels of confusion and lack of 
direction as far as the attempts to set up PMGs were 
concerned. It was argued that the PMU had been placed in 
an impossible position in this respect because there had 
been no real thought given to the topic and there were a 
series of assumptions about police monitoring groups that 
were fallacious. The report argued that a different 
strategy would have to employed by the unit if PMGs were 
to be realized. The Unit would have to cease trying to 
push the idea of monitoring groups and instead actually go 
out into the community and find .out what it wanted and 
what its needs were. The report was very concerned that, 
even in comparison with some of the London initiatives, 
the Manchester PMU seemed to.be totally isolated from the 
commuryity. The report·s assessment and suggestions were 
rei~e~ated in a 'Way For~a~d- ;s;t~·ategy Doc·ument' ~g~eed to 
by the PMC in July 1986 (PMC Report no 63) In order to 
reach the community and gauge what the community wanted 
I. i : 'tw 
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the document suggested that information be collected to 
assess community needs and views. The Unit Strategy 
document also recommended that the PMU should investigate 
the problems of security and ~ear o~ crime in the 
community, commissioning local surveys as necessary. 
Such a community focus had serious implications ~or the 
work of the PMU. The PMU had e~~ectively withdrawn ~rom 
community work when, during the course of a consultation 
exercise over whether staffed monitoring groups should be 
set up in Manchester, community groups 
preferred to retain their autonomy. As 
decided that instead o~ ~unding 





monitoring groups, the PMU would provide support for any 
groups that needed it. Consequently, the PMC/U moved from 
the idea o~ ~acilitating PMGs to facilitating single issue 
meetings as and when demanded by community groups 
We believe that these single issue meetings are one of 
the best ways of making the police accountable to 
Manchester people (Policewatch No 5, 1986). 
Thus, the role of the unit in terms of its community work 
was in terms of helping groups organize training days and 
single issue meetings such as the conference on Black 
Communities and Inner City Policing, Youth and Allied 
Workers Police Monitoring Group days, a Women and Policing 
conference meetings in Benchill and in Withington (see PMC 
Reports nos 44, 61, 68, 73, .81' 94) 
However, no sooner had this !ingle issue strategy been 
worked out than the Unit was placed under considerable 
pressure to go back into geographically defined 
communitles·_wlth_a very di~~erent remit. In order to reach 
the community a systematic approach was suggested. The 
PMU's development workers were to extend their list of 
community contacts and networks and to include other 
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agencies working in the community, in order to ensure that 
their knowledge of local requirements and needs was 
accurate. To achieve this a wide variety of community' 
based groups and organizations, apart from statutory ones, 
were contacted. This 'Area based Monitoring And 
Consultation Initiative' was ratified by the PMC on 30 
March 1987 (see PMC Report no 137). It must also be noted 
that during this period the appointment of a more moderate 
Chair of the PMC strengthened the move to concern about 
crime and community safety. The new Chair stressed that 
the PMC was not police bashing, qualified the previous 
demands for police accountability, specifically relating 
them to the failure of the force to tackle crime, and 
stressed the council's concern about crime (see 
Policewatch. NO 8, 1987). 
By July 1987 the mass of the initial consultative work had 
been completed. It had focused on identifying and making 
contact with 'relevant and appropriate groups·, defined as 
local neighbourhood and voluntary organizations such as 
tenant and resident aSSOCiations, youth and community 
groups, etc. This contact was made utilizing the Labour 
Party ward structure with the intention being to contact 
roughly twelve of these groups in each ward and in order 
to identify them the Unit had liaised with other.council 
departments 'which have a working brief in the community'. 
Nineteen 
sixteen 
groups were identified 
in South Manchester and 
in North Manchester, 
seventeen in Central 
Manchester and letters were sent to them as well as to 
tenants and residents entitled 'Policing and A Safer 
Communityl Obtaining Your Views·., 
;~~As': you ars'probabl y aware, the Ci ty '-Counci f . has f c:i'r 
some time taken the view that the promotion of policing 
of a nature, style and quality which meets the needs of 
the residents of Manchester is clearly in their 
interests. In order to respond,to these concerns, the 
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City Council set up a Committee, Police Monitoring. It 
seeks to achieve the promotion and support of effective 
policing policies by consulting with residents on 
policing activities, crime prevention and making 
communities safer. 
As part of this process the council has decided to 
begin a systematic consultation process with groups in 
the community, whether they be tenant or issue based 
(see PMC Report no 137) 
It was hoped that these community groups and organizations 
would partiCipate in the consultation process to have 
their views represented along with those of others in 
their community. In addition specific area based crime 
surveys on a geographical basis were to be organized to 
meet specific demands by local people such as that on the 
Nell Lane Estate in Chorlton, South Manchester, Mossbrook 
Court, Collyhurst, North Manchester and Hulme in Central 
Manchester (see PMC Report no 137). In these areas there 
were subsequent meetings between the police, City 
councillors, the PMC and the community to discuss crime 
problems with the Monitoring Committee subsequently 
claiming that 
The success of these forums between residents, the 
Council and the police, where local people are setting 
. the agenda and asking for action, has been obvious 
(Policewatch. No 9 1987). 
Such forums were also used to bolster the PMC's opposition 
to CLPs, which were through the high profile work of the 
CLR, increasingly encroaching upon Manchester. In this 
context it was even suggested by the PMC that thei~ forums 
could act as the statutory consultative committees in 
Manchester 
We believe that there is a 
'~" ,,;;,":.,.than.(;that . favoured by· the 
meet head-on with not only 
people from the Town Hall, 
in a realistic manner. 
far more effective system 
GMP. ·We·want~the.pub1ic·to 
the police but also with 
to tackle Issues of crlmlng 
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By bringing together police, councillors, housing and 
planning officials, and Community Development workers, 
who have on-the-ground real liaison with the residents, 
questions on community safety can be approached by 
bodies who may be able to do something about it. 
Unfortunately these forums will still not make the 
police truly accountable - only a change in legislation 
can do this. But at least they will allow the public a 
chance of saying what they want. <Policewatch No 91 
1987) 
The PMC also made overtures to the police in a manner 
which would have been inconceivable in 1984 
Let us hope 
prejudices that 
fully with the 
tackle crime in 
that the police can put aside any 
they have against the PMU and work 
City Council in a realistic attempt to 
our city <Policewatch No 9: 1987) 
b. Women. Policing and The Fear of Crime 
The issue of women's experience of policing, crime and 
violence also provided a powerful impetus for the 
prioritization of community safety within the work of the 
PMC/PMU. At the same time as the PMC came into being so 
did several other committees and units, reflecting the 
promises of the 1984 manifesto, including the Equal 
Opportunities Committee which had a steering group on 
women's issues. In January 198~ a joint working party was 
agreed to by the Equal Opportunities Committee and the PMC 
to consider issues of common interest. 
The steering group of Equal Opportunities Committee felt 
that the issue of women and violence should be prioritized 
and set up a Women and Violence'Working Party. From the 
outset the Working Party embarked upon a process of 
conSUltation with two public meetings being held in 
dlfferentparts of the city during October 1986. A series 
-. --,.. .",,-.;. ""'. of, .iS5sues.~ emerged from' these meetings' concerning women"s' .--
fears about violence. Anxiety was expressed with regard to 
, 
the public transport system, assaults on female children, 
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safety on estates, the importance of women's refuges, 
racial harassment, problems with medical care, sexism and 
advertising, adequate and secure housing provision, and 
sexual harassment at work. Women were expressing concerns 
about a wide variety of contexts, all of which left them 
vulnerable to sexual and racial harassment, and violence. 
Policing was also mentioned during these meetings with 
some women wanting to see more police officers on the 
beat, whilst others, principally black women, said that 
they did not feel safe with an increased police presence 
in their communities. 
The decisive point was that the meetings articulated the 
fears and concerns of women over a wide variety of issues 
relating to sexual violence and fear of violence. Within 
this context of overall fear of sexual violence policing 
was just one concern of women and not necessarily the 
major concern. It was not just the police who were the 
problem but men. These issues were discussed by the Equal 
Opportunities Committee in January 1987 where a set of 
recommendations for future policy was agreed to. As a 
consequence a report, 'The Safety of Women in Planning the 
Environment· was produced for November 1987. 
During this period the PMU also had a Women and Policing 
Working Party in operation. This emerged out of the 
dissatisfaction with the way that the Police Authority had 
dealt with the issue in one of its conferences and the 
rows that had emerged with the meeting ending in uproar 
because of racist comments that were made. The PMC made it 
clear that the intention was to facilitate the 
participation of another previously unrepresented section 
The PMU is pledged to campaigning for an accountable 
police force; one that meets the needs of the community 
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it is supposed to serve. Women as 
community must have their voices heard 
their needs, their wishes and their 
reflected in police practice and in 
(Policewatch No 31 1986) 
part of that 
to ensure that 
priorities are 
police policy. 
The Working Party arranged two training days for women and 
police powers in September and October 1987 with workshops 
on domestic violence, sexual offenses, children·s rights, 
public order situations, prostitution/kerb crawling, black 
women, mental health and lesbians. The focus of the 
workshops was the role of the police in relation to each 
one of these issues (see PMC Report 172). In addition the 
working party also pressed for a women·s officer within 
the PMU (see PMC Report no 127). 
The largest project that the Working Party undertook 'was a 
survey of violence against women in October 1986 and the 
aim was to focus on the response of the police to women's 
needs. The survey findings were to be the basis for the 
campaign to make the police accountable to the needs of 
women. However, 'in the final report the issue that was 
highlighted was not women and policing but women and male 
initiated violence. What was most striking in the findings 
were women's perception of their vulnerability, their 
widespread experience of crime and the curtailment affects 
on their lives. It was not just the response of the police 
that constituted a problem for women in Manchester. Every 
department and committee of the Council was responsible 
ior implementing policies that ha~ detrimental effects on 
the safety of women. Therefore, the report recommended a 
Co-ordinated community safety strategy that involved the 




working party and 
overlap between the work of the PMC's 
the work of the Equal Opportunities 
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Women~s Steering Group can be found in the latter's report 
'Planning a Safer Environment for Women' of November 1987. 
This was an important policy document because of the 
manner in which the issue was approached. Utilizing the 
national crime surveys, the Merseyside and Islington 
surveys (see Hough and Mayhew, 1983; 19851 Kinsey, 19841 
Jones, McLean, Young, 1986) and the PMC's 'Women and 
Violence Survey Report' it argued that the police could 
not provide a comprehensive response to the problems faced 
by women. It was stressed that whilst real modifications 
in the level of violence 
achieved by societal change 
against 
and the 
women could only be 
redistribution of 
power, design related changes had the potential to make 
women feel more secure by reducing the opportunities for 
crimes against women to take place. 
This comprehensive report 
environment both in the home 
listed aspects 
and outside that 
of the 
could be 
practically changed in order to facilitate greater safety 
and concluded by saying that 
Although this report has concentrated on the safety of 
the environment for women it is obvious that, by 
improving the environment for women, the proposals will 
be of advantage to children and men particularly 
elderly or disabled men. The result will be a city 
where people of both sexes, of all ages and races, can 
live in greater safety and enjoyment (Report 1987119) 
The report did not 
po1lcing because it 







the issue of women and 
~he police as being part 
that women faced. But 
neither did it see them as being part of the problem that 
women faced. For example there was no mention of the fears 
of black women in this respect. The solutions focused upon 
multi-agency coordination to create a safer environment 
for women. This meant that the police still had a role to 
play in these, security conscious environments. This work 
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on women and violence during 1987 augmented the Council~5 
increasing prioritization of community safety. 
The degree of prioritization of community safety, and 
women,s safety within this overall project, is indicated 
by the centrality of the issue during the 1987 local 
elections. As with the 1986 elections there were concerns 
expressed within the Party that the controversial nature 
of some of the council's policies would be electorally 
damaging. Labour candidates in their election literature 
emphasized the Party's concern with crime prevention, 
community safety measures and women's safety. Except in 
this context no mention was made of police accountability 
or the PMC. As part of the campaign a leaflet was produced 
indicating the main priorities of the Party. This included 
a section on 'Action Against Male Violence', emphasizing 
Labour's commitment to make Manchester a safer place for 
women. Some of the candidates broke ranks completely with 
the Party and expressed their support for CLPs and 
neighbourhood watch. The opposition parties continued to 
condemn the PMC and Policewatch, promising that they would 
continue to lobby for the abolition of the monitoring 
initiative. The Conservative candidates stressed their 
complete support for the GMP whilst the Alliance promised 
to persist with their campaign for the introduction of 
CLPs. The latter pointed to the fact that Labour had to 
reverse its position on 'Homewatch' as being proof that, 
sooner or later, it would have to do the same in relation 
to CLPs. 
LabOur suffered set 
Party losing nine 
implications for the 
backs in these elections with the 
seats to the opposition. The 
police monitoring initiative were 
significant. First, there were nine more councillors who 
were committed to voting for its abolition at the first 
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opportunity. Second, it confirmed the fears of those 
sections of the Labour Party who had been concerned with 
the electoral consequences of the controversial policies 
of the left. In any inquest into the election the PMC 
would be identified as an electoral liability along with 
the Council~s highly publicized ·loony 
relation to the Viraj Mendis Affair 
left' role in 
and the Burnage 
Campaign, 1988; incident (see Viraj Mendis 
MacDonald Inquiry, 1989). 
Defence 
These two factors took on significance 
when the Council had to decide on 
in December 1987 
how to respond to 
continued central government imposed limitations on local 
government spending. Prior to thiS, the Council had 
survived by a variety of creative accounting measures and 
by compromising on its 1984 manifesto promises not to set 
a rate. However, as a consequence of the continued 
pressure from the central government a more serious 
situation was faced by the Labour Party. On 11 December 
1987 the Policy Committee of the Council agreed to a £6.5 
million package of general cuts. This caused a public 
outcry and at a meeting of the full Council to discuss 
where the cuts would be implemented a demonstration took 
place demanding that the leadership of the Labour Party 
stick to its ·no cuts' manifesto. Because of the uproar a 
further meeting took place on 17 December with 28 members 
of the Labour Party sided with the opposition to defeat 
the proposed spread of cuts. The o~positlon forced through 
a specific agenda of cuts which included the abolition of 
the PMC. This meeting also witnessed the Council calling 
in the GMP to deal with demonstrators. Ironically, all the 
work of the PMC/PMU on public order policing and contact 
between the police and the Council was ignored by the 
Council when it came to dealing with those demonstrating 
against its policies. It is within this conteKt -that the 
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PMC and PMU were abolished. The Liberals threatened to 
take court action against the Council if the abolition was 
not carried out immediately whilst the Right of the Labour 
Party demanded that the staff of the PMU be reallocated 
and the PMC disbanded as soon as possible. As part of the 
subsequent negotiations between the right and left of the 
Labour Party a meeting of the council on 28 January 1988 
agreed to a package of cuts that included disestablishment 
of the PMC and Policewatch. 
At the Policy and Resources Committee meeting of the City 
Council on 16 March 1988 a Community Safety Section was 
established, incorporating some of the posts from the old 
PMU 
and that with immediate effect, recognizing the 
devastating effect which crime and fear of crime has on 
the lives of Manchester residents, the focus for the 
Council's policies on policing and community safety 
should be the development of practically based policies 
aimed at supporting community based initiatives (Report 
17.6.88). 
The justifications for this move were first, the extent of 
crime in Manchester, second, the consequences and impact 
of crime, and third, the fear of crime. Utilizing the 
national Home Office crime surveys and the Merseyside and 
Islington surveys it was argued that the dramatic crime 
increases in Manchester were only the tip of the iceberg. 
Employing the new Left realist perspective it was argued 
that the financial and emotional impact of crime wa~ 
greatest' amongst the most vulnerable sections of the 
community in Manchester, eg, the poor, ethnic minorities, 
women and the elderly. It was also argued that the fear of 
crime was not just a facet of individual psychology but a 
social-phenomenon involving 'vulnerable and fearful 
populations', particularly women and the elderly. There 
was a clear attempt to argue that crime prevention was a 
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structural or social matter as opposed to being a purely 
individual one. 
In order to respond to this the document argued that the 
Community Safety Section was being set up by the council 
to 'develop the concept oT crime prevention Trom its 
rather narrow associations with the police and 'bars and 








the role oT 
of a safer 
the physical 
security of estates and residences was useTul it would not 
bring about people's saTety or sense 'oT safety in their 
homes or neighbourhoods. Community Safety would focus upon 
the interdependence oT types of crime prevention and the 
social structure of particular areas. The intention was to 
challenge the dominant idea of crime prevention that had 
an inbuilt bias towards individualized personal 
property protection measures known as 'target 
hardening'. Such a narrow approach fails to meet 
important needs as it is not possible to 'target 
harden' women against rape or 'design out' heroin 
pushing. It particularly fails to recognize the 
experience of large numbers of women who suffer assault 
and injury in their homes as well as a result of 
domestic violence and whose situation no amount ef 
improved street lighting or fencing will alter. 
Community Safety must recognize that the effectiveness 
of a policy or approach is influenced by both the 
relations between offenders and victims and the 
relations between social groups - as defined by class, 
race, sex and age within a locality (Report 17.6.88). 
Whilst none of the above would. have been necessarily 
outside the remit of the old PMC the next part of the 
document was in total oppOSition to one of the basic 
tenets of that initiative. It was argued that the council 
should .... assist _ the 'development of communities' and 
community based initiatives with four main aims in mind. 
First, there should be the provision of general community 
safety improvements across the city. ie, for the whole 
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community. Second, there should be the provision of 
specific community safety improvements for those residents 
known to be particularly vulnerable to fear of crime. 
Third, policies should be implemented to avoid fuelling 
the fear of crime and, finally, all recommendations should 
avoid focusing on 'solutions' which placed restrictions on 
the activities and lives of vulnerable groups. In order to 
achieve this' 
The Council's developing community safety policy should 
start from the concerns of the residents, and have as a 
basic premise the need for the local authority and 
other agenCies, such as the police, to concentrate 
their resources on those offenses thought by residents 
to be most problematic (Report 17.6.88). 
Hence, the Community Safety initiative 
integral role of the police within 
acknowledged the 
its strategy and 
accepted that some form of contact would have to be 
necessary given the aims set out above. Essentially what 
was being proposed was a Council co-ordinated multi-agency 
approach utilizing all the Council's service departments 
as well as building upon existing work by those 
departments. The crucial departure from previous policy 
was the recognition of the role,even if limited, that the 
police had to play and the elimination of police 
monitoring as a Council concern. Thus, in the 
dissemination of crime prevention literature -it was 
suggested that the Community Safety section would liaise 
with crime prevention officers of the Greater Manchester 
Police as well as make available .police and Home Office 
literature on the issue. 
As indicated, the fundamental omission within the new 
- .. _ .• - .... - ... -,-,_ ... ~nitlative, given .. that it had effectively-taken over from 
the PMC, was the purging of all reference to monitoring or 
responding to the behaviour of the police. The police were 
no longer the primary focus of concern. The only mention 
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was of the possible use that the police could be. The 
debates had virtually come full circle from a critique of 
policing and multi-agency approaches and the dangers of 
such approaches to the utilization of a multi-agency 
approach which did not rule out co-operation with the 
police. In fact the initiatives proposed would have fitted 
in well with the principles laid out in the various Home 
Office circulars. What we witness was the neat dovetailing 
of the "new Left realist~ approach and the Home Office 
proposals on community crime control and much of that had 
to do with the emergence of the issues surrounding women 
and crime in Manchester. Once this issue was prioritized 
or reached prominence on the political agenda it became 
apparent that police monitoring and police accountability 
were not necessarily the issues that concerned women in a 
straightforward manner. Thus, the move away from the 
police monitoring initiative was compounded by the debate 
about women and crime that emerged nationally and which 
was reflected within various committees and working 
parties of Manchester City Council. 
Discussion 
This section has documented the dramatic reorientation 
that took place in the work of the PMC/PMU between 1985 
and 1988. This reorientation was the result of a series of 
different pressures that bore down upon the PMC. First, 
there was the increasing political vulnerability of its 
work. During the transition period from old Police 
Authority to new Police Authority' the PMC moved centre 
stage in the struggle for police accountability in 
ManChester. However, its controversiality resulted in it 
becoming both locally and nationally politically 
'-'''·~';'-~-· ... ;~vulnerable. In addition to the "'constant·· attack!5 on the -
. 
initiative by the Conservatives and Liberals in 
Manchester, it'was singled out by government spokespersons 
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as an example of "loony Leftism". This in turn caused 
electoral concern within the Labour Party both locally and 
nationally, particularly at a time when the Party was 
stressing its concern about crime. As a consequence the 
PMC came under increasing pressure to respond to the 
political attacks. The emergence of the national discourse 
on crime prevention provided the second source of 
pressure. The PMC~s controversiality was intensified 
through its opposition to neighbourhood watch, community 
consultation and multi agency policing. The third source 
of pressure issued from demands of the Council that all 
departments had to become involved in facilitating 
community participation. The fourth source derived from 
the PMC's need to respond to an internal report that 
argued that the PMU had to rethink its strategies for 
making contact with the community. Both pressures forced 
the PMU into consultations with the whole community and as 
a consequence the issue of crime was placed firmly on its 
agenda. The final source of pressure was the necessity to 
respond to the increasing local and national concern about 
women's safety and fear of crime. 
The response to these pressures took the form of a shift 
in the community interests that the PMC/PMU represented. 
There was a move away from the politically controversial 
campaign for police accountability to the politically 
popular promotion of community safety measures. As a 
consequence, those sections of the community who had 
problems with the police had their interests marglnalized 
through the political prioritization of the interests of 
the whole community and the interests of women. In 
addition such a move also resulted in the facilitation of 
multi-agency~policing·-arrangements. As a consequence~' the-~~" 
interests of those for whom policing was a problem 




Summary of Part IV 
Part IV of this thesis has attempted to document and 
analyze the finale to the struggle for police 
accountability that took place in Manchester between 1985-
1988. The significant changes that took place in the two 
models of community representation and participation have 
been chronicled. 
a. The Police Authority and Community Liaison 
On 1 April 1986 the government abolished the Police 
Authorities and replaced them with Joint Boards. In 
addition to changing the form of political representation 
the central state's control of policing arrangements was 
enhanced. During the last months of the operation of the 
old Police Authority all attempts to call the Chief 
Constable failed, most notably in the case of his 
unauthorized acquisition of plastic bullets. Ironically, 
during the first year of the operation of the new Police 
Authority the conflict with the Chief Constable 
intenSified as a result of the latter's role in the 
Stalker Affair and his Aids speeches. However. through 
Anderton's continued assertion of his autonomy, which was 
supported by the Home Office, and the defeat of the Left 
on the Police Authority, the campaign to call the Chief 
Constable to account was finally neutralized. 
Although the CRU continued with the work of the CLO there 
were important qualifications. As documented previously, 
the CRU discarded the community representative work of the 
CLO. As a consequence, the interests of black people were 
-.. . ,. ." • -~. '",' .... " .j " ~'. ," "'","r ~ ,.. ... ' ~ . • '.. . .... ' !''t'_., '" ''': f' .. ~ '~." ,,-,. 
not part of the CRU's terms of reference. In addition, 
unlike the CLO, the CRU prioritized the issue of crime 
prevention and the.· issue of police accountability was 
not a part of its remit. 
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The CRU did attempt to take a more active approach to the 
problems of the under/non-representation of certain 
sections of the community. However, the fundamental 
problems with this representative model were compounded by 
the CRU's efforts. The attempts to involve young people 
resulted in the participation of those respectable young 
people for whom the police were not a problem. Therefore, 
the representativeness of the youth representatives was 
open to question. There were corresponding problems with 
the CRU's endeavors to facilitate the representation of 
women's interests. The CRU did not address the power 
imbalances and ideological divisions of interest that 
existed between women. By giving equal representation to 
all women, the CRU mobilized respectable women·s groups 
who articulated dominant ideologies and this resulted in 
the non-participation of women's groups who questioned 
such ideologies. 
As a consequence, the representative model continued to 
facilitate the interests of those respectable sections of 
the community not in conflict with the police. Within the 
operation of this model a process of defining in/out, 
inclusion/exclusion and prioritizatlon/marginalization has 
been identified. The conclusion would seem to be that 
giving all sections of the community rights of 
. . 
representation within structures ~oncerned with majority 
interests leads to the systematic non-representation and 
non-participation of powerless and marginal sections of 
the community. This is particularly ironic given that the 
origin~l prinCiple behind community liaison in Greate~ _ 
Manchester, was to enable the representation and 
participation of the powerless and the marginal sections 
of the community who were in conflict with the police. 
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b. Manchester City Council and Police Monitoring 
A series of pressures have been identified that resulted 
in the considerable reorientatton of the work of the 
PMC/PMU. The increasing political vulnerability of its 
campaign for police accountability, the emergence of the 
issue of crime prevention, its consultations with the 
whole community and the increasing concern about women·s 
safety resulted in a considerable shift in the community 
interests that the PMC/PMU represented. As a result, the 
politically controversial campaign for police 
accountability was replaced by a politically popular 
community safety campaign. Consequently, the 
marginalization of the interests of those sections of the 
community subject to unaccountable policing practices 
occurred. In effect, as a result of the changes within the 
PMC/PMU, there was a considerable overlap between the work 
of the Community Safety Unit and the Community Relations 
Unit and the community interests represented within that 
work. As a consequence, 1n addition to being marginalized 
within the community liaison initiative, the interests of 
those for whom policing was a problem disappeared off the 
political agenda in Manchester. The final part of this 
thesis will examine the role of the local newspaper, the 
Manchester Evening News, in this marginalization process. 
324 
PART V: LOCAL NEWSPAPERS AND THE 
REPRESENTATION OF THE-COMMUNITY 
A newspaper is ••• much more than a business; it is an 
institution; it reflects and influences the life of a 
whole community (C.P.Scott, quoted in Cox and Morgan 
1973:1). 
The role of the media is of pivotal importance for this 
thesis because as was documented previously (see pp 18-19) 
partiCipatory theorists have stressed that one of the 
conditions for effective participation is, at the very 
minimum, equal access to knowledge and 
information/communication systems. If this is absent, the 
possibilities for distortion and manipulation by those 
groups who do have access 
Considerable attention has 
are increased considerably. 




and the media generally in creating a 
consensual concept of community in their 
of the highly fragmented and differentiated 
world in which we live (see Cohen and Young, 1973; Glasgow 
University Media Group, 1976; 1982; Hall et al, 1978, 
Golding and Elliot, 1979). Central to this creation of 
consensus has been the documenting of which groups and 
interests achieve positive representation and which groups 
and interests are defined out either through being ignored 
or through negative representation. Whether groups and 
interests are defined in or defined out i5 not accidental. 
Hall et al., (1978153-60) have argued that journalistic 
practices 
combine to produce a systematically structured over-
accessing to the media of those in powerful and 
-prlveleged -institutional positions. The media thus 
tend, faithfully and impartially, to reproduce 
symbolically the existing structure of power in 
society's institutional order (lbldI58). 
As a consequence p'owerful 'primarydefiners' are accorded 
the status of community representatives and their 
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interpretations of reality effectively set the agenda for 
how issues are discussed. Hall et al. argue that this 
'initial interpretative framework' makes it very difficult 
for alternative arguments to achieve comparable 
representation. Thus powerless groups have considerable 
difficulties in having their interests represented in an 
undistorted manner within such an interpretative 
framework. As such the media the media has the influential 
role of clearly defining what is and what is not 
acceptable in British society, and articulating the 
consensual boundaries and contours of the community (Cohen 
and Young, 1973:342). 
It has already been chronicled (see pp 253-254) how the 
popular press in Britain mobilized in a virtually 
monolithic manner to define out the 'loony· interests and 
groups represented by the new urban left during the 1980s. 
In doing so the contours of the community were powerfully 
reaffirmed in terms of what interests and groups would 
achieve representation and what interests would not. 
If it is possible to identify a particular notion of 
community that is being articulated and reproduced at a 
national level, the question must be asked what notion, if 
any, does the local media articulate and reproduce? It has 
been argued that the notion of community is all the more 
important precisely because of the sense of proximity 
conveyed within the local dimension (see Williams, 19701 
Jackson, 19711 Cox and Morgan, 19731 Hall et al., 1978) • 
• ~ <. -,~ '~Two'~key·.a9pects of· the relationship between -the local 
. 
press and the community have been identified. First, there 
is the role of the local paper in representing the 
community interest. Williams (1970126) has argued that the 
uniqueness of the local paper lies in its expression of 
# " .... I ~ 
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·an interest larger than the paper itselfl the interest 0; 
the local community'. 
Second, there is the role of the local paper in the 
delineation and affirmation of community values and 
boundaries. Jackson (1971) argues that the predominant 
order/disorder features and stories that appear in the 
local press exemplify values that are supposedly actively 
held by the community and in doing so reaffirm the moral 
boundaries of the local community. Thus, the local 
newspaper clarifies 
the nature of the positive forces in the community life 
that the press discerns and which contrast with the 
unabating flow of crimes, accidents, disasters and 
institutional disorders (Jackson, 19721120). 
Thus, the local press not 
information about what happens 
upon the assumption that it 
reaffirms and defends the 
only attempts to convey 
in the community but acts 
represents the community and 
moral boundaries of that 
community. As such a particular form of reality is 
reproduced, one which bolsters 
the ·old truths', the old patterns, the old concerns, 
the old and tried ways of doing things. It is a deep 
affirmation of the social order, underscored by a 
rooted popular traditionalism (Hall et al., 19781114) 
Cox and Morgan 
forced into such a 
(1973) argue that local newspapers are 
role in their'reporting of community 
affairs. Their very localness imposes restrictions upon 
how they operate. First, such a role is necessary because 
of the concerns of the readership - concerns that are 
.. important·. nationally .. ~a'( .. _1)9t. be locally •. Second, tt:'le.~ ... , 
relationship with the locality is less anonymous than that 
of national papers. The local paper itself is a part of 
the local establishment. Whilst this means that it has 
patronage to distribute in terms of good media coverage, 
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it is also dependent upon the goodwill of key local 
sources, and business interests, and is aware that there 
are serious social losses to be sustained iT it 
miscalculates in its news coverage and comments. Finally, 
local papers are Torced to emphasize the distinctiveness 
o~ their local coverage i~ they are to survive because 
they cannot compete with the national press in their 
coverage o~ non-local news. As a consequence of these 
restrictions they operate with an implicit conservative 
conception o~ the local community and their role within 
that community as representative of it. This 
representative role is geared towards protecting the 'the 
good oT the town' (Cox and Morgan, 1973:108). 
The above-mentioned studies illustrate that local 
newspapers have a crucial role 
shaping and articulating a 
community. Through the mantle 
takes on and its position 
to play in relation to 
particular conception of 
that the local newspaper 
within that community, a 
particular conservative consensual conception of community 
which gives respect to local elites, promotes 'quiet 
orderly government' (Cox and Morgan, 1973:133) and pride 
in locality is prominent. Issues and policies that 
threaten to rupture that notion of community and the 
assumptions flowing from it are met with considerable 
OPposition. As such the local press 
is"essentially a c~n~~rvative communications medium. It 
strongly upholds Tamily and institutional life; it 
typically demands discipline in relation to penology 
and education, it values conventions "and traditions. 
Broadly speaking, it"endorses capitalistic assumptions 
_~and the Protestant ethic (Jackson,19711278). 
.. ~ " .. ,.. . .,. " . . . . . ... '" '-:. ....... : .. , 
Community Representation and the Manchester Evening News (MEN) 
The Manchester Evening News (MEN) prides itself on having 
the largest circulation amongst provincial newspapers in 
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Britain and consequently has a conception of itself as 
being a key moulder of opinion. Prior to 1966, Jackson 
(1971:260) has noted that the paper was politically 
inclined towards the Conservative Party whereas between 
1966 and 1970 it adopted a "more radical outlook with 
explicit support for Labour, the Liberals and a general 
Lib-Lab position'. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
~ totally opposed the increasing prominence of what it 
viewed as a hard Left both nationally and more importantly 
locally. As far as the paper was concerned Left extremism 
had no role to play in the intrinsically moderate 
political life of Manchester and therefore, its patronage 
went to community representatives who it defined as 
personifying sensible and moderate political views. Those 
Who deviated from such values were portrayed as being not 
of the community. 
a. MEN's Definition and Defence of the Community 
The possibility of the Left wing of the Labour Party 
taking control of Manchester City Council deeply disturbed 
MEN as this would effectively mean, as far as the paper 
was con,cerned, the extremists finally coming in from the 
wilderness. From 1980 the tenor of the reports constantly 
suggested that a conspiracy had being hatched by 
extremists to infiltrate and gain control of the local 
Labour Party and through that to seize control of the City 
CounCil. Headlines such as "Left all out for Town Hall 
power' (21.5.81) and 'Town Hall facing Left-Wing takeover' 
(22.5.81) set the tone for the reporting of the struggle 
between the two factions of the Labour Party' in 
Manchester.~·During this period the paper celebrated the 
rise of the moderate and sensible Social Democratic Party, 
warning the local Labour Party of the electoral 
consequences if it did not retain its moderate leadership 
(10.11.81). In 1984 MEN revealed to the community that 
, 329 
there was a distinct possibility of the Left taking 
control in the May elections and warned that if it 
happened 
The spectre of Liverpool-s confrontation with the 
government will cast a long shadow over Manchester Town 
Ha 11 (3 • 4 • 84) • 
This warning was 
elections with 
power was about 
and during the local 
Left's long march to 
repeated before 
reports that 'the 
to reach its goal· (3.5.84) and that 
'Labour's hard Left was today poised to seize Town Hall 
power in Manchester' (3.5.84) • In the days after the 
ei'ection results, MEN reported on the split between the 
moderate Labour councillors who had ruled Manchester for 
thirteen years and the hard Left lending support to the 
moderates in their attempts to retain power. After it was 
confirmed that the Left of the Party had taken control of 
the Council, the headlines were, 
Hall' (15.5.84), 'And a Hard 
'Rebels come in from the cold' 
'Left turn at the Town 
Left at Town Hall' and 
(16.5.84). It was also 
reported that the new leader of the hard Left was '50 Left 
wing he made Red Ken Livingstone appear moderate' 
<15.5.84) 
Manchester Town Hall was firmly in the orip of Labour's 
hard Left today. Co un Graham Stringer, new Left wing 
leader of the new controlling Labour group said their 
radical no-cuts confrontation-seeking manifesto would 
now become the policy of the city council (16.5.84). 
A concerned editorial 'The reaiity of power' (16.5.84) 
expressed disappointment that the national Labour Party 
had allowed' the extremists to take control of the Council 
and that the moderates had effectively been 'removed from 
positions'of power ' " , .' 
the hard Left have now firmly grasped the reins of 
power and the City's doyen of Socialist dogma, Graham 
Stringer, is in charge. 
He has a reputation as a party extremist, but we are 
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt. We are 
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prepared to wait and see if he really does have the 
interests of Manchester - or those of a minority clique 
after their own political ends - at heart (16.5.84). 
MEN declared its intention, as the representative of the 
community, to monitor the actions of the new Council and 
it urged the hard Left to be reconciliatory in its actions 
and poliCies for the good of that community 
The weight of office has a habit of tempering 
ideological dreams with hard nosed reality. Let us hope 
this continues to be the case (16.5.84). 
This monitoring can be separated into two main areas. 
First, there was the monitoring of those actions and 
poliCies that the paper saw as denigrating the good name 
of Manchester and therefore not representing the best 
interests of the community. And second, there was the 
monitoring of those actions and poliCies that it defined 
as promoting sectional interests as opposed to the 
interests of the whole community. The overall purpose of 
this monitoring was to defend the good name of Manchester 
and the community. 
i. Defending the good name of Manchester 
~ saw the takeover of power by the hard Left in itself 
as denigrating the good name of Manchester which was seen 
as being moderate and sensible. Concern was expressed 
about the possible effects on the civic traditions of 
Manchester of outsiders with ext~emist ideologies coming 
to power. As far as MEN was 







its worse fears 
unlike previous 
its manifesto 
i (a), The abolition of the post of Lord Mayor 
As part of its red scare-mongering prior to the elections, 
~ had emphasized the threat to the Lord Mayor's office 
from the Left with headlines informing the community that 
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'Ex-Lord Mayor quits Labour' (10.11.81) and 'Lord Mayor 
Dropped by Labour' (5.1.82). For MEN such concerns were 
confirmed by the 1984 Labour manifesto which promised to 
replace the Lord Mayor with a Chair of Council. After the 
election, initial attempts to implement this proposal were 
defeated by the combined efforts of the opposition 
parties, and crucially by the rebel moderate Labour 
councillors. This resulted in a Conservative becoming Lord 
Mayor but with the ruling group committed to abolition of 
the post at the first opportunity. It was decided to cut 
back on expenditure on the ritualistic trappings 
associated with the post. This brought the Council stern 
censure from MEN for interfering with the civic traditions 
of Manchester with headlines such as 'Left scraps civic 
pomp', 'Axe falls on town hall tradition' (10.7.84) and 
'New Threat to Lord Mayor' (12.12.84) 
The hard Left running Manchester detest the office as a 
symbol of civic pomp and were only thwarted in their 
bid to axe the post this year by an alliance between 
Tories and moderate Labour councillors (12.12.84). 
On 24 April 1985 the Left's decision to abolish the post 
was met with 'The Lord Mayor pageantry axed'. There was a 
detailed report on the plans of the Left to 'end elitism 
and outdated custom' and that as a result '4.94 year 
tradition was conSigned to the history books despite a 
city wide referendum opposing the view' (24.4.85). When 
the abolition was affected, considerable coverage was 
given to the last day of the Lord Mayor. Indignant 
editorials (16.5.85124.5.85) castigated the Left 
An Eastern European-style political "chair" is not 
wanted in democratic Britain, what we wantlsa neutral 
ambassado~ fo~ Manchester who is bright enough to rise 
above-petty' local politics and instead support this 
great city (24.5.85). 
It was stressed that whether the Left liked it or not 'at 
some point in the future the Lord Mayor. will be back'. 
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After the abolition of the post MEN scrutinized the 
actions of the ~First Citizen', the new name for the Lord 
Mayor, very closely as well as reporting on the response 
of the community to the change. MEN, in an editorial, 
stated that it would not accept the new title and would 
continue to refer to him as Lord Mayor (20.5.85). By 24 
May 1985 the actions of the First Citizen in appearing on 
the picket lines of industrial disputes provoked an 
editorial, 'Lord Mayor's bad start' (24.5.85) about the 
embarrassment and disgrace he had caused Manchester. The 
reports after this consistently emphasized how he had 
broken with tradition and protocol and was causing 
irreparable damage to the good name of Manchester. On 19 
June 1985 extensive prominence was given to the Leader of 
the Council's admission that the abolition of the post of 
Lord Mayor had been 'a propaganda disaster'. 
However, by December 1985 MEN had to report the 
possibility that the Left was proposing for first citizen 
"a female gay 
on 9 January 
decided on 
rights campaigner" and with relief announced 
1986 that the Council had backed down and 
a less controversial choice. In the same 
edition of the paper a feature, 'Sadness for lost 
tradition' documented the ex-Lord Mayor's wife sadness at 
the abolition of the post. This was followed on 30 January 
1986 by the demand from a group of elderly citizens 'We 
want a REAL mayor'. On 8 February 1988 it was reported 
that the Left was softening in its attitude towards the 
post of Lord Mayor. On 23 March 1988 MEN reported that a 
'Pact For Return 'of· Lord Mayor' was being worked out 
-. between: moderates and the- Left as part of the overall 
package for the former's support for the Council 
leadership. On 24 May 1988 the paper was able to report 
the 'Return of the Lord Mayor' with an editorial welcoming 




foolish enough to attempt to abolish an institution that 
had been established by a medieval Royal Charter. 
i (b). The rates rebel 1 ion 
The Left had to face up to the consequences of its 
manifesto commitment to a 'no ifs, no buts, no cuts' 
administration by refusing to set a rate. MEN reported the 
decision in a suitably dramatic fashion with headlines 
such as 'City ready to defy the law' (21.1.85>; 'City 
gathers forces to fight Thatcher cuts' (18.1.8SH 'City is 
ready for rates battle' <1.2.85>1 'City is set for rate 
rebellion' (7.3.85) J 'Huge Cost of Rates Revolt' 
(19.3.85); 'Labour set for rates in-fight' (20.3.85). An 
editorial, 'The cap will have to fit' (7.3.85) noted that 
the 'whiff of rebellion is in the air' with Labour 
councils throughout England getting ready to challenge the 
government and with dreary resignation added 'inevitably, 
the Left dominated City council in Manchester 1s among 
them' • 
After the decision of the Left not to set a rate was 
ratified, MEN warned the Left about playing political 
games which could 'threaten the bankruptcy of a Qreat and 
proud City' and reminded them that 
The council has a 
make the city a 
do all in its 
(8.3.85). 
solemn responsibility not only to 
proper place, ~n which to live, but to 
power to invigorate the community 
This was followed by another Armaggedon type editorial 
'Tonight's the night' (22.3.85) which whilst conceding 
~that· . the"'"Left::':'~"had '''''gover'ned - Manchester in a competent' ,-" 
manner, demanded, in relation to its refusal to set the 
rate, that 'council leaders must grow up and act for the 
good of the city'. When a rate was finally set, an 
editorial, 'Good sense prevails' (1.4.85) d~scribed the 
• o. 
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decision as a victory for common sense over the ~fatuous 
self defeating stance~ of the Left 
Had the hard Left stuck to their guns and refused to 
set a rate they would have made fools of themselves and 
would have put the well being of a great city in 
jeopardy. 
The fiscal crises of 1987 and 1988 were reported in a 
similar manner and when the Left was finally forced to 
compromise with the moderates of the Labour Party to get 
their proposals through, an editorial 'Working Together' 
(29.1.88) argued that the Left should have realized that 
its unpopular ~loony' schemes would eventually have to be 
jettisoned. As a consequence of the compromise it argued 
that 'the Labour group will be more representative of the 
views of the voters of the city'. 
ii. Defending the interests of the community 
It is worth reiterating that when the Left took control of 
the council in Manchester, MEN warned in an editorial that 
it would monitor whether the council would represent the 
interests of Manchester 'or those of the minority clique 
after their own political ends' (16.5.8~:)). Since the 1984 
manifesto promised to implement structures and policies 
facilitate equal opportunities with the 
facilitating the representation and 
of previously unrepresented and non-




council was representing in terms of the allocation of 
scarce resources and recruitment practices, le, those who 
did not fit into MEN's conception of the community. 
The paper"~~pr'e'3'sed:' 'its :'c6ncern that the Left' 'was'·'" ,.;, -. 
conducting a purge both against moderate councillors and 
senior council officers. A consistent theme in the 
reporting of internal council politics was that since the 
Left had come to power it was behaving in a vindictive 
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manner towards its political opponents, particularly 
moderate Labour councillors. Considerable coverage was 
given to the complaints of the moderates that the Left had 
broken with tradition in refusing reconciliation with its 
opponents and was instead conducting a witch hunt. Such 
allegations were accompanied by headlines such as 'Wrath 
of the Labour Left' (8.5.85); 'Council mods on the mat'; 
'Mods stay out in the cold by one vote' (16.5.85) and 
"Mean' Labour are rapped' (2.7.85) 
Labour moderates have been summoned to attend a 'Star 
Chamber session' by Left wingers on Manchester City 
council 
Such reporting of the malevolent Left also extended to 
reports of a conspiracy to remove local moderate MPs who 
were opposed to extremism. Thus internal reselection 
struggles were reported under headlines such as 'Left wing 
threat to oust MP Alf' (10.4.85), 'Left challenges 
Kaufman' (1.5.85) and 'Kaufman safe after Left threat' 
(13.5.85) • 
This conspiracy also extended to high profile coverage of 
allegations that senior council officials were being 
singled out for harassment by the victorious Left. 'Forced 
to quit row' (10.11.84) 'Forced out by the Left wing 
regime in the Town Hall' (10.11.84" 'Bitter end to top 
career' <12.1.85), 'I was victim of pub plot' (31.1.8:5>1 
'Another ,chief quits' key job' ·(22.7.85) was how the 
allegations were reported. All the resignation and early 
retirement stories were placed within the context of the 
previous ones emphasizing that it was because these 
~0;officials were _opposed to the'new poliCies the Left was 
introducing that they were being forced out. 
This purging was placed in the context of the recruitment 
for posts in the new units created by the Council. There 
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was constant coverage ('Row over £28,000 city post P ; 
'Essay is a farce' (11. 10.85) J 'Town Hall 'jobs for the 
boys' row' (19.2.85) ) of opposition allegations that not 
only were the Left appointing their own people but also 
outsiders as opposed to Mancunians. Such allegations were 
linked to opposition claims that ratepayers' money was 
being wasted on support for 'loony Left' groupings and 
that the Town Hall was 'Bulging at the seams' (19.7.85) 
whilst the wishes of other sections of the community were 
being ignored. Opposition parties' outrage at the 
financial support of the Left for the setting up of an 
Equal Opportunity Unit, at the decision to make Manchester 
a nuclear free city and to twin it with towns in East 
Germany and Nicaragua was reported in full. 'Labour Backs 
Aid To Rebels' (14.1.86) was how the proposal of the 
Council to give financial support to the rebel councils of 
Liverpool and Lambeth was announced. 'Broadside at War 
Party' (13.2.86) attacked, via the Conservatives, the 
council's proposed celebrations to commemorate the Spanish 
Civil War. The headline 'IRA link growsl Labour plans to 
twin with Sinn Fein City' (8.2.88) announced the proposals 
to twin Manchester with Derry. 
In focusing on the new appointments by the council, 
particularly critical attention was paid to the policies 
of the Council in relation to gays in Manchester. What can 
only be described as a homophobic campaign was conducted 
by MEN against what it saw as the Left's support for 
homosexuality. The headlines, 'City grant to gays raised 
by £4,~OO' (26.6.84) and 'More help for gays' (5.7.84) 
were accompanied-with reports that despite 'fierce Tory 
OPposition' the Council had decided to give more financial 
support to homosexual groups. Prominence was given to a 
Conservative councillor who claimed that Manchester was 
becoming 'another Sodom and Gomorrah' and that 'decent 
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people were being driven out' oi the city (5.7.84). 'Gay? 
The job could be yours' (23.10.84) 
people applying ior jobs on a council's new equal 
opportunities unit could be disqualiiied ••• unless they 
are homosexual (23.10.84). 
The headlines, "City prisoner of the gays' (8.11.84), 
'£140-a week ior lesbian worker' (22.11.84). 'Gays bac:k 
sex roles move' (30.1.85) J "Gay bias bl ast at Left' 
(7.2.85) were iollowed by a complete ieature about a 
moderate Labour councillor complaining about the Left's 
attitude towards gays promising that he would not "let the 
Leit turn Manchester into a gay city like San Francisco' 
(8.2.85) • 
The idea that the Left was turning Manchester into a gay 
city became a constant theme of MEN's reporting with 
headlines such as "Alarm over city haven for gays' 
. (22.2.85) J "City's gays run into thousands'" <1.3.8S) 
Manchester is to open its doors to homeless gay couples 
- sparking iears that the city will be invaded by 
homosexuals (22.2.8S). 
This theme appeared at the same time as ~ was reporting 
the discovery oi the iirst AIDS cases in Manchester. On 2~ 
January 1985 iront page headlines reported that "The 
killer disease Aids has spread to Manchester' and this was 
fOllowed by regular reports on the spread of the virus to 
the city with probably one oi the most controversial 
headlines being "Gay plague fear sparks action' on ~ July 
1985.'The link between the stories was finally made in the 
. story, "Uproar Over Aids Haven" (3.3.88). 
This prioritizatt"on'of"marginal"'and dangerous' "loony Left' 
groupings, such as gays, was contrasted regularly with the 
treatment of other sections of the community. In fact in 
much of the reporting it was inferred that these marginal 
groupings were not of the community at all and that the 
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LeftPs support of them was at the expense of the whole 
community. Such themes were to the fore in the paper's 
coverage of the ban on military parades in the City as a 
result of it being made a nuclear free zone and the Left's 
promise to support peace groups in the city. ~ took up 
the claim that this meant that old soldiers would not be 
allowed their traditional commemoration march. The paper's 
normal coverage of the commemoration before the Left took 
over was through high profile dramatic montages with 
headl ines such as 'We Wi 11 Remember Them' (7.11. 81> 
This supposed prioritization of 
led to a direct confrontation 
peace groups by the Left 
with MEN in its role of 
representing the decent members 
campaign was mounted, utilizing 
images, against the attitude of the 







in two world wars to 
safeguard democracy. It was constantly reiterated that the 
decision of the council was an insult to those who had 
died. 'Carry on Marching' (29.6.84) was the headline that 
reported a MEN poll had shown that 88Y. of Mancunians 
supported the idea of allowing the old soldiers to parade. 
The headlines, 'Left shoot down RAF rescue bid' (~.7.84)' 
'CeciPs war on military ban' (10.7.84>1 'By the Left-
.fall out again' (23.2.85), 'Cruise crusade stunt slammed' 
<19;3.85) I 'Vete~~ns . snub peace march' (1~.3.85)' 'VE Day 
Uniform ban final insult' <1.5.8S) I 'Heroes outflank VE 
Day kill JOYs' <13.5. 85) left no one i ndoubt where MEN 
stood on the issue. This campaign continued with 'Cheers 
for the troops' (15.6.85) 
Crowds packed Manchester 
watch the Kings Regiment 
exercise its freedom of a 
council leaders have said 
City Council yesterday to 
dubbed Manchester's own-
city whose anti-nuclear 
the' army isn't welcome 
<15.6.86) • 
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Thus, MEN took on a very vigorous monitoring and 
campaigning role as the self appointed guardian and watch 
dog of community values. The paper took the position that 
the Left had not only somehow usurped power but was out to 
destroy the institutions of community pride and replace 
them with ones premised upon alien ideologies. There was 
also the suggestion that the Left had found it necessary 
to bring in outsiders literal. like themselves, to do this 
job since decent Mancunians would not co-operate with such 
plans. This was the reason why it was prioritizing the 
interests of groups that the paper did not see as being a 
legitimate part of the community. 
The reporting of the actions of the Left in control of 
Manchester was very different to the reporting of the 
Greater Manchester Council (GMC). There was very little 
critical coverage of the GMC because it was viewed by MEN 
as being under respectable Labour control as opposed to 
the hard Left. When it became apparent that the Council 
was going to be abolished MEN expressed severe 
reservations about the government's proposals. On 9 July 
1985 MEN asked 'What now?' in an editorial which was 
critical of the attitude of successive governments towards 
the metropolitan county councils and concluded that 
abolition could turn out to be a costly mistake. 
On 19 July 1985 a feature described how the GMC had 
enhanced the reputation and pride of the region. This was 
accompanied by an editorial, 'Lasting tribute', about the 
contribution that the GMC had made and how it had 'etched 
\"', ... ;,--;."" ." 'its name '"in -'the-local'.history books'. This positive'" -
reporting of the sensible and moderate policies and 
actions of the GMC stands in dramatic contrast to the 
constant criticism of the extremists who had taken control 
of Manchester Town Hall. The only committee of the GMC 
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that received considerable coverage and comment in the 
paper was the Police Authority. The conflict between the 
Authority and the Chief Constable made the front page 
headlines on numerous occasions and the shaping of that 
reporting can only be understood within the context of the 
above-mentioned role that MEN took in relation to 
safeguarding the community. It was this role that 
determined the reporting of policing matters in Manchester 
generally. 
b. MEN's defence of the protectors of the Community 
Given that crime, law breaking and disorder have a large 
part to play in local news stories it is hardly surprising 
that the custodians of law and order appear as paragons of 
virtue and the protectors of community values (see 
Chibnall, 19771 Hall, et al 19781 Cohen, 19801 Reiner, 
1985). Additionally, as a powerful local institution 
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) was accorded respect and 
courtesy. As emphasized in the opening discussion about 
the nature of the relationship between the media and 
'primary definers' the medi~ 
percieve some institutions as more important and hence 
more 'newsworthy' than others and they perpetuate that 
perception by locating themselves within or near those 
institutions (Negrine, 198916). 
This was not just because of the nature of the 
relationship between the journalists and the force but 
-
also because MEN was proud of the heroic deeds of the 
institution that protected the community. 
Headlines such as 'Naked Courage of Tower Block PC' 
• '. _..... ., .~, •. , ..... -, .' ~ ;. \'.4.... <-
(6.5.81) 'Our wonderful bobbies' <11.10.84) 11 "The boys in 
blue save the day' (18.5.84), 'Gentle arms of the law' 
(3.4.85) and "Magnificent 7 foil lager louts'(13.1.89) 
give an idea of the dramatic context within which policing 
matters were reported. As well as the stream of stories 
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about horrific acts of criminality, there were also ones 
relating to the heroic nature of policing and the dangers 
associated with the job of protecting the community. 
Editorials and features constantly affirmed the image of 
'the thin blue line' in maintaining order and keeping at 
bay those forces of evil that would engulf and destroy the 
community. 
The disturbances of 1981 and the 1984 coal dispute 
provided MEN with a torrent of dramatic images of chaos 
and disorder, and with bleeding police officers who had 
been attacked by 'the mob'. When Liverpool 8 e~ploded and 
Officers from the GMP were sent as reinforcements, the 
headlines were unequivocal in their support for the 
police. Headlines such as 'Police: CS gas was our only 
choice'; 'Terror of Toxteth'l 'My 4 hours Of Hell in Hate 
City' (all, 6.7.81) were accompanied by editorials 'Bloody 
face of Britain' (6.7.81) and 'Battle which must be won' 
(7.7.81), supporting the use of police and technology on 
the grounds that 
If the police should lose control, anarchy will reign 
and no city in Britain will be safe (7.7.81). 
When Moss Side erupted the news copy left ~othing to the 
imaginationl 'Looting Blitz in 
lost ••• from haven to ghetto', 
looting'; 'Crime orgy' (8.7.81)' 
Moss Side', 'Paradise 
'Hooligan army's orgy of 
'Guerilla war in Moss 
Side', 'Like a scene from Dante's 
Blind Fury' (9.7.81). Ph~tographs 
inferno" 'Streets of 
with 'thin blue line' 
captions appeared with editorials such as 'Law and Order' 
- ,.' 
(14.7.81) and 'Riots and the Police' (3.9.81) giving full 






go on the rampage, burning, looting and 
the forces .of law and order. what are our 
supposed to do withdraw and let anarchy 
take positive action to protect the rest of 
the community? (3.9.81). 
As a result of the controversy generated by the setting up 
of the Hytner Inquiry, MEN in an editorial (17.7.81) 
initially took the line that it was a waste of time and 
supported the City Council's demand for Scarman to conduct 
an investigation into the riots. The testimony of one 
witness received front page headlines in a manner not 
accorded to those critici~ing the policing of Moss Side. 
This particular witness agreed with the Chief Constable 
that there had been a conspiracy to start the riots and 
his evidence was headed 'The Fine Police Of Moss Side' 
(24.8.81). When the Hytner report was released, MEN 
concentrated on the fact that although the Hytner report 
stated that police-community relations in Moss Side were 
bad, it was complimentary to the Chief Constable and his 
approach to the policing of Moss Side. The headline 'New 
era dawning for police' was accompanied by an editorial 
'Bury the hatchet· (12.10.81) streSSing that all sections 
of the community had to work together with the police to 
ensure that further disturbances did not break out. 
Community leaders and representatives in Moss Side were 
also warned that they had a duty to keep 'their' people 
under control. 
During the coal dispute MEN took a similar position. 
Images and stories of police ca~ualties, 'PCs hurt in 
pithead battle· (9.11.84), 'Why bullies are out' 
(10.11.84), 'Pit petrol ~omb riot· C12.11.84)i 'Murder of 
a pit innocent' (30.11.84» were accompanied by editorials 
demanding that the government give extra resources to the 
'weary blue line' (10.1.85). In addition the 
responsibility for the violence was firmly placed with the 
leadership of the National Union of Mine Workers. 
Thus the base line for reporting police affairs, during 
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the period of this study, was that it was the one 
institution that stood between the community and barbarism 
The maintenance of law and order is of paramount 
importance to the vast majority of people in this 
country ••• We simply cannot afford to let the mobsters 
take over (Editorial: 14.6.85). 
Everyone knows the police have a difficult and often 
dangerous task to perform in protecting SOCiety from 
terrorists and other criminals (Editoriall 9.1.86). 
It is all too fashionable these days 
police force which carries out 
increasingly hazardous times. Those of 
the police for protection owe them an 
gratitude (Editorial: 6.1.89). 
the law of the land is sacrosanct. The 
anarchy (Editorial: 18.1.89). 
to criticize a 
its duties in 
us who look to 
immense debt of 
alternative is 
As a consequence stories of police malpractice were played 
down. Whilst there were reports of police deviance and 
criminality they were not emphasized and did not produce 
concerned editorials. Comment was usually absent unless it 
was about other police forces, eg, 'Bias, Bullying and 
Boozel Police's Own Report Shames the Met'. 'Met's Pride 
Shattered by a Hammer Blow' (18.11.83). The malpractice of 
officers of the GMP was explained by reference to the 
rotten apple theory of police deviance. There was no 
question of institutional explanations being utilized by 
the paper to make sense of such deviance. 
" " 
i.MEN and the Police Authority 
Another implication of the position of ~ concerning the 
police was that those who criticized the police or came 
"into conflict w"ith them received censorious coverage. 
~ImplicitlY since:-the police were of the community those 
who criticized the institution were defined as not being 
representative of the community, or indeed of the 
community. During the period of the most bitter rows 
between the Chief Constable and the Police Authority. this 
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was the manner in which the conflict was reported. MEN was 
sympathetic to the Chief Constable's claims that the 
Authority was attempting to control him politically in 
order to gain influence over GMP. There was also the 
inference that this particular GMe committee was 
controlled by extremists of the Party. 
~ also tended to argue that the conflict was the result 
of a personality clash between the Chair of the Authority 
and the Chief Constable. In this personality clash the 
Chief Constable, as one of Hall et ai's 'primary 
definers', had an unfair advantage. First, the fact that 
the Chief Constable was a local lad made good ensured 
MEN's deference and support. Second, the Chief Constable 
was the community representative in charge of safeguarding 
the community. This personalization also resulted in MEN 
referring to the GMP as the Chief Constable's force. There 
was continual reference to 'Jim's cops'. This provided the 
context within which the arguments between the Chief 
Constable and the Police Authority must be understood. The 
Police Authority, and particularly the Chair, was viewed 
as trying to interfere with the Chief Constable's force. 
When the Labour Party won the 1981 County Council 
elections, an editorial urged that the government set up 
an inquiry into the question of police accountability 
because it recognized that the relationship between the 
Chief Constable and the Police Authority would change. 
Concern was expressed about the implications of having a 
Labour controlled Police Authority which was committed to 
democratic "accountability of~the police. This'was the only' 
time in MEN's coverage of the conflict over the policing 
of Greater Manchester that an editorial or story was 
devoted to the issue in terms of accountability. Given 
MEN's concern it is not surprising that the resultant 
345 
conflict provided striking front page headlines and 
statements, eg, 'Anderton is warned: stay out of Politics' 
(9.5.81); 'Tighten grip on police, bid by watchdogs' 
(3.6.81); 'Riot Storm:Police Probe starts' (21.7.81); 
'Chief Slams Tribunal' (4.9.81>; 'Anderton crisis as 
council chi ef 1 ashes out' (1. 10.81), 'Leave poli ce alone-
Anderton~ (18.10.83); 'Who is boss? Police Storm' 
(7.1.84); 'Crisis talks on police budget' (11.1.84)' 
'Anderton 'snub' storm' (5.4.84); 'Anderton sticks to his 
guns' (20.7.84); 'Tough talking Anderton slams ••• Picket 
line terrorism' (27.6.84); 'Sacked: Rebel who backed 
Anderton' (27.7.84); 'Anderton's new clash' (8.9.84), 
'Anderton storm goes to the top'(6.10.84)1 'Don't 
prostitute the police pleads Jim' (7.6.85), 'Police chief 
lashes new law' (10.1.85); 'Sign 
J i m ' (8. 6. 85) • 
a pledge order to 
When MEN felt that the conflict had reached intolerable 
levels editorials would pronounce on the issue. Thus, when 
the Police Authority decided to abolish the Police Band 
MEN in 'Harsh notes over band' (9.1.94) presented very 
forthright views on the nature of the conflict 
What it bOils down to is yet another bust-up on the 
fundamental issue of who should control the police, the 
Chief Constable or the police committee. 
Also involved .is a clash of 
outspoken police chief and 
chairman, Mrs 6abrielle Cox, 
love lost. 
personalities between the 
t~e determined committee 
between whom there is no 
The editorial concluded that the 106 year old tradition 
was being threatened and that 'every effort must be made 
to~ensure.that the band plays· on'. As the row continued, 
MEN responded critically to the deciSion of the Labour 
group to remove a councillor who had voted against their 
decision. An editorial supported the rebel Labour 
councillor against the 'Left-dominated committee' 
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he had the temerity to abstain when the motion was 
carried by 13 votes to 11 - the only Labour councillor 
to defy the party whip. As a result, he has been sacked 
from the committee. That is democracy in Manchester, 
1984 (27. 7. 84) • 
Within the overall context of the reporting of police and 
community affairs in Manchester the conflict between the 
Chief Constable and the Police Authority was always likely 
to be reported in a manner which was supportive of the 
Chief Constable. 
ii. MEN and the Police Monitoring Committee 
Given that the majority of the conflict over policing in 
Manchester took place within the meetings of the Police 
Authority, MEN paid little attention to the setting up of 










that ~ would pay 
mum fights jail 
surrounding the 
attention to the 
smear· <14.7.84) J 
bashing row· <1.8.84), 'Check on 
'Reform or quit, Anderton told' 
U 9.10.84). 'Anger over cash for pol i ce probe· (20.10.84). 
The PMC began to provide MEN with a stream of 
controversial headlines both in terms of statements and 
actions it was making concerning the Chief Constable and 
the policing of Manchester, eg, 'City sleuths trail 
police' (29.5.85); '. 'Police tactics to be probed' 
(25.5.95). 'Anderton challenged over cuts' (28.5.85). 
Considerable coverage was given to the outrage of the 
Conservative and Liberal councillors over the setting up 
..... c.:::: OoL:the ... : in1..t1.a~~:ve. When the ~olict! Monitoring Unit (P~~P ... 
was set up, MEN reported that the new Head of Unit had 
'taken on the hottest job 1n Manchester' (11.2.85) because 
police officers and opposition councillors viewed it as, 
'police basher number One'. It was emphasized that 
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Conservative and Liberal councillors would be campaigning 
for the abolition o~ the PMC, eg, 'Fight to axe new police 
unit~ (22.2.85), 'Storm over Police groups'(22.2.86). This 
coverage o~ the outraged opposition was strengthened by 
the high profile give to comments by national politicians. 
'MP slams 'Watch' magazine' (25.2.86) reported that in the 
House of Commons Policewatch had been described as 'a 





for subversive campaigning~ (25.2.86). 
'Hurd slams Police Critics' <1.3.86) 
the Home Secretary had accused Labour 
Manchester of spreading malicious anti-
police propaganda 
I have been shocked and angered by vicious anti police 
propaganda spewed out by various hard Left controlled 
authorities by supposedly responsible members of the 
Labour Party 
The statements of the local and national opposition were 
,also given a high profile when the PMC/U decided to oppose 
neighbourhood watch being introduced 
Labour councillors stunned 
condemning popular Home Watch 
gathering exerCises, 
community leaders by 
groups as information 
MEN expressed concern that because of the extremist stance 
of the PMU on issues such as Policewatch and'neighbourhhod 
watch, Manchester was acquiring the unwelcome label of 
being an 'anti-police city. The .paper also blamed the 
conflict between the Chief Constable and the joint board 
on the fact that members of the PMC were Manchester's 
representatives on the new Police Authority. 
. :-'." 
'" 
Given the extremely hostile attitude of the paper to the 
PMC, MEN reported the imminent demise of the PMU in 
dramatic fashion. 'Mods want swift axe on police .team' 
(18.12.88) was the headline that announced the possibility 
that the PMU would be disbanded. This was followed by 
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'Police unit pledge as the axe looms' (22.12.87) and 
\ 
'City's pet unit axe is binding~(29.12.87), reporting that 
the Liberals were 'cock-a-hoop' with the decision. The 
headline, 'Axe poised over police watchdog' (23.3.88), 
announced the final demise of the police monitoring 
initiative in Manchester and 'City funds crime fight' 
(26.3.88) heralded the setting up of the Community Safety 
team to replace the 'controversial' Police Monitoring 
Committee. 
Thus, MEN had little difficulty in locating itself in 
relation to the arguments between the Chief Constable, the 
Police Authority and the PMC. However, there was one 
incident that took place during the course of this thesis 
that disrupted the normal pattern of the paper's reporting 
of policing matters in Greater Manchester. From the 
beginning MEN supported John Stalker, stating bluntly that 
the allegations 
ran a series of 
were 'totally 
exclusives in 
unwarranted' (26.8.86) and 
relation to the latest 
developments throughout. On the day that the Police 
Authority finally met to discuss the Sampson Report it ran 
an editorial 'End the Agony', demanding that the Police 
Authority 
should reject the recommendation of West Yorkshire 
Chief Constable Colin Sampson ••• they should issue him 
[Stalker] with a firm reprimand and allow him to return 
to work forthwith (22.8.86). 
MEN argued that the allegations amounted to 'minor 
misdemeanors' and that there were very few senior police 
officers in Britain who would emerge with a clean slate if 
they had been _subjected to a similar the type of 
investigation. When it was announced that Stalker had been 
cleared by the Police Authority, the paper ran an 
editorial on 'Anderton and Stalker' expressing its 
'delight that John Stalker is back at his desk' (26.8.86). 
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This editorial was highly critical of the Sampson inquiry 
the attitude of James Anderton stating that ·His conduct 
before and since the inquiry got under way has left much 
to be desired'. The paper claimed that the Chief Constable 
had ·continued to humiliate his deputy» and that whilst 
Stalker had shown ·immense dignity and fortitude 
throughout' the Chief Constable had acted 
shamefully'. This editorial ended by noting that the 
Constable was to become head of Association of 




Members of this prestigious body might well question 
whether he has behaved in a manner which deserves such 
a high honour. 
On the 18 December 1986 the front page was devoted to 
Stalker's decision to resign from GMP. It was reported 
that this decision would plunge GMP into crisis once again 
since there were rumours of deep splits within the senior 
ranks of the GMP. This was followed by an editorial 
·Enough is enough' (22.12.86) which reviewed John 
Stalker's career and downfall. MEN blamed the Chief 
Constable for bringing about the situation because of his 
response to the reinstatement of Stalker 
His gOing is to be greatly regretted. And the saddest 
aspect of the whole sorry affair is that it was totally 
unnecessary (22.12.86). 
As indicated the paper expressed concern about the impact 
. 
of the affair on force morale and on 29 December 1986 
there was one of the most forthright reports, ·Police in 
criSis', about a crisis of confidence within the GMP and 
in relation to the leadership of the Chief Constable. 
No ,sooner had the Stalker affair quietened down than MEN 
had to deal with the Chief Constable's controversial 
comments on AIDS made during a speech on 11 December 1986 
and subsequent comments on Radio 4 on 18 January 1986. 
This prompted another editorial, ·Prophet Jim', which 
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stated that although he was entitled to his beliefs he had 
gone too far this time in his 'implacable stance'. ~ 
made it clear that the Chief Constable had been rebuked by 
the Bishop of Manchester, had caused a row within the 
Police Federation and 'even those within his own force who 
have rushed to defend him are becoming increasingly 
embarrassed by his dogmatism'. It also took a swipe at his 
Supposed Christian beliefs 
for a man so committed to using his 
instrument of God's judgement, Mr Anderton 
lack one important Christian virtue 
compassion. 
job as an 
appears to 
that of 
He certainly did not allow compassion to cloud his 
judgement of those suffering from Aids and he displayed 
precious little of this quality in his dealings with 
his deputy, John Stalker. 
Extensive coverage was given to the criticisms of the 
Chief Constable with front page headlines such as 
'Anderton under fire' <19.1.87,. 'Anderton called to 
crisis talk' (20.1.87) and 'Anderton the Martyr?' 
(21.1.87). A main article was devoted to the question 
'Should Jim go? You have your say' (21.1.87) 
Jim Anderton should go - that was the gut reaction of 
many people on the streets of Manchester today ••• The 
Manchester Evening News chose people at random, and 
most of them said Greater Manchester's police chief 
should quit now. 
There was constant reference to 'the beleaguered Chief 
Constable' and to the fact that ·he had pulled out of a 
public engagement involving the visit of Royalty to 
Manchester in order not to 'subject Her Royal Highness to 
any embarrassment' because of the 'huge amount of Press 
.-",.::.and:;mediavinterest in him in the wake.of his 'controversial;' 
Aids speech' (21.1.87). MEN emphasized that it was not 
just the Left wingers of the PMC who were,fiercely 
critical of the Chief Constable but that 
the Chairman of the Police Authority, eoun. Steve 
Murphy, regarded as a Labour moderate, has already told 
~. -, 
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Mr Andertcn to shut up or go (21.1.87). 
It was also stated, referring to the rifts causEj by the 
Stalker Affair, that his own force was not prepared to 
continue to give unconditional support to their Chief 
Constable. One senior officer was quoted as saying 'we 
rally around him, but then he knocks his own wickets over 
in another row' (21.1.87), 
As a consequence, according to MEN, Anderton was isolated 
and had become 'a solitary figure who does not discuss his 
innermost problems' mainly because without John Stalker 
there was 'no longer a shoulder to lean on' (21.1.87). 
During the subsequent meetings at the Home Office to 
resolve the crisis surrounding the Chief Constable's 
statements, considerable coverage was given to those 
respectable members of the community who were advising the 
Chief Constable to take a lower profile. Under the 
headline 'Police urge; Cool it Jim', (26.1.87) it was 
reported that ACPO was concerned about the negative 
publicity the Chief Constable's comments had aroused as 
, 
well as the ridicule of the officers of GMP. This was 
reiterated in the accompanying editorial which stated that 
Anderton's role in the Stalker Affair, his Aids speeches 
and the 'constant battles with his Police Authority have 
given the force a high profile it could well do without'. 
MEN argued that he should 'conce~trate his considerable 
talents on halting the soaring crime rate in Greater 
Manchester'. However, this editorial also criticized the 
'less than diplomatic' comments made by certain left wing 
members of the Police Authority, warning both sides that 
.... : .•• ; .... ~ •. , .. '.... I·.".· ........ " , ..... ,.-' .. ".. - .• ',., ...... • ... rf""-.~~· ... :-
Language like t"his helps no":one and it is imperative 
that Mr Anderton and those who seek to control his 
words and his deeds, curb their tongues if public 
respect is to be retained (26.1.87). 
The paper also gave extensive coverage to the Chief 
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Constable's controversial interview to Woman's Own in 
which he supported flogging. Editorials, particularly 'The 
Lord's Voice' (14.12.87;) stated that he was continuing to 
embarrass the force and that the 'public would prefer him 
to concentrate on policing rather than pontificating' This 
upset the Chief Constable so much that he gave his tape 
recordings of the interview to the paper to prove that his 
views had been distorted. 
Thus, MEN's 
Constable and 
position in relation to the GMP, the Chief 
the policing of Manchester was clearly 
the Stalker Affair and the aftermath of the tested by 
Chief Constable's AIDs speeches. It supported Stalker 
openly against the Chief Constable and in relation to the 
AIDs controversy definitely pushed 
Anderton in the interests of the 
for the silencing of 
community and the GMP. 
This was the key point for MEN. It had constantly defended 
Anderton, as the chief officer of a central community 
institution, from attacks by the Left but it could no 
longer do so when his actions and words seemingly 
endangered that institution. 
There are two other interconnected reasons why MEN 
withdrew its support from the Chief Constable over, and 
after, the Stalker Affair. First, respectable members of 
the local community and national politicians, ie, other 
'primary definers' were decidedly unhappy with what they 
viewed as the conspiracy to remove John Stalker from his 
investigations. Therefore, MEN had to take into account 
the fact that it was not just the 'loony left' of the PMC 
or the POlice Authority who were asking awkward questions. 
Second, the Affair not only brought negative attention 
upon the GMP but also upon other key local institutions 
and individuals. In doing so it opened the proverbial can 
of worms. The 'establishment' in Manchester came under 
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intense scrutiny during the 
allegations made concerning the 
Freemasons and the criminal 
Stalker Affair because of 
Conservative Party, the 
connections of the local 
business elite (see Taylor 1987). Thus, the community 
institutions and respectable Mancunians to which MEN as a 
matter of course gave its support were suddenly surrounded 
by decidedly unsavoury allegations. Under such 
Circumstances MEN took on its role as protector of the 
local interest. It is notable that as soon as the Chief 
Constable ceased to bring controversy to local 
institutions MEN once more offered him protection from his 
critics. 
Alternative Newspaper Representation of the Community 
a. Alternative community representation on politics 
What is rarely documented in studies of the media are 
attempts to set up alternatives to challenge the dominant 
forms/means of information dissemination. If all sections 
of the community are to have equal representation of their 
interests, the proviSion of such alternatives is crucial 
because of how their interests are distorted, manipulated 
and hence defined out by the dominant media forms. The 
only alternative media representation to MEN 1n Manchester 
before the elections of 1984 was City Life, an independent 
magazine concerned with all aspects of llfe 1n Manchester. 
This magazine continually monitored the actions of 
council, the police and MEN as well as reporting on local 
scandals and controversies. It was broadly' sympathetic to 
the policies' of the new Council, including the setting up 
t'':~~\·''''~~·-'J' . -.:, -of ,the PMC. However, 'City Life eventually met the fate of 
all independent alternative under funded publications 1n 
it was taken over by MEN. 
It was precisely because of the antiCipated attitude of 
. .: ~ 
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MEN, and to a degree City Life, towards the Left of the 
Labour Party that the new Council immediately made plans 
to produce its own magazine, The Manchester Magazine. This 
magazine was to be part of the new strategy not only to 
involve but also bring about the participation of the 
community in the work of the Council. In justifying the 
setting up of the new publication the council argued that 
Manchester needs a magazine that strives to serve the 
whole community (Sept 1984:3). 
The magazine enabled the council to explain its policies 
and to provide an alternative to the possible 
sensationalist and negative coverage such policies would 
receive in MEN. As such the magazine had a series of roles 
to play. First, features explained the Council·s 













government policies. Second, it provided information about 
where to contact councillors, where and when meetings were 
taking place, how to claim benefits and how to make 
complaints. Third, it gave space to various community 
groups and interests to use the magazine to publicize 
their own events and meetings and to explain their 
Position on pertinent issues. Thus, the magazine gave 
consistent representation to those under/non-represented 
groups and 1 ssues that 1 t sal d '1 t woul d represent in the 
manifesto. It also meant that these section5 of the 
community were getting a chance to put their case in a 
manner which MEN would not allow. The general idea 
conveyed by the magazine was that Manchester was a 
heterogeneous'commun1ty"and that all sections had'a 'right' , .... 
to have their vlews represented. This was directly 
Opposite to the notion of community utilized and 
represented by MEN. 
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The new magazine not only met with a degree of scepticism 
from MEN but it also generated a reactionary alternative 
in the form of Citywatch, which was produced by the 
Conservative Party. It was stressed that this was a 
alternative to the propaganda pumped out by the Labour 
Council. Citywatch argued that hard line Marxists from 
outside of Manchester had 'stolen the Labour Party's 
clothing' and taken control of the Council. As a result it 
was claimed that the Council had grossly misrepresented 
central government policies, destroyed Manchester's civic 
traditions and financed a series of 'mad cap schemes'. 








interests of lesbians, 
women and the disabled' 
The magazine stressed that the 'totalitarian Eastern 
European style administration' in charge of the council 
would bring rack and ruin to Manchester. What was most 
striking about Cltywatch was its close resemblance to MEN 
in its portrayal of what had happened in Manchester since 
the Left had taken over. Thus, the setting up, by the 
Council, of a magazine to provide alternative definitions 
of reality resulted in another alternative magazine being 
launched to reinforce dominant definitions of that 
reality. 
b. Alternative community representation on policing 
This process also happened in relation to the struggle 
over the dissemination of information concerning policing 
issues in Manchester. As documented, the PMC decided that 
if it was to reclaim the agenda on policing in Manchester 
it was necessary to produce an alternative to MEN. 
Throughout discussions about what format of this magazine 
should take, it was emphasized that, unlike the GLC's 
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Policing London, it should be a 'people's paper', going to 
every household in Manchester and that in doing so 
its function will be to draw a wider community into 
policing matters and the policing debate (Proposed work 
programme:6). 
To this end its role was also to 'contribute much to 
improving the community's knowledge and understanding of 
policing issues' (Revenue Development Proposals (17.1.86). 
Given the community that the PMC/U was supposed to be 
representing Policewatch reTlected those community 
priorities and concerns and hoped for their participation 
Your experiences of how you are policed and your 
thoughts and ideas on how it can be improved are of 
interest to us and the Police Monitoring Committee and 
the Policewatch magazine can be your voice. (No 11 Feb 
1986) 
It was made clear that Policewatch would monitor and 
adjudge policing practices and policie~ in Manchester on 
the premise that 
all groups no matter what their background, ethnic 
origin or sexual orientation receive the same policinQ 
(Policing Manchester the need for a bulletin 
(31.10.85). 
There were three aspects to this role. First, it had .n 
explanatory role in relation to demonstrating .why the 
PMC/U was set up and what its policies were. Second, it 
; 
had an educative role explaining about developments in 
policing and developments in the the law through the 
inclusion of material on legal rights, the structure of 
po1i~e governance, crime levels etc. Finally, it had the 
role of faCilitating the representation and participation 
of those groups who were subject to unsatisfactory 
- policing practices. Hence, there were articles on the 
poliCing of the black people, the policing of women, the 
policing of young people, the policing of Irish in 
Manchester, the Battle of Brittan and its aftermath and 
the Stalker Affair. Policewatch had an uncompromisingly 
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aggressive approach to its monitoring role, particularly 
in relation to its coverage of the aftermath of the Battle 
of Brittan and the Stalker Affair. 
As a consequence, it is no surprise that the bulletin was 
singled out as a prime e~ample of 'loony Left' propaganda, 
particularly since representatives of the PMC gained 
national prominence and constant media coverage during the 
Stalker Affair. The considerable pressure that was brought 
to bear upon the 'scurrilous' publication has already been 
documented and provides an indication of how alternative 
forms of informationl dissemination can e~pect to be 
received. The pressure that was e~erted upon the PMC and 
the magazine meant that Policewatch went through subtle 
but significant changes. Its logo changed from the initial 
'Working for an accountable police force' to the assertive 
'Working for a democratically controlled police force' to 
a weaker'Working for democratic control of the police' 
finally to the vague 'Working for democratic policing and 
a safer Manchester'. Its last issues reflected the change 
from its monitoring of the police role to its more 
e~pansive concern with community safety of which 
monitoring the police was only a part. However, this 
change could not save it from abolition in December 1987. 
In the same way that .the setting up of an alternative to 
MEN by the Council resulted in the setting up of an 
alternative to the Council's publication, ~o the setting 
up of Policewatch as an alternative to ~ resulted in the 
setting up by the Police Authority of the alternative 
Community Liaison. Thus, in addition to haVing to counter 
MEN, Policewatch had also to counter a direct 
alternative. Despite all the negative coverage given to 
the Police Authority in its conflict with the Chief 
Constable, the former did not produce an alternative 
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newsletter attempting to explain its position. It was only 
when the Community Liaison Office (CLO) reviewed the 
future of the community liaison structures that producing 
a bulletin for the CLPs was suggested. A variety of 
reasons can be put forward as to why this idea was adopted 
by the Authority. First, it was to be part of the process 
of strengthening communication and links between the 
various panels and the Police Authority. Second, it was to 
allow a means of communication between the panels and the 
community. Third, it became imperative to counteract the 
anti-community liaison position being pushed by the PMC in 
Policewatch. This latter concern was the reason why there 
was considerable attention paid to upgrading the format of 
the newsletter after the first very dour issue was 
produced. Thus, the newsletter was to be the means whereby 
news concerning the initiative was communicated to other 
panels and therefore the community 
It is very much YOUR newsletter ••• to be written BY 
panel members FOR panel members (Issue 110ct 198516). 
In keeping with the notion of community representation and 
partiCipation it was distributed not to the community 
directly but to community representatives, community 
organizations, and libraries. It specifically reported on 
the work of the panels, community initiatives in crime 
prevention, new government, GMP and Police Authority 
policies and proposals. There was little coverage of 
policing issues and no mention of controversial ones such 
as the Battle of Brittan or the Stalker Affair. The 
differences between Community Liaison and Policewatch 1s 
L·o. ~'~L~ summed up~by the former's logo, 'Police and People Working 
Together'. Any critical comments made by Community Liaison 
were addressed to the anti-community liaison stance of 
Manchester City Council. In Issue 8 of Community Liaison 
reported that the Council had decided to disestablish its 
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'controversial' anti-police magazine Policewatch. With the 
abolition of its rival in following issues Community 
Liaison was able to report that CLPs were finally being 
set up in Manchester. 
Discussion 
Part V of this thesis has attempted to document the two 
key roles that MEN played in conveying information about 
political changes in Manchester between 1981-1985. The 
first role that the paper played was in the delineatation 
and affirmation of community boundaries. This was achieved 
through constantly reproducing what Hall et al., (1978154) 
have described as 'maps of meaning' through which people 
living in Manchester'could make events intelligible. This 
constant mapping powerfully defined which groups and 
which were interests were of the community and 
consequence it reaffirmed which groups and 
represented 
allocation of 
not. As a 
interests 
(traditional ones) should 
government's policy decisions 
The second role that the paper 
of community institutions. It 
be in local 
and resources. 
played was as the defender 
is within this context that 
we can understand its hostile attitude towards those who 
were critical of GMP. MEN took this role to its logical 
conclusion when it thought that the Chief Constable by hi5 
statements and actions was threatening the good name of 
GMP and therefore the community. It showed no hesitation 
in launching a campaign to silence' the Chief Constable and 
in doing so was making clear that community institutions, 
and therfore -the community, were more important than 
individuals. 
This part of the thesis has also documented the fate of 
attempts to provide alternative interpretations of events 
in Manchester. Such alternatives not only faced 
considerable criticism from MEN but also spawned counter-
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alternatives directly attacking them. As such the counter-
alternatives bolstered the dominant interpretation of 
reality provided by MEN. Such criticism and attack, again, 
made it clear which community interests issues and groups 
had a right to have their views represented and which did 
not. In doing further confirmation was provided about who 
was of the community and who was not. The differences 
between the alternative conceptions of community were 
demonstrated in the conclusions, made public in December 
1987, of a MORI poll commissioned by the Council to assess 
what the community thought about the Council and its 
publications, The Manchester Magazine and Policewatch. The 
poll showed that 40% used MEN for finding out about 
council affairs as opposed to 24% who used the Council's 
publications. The poll also found that dissatisfaction 
with the policies of the council was highest amongst men, 
older people, the middle class, owner occupiers and white 
people whereas dissatisfaction was least amongst women, 
council tenants, ethnic minorities and the young. Of those 
polled 55% wanted less in Council's publications about 
gays and lesbians and 39% wanted less about ethnic 
minorities. MEN commented enthusiastically that the poll 
was a vindication of its position in relation to the 
policies of Manchester City Council. For the purposes of 
this thesis there could be no clearer breakdown of the 
community represented by MEN and the community represented 
by the Council's publications. It was the latter community 
who lost their voice and means of communication and 
information when the pressure brought to bear upon the 
Council resulted in the decision to disestablish its 
"publ'ic:att-ons. - Onc:e more the interests of the powerless and 
dispossessed were defined out of the structures of 
representation. 
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PART VI: CONCLUSION 
This thesis has attempted to chronicle the struggle by 
Greater Manchester Police Authority and Manchester City 
Council Labour 
accountability in 
Central to that 
competing models 
and participation 
of both models was 
representation to 
councils to bring about police 
Manchester between 1981 and 1988. 
struggle was the setting up of two 
to facilitate community representation 
in policing matters. The principle aim 
to create structures that would give 
the interests of those sections of the 
community in conflict with the police. However, as has 
been documented, the models developed in such a way so as 
to give representation to sections of the community other 
than those they were set up to represent. In order to 
explain how and why this has happened it has been argued 
that it is first, necessary to understand the 
problematical nature of the concepts, ie, community, 
representation and participation, upon which the models 
were premised and second, necessary to understand how 
demands for rights of representation and participation 
have been dealt with by the British state. 
The first section of the thesis identified the theoretical 
and structural problems that have to be confronted by 
those who demand that the police- be made democratically 
accountable to the community. Theoretically, it has been 
argued that demands premised upon the concepts of 
community, representation and partiCipation are 
! ~.~, .,intrinsically problematical. With regard to community, it 
• , .,' .w ., _,~" ,... '. ~. , ___ • ~ 
has to be recognized that there is no homogeneous 
community but stratification and differentiation systems 
based upon class, gender, race and age making conflicting 
demands with no necessary overlap or correspondence of 
interests. It has also to be acknowledged that groups are 
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further differentiated in terms of their position in 
hierarchies of power and knowledge. Given the existence of 
such hierarchies the key question is whether it is 
possible to 
participation 
facilitate community representation and 
that does justice to all the competing 
interests and claims. Central to this is the question of 
whether it is possible to redress structural power 
imbalances not just between the powerful and the powerless 
but also between more or less powerless groups. 
In relation to representation 







representation of the whole community, and if it is not 
how does one chose community representation that does 
justice to all sections of the community and will be 
recognized by the community as legitimate. If one does not 
address this issue, participation will be seriously 
jeopardized. Finally there is the problem of whether it is 
Possible to create structures that bring about the active 
and meaningful participation of the whole community. It is 
only through active and meaningful participation in micro 
structures and situations that there is any possibility of 
people becoming aware of their true interests and needs. 
In order to do this power inequalities, dominant 
ideologies and the possibility of the interests of the 
powerless being marginalized must be neutralized. These 
are the necessary conditions for the participation of the 
powerless • 
• • r •• , 
, ..... ,'; :.-:, .~. 
Structurally, it has been argued throughout this thesis 
that the British state has dealt with demands for rights 
of democratic representation and participation in a three 
fold manner. First, there has been the construction of 
democratic rights of citizenship, premised upon the notion 
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af representation. The mass of British society was 
eventually endowed with individual political and legal 
rights which could be exercised within a highly structured 
and hierarchical constitutional structure. Demands for 
radical participatory forms of democracy were defeated, as 
were demands for fundamental changes in the hierarchies of 
power/powerlessness. Therefore, a process of ~defining 
out· and 'defining in· of interests has been 
characteristic of how the state has dealt with demands for 
democratic rights. At the same time as formal 
representative rights were conceded, a concurring process 
of de-democratization took place with principal areas of 
decision-making being removed from the possibility of 
being democratically accountable to the enfranchised 
masses. 
It has been argued that in the post-war era the 
development of corporatist forms of governance resulted in 
the further evisceration of democracy. The consequence was 
that formal rights of representation in the social 
democratic state became virtually meaningless for certain 
sections of British society as powerful interests ensured 
that their interests were prioritized in the non-
democratic arrangements. Hence, it is possible to detect 
the process of the 'defining out' and 'defining in' of 
interests. As a consequence by' the end of the 1960s a 
crisis of democracy and more specifically a crisis of 
representation and participation was identified. This 
important conjuncture furnished another example of how the 
:" c:·~:·British .. state. ~defined in' 
community participation and 
and 'defined out' demands for 
representation. Supplemental 
non-democratic community based structures were created to 
give representation to the interests of the powerless. 
However, through acting upon social diVisions such 
structures contained and channelled moderate community 
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demands whilst radical participatory ones, which demanded 
changes in the distribution of power, were defined out. 
The third process identified in the state's response to 
demands for the extension of democratic rights, involved 
the coercive policing of 
were identified in the 
such demands. Two key processes 
historical analysis of poliCing 
that provide particular problems for those 
democratization of this institution. 
demanding the 
First, certain 
marginal sections of the community have never had their 
interests represented in or by policing arrangements. On 
the contrary these sections have been the very object of 
policing, constituting 'police property' and even the 
truces negotiated between respectable sections of the 
working classes and the police have not covered these 
marginal groupings. It is no coincidence that they are 
also the sections of the community whose rights of 
citizenship either have not been clearly established or, 
because of the structural inequalities that exist in 
British SOCiety, are substantively meaningless. The second 
process that compounds the problems created by the first 
one, concerns the interests that the police represent. It 
is a central argument of this thesis that as the police 
assumed the role of representing the interests of the 
state, steps were taken to remove 
the possibility of democratic 
exercised. The consequences of 
marginal groupings is that their 
this institution from 
accountability being 
both processes for the 
interests have always 
been formally and substantlvely excluded from all' 
-·-~-settlements concerning policework; 
The criSis in democracy and crisis in policing that 
developed in Britain in the post-war period were 
heightened by the emergence of an increasingly 
authoritarian state form, from 1974 onwards. The election 
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of a radical right administration in 1979, committed to 
the prioritization of rights of economic representation 
and participation, resulted in the dramatic restructuring 
of the edifice of citizenship, further de-democratization 
of British society and the police being empowered in order 
to contain the consequences of whole communities being 
politically and economically 'defined out· by the changes. 
When the group that was subject most intensely to the 
resultant marginalization and policing processes revolted 
in 1980 and 1981 the issue of democratic representation 
and participation in policing matters reached the 
political agenda. However, as in the 1960s and 1970s, 
Supplemental non-democratic structures of community 
representation were introduced to supposedly provide 
forums for the improvement of police-community relations. 
Given that there was no change in the structure of police 
accountability such structures were effectively powerless. 
The key issues concerning the consultation structures were 
what community interests would find representation in 
these powerless structures and which sections of the 
community would participate in them (see Marshall, 1982, 
Atkins and Rutherford, 1983; Morgan and Maggs, 19841 1985. 
Morgan, 1986; 1987; 1988) Would it be the economically and 
Politically marginallzed black youths who were at war with 
the police on the streets of Britain·s ghettoes? These 
were the concerns that governed the analysis of the 
struggle over police accountability in Manchester after 
the disturbances of 1981 and the setting up of two 
alternative models that were supposed to facilitate the 
,,~epresenta.tion~,of.~' the interests of those in conflict' with'''' 
the police. 
The Police Authorlty.s model had two components. First, 
the Police Authority attempted to call the Chief Constable 
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to account through utilizing the 1964 Police Act and 
through strengthening its organizational structure. As a 
consequence, it was hoped that not only would the 
Authority have a greater input into policing matters but 
would also begin to set the agenda for how the community 
should be policed. However, given the position of the Home 
Office and the overall context of the authoritarian state, 
the Chief Constable vanquished all attempts to make him 
accountable. 
It was within this context of their own powerlessness to 
call the Chief Constable to account that the Police 
Authority introduced a liaison model which was supposed to 
empower the community. However, this model had serious 
defects. First, the Home Office guidelines, directing the 
model, limited the purpose of consultation to crime 
control and enshrined the operational independence of the 
police. And second, in terms of the conceptualization of 
the issues of community, representation and participation 
referred to above, there were also serious limitations. 
The analysis of this model has illustrated the 
difficulties of using a model which prioritizes the 
representation of the whole community. A series of 
problems have been identified. First. the Police Authority 
appointed as the representative qf the black community 
someone whose appointment had been opposed by those 
sections of the community in conflict with the police in 
Moss Side. Given that the Hytner Inquiry had specif~cally 
counselled against appointing someone who did not enjoy 
the full confidence of these sections of the community. 
this was a serious weakness. Second, the multi-agency and 
reformist philosophy underpinning ,the ,work of the CLO, and 
enshrined in the Home Office guidelines, confirmed his 
unrepresentative status. Third, whilst the CLO was trying 
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to alleviate community concerns, the controversial 
policing of Moss Side~ and the statements o~ the Chief 
Constable, did not change. This demonstrated first, that 
the CLO and the Police Authority were completely powerless 
in relation to effecting change in the policing of Moss 
Side and second, that black interests could not be 
represented with the proposed community liaison 
structures. As a consequence people in Moss Side, despite 
extensive exhortations~ declined to participate in the 
powerless liaison initiative~ not least because the Police 
Authority had ignored their wishes on the subject in the 
~irst place. 
It was within this context of the widespread refusal o~ 
the section of the community for whom model I was meant 
to participate in it, that other sections o~ the community 
achieved representation. CLPs were set up in communities 
throughout Greater Manchester which were not in conflict 
with the police. However, even in the operation of these 
non-con~lictual CLPs there were still problems o~ 
non/under participationl representation generated by this 
model of community representation. 
First, there was no recognition that there were power 
inequalities between the disparate groups that were given 
equal representation. Second, there was no recognition 
that certain sections of the community did not have formal 
community representatives. Third, there was no recognition 
of the problematical nature of the representativeness of 
many Of. these community groups and individuals. Fourth, 
rights of representation were given to community groups 
and representatives who had no necessary relevance to the 
discussions of the CLPs. Finally, GMP, the Police 
Authority and the local council were given a privileged 
status in that they enjoyed statutory rights of automatic 
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representation, despite what 
representatives might think. 
the other community 
Model I also tightly controlled and limited participation. 
First, the participation of the community was limited to 
their being able to contribute at the end of the highly 
formal CLP meetings. Second, the 
community representatives was mobilized 
opposed to being a spontaneous or 
Specifically, their participation was 
participation of 
by the powerful as 
voluntary decision. 
mobilized for the 
purpose of helping the police to control crime. Third, the 
partiCipation of the community representatives was limited 
by the structured terms of reference. Fourth, the CLP 
meetings were, situations of partial participation with 
power residing firmly with the police representatives who 
had their operational autonomy enshrined in the terms of 
reference and who kept control of the information and 
knowledge that would have been a pre-condition for an open 
discussion about policing. Hence, the initial phase of 
model I facilitated the over-representation/participation 
of white, middle aged, respectable males who accepted the 
limited terms of reference of the CLPs. As a consequence, 
the manner in which issues of community, representation 
and partiCipation had been dealt with, reproduced the 
e~isting power inequalities 1n British SOCiety. 
Concerted efforts were made 





minorities, ... young people. and women. However, to bring 
,.'-"abol,lt·.·· .. thei r.·~ ",parti ci pat1 on the· .. CLO . persi sted -:. . ..,i th 
homogenizing supplemental structures of representation, 
based on the notion of the whole community of ethnic 
minorities, the . whole community of young people and the 
whole co~~~nity of women. 
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Within the initial operation of this model one section of 
the community began to have their interests prioritized. 
The non/under-representation of women was given the most 
attention by the CLO and the Police Authority. However, 
the all-encompassing format of structured representation 
~ailed to give recognition to the fact that first, there 
are racial and class inequalities between womenPs groups 
and second, that certain women's groups articulate 
dominant ideologies and interpretations of reality. As a 
consequence the interests of those powerless womenPs 
groups who challenged dominant ideologies concerning women 
and policing were defined out. Thus, not only did the 
original structure of community representation reproduce 
the existing power inequalities and social divisions but 
the supplemental structures, set up to counter-balance 
those inequalities and provide justice to all interests, 
reproduced further divisions between respectable women and 
disreputable women. As a consequence, the interests of 
those in conflict with the police were once more 
marginalized and "defined out P by the representative 
structures. 
It was in response to the unrepresentativeness of model 1 
and the powerlessness of the Police Authority that a PMC 
was set up in 1984 by . Manchester City Council with the 
remit of representing the interests of those sections of 
. the community in conflict with the police. This model 
initially. utilized very different notions of community, 
represelJ.tation:and participation •. The PMC did Q.Q.t utilize .... 
the notion of the whole community as there was the 
recognition that there were certain marginal sections 
within the 'community whose interests needed to be 
prioritized in terms of the unaccountable policing they 
were subject to. Thus, there was the crUCial acceptance of 
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the claims of marginal groups that, in terms of police-
community relations, the police were the cause of the 
problems. Hence, the stress was on the setting up of 
structures that would ~acilitate the participation of the 
under/non-represented sections of the community. It was 
emphasized that there should be voluntary, spontaneous and 
active participation with community groups setting their 
own agendas. There was also recognition of the issue of 
the power imbalances that existed between different groups 
and interests. In theory, the PMC was to take on the role 
of empowering the powerless sections of the community and 
neutralizing the power imbalances. This was to be achieved 
by nullifying the political opposition, blocking all 
attempts to set up model I in Manchester and holding the 
Chief Constable to account for discriminatory policing 
practices. Furthermore, through the commitment to set up a 
research and development unit (PMU) and publish a magazine 
there was also recognition of the need to challenge the 
Chief Constable's monopolization of knowledge and 
information about how Manchester was policed. 
Thus, the fundamental problematical Issues concerning 
community, representation and partiCipation were, in 
theory, addressed by the first deliberations of the PMC. 
,However, there were problems with the proposed PMC 
i~itiative. First, the PMC had no statutory powers to call 
the Chief Constable to account for the manner in which 
marginalized groups were policed. Therefore, although it 
wa~ attempting to empower those sections thePMC, like the 
I , 
,Police.AutborLty,.was effectively powerles9 i~relation to 
how Manchester was policed. Second, this initiative was 
still a 'top-down' initiative, located within heavily 
bureaucratic and hierarchical Labour Party and Council 
struct'ures. Third,' the Labour Party assumed the role of 
being the representative of those under/non represented 
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groups and interests. Those groups and interests were in 
many ways just as alienated from the Labour Party and 
Manchester City Council as they were from the GMP. Fourth, 
there were different ideas within the PMC, and Party, as 
to the role that the PMGs would play when they were set 
up. It was hoped that the PMGs would harness support for 
the Party and the Council. It is within this context that 
the hope was expressed that the 
the idea of a multiplicity 
PMC was working towards 
of community based PMGs, 
notion of the Labour Party premised on the geographical 
ward structure. The danger with such a plan was that the 
model of police monitoring was being used for a purpose it 
was not meant for. Finally, there was the assumption that 
the different under/non-represented groups and interests 
in the community conceptualized their problems in the same 
manner as the PMC and therefore viewed PMGs as a solution 
to their problems. 
Such problems manifested themselves in the first attempts 
by the PMU to set up its model in Manchester. Traditional 
Labour voting white communities began to demand that their 
interests be repr~sented by the PMC/U. Therefore, under 
political pressure the PMU was expected to encourage, in 
addition to issue based ones, community based PMGs. The 
PMU found communities who wanted something to be done 
about crime. This meant that they did not necessarily want 
PMGs, or indeed CLPs. Once more, the difficulties of 
allowing the whole community representation were 
illustrated. 
By 1985 the struggles taking place in Manchester 
concerning police accountability were effected by national 
developments. First, the confrontation between the 
authoritarian state and local institutions of government 
was finally resolved. Legislative coercion was used to 
bring problematical local 
control. As part of 
Authorities were finally 
political representation 
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authorities under central 
the restructuring the Police 
abolished with new forms of 
and tighter central control 
imposed. The implications of these changes for those 
struggling for democratic accountability were profound. 
Second, the overall impact of the emergence of a powerful 
discourse on community and crime was three-fold for those 
campaigning for police accountability within the Labour 
Party. First, it made them vulnerable to the accusation of 
being anti-police. The practical implications for local 
authorities who were at the forefront of campaigning for 
police accountability and fundamentally opposed to such 
corporatist community policing approaches to crime 
prevention were serious. Non-cooperation was ideologically 
and financially damaging, particularly in a climate when 
local authorities were under constant attack from central 
government. Second, it made them vulnerable to those 
sections of the Labour Party, both locally and nationally, 
who alleged that an anti-police stance was an electoral 
liability. Third, they had to confront the issues of crime 
prevention, the fear of crime and the mobilization- of the 
community by the government to actively participate in a 
co-ordinated fight against crime. As a consequence, 
considerable pressure . was brought to bear on local 
authorities to participate directly in multi-agency crime 
prevention projects. This pressure also meant that 
policies and . p~oposals concerned with police 
. __ .... account.abi li ty, .. ,.and. priori tizing ... the --. concerns .~ ·of . those 
sections of the community for whom the police were a 
problem were being 'defined out'. 
Significant changes occurred in the two models of 
community representation and participation between 1985-
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1988. In addition to changing the form of political 
representation on the Police Authorities, the central 
state's powers over policing arrangements were enhanced. 
Thus, the Authorities suffered further disempowerment and 
in the intense conflict that took place before and 
immediately after the change over, the campaign to call 
the Chief Constable to account was finally neutralized. 
A professional Community Relations Unit replaced the 
Community Liaison Officer and there were further changes 
to the community interests that were represented within 
model I. The CRU discarded the community representative 
work of the CLO. As a consequence, the interests of black 
people were not part of the CRU's terms of reference. 
Moreover, unlike the CLO, the CRU prioritized the issue of 
crime prevention and the issues relating to police 
accountability were 'defined out'. 
The CRU did attempt to take a more active approach in the 
attempt to resolve the problems of the under/non-
representation of certain sections of the community. 
However, the fundamental problems of this representative 
model were compounded by the CRU's efforts. The attempts 
to involve young people resulted in the participation of 
those respectable young people for whom the police were 
not a problem. Therefore, the representativeness of the 
youth representatives was open to question. There were 
corresponding problems with the CRU's endeavors to 
facilitate .the representation of women's interests. The 
,.~~.", •. ,. '·~·;';"''''Z';''''Z CRUdi d. not -address- the -power ~." 1 mbal ances and 1 deol ogi cal--
divisions of interest that existed between women. By 
continuing to give equal representation to all women, the 
CRU mobilized respectable women's groups who articulated 
dominant ideologies and this resulted in the non-
partiCipation of women's groups who questioned such 
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ideologies. Thus, even though the interests of women were 
prioritized it was only the interests of certain women and 
only in a particular manner. 
As a consequence, the representative model continued to 
iacilitate the interests of those respectable sections of 
the community not in conflict with the police. Within the 
operation of this model a process of defining in/out, 
inclusion/exclusion and prioritization/marginalization has 
been identified. The conclusion would seem to be that 
giving all sections of the community rights ef 
representation within structures concerned with majority 
interests leads to the systematic non-representation and 
non-participation of powerless and marginal sections of 
the community. This is particularly ironic given that the 
original principle behind community liaison in Greater 
Manchester, was to enable the representation and 
participation of the powerless and the marginal sections 
of the community who were in conflict with the police. 
Even though, in theory, the PMC attempted to address the 
key issues that model I did not, events conspired to make 
sure that it was also marginallzed and defined' out. A 
series of pressures resulted in the reorientation of the 
work of the PMC/PMU. The' increaSing political 
vulnerability ef its campaign for police accountability, 
the emergence of the issue of crime prevention, its 
,consultations with the whole community and the increasing 
concern about women's safety resulted in a considerable 
" -;---." ,- ,':',-:::-'.,::-- shi ft ':1 n -', the':"~··communi ty ""<interests' that the.' PMC/PMU . 
represented. As a result, the electorally unpopular 
campaign to represent those sections of the community 1n 
conflict with the police was replaced by the electorally 
popular community safety campaign. Consequently, the 
marginalization of the interests of those sections of the 
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community subject to unaccountable policing practices 
occurred. In effect, as a result of the changes within the 
PMC/PMU, there was a considerable overlap between the work 
of the Community Safety Unit and the Community Relations 
Unit and the community interests represented within that 
work. Most signi~icantly, the boundaries defining who were 
and who were not of the community were reaffirmed. As a 
consequence, in addition to being marginalized within 
model I, the interests of those for whom policing was a 
problem finally disappeared off the political agenda in 
Manchester. Such was the intense hostility mobilized 
against the efforts of the PMC to represent the interests 
of the marginalized that model 11 was also replaced by a 
Community Safety Unit. 
Central to the mobilization against efforts to give 
representation of the under/non-represented was the local 
newspaper, the Manchester Evening News. Through its 
delineation and affirmation of community boundaries there 
~as the constant mapping of which groups and interests 
were of the community and which were not. As a 
consequence, it reaffirmed which groups and interests 
should be represented in decision making. In addition as 
the defender of community institutions, ~ was hostile to 
those who were critical of GMP. By.definition such critics 
~ere not of the community. This part of the thesis has 
also documented the fate of attempts to provide 
alternative interpretations of events in Manchester. Such 
alt~rnatives not only . __ .f~ced.oconsider,able_criticism. from 
MEN .but also spawned "'cou'~'t'er-alternatives directly 
attacking them. As such the counter-alternatives bolstered 
the dominant interpretation of reality provided by~. 
Such criticism and attack, again, made it clear which 
community interests issues and groups had a right to have 
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their views represented and which did not. Those subject 
to the consequences of unaccountable policing practices 
lost their voice and means of communication and 
information when the pressure brought to bear upon 
Manchester City Council resulted in the decision to 
disestablish its publications. Once more the interests of 
the powerless and dispossessed had been 'defined out·. 
The theme running through this thesis has been how 
dominant ideologies and practices constantly 'define out' 
and marginalize the interests of the powerless. And once 
marginalized they become the routine objective of police 
work. Thus, a vicious circle is created and recreated and, 
as this thesis has documented, given e~isting social 
arrangements the problem is insoluble. A situation has 
been created in Britain today where the processes of 
marginalization have resulted in the powerless, as in the 
first half of the nineteenth century, having only one 
means of expressing their discontent. When they riot 
against their exclusion they face the full force of the 
police. In this moment both the marginalized and the 
police fulfil their historic roles, the former's status as 
police property is confirmed and the symbiotic 
relationship between the police and the respectable 
community is reinforced. In her last speech as Chair of 
the Police Authority Gay Cox stated 
Many of us represent inner-City constituencies where 
unemployment and poverty have brought real pain and 
despair to thousands of people. We record the dignity 
. and courage with which they bear evils which are not of 
.-' ," "'. I ;,.-; ~., ·d •• their making, ,', but which . 'are . indictments of a rich 
SOCiety unwilling to share its riches. We cannot 
believe that the answers to the frustrations bred In 
young people in such situations should be to meet them 
with plastic bullets. Such action wouldcreat. an 
unparalleled anger, bitterness and violence which no 
short-term tactical advantage could possibly 
justify ••• We are not prepared to see two-nation 
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policing, with the inner cities becoming the subject of 
'township policing' (20.3.86). 
Until the issues of community, representation and 
participation raised by this thesis are addressed township 
policing methods will be needed to contain the anger and 
frustration of those who are subject to such 
marginalization processes. If such issues are not given 
serious consideration I would argue that attempts to set 
up models that are supposed to improve relations between 
the police and the policed, to paraphrase the Chair of the 
Greater Manchester Police Authority, will have as much 
success as 'spitting in the wind'. 
~ . 
. , ... , 
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGICAL NOTES 
Maurice Punch (1986: 15) has stated that researchers 
utilizing qualitative research methods still have a 
professional duty to state, how and where the data was 
collected, how reliable and valid is it, what successive 
interpretations have been placed upon it, what was the 
nature of the relationship between the researcher and the 
field setting and what was the nature of the relationship 
between the researcher and the subjects of inquiry. In 
this appendix I will attempt to address these issues, if 
not exactly in this order. 
This research project was conceived of one year before it 
was registered for a Ph.D. and it owes its origins to my 
becoming involved in the debates concerning police 
accountability in Manchester after the summer of 1981. As 
a consequence of an invitation I came into contact with 
Youth and Allied Workers Police Monitoring Group (YAWPMG), 
whiCh was in its formative period and based in Moss Side. 
I subsequently became a part of that group with everyone 
being made aware of the fact that I was carrying out 
research on the policing of Manchester. In the beginning I 
thought that the object of the research could be this 
group, ie, documenting and ana~yzing the workings of a 
poli~e m6nitoring group that w~s involved in defending the 
community from the police. Consequently, I took meticulous 
notes of the meetings of this group and spent a great deal 
of time analyzing group,constructing attendance profiles, 
mak~ng the connections between this group and other 
community groups 
with the issues 
partiCipation. To 
in the area and seeing how they dealt 
of community, representation and 
this end I thought that I had reached 
achieved a radical action research situation because I was 
in a POSition not just to research but to also influence 
and aid YAWPMG in its campaign for police accountability. 
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The work of the group forced me to face the issues 
concerning qualitative research that I had previously only 
read. First, I found myself more interested in the 
campaigning work of the YAWPMG than the research. Second, 
I had to confront the issue of who would benefit from this 
research. Documenting the inner dynamics of YAWPMG was not 
gOing to benefit the group because by the time the 
research was finished the group would most likely have 
ceased to exist in that form. Neither was it going to 
provide a blue print on how to set up/not set up your own 
police monitoring group because, as the PMC found out, 
police monitoring groups cannot be set up according to a 
format. In reality the only organization that the research 
could possibly be of interest to was the GMP. The Chief 
Constable repeatedly asserted that YAWPMG were a central 
part of the conspiracy to undermine the authority of hi~ 
force in Manchester. In many senses, my documentation of 
the work of the group, profiles of the people involved and 
the campaigning strategies it utilized, if read in a 
particular manner, would have given SUbstance to his 
allegations. Throughout the period of my research 1 also 
came across a whole range of other groups, individuals and 
organizations working either directly or indirectly on 
policing issues in Manchester and I worked with two other 
groups involved in the debates. Once more I had to face 
the ethical issue of documenting and divulolng the work of 
such groupings. 
This issue also had relevance to the area where many of 
these groupings were based. I quickly became aware that 
people in Moss Side were not prepared to be used as the 
'research farm' for the nearby institutions of higher 
education. Repeatedly the complaint was made that the 
researchers came and went but the conditions of the people 
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did not change. Indeed for certain people the connections 
between power/knowledge and social control were clear. ·he 
object of such research was to collate informati" to 
formulate more effective methods of ~ocial control. This 
issue reached a head with the ESRC funded 'Flashooints' 
project that was located within Manchester University. The 
word went out that there was to be no co-operation with 
the researcher on this project and, despite claims to the 
contrary, from my understanding that call was heeded (see 
Parry, Moyser and Wagstaffe, 1987). Moss Side showed 
itself, as it did throughout the course of this study, to 
be capable of defending its own interests. Thus, the 
reader will find little reference to the work and 
considerable influence of YAWPMG in the debate on police 
accountability in Manchester. This is also true of the 
dynamics of community politics in Moss Side and other 
parts of Manchester. There are few of the 'vignettes' of 
community life that liberally splice qualitative research 
- in many senses the reader is reading an edited te~t and 
I make no apology for the fact. 
As a consequence of my having to confront these issues I 
refocussed my research upon the Police Authority to 
analyze how the ruling Labour group was attempting to 
implement its promise to facilitate more community 
representation and partiCipation in decisions relatinQ to 
the policing of Manchester. This took me into contact with 
the CLO and his unsuccessful attempts to set up a CLP in 
Moss Side. Attending these meetings gave me the first real 
- ----.insight..1nto ..... how.easy ~it was to utilize rhetoricAlly.the 
. 
concepts of community, representation and partiCipation 
and how difficult it was to actually realize such a 
Situation. The community in Moss Side refused to 
partiCipate in the consultative structures. I received 






Authority even though they had more important things to be 
thinking about. 
Fortunately. ior this research the Left of the Labour 
Party iinally took control of the City Council after the 
1984 local elections with a commitment to setting up a 
police monitoring initiative as an alternative to 
community liaison. As a consequence, the issue of the 
democratic accountability of the GMP was placed on the 
~ormal political agenda. This provided an almost perfect 
research situation because there were in e~istence in 
Manchester two distinctive models with the stated shared 
aim oi attempting to bring about community representation 
and partiCipation in policing matters. Through my 
connections I was allowed access to the various meetings 
oi the councillors mandated to set up their initiative and 
was able to monitor. with the cooperation of the members 
oi the PMU, the dilemmas, problems and the PMC/PMU faced. 
At the same time being a member of YAWPMG allowed me to 
monitor the impact of the initiative on the ground. The 
real difficulty was in keeping track of the different 
meetings that were taking place. This was no easy process 
especially when issues relating to the policing of 
Manchester necessitated my presence at other meetings. 
To complicate matters even more when the CLO resigned the 
ruling Labour group decided to appoint a CRU to first, 
service the panels that were in operation everywhere but 
_.~~nchester and second,.introducethem into Manchester. The 
consequence of having two full time professionalized units 
dealing with policing matters 1n terms of the amount of 
work they generated was 
great temptation to 
elsewhere in Greater 
staggering. Although there was a 
analyze what the CRU was doing 
Manchester it simply was not 
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possible. In this sense my empirical data on the community 
liaison initiative has primarily related to Manchester and 
once again I was given access to the relevant 
documentation. I may be critized for this limitation but I 
did not feel it was possible to do anything else. In any 
case the police monitoring initiative only related to 
Manchester. The only area that I wish that I had paid more 
attention to is Tameside, where the council also opposed 
community liaison. 
By the summer of 1985 I felt that I had enough material to 
write ten theses on police accountability in Manchester 
and in September 1985 I moved to Hong Kong. I felt that 
the research had been completed and that the move would 
force me to disengage fully and allow the writing up to 
begin. Fortunately, through friends and colleagues I was 
able to keep up with the dramatic developments in 
Manchester that resulted from the aftermath of the 
abolition of the Police Authority, the Battle of Brittan, 
the case of John Stalker and the Chief Constable's 
speeches on Aids. Such developments necessitated the 
constant revision of what my thoughts were on the issue of 
police accountability in Manchester. During the summer of 
1986 when I returned to Manchester, given the 
controversies and developments, I encountered a sense of 
confusion, disillusionment'and fear amongst those working 
on the issues of police accountability. Martin Walker's 
book With Extreme Prejudice conveys precisely the 
atmosphere that I encountered. What exactly had the 
demands for. police accountatility in Manchester unleashed? 
No sooner had I started to attempt to make sense of these 
disturbing developemnts than it all began to change again. 
What was becoming apparent was that police monitoring was 
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becoming politically' too hot to handle' and the dramatic 
impact of the rise of the discourse on community and crime 
meant that although my thesis was essentially correct the 
consequences for the police monitoring initiative were all 
too depressingly obvious. In one sense it was a great 
relief to me when the PMC/PMU was abolished as it meant 
that I had a definitive cut-off date. From that time I 
have attempted to examine and reexamine every piece of 
data collected from the struggle to further police 
accountability in Manchester. 8ecause of this re-
examination process and because of the deliberate editing 
out of the background political work that I was party to 
this is only one version of what happened in Manchester 
between 1981 and 1988. However, hopefully this version 
still conveys the intensity of the struggle that took 
place. 
. .~ ............... ' ............... , ... ,,' ,-
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